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The aim of this thes~s is to examine the idea of spontaneous 
order as it appears in the c1assicalliberal tradition of political 
thought. It will be argued that spontaneous order thought represents 
a distinctive approach to social theory; and the aim of the study will 
be to identify its core principles and to develop a conceptual model 
of the approach based upon them. To this end the study will 
examine a series of thematically linked topics in the work of the two 
groups of major exponents of the approach: the Scottish 
Enlightenment and the Twentieth Century Classical Liberal Revival. 
The examination of these topics - science, morality, law and 
government, and the market - will enable us to identity the common 
elements that characterise a spontaneous order approach. 
It will be argued that the spontaneous order approach operates 
with a particular notion of human nature: that men are classificatory 
beings who seek order and stability of expectations, and yet who are 
capable of only limited knowledge of the complex world in which 
they exist. Habitual and non-deliberative behaviour playa central 
role in this model of human behaviour, as does the assertion that 
men are naturally sociable and socialised within traditions of 
behaviour. Such traditio~s of behaviour exemplify the non-
deliberative imitation of conventionally generated practices: in this 
sense 'objective' social values are in reality inter-subjectively 
generated conventions. Such conventions are neither deliberately 
nor intentionally created, but rather arise as the unintended 
consequences of man's adaptation to his circumstances. This leads 
the exponents of spontaneous order to adopt conjectural history and 
functionalist analyses as 'a means of understanding the development 
of social conventions. The study will trace their conjectural 
histories of morality, language, law and government, demonstrating 
the application of spontaneous order as a neutral descriptive 
approach to the examination of social phenomena, 
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Similarly the process of social change and development will be 
examined as an evolutionary process. The role of adaptive change 
will be discussed in the light of a notion of immanent criticism that 
is itself drawn from the conjectural history of the evolution of 
human knowledge. Throughout this analysis a particular stress will 
be laid on the significance of the distinctive view of epistemology 
that underlies the spontaneous order approach. It will then be 
argued that the 'Invisible Hand' of Adam Smith is to be found in the 
evolution of institutions and prl\ctices which allow the efficient use 
of dispersed knowledge through mutual interaction and co-
ordination. Such views will then be considered as a possible 
instrumental justification of liberalism and freedom. 
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Section One: Introduction 
Chapter 1: Spontaneous Order in Liberal Political Thought 
'All nature is connected; and the world itself consists of parts, which, like 
the stones of an arch, mutually support and are supported 
This order of things consists of movements, which, in a state of 
counteraction and apparent disturbance, mutually regulate and balance 
one another. ' 
4 
(Ferguson 1973 vol. 1 : 18). 
The aim of this thesis is to clarify with some precision the meaning of 
the term spontaneous order. It will be argued that spontaneous order 
thought represents a distinctive approach to social theory; and the aim of the 
study will be to identify its core principles and to develop a conceptual 
model of this approach. By identifying the key features of a spontaneous 
order argument as they appear in the work of the two most significant 
groups of spontaneous order theorists - the Scottish Enlightenment and the 
Twentieth Century Classical Liberal Revival- we will build a composite 
.. 
model of the application of the approach to the explanation of science, 
morality, law and government and the market. The analysis will concentrate 
on spontaneous order as a descriptive approach to social theory rather than 
as an offshoot of attempts to justify liberal principles. As a result it will be 
demonstrated that the use of spontaneous order as a descriptive approach 
distinguishes a particular branch of liberal thought. 
The notion of spontaneous order has appeared at various times down 
the centuries and has been applied in a variety of academic disciplines: 
spontaneous order inspired arguments can be found in the fields of Biology, 
Science, Epistemology, Language, Economics, History, Law, Theology, 
Sociology, Anthropology and even recently in Management Studies and 
Computing. However this study will focus on its appearance in what may be 
broadly referred to as Social and Political Theory. This field, though it to a 
certain extent embraces elements of many of the above - Epistemology, 
Language, Economics, History and Law - is nonetheless more focused on 
the application of a spontaneous order approach to social and political 
interaction. Though Economics and economists loom large in our study, 
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and in most discussions of the notion of spontaneous order, the aim is to 
concentrate on what they have to say about the political theory of 
spontaneous orders. That is, we will consider the market, often taken to be 
the paradigmatic example of a spontaneous order, as one social phenomenon 
among others and not purely' as an economic model. For this reason our 
analysis will begin by examining the application of the approach in the field 
of science. 
Liberalism, it may be observed, is a broad church: it is a term which has 
come to have a variety of meanings. and which is claimed by groups who 
hold radically differing views. Our subject matter is spontaneous order in 
liberal political thought and, before we commence, it is necessary to make 
clear exactly where within the broad church of liberalism these ideas appear. 
The first distinction we might usefully make is between the use of the term 
'liberal' as it is traditionally understood in the history of political thought, 
and its use in the United States as a description of a particular political 
position. A liberal, in this American sense, is what in Europe might be called 
a social democrat; liberalism.in America has become a term that refers, 
particularly, to the left-leaning intelligentsia within the Democratic party. 
More likely than not the cold war context of American politics rendered 
terms such as socialist and social democrat unpalatable to the majority of the 
population and so, in their stead, the term liberal was adopted to 
'camouflage' (Hayek 1967: 222; 1988: 110) a policy platform which was 
essentially the same as that advanced by the social democratic movements in 
other western countries. We are not then talking about liberalism in this 
sense. Hayek, in his Why I am not a Conservative, argues that 'liberal', as a 
descriptive term, is no longer accurate as a result of this development. It 
does not refer to the same set of ideas as once it did, and the popularity of 
this new meaning in the United States makes its use misguiding. What 
instead we are concerned with is what has come to be known as Classical 
Liberalism. 
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A second distinction should be made at this point: that is between 
Anglo-American and Continental liberalism (polanyi 1951: 94).1 This 
distinction broadly follows that between the philosophical traditions that 
Popper identifies as British Empiricist and Continental Rationalist (popper 
1989: 4). The thinkers of the spontaneous order tradition take great pains to 
emphasise this distinction (Hayek 1979: 360; 1960: 55-57; Oakeshott 1991: 
138). They argue that the Cartesian influenced constructivist rationalism 
[see below] of the Continental school's methodology sharply distinguishes it 
from the Anglo-American tradition of empirical, analytical liberalism (Hayek 
1967: 94, 99; 1978: 5). Spontaneous order theorists identify themselves 
with the Anglo-American philosophical approach to liberalism, and expend 
considerable energy in a critique of continental rationalist thought. 
Spontaneous order theories occur within Anglo-American Classical 
Liberal thought. 2 There is however a further distinction which might be 
drawn to specify the position of spontaneous order thought within 
liberalism: that is a distinction between what Gissurarson, following 
Buchanan (Gissurarson 1987: 155-56; Buchanan 1977: 38), typifies as 
American Libertarianism and European Classical Liberalism. The 
distinguishing feature here is the rights based contractarian approach of 
Libertarianism in contrast to the evolutionary gradualism of Classical 
Liberalism.3 The contrast arises from the evolved nature of European 
liberalism, as opposed to the intentional constitution building of American 
Libertarianism. This distinction leads Gissurarson to place spontaneous 
order thought within a tradit~on that he refers to as 'conservative liberalism' 
(Gissurarson 1987: 6; Gray 1986: ix).4 However given the distinctions 
1 Davie argues that this distinction is implicit in the work of Hume. He notes that Hume 
distinguishes between: 'a pragmatic attitude recognized as typically English, and an 
intellectualist attitude associated with France and tbe Continent' (Davie 1967: 29). 
:2 Leading Hayek to refer to himself as an 'old Whig' (Hayek 1960: 409). Sufrin believes 
that 'British Whiggery' is Hayek's ideal (Sufrin 1961: 202) and Monro notes that it is 
fossible to read Oakeshott as a 'libertarian Whig' (Monro 1974: 616). 
Examples of American Libertarian thought can be found in Narveson (1988), Hospers 
(1971) and Machan and Rasmussan (1995). 
4 Gissurarson lists the key aspects of conservative liberalism as 'spontaneous order', 
'anti-pragmatism', 'traditionalism'. 'evolutionism', and 'universalism' (Gissurarson 
1987: 11-13). Legutko however rejects the label of liberal conservative or conservative 
liberal as oxymoronic (Legutko 1997: 162): a view shared by Barry who points out that 
modem conservatism is descended from the Whig thought of Burke, in which case 
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which we have drawn thus far it would be more accurate to refer to 
spontaneous order thought as existing in a subset of liberalism which we 
might call British Whig Evolutionary Liberalism, a subset whose 
distinguishing characteristic, as we will demonstrate, is precisely its concern 
with the notion of the spontaneous formation of order. 
spontaneous order theorists are not mixing liberal and conservative tllOught but 
continuing the development ofthe Whig tradition (Barry 1979: 197). 
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Chapter 2: The Tradition 
Though we will not be undertaking a historical study, our aim being to 
clarify a 'model' of the spontaneous order approach, rather than to trace its 
historical development, it is necessary nonetheless to sketch briefly the 
history of the tradition in order that we might select the building blocks from 
which our model will rise. As we pass through the list chronologically it 
would appear best, for the sake of accuracy, to restrict our attention to those 
thinkers who express a significant spontaneous order theory in our chosen 
field of social and political theory. By limiting our attention in such a way 
we will be more able successfully to draw out the essential elements in a 
spontaneous order argument. With this in mind we may exclude from our 
study some of those to whom spontaneous order ideas have been attributed. 
In his article The Tradition of Spontaneous Order Norman Barry 
conducts a study ofthinkers whom; he believes, have utilised spontaneous 
order arguments through the centuries. This he claims, following on and 
building upon Hayek's views (Barry 1982: 12), represents the tradition of 
spontaneous order thinking. But if Barry's group of thinkers represent a 
tradition, then it is a tradition in a peculiar sense of the term. 5 That is to say 
a tradition is more usually considered as something that directly relates its 
members; something passed down from one exponent to another. Or as 
Condren would have it: 'At its most general, the term "tradition" refers to a 
chronological series, a sequence by virtue of certain continuities shared by 
5 For example, in chronological tenus the earliest author to whom ideas of spontaneous 
order have been attributed is the mythical Chinese Taoist sage Lao Tzu. Contemporary 
Libertarian and Classical Liberal commentators who are engaged in a kind of ancestor 
hunting have claimed Lao Tzu as an early Libertarian (Boaz 1997: 207; Machan and 
Rasmussan 1995: 4). 
While a careful reading of the central text of Lao Tzu's Taoism, the Tao te Ching. 
reveals a number of passages which could be interpreted as advancing spontaneous order 
and Libertarian ideas, [see Boaz's list (Boaz 1997: 208) and also sections 17, 19,32,42, 
48 and 57 (Lao Tzu 1997: 17. 19,33,45.51,60»). it is nonetheless highly unJikely that 
Taoism in any form influenced the development of ideas in the western intellectual 
tradition which produced liberalism [Though Oakeshott does cite him briefly (Oakeshott 
1991: 41 n.41)]. With this in mind it is doubtful whether an examination ofthe origins 
of the ideas that some modern Libertarians claim to share with Lao Tzu would benefit a 
history of the idea of spontaneous order which operates within a 'tradition' of spontaneous 
order thought. For the sake of clarity, and accuracy, it is best to centre our study on the 
tradition of western liberalism. 
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its members, transmitted from one to the other.' (Condren 1985: 63). This 
being the case the early members of the tradition to whom Hayek and Barry 
refer (the Spanish Schoolmen, Molina and Halet cannot really be considered 
as representing members of a tradition. Ifwe follow Quentin Skinner's 
criteria for attributing influence - 'Skinner sets down three simple conditions 
necessary for asserting an influential relationship between thinkers: (1) that 
there should be a "genuine similarity between the doctrines" of the writers; 
. 
(2) that the influenced writer could only have got the relevant doctrines from 
his alleged creditor; (3) that there should be a low probability of the 
similarities being coincidental'. (Condren 1985: 133, citing Skinner 1969: 
26) - we will see that, though similar ideas may recur in the work of each of 
these individuals or groups, it would be difficult, nay impossible, to trace 
with any accuracy the influences of these early writers who are credited with 
applying the spontaneous order approach upon each other. As Hayek's 
sketchy contentions in his article Dr Bernard Mandeville show (Hayek 
1984: 181-183) we simply lack the evidence to assert that the Spanish 
Schoolmen influenced Hale, who in turn influenced Mandeville.7 We have 
no real historical record, despite Hayek's best attempts, of such a connection 
except the recurrence of broadly similar or conceptually similar notions, and 
that, for the purposes of our study, does not constitute evidence enough to 
refer to them as members of a tradition.8 It is more accurate to refer to 
those early thinkers to whom Hayek and Barry attribute spontaneous order 
6 Norman Barry places the beginning of western ideas of spontaneous order in the work 
of the 'School of Salamanca', or wbat Hayek refers to as the 'Spanisb School men' (Hayek 
1993 voU: 170n. 8-9; Barry 1982: 12; Sturgis 1994: 23). 
The School men, writing between 1300 and 1600, are credited with the creation of a 
subjective theory of value that they applied to economics and in particular to money. In 
the writing of the Spanish Schoolmen there appeared the first conception of the idea of a 
self-regulating market based on the subjective valuation of goods (Hayek 1993 vol. I : 21). 
For a discussion of tile Schoolmen and their analysis of 'automatic equilibrating 
processes' see Hollander (1973: 27). This view, along with that of Bodin, would later be 
taken up by the Austrian School of economists of which Hayek was a member. 
Matthew Hale's support of the English Common Law system is referred to by Hayek as 
having influenced Mandeville and Hume (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 22), but Hayek fails to 
provide sufficient evidence of the relationship, or indeed of Hale having developed a 
significant spontaneous order approach, for him to be considered as a serious candidate 
for inclusion in the tradition. 
7 Hayek admits that 'The tracing of influences is the most treacherous ground in tbe 
history of thought... • (Hayek 1979: 358). . 
8 See Condren (1985: 65-66) and Popper (1972: 297-99), 
ideas as precursors of the tradition of spontaneous order. One other such 
figure whom we might consider in this light is Giambattista Vico. 
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Duncan Forbes and others have highlighted the conceptual similarities 
which may link Vico (1668-1744) to the tradition of spontaneous order 
(Forbes 1954: 658-9; Berlin 1980: 250-263; Nisbet 1980: 235-247; 
Cahnman 1980: 168-178; Dallmayr 1980: 199-215; and Goretti 1976: 213-
219). Forbes cites the evidence of Vi co's Scienza Nuova Seconda. and in 
particular refers to one passage as the 'locus classicus' (Forbes 1954: 658) of 
his concept of the 'Law of the Heterogeneity of Ends' . The passage in 
question has clear similarities with the Scots' use of what has come to be 
known as unintended consequences. It reads: 
'The world of nations is in fact a human creation .... Yet without a doubt 
this world was created by the mind of providence, which is often 
different, sometimes contrary, and always superior to the particular 
goals which people have set for themselves. Instead to preserve the 
human race on the earth, providence uses people's limited goals as a 
means of attaining greater ones. Thus, people seek to satisfy their 
bestial lust and abandon their offspring, but they establish the chastity of 
marriage, from which families arise. Fathers seek to exercise 
immoderate paternal authority over their clients, but they subject them 
to the civil powers which create cities. The ruling orders of the nobility 
seek to abuse their lordly freedom over the plebeians, but they become 
slaves to the laws which create popular liberty.' (Vico 1999: 489-90). 
Forbes though rejects any direct relationship of influence by Vico upon 
the Scottish Enlightenment on the grounds of a lack of historical evidence 
. 
(Forbes 1954: 658-59).9 Indeed Vico's concept of unintended 
consequences, though it bears conceptual similarities to the Scots', is 
separated from them by his constant appeal to divine providence (Goretti 
1976: 215-216). For Vico his Scienza Nuova represents a 'demonstration of 
what providence has wrought in history' (Vaughan 1972: 39), it establishes 
divine providence as 'historical fact' (Vico 1999: 127). Though his analysis 
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of the growth of political institutions is undertaken through an unintended 
consequences approach, it is also carried out under a strong conception of 
divine intervention through providence. According to Vico, because fallen 
Man is corrupt and selfish, t4e good which is produced by human 
institutions must be brought about by the actions of selfish men: 'Because of 
their corrupt nature, people are tyrannized by self-love, and so pursue their 
own advantage above all else' (Vico 1999: 125). As man gradually 
associates with others he extends the realms of his attention and places lesser 
degrees oflove on those with whom he interacts~ family, friends and 
eventually fellow citizens come to be part of man's self-love. Despite this 
gradual extension of interest ' ... the individual continues to love his own 
advantage above all else. Hence, it is by divine providence alone that the 
individual remains within these social orders ... ' (Vico 1999: 126). 
The key difference between the Scots' conception of unintended 
consequences and that deployed by Vico is precisely over this point. What 
Vico attributes to God's divine providence, is precisely that which the Scots 
seek to explain in secular so~iological terms. lO If indeed models of divine 
providence and arguments from design are to be held to have influenced the 
Scots, whether they accepted fully the role of a providential God or whether 
they simply.borrowed the model and then applied it to a secular social 
mechanism, we cannot, with any accuracy, trace this to Vico's writings. If 
religious models influenced the Scots it is far more likely that their 
conceptions of providence would be shaped by the historical context of 
Presbyterian Scotland (Allan 1993), or by the broader Enlightenment Deism 
of Europe. As Burke wrote, Vico 'is on the frontier between the theological 
and the secular interpretation of history' (Burke 1985: 61). The Scots, on 
the other hand, stand firmly on the secular side of this great transition and 
our tradition, if we are to seek historical accuracy, ought to begin on that 
side of the divide. In other words this leads us to Bernard Mandeville 
(1670-1733). 
9 Burke also rejects any direct relationship of influence betwecn Mandeville and Vico, 
arguing that, as Mandeville wrote in English [a language with which Vieo was 
unfamiliar], it is likely that his work escaped Vico's attention (Burke 1985: 60-61). 
10 See Part Two, Sections One and Four for evidcnce of the Scots' secular approach. 
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With Mandeville we are· able to start the tradition of spontaneous order 
at a point where we have some record of influence, or at least 
acknowledgement of influence, and where there are more definite grounds 
for using the terms influence and tradition. 11 Given that there is some 
reasonable certainty that successive thinkers have been familiar with the 
work of their predecessors, then it allows us to refer to historical record in 
order to postulate influences that more properly constitute a tradition. The 
accuracy of these claims with regard to the extent and nature of the influence 
may then be considered and debated as a matter both of historical record and 
of philosophical similarity. We are on safer ground if we follow a tradition 
of thought which begins with Mandeville whose work was clearly an 
influence on the thought of the Scottish Enlightenment. Aside from the fact 
that several of the Scots cite .him in their work, and attempt critiques of his 
views, we also have the evidence that one of Mandeville's chief critics, 
Francis Hutcheson, was a professor at Glasgow and a teacher of Smith. 
In recent years a debate has raged over Mandeville's position in the 
history of economic and political thought. Some, following Jacob Viner, 
have viewed Mandeville as a mercantilist (Viner 1958; Petsoulas 2001) while 
others, following Kaye and Rosenberg have instead viewed him as a 
precursor oflaissez-faire thought. This debate touches on our concerns as 
Viner, Home et al (Viner 1958; Home 1978) have argued that far from 
advocating a spontaneous order approach to social change Mandeville 
instead argued for the intentional intervention, or 'dextrous management', of 
skilful politicians, to ensure socially beneficial outcomes (Dickinson 1975: 
93). Under this view benign social consequences are not the result of an 
unintended consequence model of social change but are instead the product 
of the deliberate channelling of individual action brought about by the 
intervention of politicians. This Viner-inspired argument is consonant with 
reading Mandeville as a paternalistic mercantilist: the view being that self-
interest leads to beneficial results only when individuals have their actions 
constrained and guided by the intentional manipulation of politicians. In 
contrast to this view, Goldsmith has developed Kaye's reading of Mandeville 
11 See Condren on influence (Condren 1985: 131-38). 
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and has argued that the passages which support the Viner interpretation can, 
in fact, be read to support a reading of Mandeville which views him as firmly 
within the spontaneous order tradition. Under this interpretation 
Mandeville's skilful politicians are not literal figures, but rather are 'an 
elliptical way of pointing to a gradual development whose stages we may not 
know but which we can reconstruct conjecturally' (Goldsmith 1985: 62). By 
viewing Mandeville in this light, as a conjectural historian, we bring him 
closer to the Scottish Enlightenment in terms of approach. There appears to 
be a widespread acceptance that Mandeville's thought influenced the Scots 
in a significant manner (Home 1978: 33, 71,92,98; Goldsmith 1985: 101; 
1988; Hundert 1994: 58, 83-3, 177-7,220-1,219-236; Hayek 1984: 176-
194), there is also considerable agreement that Mandeville was one of the 
first to deploy an unintended consequences model of social understanding 
(Hayek 1984; Hundert 1994: 77-78, 249; Goldsmith 1985: 40, 62; 1988; 
Rosenberg 1963), and this alone is cause to place him within the tradition of 
spontaneous order.12 So Mandeville and his chief opponent Hutcheson 
provide the bridge into the Scottish Enlightenment. 13 
It is possible to trace a distinct connection travelling from Mandeville 
and Hutcheson to Smith and his friends Hume and Ferguson, which we may 
then extend to Smith and Ferguson's respective pupils Millar and Dugald 
Stewart. There is little doubt that the spontaneous order approach plays an 
important role in much of the thought of the Scottish Enlightenment.14 This 
however is not to claim that the movement, if indeed it was such, held a 
coherent position as regards the spontaneous order approach. The bulk of 
this study will focus on the relationship of the thought of the major Scottish 
exponents of spontaneous order to the more recent thinkers of the Twentieth 
Century Classical Liberal revival. Our study will concentrate on three of the 
12 Hayek notes the possible ambiguity: 'Mandeville is perhaps himself a good illustration 
of one of his main contentions in that he probably never fully understood what was his 
main discovery.' (Hayek 1984: 178). Popper makes a similar point with regard to the 
inventors of theories more generally (popper 1972: 299). 
13 It was Hayek's view that Mandeville's main significance was that he 'made Hume 
p:>ssible' (Hayek 1984: 188). 
4 Norman Barry also refers to Josiah Tucker (1712-1799) as an exponent of spontaneous 
order (Barry 1982: 20), but the absence of a fully developed social or political theory 
Scots: David Hume (1711-1776), Adam Smith (1723-1790) and Adam 
Ferguson (1723-1816). 
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In addition to these figures there are also a number of ' second rank', or 
second generation, Scots thinkers who deploy spontaneous order 
approaches in their thought. Ronald Hamowy has argued that spontaneous 
order ideas can be traced in the work of most of the Scots thinkers of this 
time: this includes lesser figures such as John Millar (1735-1801), Dugald 
Stewart (1753-1828), Lord Kames (1696-1782) and Gilbert Stuart (1743-
1786). In addition spontaneous order ideas are apparent in the work of 
Thomas Reid (1710-1796), who is traditionally thought to sit somewhat 
outside the mainstream of the Scottish Enlightenment, and whose use of the 
notion shows how widespread its influence was at the time. 15 Spontaneous 
order ideas can also be found in the ground-laying work of Francis 
Hutcheson (1694-1746) whose active period predates the golden age of the 
Scottish Enlightenment and ~erves as a link between the Scots and 
Mandeville (Hamowy 1987: 25-33). 
Following on from the Scots we can also trace ideas of spontaneous 
order in the thought of Edmund Burke (1729-1797). Burke was himself a 
leading Whig politician and was known to Hume, Smith and the Scots 
(Smith 1987: 180-181,230,265,297-298; Turnba11199S). He also served 
as Rector of Glasgow University a~d is known to have been intimately 
familiar with the thought of the Scots writers. 16 From the Scottish 
Enlightenment we are able to trace our connection down into the next 
generation of political theorists by three paths. 17 
utilising ideas of spontaneous order allows us to exclude him from our definition of the 
tradition. 
15 On Reid's place outside the mainstream see Schneider (1980: v). 
16 It is Burke's development of sPontaneous order ideas which leads Gissurarson to 
deploy the tenD conservative liberal in relation to the tradition. 
11 Barry includes in his exposition of the tradition two French thinkers, Frederic Bastiat 
(1801-1850) and Gustave de Molinari (1819-1912) (Barry 1982: 29), and, although both 
advance arguments in favour of laissez faire principles, neither appears to advance a 
gradualist spontaneous order style approach. The absence of an evolutionist, or 
gradualist, element in the thought of either of these thinkers, togcther with their 
rationalistic outlooks, makes their justification of freedom categorically different from that 
of the tradition of spontaneous order. 
Similarly we might exclude De Tocqueville (1805-1859), who some, including Boudon 
(Boudon 1982: 200), have related to the tradition, on the grounds that, though he may 
15 
First we have a direct link to the late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth 
Century economists now referred to as the classical economists, particularly 
Say (1767-1830) and Ricardo (1772-1823) who both developed aspects of 
Smith's economic analysis into a highly sophisticated abstract discipline of 
economic science. They pick up some of the ideas of spontaneous order 
but, as their focus is on economics rather than the broader field of social and 
political theory, this will allow us to note them and pass on. 
The second, and related path of development, is that which stems from 
Dugald Stewart to his pupil James Mill (1773-1836), also considered to be a 
member of the school of classical economists. From here we have a direct 
link to his son 1.S. Mill (1806-1873), who also, it should be noted, was an 
admirer of both Ferguson and Millar (Fagg 1968: 101-02). Hayek has 
questioned the Mills' relationship to the tradition of spontaneous order 
because of their relation to Benthamite utilitarianism. He has argued (Hayek 
. 
1960: 61) that the younger Mill is more properly considered as an exponent 
of the continental style rational liberalism which we contrasted with the 
tradition of liberalism which produced the spontaneous order approach. IS 
There are nonetheless significant spontaneous order aspects which may be 
detected in the younger Mill's defence of liberty, particularly in On Liberty. 
The third path of development that leads from the Scots is that which is 
to be found in the Nineteenth Century evolutionists. Charles Darwin's 
(1809-1882) theory of evolution is, according to Hayek, an adaptation of the 
Scots' spontaneous order theories applied to biology. Hayek believed that 
Darwin picked up these ideas through the medium of the Scots geologist 
James Hutton (1726-1797), a member of the broader Scottish 
Enlightenment, and through the influence of Hume upon his grandfather 
Erasmus Darwin, and then applied the approach to nature (Hayek 1993 
vol.1: 152 n.33; 1993 vol.3: 154; 1960: 59,433-34 n.22). Darwin himself 
was not a social and political theorist and so his work is outwith the scope of 
have had sympathies with the spontaneous order tradition, he nonetheless deploys other 
~ecies of argument for the central thrust of his work. 
1 For discussions of the Scots' influence on the Mills see Forbes (1954: 664-70) and 
MacFie (1967: 19, 141, 145). MacFie also argues that the Scots approach to social 
matters is fundamentally at odds with that of Benthamite utilitarianism (MacFie 1990: 
12). 
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this study except in one feature, namely, the use by Rayek and Popper of a 
notion of evolution which they relate to spontaneous order and which draws 
on the process of natural selection formulated by Darwin. From Darwin we 
are able to trace a development of the spontaneous order approach through 
the writings of Herbert Spencer (1817-1862) and T.R. Huxley (1825-95). 
These two thinkers are often portrayed as the leading exponents of the 
application of Darwinian evolution to social and political matters. Hayek, 
however, argues that, thoug~ Spencer in particular draws on spontaneous 
order ideas of evolution, he sees them through the lens of Darwinian 
biology. That is to say that Spencer's use of evolutionary ideas owes most 
of its force to its reliance on eugenics. Hayek has also argued (Hayek 1993 
vo1.1: 23-24, 152 n.33) that this was a false path in the development of 
spontaneous order ideas. His distaste for this development of spontaneous 
order through eugenics leads him to omit any detailed discussion of either 
Spencer or Huxley from his work. Hayek's rejection of this development of. 
the spontaneous order approach is grounded on the assertion that it does not 
follow on accurately from the work of the Scots. Indeed part of Hayek's 
project is to resurrect the Scots' understanding of spontaneous order in the 
face of the errors of Nineteenth Century evolutionists. 
Moving closer to our own times spontaneous order appears in the work 
of the Austrian School of economists, including Menger (1840-1921), 
BOhm-Bawerk (1851-1914), Weiser (1851-1926) and von Mises (1881-
1973). The Austrians developed a subjectivist theory of value and applied it 
to economics. Their chief concern was with questions of epistemology as 
applied to economics. Although primarily concerned with economics, and 
thus outwith the central concerns of our study, both Menger and Mises 
appear in the main text as they represent a significant influence on the social 
and political thought of Hayek. 19 In the second half of the Twentieth 
Century there was a renewed interest in spontaneous order ideas which saw 
a rejuvenation of the tradition. This Twentieth Century revival will feature 
19 It is worth noting here that Menger criticises Adam Smith in various places for not 
being a spontaneous order thinker and for excessive rationalism (Menger 1996: IS3-203~ 
Rothschild 2001: 65). However the critique is based on Menger's own, particularly 
idiosyncratic, reading of Smith and is rejected by Hayek as mistaken. 
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heavily in Part Three of the thesis?O Among its members are: Michael 
Polanyi (1891-1976), whose place in the tradition of spontaneous order is 
assured by his apparent coining of the term (Jacobs 1998: 14-28)~ Karl 
Popper (1902-1994) and F.A Hayek (1899-1992), perhaps the greatest 
Twentieth Century exponent of the tradition in the social and political sphere 
and the one who here will receive the most treatment. In addition to this 
triumvirate spontaneous order ideas can also be traced in the work of the 
conservative political theorist Michael Oakeshott (1901-1990). Oakeshott's 
ideas are often compared to those of his near contemporary Hayek, and his 
theory of civil association and his views on the market possess significant 
enough similarities to those of Hayek to warrant his inc1usion.21 
In his Anarchy, State and Utopia Robert Nozick (1938-2002) makes 
use of spontaneous order arguments under the name of invisible-hand 
arguments. A discussion ofNozick's use of this term will form part of the 
next chapter but we can here note that, although Nozick does make use of 
the spontaneous order approach, the bulk of his theory is rather conducted 
in terms of Locke an rights theory. As a result, he is perhaps more 
comfortably at home in the American Libertarian tradition which we have 
distinguished from the more spontaneous order orientated British Classical 
Liberal tradition. More recently Virginia Postrel, in her The Future and its 
Enemies (postrel 1998), defends classical liberal values in a manner which is 
informed by spontaneous order methodology. Drawing on concrete 
examples from contemporary life Postrel attempts to illustrate the benefits of 
an open-ended future where progress is achieved through the medium of 
spontaneous development and freedom. 
We are now in a position to identifY the particular role played by the 
'tradition' in this study. From our survey we are able to identifY two main 
time periods in which the spontaneous order approach has been deployed in 
a significant manner to social and political issues. We might refer to them in 
short hand as The Scots and The Moderns. The Scots being those major 
20 For historical background on the revival see Grcen (1987). Cockett (1995) and Graham 
and Clarke (1986). 
21 There is a considerable literature which approaches Oakeshott through the liberal 
aspects of his thought (Franco 1990~ Coats 1985~ Grant 1990: 9). 
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Scottish Enlightenment thinkers who deploy the spontaneous order 
approach: Hume, Smith, Ferguson and Millar (and by association Mandeville 
and Hutcheson). And the Modems being those theorists of the Twentieth 
Century Classical Liberal revival: including Hayek, Popper and Polanyi (and 
by association Oakeshott)?2 The rest of this study will be devoted to an 
examination of the use of the concept of spontaneous order by the Scots and 
Moderns; and will consist of.an attempt to define coherently the nature of 
spontaneous order and its application as an approach to the study of social 
phenomena. With this aim in view the study will not concern itself with 
strict contextual readings of either period. 
This is not to say that such an approach would be without merit, indeed 
contextualised readings are the dominant technique in the contemporary 
discipline of the history of political thought (Runciman 2001; Skinner 1969; 
Dunn 1968; Tully 1988); rather, it is to say that we have a different end in 
view. Ifwe are to construct a descriptive 'model' of the spontaneous order 
approach to social and political theory, then context must necessarily take 
something of a back seat. Equally 1:his is not to say that we are advancing an 
ahistorical abstraction. That is not our purpose: we are using the two 
groups of thinkers to develol? a conceptual model [which borrows, with 
express acknowledgement) in order to clarify what we believe to be a 
distinct approach to social theory. 23 [In this way it does not really matter if a 
contextual study reveals that Smith did not think what Hayek thought he 
did, for the evolution of the idea depends on what Hayek thought Smith 
thought, and not what he actually did think.)24 Our purpose is not to 
criticise the modern thinkers' reading of the Scots [as Christina Petsoulas 
does], nor is it to highlight inconsistencies between the groups or within the 
groups. Such approaches are rendered somewhat redundant when a thinker 
22 The Modem section will give a prominent focus to the work of Hayek as the foremost 
modem proponent of the approach in our field of social and political theory. 
23 Hayek, as we will see, refers to this as the compositive method. 
24 Gissurarson, for example, believes that Hayek may have read too much of himself into 
Smith and Hume (Gissurarson 1987: 122). Gray also argues that there is a 'complicated 
connection' between Hayek and the Scots made more difficult, in his view, by the diverse 
opinions expressed by the earlier writers (Gray 1990: 250). Skinner, on the other hand, 
argues that there is sufficient similarity of approach among the Scots to justifY referring to 
them as a 'school' (Skinner 1967: 33). 
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such as Hayek openly admits: 'But what I told my students was essentially 
what I had learnt from those writers and not what they chiefly thought, 
which may have been something quite different.' (Hayek 1978: 52 n. 2).2' If 
we are to develop a clear understanding of what the spontaneous order 
approach looks like, then we, must seek the theoretical similarities and from 
there develop our analysis of the model that results. What our analysis 
depends upon is not so much the strictures of a tradition of direct influence, 
though we have made the case for such in selecting our two groups, nor 
does it depend upon a claim as to the accuracy of one thinker's reading of 
the work of a predecessor: rather it is concerned with the 'family 
resemblances' (Gissurarson 1987: 10) which will allow us to draw out the 
implications of a spontaneous order approach. 26 Oakeshott argues that this 
is precisely the true nature of a tradition: 'These I call tradition because it 
belongs to the nature of a tradition to tolerate and unite an internal variety, 
not insisting upon conformity to a single character, and, because, further, it 
has the ability to change without losing its identity.' (Oakeshott 1991: 227). 
With these strictures in mind the main body of the text will represent an 
examination of the two groups of thinkers' approaches to the same key 
features of social life. Moreover what is stressed in this study is spontaneous 
order as an approach: spontaneous order as 'a methodological tool rather 
than an ethical postulate' (Gissurarson 1987: 42)27, or as a 'value-free 
explanatory system' (Gray 1986: 119-20) and as being 'technical rather than 
value based' (Shearmur 1996a: 4). Kley, referring to Hayek, notes that he 
does not provide a political philosophy but rather a 'distinct body of 
descriptive and explanatory theory' (Kley 1994: 3) which may, or may not, 
lead to the normative conclusions which he wishes to draw from it 
25 Moreover Hayek's study of other thinkers did not enable him to 'reproduce their 
thought but altered my thought' (Hayek 1978: 52-53). 
26 Polanyi writes to Hayek: 'I have often disagreed with your views, but have done so as a 
member of the same family, and I have always admired, unfailingly, the power of your 
scholarship and the vigour of your pen.' (Letter from Polanyi to Hayek dated 2/2/68, 
Friedrich A. von Hayek papers, Box no.43, Hoover Institution Archives). 
21 Ullman-Margalit refers to the invisible hand as a 'conceptual tool' (U11man-Margalit 
1997: 195). 
(petsoulas 2001: 2).28 Our aim is to identify the spontaneous order 
approach to social science with a measure of clarity that might allow the 
. 
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examination of its relation to instrumentalist justifications of normative 
positions regarding freedom and liberalism?9 To make this distinction clear 
we will approach the subject by way of a distinct critical vocabulary. 
28 Most studies of the idea of spontaneous order begin with an examination of the 
paradigmatic example of the market. However, because we are interested in the broader 
approach to the social sciences we shall proceed from the conception of science involved, 
following it through the explanation of the development of social institutions [including 
the market]. With this aim in view the analysis will dwell primarily on primary texts 
from both periods. Occasionally we will engage with specific critical literature in the 
body of the text, but for the most part discussion of secondary literature will take place in 
footnotes. 
29 The kind of argwnent suggested by Gissurarson where spontaneous order 'might not 
tell us what is desirable, but it may tell us what is definitely undesirable' (Gissurarson 
1987: 65); and Gray's assertion that the idea of spontaneous order might not have a 
liberal content but may suggest liberal implications (Gray 1986: 124). KJey refers to 
Hayek's 'instrumental liberalism' (Kley 1994: 1) as a distinguishing characteristic of his 
approach: Hayek's argument is that liberalism and socialism are different methodologies 
with the same ends in view and can thus be compared in their relative success in securing 
those ends [A view shared by Mises (1918: 7-8»). Walker and Buchanan both accuse 
Hayek of confusing positive and normative, descriptive and prescriptive arguments 
(Buchanan 197731; Walker 1986: 63). This view however neglects the fact that Hayek 
does not pretend to produce a moral argument (Barry 1979: 5), nor does he seek to derive 
values from social science: rather he seeks to examine the pursuit of values by different 
methods [Socialism and Liberalism] (Bany 1979: 198-99). He presents a 'factual' 
argument for freedom (Connin 1990: 301). Similarly for Oakcshott freedom is 'an 
historic achievement, not an abstract right' (Grant 1990: 63). See also: • A large majority 
of what are usually considered to be normative questions can often be shown to be 
questions about facts or positive theory, which hence are open to discussion and empirical 
investigation with the aid of the standard procedures of science and analytical philosophy. 
They can be solved without value judgements.' (Karlson 2002: 181). 
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Chapter 3: Towards a Definition of Spontaneous Order 
Before embarking on our study of ideas of spontaneous order it will be 
helpful, for the sake of clarity, to examine the terminology associated with 
the tradition. This examination will serve to build a critical vocabulary 
which will be carried through the text. There are certain key descriptive 
terms which have come to be applied to the species of argument which we 
will be examining. Four such terms can be identified from the literature 
surrounding the tradition. 
Unintended Conseguences30 
The term unintended consequences is applied, most often, to the ideas 
expressed by the writers of the Scottish Enlightenment. It is conceptually 
related to the term spontaneous order in that spontaneous orders are, by 
Hayek and Polanyi's definition, brought about in the social sphere by a 
process of unintended consequences. Indeed both Hayek and Popper refer 
to the notion of unintended consequences as being the central subject matter 
orall social sciences: a claim which we shall examine later (Boudon 1982: 1; 
Hayek 1979: 69). 
. 
The key idea here refers to purpose and intentionality. An order which 
is created spontaneously is not the realisation of an actor's intention (or 
purpose), rather it is the result of a process which sees the interaction of . 
various actors pursuing different purposes.31 In a spontaneous order nobody 
can be considered to have intended the resulting order, it is, to paraphrase 
Ferguson, 'The result of human action, but not the result of any human 
design'. 
The term unintended consequences refers to' the notion that actions 
create consequences other than those which are explicitly intended. This is 
how most social scientists, in particular Robert Merton, have dealt with the 
30 Smith makes use of this term noting 'the unintended and unforeseen consequences of 
different actions' (Smith 1984: 93). 
31 What Acton calls 'social detritus' (Acton 1972: 429). 
issue (Hamowy 1987: 3; Merton 1976).32 All actions produce unintended 
results in the social sphere because they necessarily entail interactions and 
reactions that cannot fully be predicted.33 
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Duncan Forbes, in his Scientific Whiggism: Adam Smith and John 
Millar, deploys a concept of the law of the heterogeneity of ends [ from 
WUndt's 'das Gesetz der Heterogonie der Zwecke' (Forbes 1954: 651)] to 
describe the notion of unintended consequences. The law of the 
heterogeneity of ends is described in terms of an opposition to the great man 
theory of history, and indeed to all historical approaches which rely on 
rationalistic analysis of history in terms of conscious action. By viewing the 
law of the heterogeneity of ends as a historical methodology, Forbes does 
indeed leave open the possibility of good and bad unintended consequences, 
just as he does not restrict the law's field of application to any particular 
aspect of human action. Similarly, Boudon draws distinct subsets of 
unintended consequence arguments, one of which he describes as that which 
I ••• may produce collective advantages that had not been explicitly sought (the 
'invisible hand' of Adam Smith).' (Boudon 1982: 6). He identifies this model 
32 Merton's analysis of 'The Unanticipated Consequences o/Soclal Action' restricts its 
attention to 'isolated purposive acts' (Merton 1976: 146) in terms of sociological analysis, 
though he highlights the fact that most social commentators have acknowledged the 
existence oCthe phenomena (Merton 1976: 145). The article itself stresses that there can 
be both malign and benign unanticipated consequences of action and that the reason for 
such consequences being unanticipated can be broken down into four categories: 
Ignorance, the 'Imperious immediacy of interest' and the roles played by basic values and 
self-defeating predictions in altering the circumstances in which the actions are 
undertaken. 
His reference to the concept of unintended consequences with which we are concerned is 
made when he considers Adam Smith's Invisible Hand as an example of his second 
category of unanticipated consequences. Merton closes his article by arguing U1at though 
unintended consequences exist, this is not in itself sufficient to reject out of hand calls for 
social planning (Merton 1976: ISS), instead he calls for more study and classification of 
action in order properly to understand how good and bad unintended consequences arise. 
His approach has been criticised by Karlson who argues that in referring to the 
'unanticipated' consequences of action his analysis becomes unnecessarily vague. 
Karlson instead argues that intention [or mther unintention] and not anticipation is the 
significant factor (Karlson 2002: 27). 
33 The sociologist Raymond Boudon, in his The Unintended Consequences o/Social 
Action, broadens Merton's basic assumptions and examines what he terms 'perverse 
effects' (Boudon 1982: 8) in terms of social intemction. Most of Boudon's book is 
concerned with the sociological study of French education in the light of perverse effects, 
or unintended consequences; with his term perverse being applied to both benign and 
malign effects. Writing on Rawls' Theory 0/ Justice he explores a perverse effect 
argument which pamllels Nozick's ideas on freedom disrupting patternS (Boudon 1982: 8, 
127·52). 
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not only with Smith but also with Hayek and Popper, and to a lesser extent 
Merton (Boudon 1982: 9). Unintended consequences arguments of this sort 
are, he believes, a species of dialectical argument which, through Smith's 
invisible hand and Hegel's cunning of reason, influenced Marx's concept of 
the dialectic as well as Hayek's view of rationality (Boudon 1982: 167).34 
Hamowy however makes a pertine~t point in this connection. He argues: 'In 
writing of the unanticipated consequences of certain acts, both Merton and 
Forbes appear to include the whole spectrum of unintended outcomes within 
the concept, regardless of their specific nature. The theory of spontaneous 
order, on the other hand, refers only to those acts the unanticipated results 
of which issue in complex social patterns.' (Hamowy 1987: 4).3S Thus the 
term unintended consequences as it appears within the tradition of thought 
with which we are concerned refers not to the broad assertion that actions 
can produce unanticipated results, but to a more specific notion that 
complex orders are formed without the purposive intention of anyone actor 
(or actors). 
Having accepted this technical understanding of the term we are left, 
however. with a further qualification. As Hayek himself admits (Hayek 1993 
vol. I : 59), and more forcefully as Polanyi puts it (polanyi 1951: 157), there 
are two possible outcomes of unintended consequences analysis.36 There are 
both benign and malign unintended consequences.37 That is to say that 
34 For comparisons of the Invisible Hand to the Cunning of Reason sec (Acton 1972, 
Ullman-Margalit 1978; J. B. Davis 1983). Schneider has argued that unintended 
consequence arguments were precursors of functionalism (Schneider 1967: xlvii). 
35 Karlson agrees, noting that the truly interesting unintended consequences are those 
that exemplifY 'some sort of aggregate and ordered social macro-outcome, pattern or 
structure.' (Karlson 2002: 21). 
36 Popper also acknowledges the point (popper 1961: 158), as does Ullman-Margalit 
(Ullman-Margalit 1978: 266). Vernon also notes this and stresses that unintended 
consequences arguments are intimately related to the idea of ignorance (Vernon 1979: 
59). Flew shares a similar view, but he couches his argument in terms of negative and 
r,sitive invisible hands - a view that we will reject below (Flew 1985: 58), 
7 Rosen argues that there are six possible senses of unintended consequences apparent in 
Smith's work: unintended consequences that are in the interest of both the agent and 
others; those that do not go against the interests of the agent and that are in the interest of 
otbers; those that go against the interests of the agent but that are in the interest of others~ 
unintended consequences that are,in the.interest of the agent but that go against the 
interests of others; those that go against the interests of both the agent and others and 
unintended consequences that go against the interests of the agent without affecting the 
interests of others (Rosen 1996: 122-129). This variety of application indicates the 
significance of the notion in Smith's thought. However our division into benign and 
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because an order has arisen as the result of a process of unintended 
consequences (or spontaneously if you prefer) this does not mean that it is 
necessarily a 'good' phenomenon.38 A further argument is required to 
explain why a system (such as the market) that operates through a medium 
of unintended consequences produces beneficial results. It is not enough 
alone to say that the origins of an order are the result of unintended 
consequences as this must be qualified by a separate or related contention as 
to the superiority of those spontaneous orders produced by unintended 
consequences. 
Spontaneous Order 
The term spontaneous order has appeared at various stages in the 
history of political thought. John Millar, and his friend Francis Jeffrey, both 
use the term 'spontaneous' to describe the theory of political development 
which Millar had laid out (Hamowy 1987: 30), and the term spontaneous 
order also appears in the writings of Comte, Spencer and Durkheim (Klein 
1997: 323). In these cases though either the term spontaneous was not 
accompanied by the term order, or the concept to which the term was 
applied was not the same as that with which we are concerned. It would 
appear that the first use of the term spontaneous order, as applied to the 
type of approach with which we are concerned, is to be found in Michael 
Polanyi's 1951 essay Manageability of Social Tasks (Jacobs 1998: 19). 
Polanyi had used similar terms apelied to the same ideas in earlier works, 
especially the 1941 essay The Growth of Thought in Society, where he uses 
the terms 'spontaneous ordering', 'spontaneously arising order', and 
'spontaneously attained order' (Jacobs 1998: IS). 
malign refers to a systemic level judgement of utility in terms of the production of 
complex patterns or spontaneous orders. 
38 For example, Gray notes that it is possible to use an unintended consequences 
argument to explain the rise of totalitarianism (Gray 1986: 121). Elster compares the 
notion of malign unintended consequences to Sartre's idea of 'counterfinality' (Elster 
1989b: 95), for example where tree felling to clear land leads to soil erosion. Schneider 
views Ferguson's History of Rome as a tale of unintended consequences which led to Ule 
fall of the Republic (Schneider 1980: xvi; Ferguson 1830: 468). 
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In his book The Logic of Liberty, Polanyi begins to deploy the term 
spontaneous order in the distinct sense in which we are interested. A 
spontaneous order is contrasted with a 'corporate order', the distinction 
being that' there are certain tasks "which if manageable can only be 
performed by spontaneous mutual adjustments", tasks no corporate order is 
equipped to undertake.' (Jacobs 1998: 18). The key notion in Polanyi's 
discussion of spontaneous order is that such orders arise internally, that is to 
say the order is not imposed by some external agency, but rather represents 
the formation of an equilibrium by the mutual adjustment of individual 
'particles' (polanyi 1951: 155) in reaction to their surroundings [the settling 
of water in a jug is a good example]. Polanyi, and later Hayek (Hayek 1993 
vol. I : xviii), prefer to use the English term spontaneous to describe this 
process rather than the term, credited to KOhler by Polanyi, of a 'dynamic 
order' (polanyi 1951: 154).39, 
Thesaurus equivalents for the term spontaneous include: 'Free, 
gratuitous, instinctive, natural, unbidden, uncompelled, unconstrained, 
voluntary and willing'. Spontaneity then is a qualifier of a type of order, and 
. 
as such it is distinct from an order qualified as 'externally imposed'. This 
difference, which Hayek refers to as that between exogenous and 
endogenous orders (Hayek 1993 vo1.l: 36-37), is the reason why the term 
spontaneous was chosen by Hayek and Polanyi. Having said this, and 
although the term spontaneous was adopted in order to distinguish this 
species of order from types of exogenous imposed order, Hayek would later 
admit that it is not itself free from ambiguity (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : viii- ix), 
and instead offers the terms 'self-generating order' and 'self-organising 
structures', But for our purposes we shall proceed with the term 
spontaneous [as Hayek does out of 'conveniency' (Hayek 1993 vol. 1: 37)] if 
only because it has become the established critical term applied to this 
tradition of thought. The other word in our key term is 'order', and here it 
is perhaps best to proceed with the technical definition given by Hayek. 
Hayek describes an order as 'a state of affairs in which a multiplicity of 
39 KOhler's work on Gestalt perception is a significant influence on Polanyi's 
spontaneous order thought (Jacobs 1998: 17). 
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elements of various kinds are so related to each other that we may learn 
from our acquaintance with some spatial or temporal part of the whole to 
form correct expectations concerning the rest, or at least expectations which 
have a good chance of proving correct.' (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 36). This 
definition of order as a regularity owes a great deal to Hume's ideas about 
the need for stability of expectations, and the focus is clearly upon the 
internal nature of the order and not with its origins.40 That is to say order is 
not considered as a command, as something that is by definition imposed, 
rather Hayek's definition allows an order to be either the result of an external 
design ( exogenous), but equally it ~ay prove to be the result of a 
spontaneous adjustment (endogenous). The key characteristic of order is 
that it provides some stability of expectation. 
Once we have seen this it becomes clear that both Polanyi and Hayek 
adopt the term spontaneous order in an attempt to contrast it with some 
other form of order in such a way as to express the difference between 
exogenous ordering and endogenous ordering. This contrast, Hayek 
believes, brings out the fact that there are many who cannot conceive of an 
order which has not been deliberately established (Hayek 1993 vol. I : 37). It 
is precisely this misconception which Hayek seeks to oppose. We have then 
the term spontaneous order which refers to a body of explanatory theory 
concerned with orders which arise endogenously; and which its exponents 
contrast with orders which are externally imposed.41 
Eyolution 
This is a term which frequently occurs in the writings of spontaneous 
order theorists, and it is worth noting two preliminary points. First, 
evolution, as deployed by Hayek and others, is not a technical term, nor is it 
strictly related to the use of the term in Darwinian biology. Rather the term 
is picked up by spontaneous order theorists as a contrast to notions of 
design and deliberate reformation. That is to say, rather than revolutionary 
40 Hayek admits his debt to Hume on this (Hayek 1993 yoU: 162 n. 3). 
41 This stands against Gray and Kley's broader typologies which conflate unintended 
consequences, spontaneous order. evolution and the invisible hand (Gray 1986: 33-34~ 
Kley 1994: 120). 
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change, spontaneous order theorists talk of evolutionary reform. The 
purpose being to emphasise the gradual, cumulative nat~re of changes which 
they ascribe to the unintended cons~quences of social action: to this extent 
spontaneous orders are said to have evolved. The second point follows on 
from our caveat concerning unintended consequences. Evolution is a 
descriptive term, it accounts for what exists and explains it in terms of the 
gradual development of social phenomena. Viewing evolution as a term that 
refers to the process of soci~ change allows us to see that, like unintended 
consequences, it is a neutral term which is in no way prescriptive of 
beneficial outcomes. It is a solely descriptive term: Kley and Petsoulas both 
highlight this with regard to Hayek's notion of cultural evolution, arguing 
that nothing in the approach necessarily leads to liberal results (Kley 1994: 
191; Petsoulas 2001: 70). Indeed one of the chief criticisms of the 
spontaneous order approach is precisely that it confuses the allegedly 'twin' 
concepts of spontaneous order and evolution (Hayek 1984: 319; Kley 1994: 
21-23; Petsoulas 2001: 17,33, 100). We will examine below Hayek's claim 
that: 'It makes no difference for our present purpose whether the process 
extends over a long period oftime, as it does in such cases as the evolution 
of money or the formation of language, or whether it is a process which is 
constantly repeated anew, as in the case of the formation of prices or the 
direction of production under competition.' (Hayek 1979: 71_72).42 
The Invisible Hand 
The term invisible hand is perhaps the most famous description applied 
to spontaneous order arguments: it has, in Nozick's words, 'a certain lovely 
quality' about it (Nozick 1974: 18). The actual phrase occurs on three 
occasions in the writings of Adatl! Smith. Emma Rothschild has argued that 
each of these appearances is dissimilar, and this leads her to believe that 
Smith did not take the term at all seriously, but rather deployed it as an 
ironic literary device (Rothschild 1994: 2001). If this is true then the use of 
42 This will involve an examination of arguments about the emergence of order, and the 
endurance of that order: about the attainment of an equilibrium order and its evolution in 
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the term invisible hand to describe spontaneous order theories is a misguided 
appropriation of terminology from Smith. We shall argue in Part Two, 
Section Four that this is not the case and, as a result, that the term invisible 
hand can playa useful descriptive role in the conceptual language 
surrounding spontaneous order arguments. That is to say that there are 
distinct similarities between at least two of Smith's three uses of the tenn, 
and that these similarities justifY our reading the invisible hand as a definite 
and descriptive concept. 
Smith's first use of the term is in his History of Astronomy (Smith 
1982a: 49), where he refers to the 'invisible hand of Jupiter' in connection 
with the errors ofpolytheism.43 Smith begins this section by observing that 
'Mankind, in the first ages of society .... have little curiosity to find out those 
hidden chains of events which bind together the seemingly disjointed 
appearances of nature.' (Smith 1982a: 48). Thus he argues, in a crude 
society, irregular events are explained in terms of the intervention of an 
anthropomorphic Deity whose whims direct unexpected occurrences. The 
'invisible hand of Jupiter' is not seen to act in the normal course of nature, 
but rather explains events which run contrary to its expected course (Macfie 
1971: 595). Following Macfie we will argue that this early use of the term 
invisible hand does indeed differ from its later two appearances in the Wealth 
of Nations and the Theory of MorbI Sentiments. Macfie argues that the later 
two uses refer to an invisible hand which restores the natural order, while 
the Jupiter example refers to a disruption of the natural order (Macfie 1971: 
595). He notes that the Jupiter example is prior to the other two uses and 
that Smith, as a writer, recalled the 'pithy phrase' referring to the action of 
the Deity and applied it again in reference to an opposite conception of the 
role of the Deity (Macfie 1971: 598). Thus for Macfie there is a conceptual 
link in that all three references are to the intervention of a Deity in the affairs 
of man, the difference being that the Christian Deity acts in the opposite 
manner to Jupiter (Macfie 1971: 595_96).44 Ifwe accept Macfie's thesis that 
reaction to changing circumstances. See Part Three, Section Two, Chapter 4. 
~3 For a discussion of the Scots' views on Polytheism see Part Two, Section One, Chapter 
4 . 
.... A view shared by Minogue (1985: 22) and Brown (1988: 135). 
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Smith's later two uses of the tenn invisible hand differ from the first, in that 
they refer to differing conceptions of the Deity, then we are able to trace 
explicit similarities between the two later uses of the term which provide a 
conception of the invisible hand in the Christian era. 
Smith's other two. more famous. uses of the invisible hand occur in his 
later works the Wealth of Nations and the Theory of Moral Sentiments. As 
these two passages will be di'scussed in some detail elsewhere in the thesis, it 
will suffice here to assert that they are sufficiently conceptually similar to 
allow us to deploy the tenn invisible hand as a part of our conceptual 
vocabulary.4' The first, in chronological terms, of these two uses is that in 
the Theory of Moral Sentiments. In a section dealing with the effect of 
utility on the conception of beauty Smith discusses how distributive justice is 
played out in a commercial society (Smith 1984: 184-85). He argues that 
. 
the rich in a society are subject to the same physical constraints as the poor, 
that their corporeal frames restrict the amount which they can absolutely 
consume. As a result they are compelled to use their wealth to purchase the 
product of others' labour, and consequently they diffuse that wealth through 
society. Similarly, in the Wealth of Nations, the appearance of the invisible 
hand is again related to the co-ordination of self-interested action in order to 
produce benefits for the whole of society (Smith 1981: 456). Here the tenn 
invisible hand refers to the process, or mechanism, which brings about 
socially beneficial results from the interaction of self-interested actors. 
Whether that result is in the distribution of subsistence, or in the support of 
domestic industry, the process is the same: the whole of society benefits 
from the actions of individuals who did not have the good of society as their 
goal. 
In both of these cases Smith uses the term invisible hand to refer to 
some imperceptible mechanism [the hand] which acts to produce benign 
results through the media of unintended consequences.46 The key factor 
here is that in each case the unintended consequences produce beneficial 
results. The mechanism of t~e invisible hand is that which creates benign 
45 See Part Two, Section Four, Chapter 2. 
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spontaneous orders as the result of the co-ordination of the unintended 
consequences of human action.47 Richard Bronk describes this concept, 
when applied to the economy, as a metaphor: 'The invisible hand is a 
metaphor for the free market's ability spontaneously to reconcile and balance 
the requirements of competing individuals pursuing their own self-interest in 
such a way that self-interested behaviour can unintentionally promote the 
. 
economic interests of society as a whole.' (Bronk 1998: 92). Viewing the 
invisible hand as a metaphor for a particular mechanism of reconciling the 
unintended consequences of differently motivated actions allows us to use it 
as a technical term for the sy~tems which produce socially beneficial 
spontaneous orders.48 
Invisible hand arguments refer to the production of benign unintended 
consequences which manifest themselves as a spontaneous order. In order 
to use this conclusion to build a viable vocabulary we must oppose Robert 
Nozick's use of the term 'Invisible-Hand argument'. Nozick deploys the term 
to apply to arguments which we have separately categorised as spontaneous 
order arguments and unintended consequences arguments. That is to say he 
applies it to a variety of allied arguments that describe non-purposive 
interaction and the endogenous generation of order or patterns (Nozick 
1994; 1974).49 Nozick thus concludes that invisible hand arguments can 
produce both good and bad results (Nozick 1994: 192). Our understanding 
of this vocabulary is that unintended consequences arguments can produce 
benign and malign spontaneous orders, but that invisible hand arguments on 
the contrary involve an assertion as to the socially beneficial results of 
unintended consequences forming spontaneous orders. so The invisible hand 
46 Bishop argues that Smith viewed the invisible hand as a 'scientific [or empirical1 
theory' (Bishop 1995: 167). 
47 This understanding is the same as Rothschild's notion of the 'modern', as opposed to 
Smithian, invisible hand. She argues that the modern conception is characterised by three 
conditions: 'the unintended consequences of actions', 'the orderliness of the ensuing 
events', and 'the beneficence of the unintended order' (Rothschild 2001: 138) . 
... This view, that the invisible hand creates socially beneficial outcomes, is also 
expressed by Petsoulas (2001: 34) Vaughn (1987: 997) and Elster (1989a: 96). 
49 Nozick refuses to provide a detailed explanation of the concept, relying instead on a 
list of examples ofits use by other writers (Nozick 1974: 20). 
so Buchanan notes the possibility of 'spontaneous disorder' emerging from unintended 
consequences (Buchanan 1977) and appears to apply the term to two distinct notions: 
first, that unintended consequences produce no order and, second, that an existing order is 
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refers to some mechanism which ensures the benign outcome of unintended 
consequence style arguments. The nature of this mechanism, and its relation 
to the concept of the evolution of knowledge, what Gray calls the 
'indispensable epistemological component' (Gray 1986: 119), will form the 
crux of this study.51 In brief: unintended consequences arguments are a vital 
part of understanding the spontaneous generation of order in society 
(spontaneous orders), and those who argue in favour of this approach to 
social issues deploy invisible hand arguments when they wish to explain how 
the process of unintended consequences can produce benign results. 
Or we might view it in this way. Unintended consequences arguments 
are one way of approaching social and historical processes, of this there is a 
subset concerned with the analysis of the formation of complex social 
orders, this we have termed spontaneous order thought. Within 
spontaneous order analysis social change is viewed as an evolutionary 
process describing the gradual and cumulative nature of change in a neutral 
manner. Thus the results of this evolution may be viewed as either benign or 
malign orders. Benign orders are explained by invisible hand arguments. 
The invisible hand refers to some social mechanism, itself the product of 
evolution, which acts to produce socially beneficial outcomes from the 
interaction of actors pursuing their own purposes and operating under 
d' , f' ded 52 con l110ns 0 urunten consequences. 
With this precise conceptual vocabulary to hand we can now proceed to 
the details of our study and to examine the question which Menger believed 
disrupted by unintended consequences. Karlson shares a similar view (Karlson 2002: 8, 
23). , 
51 It is important to note here that invisible hand arguments are not a form of naive 
identification of interests argument. As Hayek notes: 'neither Smith nor any other 
reputable author I know has ever maintained tbat there existed some original harmony of 
interests irrespective of those grown institutions' (Hayek 1967: 100). The invisible hand 
is to be found in those social practices and institutions that have evolved by a process of 
unintended consequences in such a manner as to facilitate beneficial social outcomes. 
Social science, correctly undertaken with a spontaneous order approach, allows us to 
examine the nature of the invisible hand and those practices and institutions upon which 
it depends. 
52 When LessnotTwrites: 'by this stage it is clear that Hayek's social theory is no longer a 
neutral account of the evolution of human social structures, but is a defence of a particular 
kind of evolved social structure, one incorporating private property and a market 
economy.' (LessnotT 1999: ISS), he is acknowledging the shift from a spontaneous order 
explanation to an invisible hand argument. 
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lay at the heart of social science: 'How can it be that institutions which 
serve the common welfare and are extremely significant for its development 
come into being without a common will directed toward establishing them?' 
(Menger 1996: 124). 
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Part Two 
In Part Two we will examine the use of the spontaneous order approach in 
the thought of the Scottish Enlightenment. By analysing their explanatory 
approach to the social institutions of science, morality, law and government and 
" .. " " "" the "market we will begin to develop an understanding of the core elements of the 
approach. Our study views spontaneous order as an explanatory approach to 
social theory, and so it makes sense to begin our analysis with an examination of 
the Scots' views on science and social science. 
Section One: Science 
Chapter 1: The Impetus to Science 
The Enlightenment is often referred to as the 'age of reason', a time when a 
huge outpouring of learning and study existed against the backdrop of the first 
stirrings of an industrialised market economy, a time in some respects which 
paved the way for the modem world. In the area of science this was particularly 
true. The revolutions in scientific method which had shaped the natural sciences, 
from Bacon to Newton, had brought the consciousness of the nature and 
methodology of science to the forefront of academic enquiry. In the social 
sphere this new philosophy of empiricism, not new in the sense of never before 
practised but new in the sense of being formulated and consciously undertaken, 
found a voice in the methodological writings of Newton and Locke. The 
Newtonian method so admired by the Scots rested on a desire to identify causal 
relationships from the observation of empirical data, verification by 
experimentation and then the formulation of simple and understandable general 
rules (Miller 1981: 19).1 Newton's experimental method had led to great 
advances in the natural sciences which spurred those who succeeded him on to 
open up new areas of study to the method. Thus Hume gives his Treatise the 
1 For the influence of Newton on the wider Enlightenment see Gay (1969: 126-187). 
Discussions of his particular influence on Smith and Hume can be found in Redman (1993) 
Hetherington (1983) and Wightman (1975). 
title 'A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to introduce the 
experimental method of reasoning into Moral Subjects' (Hume 1978: xi).2 
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. Hume is clear throughout his Treatise that reasoning, and explanation, must 
advance strictly in line with experience: 'Experience and Observation' (Hume 
1978: 74) are the basis on which we must ground our expectations and our 
notions of causation (Hume 1978: 113). He is explicitly rejecting a priori 
reasoning as a suitable method through which to advance scientific 
understanding (Hume 1985: 17 n.S).3 As he puts it early in the Treatise: 'Since 
it is not from knowledge or any scientific reasoning, that we derive the opinion 
of the necessity of a cause to every new production, that opinion must 
necessarily arise from observation and experience.' (Hume 1978: 82). 
Experience must be at the heart of the practice of science and, moreover, we 
ought not to extend our claims further than what is authorised and corroborated 
by experience (Hume 1978: 466; 1975: 163).4 This desire to ground abstract 
reasoning in the reality of experimental evidence was strongly felt by all of the 
Scots. Kames wrote that: 
'Nothing has retarded the progress of philosophy [i.e., science] more than 
an unlucky propensity to make us grasp at principles without due regard to 
facts. Though fond of knowledge we are ready to purchase it at the easiest 
rate; and general principles delight us because they shorten the road to 
knowledge ... But though our only safe guides to truth are facts and 
experiments, it is, however, expedient to keep the end in view. Facts and 
experiments are useless if we are not to reason about them, nor draw any 
consequences from them. In all our operations we may have an eye to 
theory. Nay, we must have it; for such is the constitution of our mind that 
theory becomes a source of error only when we indulge it too much, or 
:z Home cites Newton favoumbly (Hume ins: 282) and Adam Smith, in his lIistory of 
Astronomy, expresses clear admimtion for the Newtonian method, viewing it as the high point 
of centuries ofstudy (Smith 1982a: 97-lOS). By applying the Newtonian method to morals 
Home and Smith believed that they were engaged in a scientific, explanatory endeavour 
(Campbell 1975: 69). 
3 See also (Home 1978: 646) where he defends those who approach thcir reasoning through 
the empirical confirmation of hypotheses drawn from observation. And Ferguson: 'Mind, as 
well as body, has laws, which are exemplified in the practice of mcn, and which the critic 
collects only after the example has shewn what they arc.' (Ferguson 1995: 16S). 
of See also Ferguson (1973 voU: 89,279). 
attach ourselves to it beyond what the facts ~nd experiments justify. In 
short, theory is vain without experiments, and experiments are best 
understood by applying them to theory.' (Kames 1774 vol. 1: 1_3).5 
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Smith, in his History of Astronomy, expresses a similar understanding of the 
human propensity to seek after systematised knowledge. For Smith the purpose 
of science is explanation and the extension of knowledge, but this is not simply 
for the Baconian utilitarian reason that the knowledge of causes is power. 
Rather he explains the desire to practise science in terms of the sentiments. 
Occurrences that disturb the course of our habitual expectations elicit in us a 
sense of surprise at there having taken place (Smith 1982a: 40). This initial 
surprise gives way to a sense of wonder when we realise that we have nothing in 
our previous experience that can account for the event (Smith 1982a: 40-46). 
Wonder is an emotion that strikes up a feeling of unease within us (Smith 1982a: 
36). and the 'imagination feels a real difficulty in passing along two events which 
follow one another in an uncommon order' (Smith 1982a: 43). Wondrous 
events have this effect upon us, Smith believes, because of the manner in which 
we form our expectations. Our feelings towards events are shaped by our 
habitual acceptance of them and our expectation that they will continue to occur 
in the manner suggested to us by our previous experience (Smith 1982a: 37, 40). 
We develop habituated thought patterns or 'passages of thought' (Smith 1982a: 
45) which 'by custom become quite smooth and easy' (Smith 1982a: 45) and we 
are shaken from this manner of approaching the world only by events which fail 
to fit into our established patterns of thought. It is in the reaction to such 
surprising and wondrous events that we are to find the original impetus to 
science. This 'psychological need' (Skinner 1974: 169) for the explanation of 
wondrous events leads us to seek understanding in terms of cause and effect 
(Hume 1978: 406).6 The desire for explanation is a product ofa 'natural 
5 See also Lehmann (1971: 174), Hume (1978: xii-xix) and Ferguson (1994: 65). 
6 Both Smith and Hume are clear that this process, the desire to explain wondrous events in 
terms of science, is one which arises only after some economic progress has occurred. In 
simple societies this sense of wonder often invokes a mystical or religious explanation, but 
when a society materially advances and frees itself from the immediacy of savagery to such a 
degree as to support intellectual enquiry (Reisman 1976: 60-61) the reliance on miracles as 
explanatory devices gives way to rational enquiry. See below Part Two, Section One, Chapter 
3. 
36 
disposition to classify', or a 'propensity to categorise or classify' (Becker 1961: 
15-16) which is, for Smith, a facet of human nature.7 
The impulse to explain, to calm the mind through understanding and 
ordering our thoughts is, for Smith, a facet of human nature which underlines the 
gradual extension of the corpus of human knowledge. Once we have identified 
chains of cause and effect, and to some measure understood the relationships 
involved, it is as if a veil has been lifted from our eyes: 'Upon the clear discovery 
of a connecting chain of intermediate events, it [ wonder] vanishes altogether. 
What obstructed the movement of the imagination is then removed. Who 
wonders at the machinery of the opera-house who has once been admitted 
behind the scenes.' (Smith 1982a: 42). Scientific enquiry does not rest simply 
with the dispelling of the initial sense of wonder. Once we have explained some 
part of the causal relationship our in~rest is piqued and we begin to enquire 
after other related relationship~ (Smith 1982a: 42-43). Smith traces this point 
through his examination of the successive systems of astronomical thought. 
Again and again he stresses that the shift from an established theory to a' new 
mode of thought is brought about by a 'gap' in the existing system.s He writes: 
'The imagination had no hold of this immaterial virtue, and could form no 
determinate idea of what it consisted in. The imagination, indeed, felt a gap, or 
interval, betwixt the constant motion and the supposed inertness of the planets.' 
(Smith 1982a: 91). This passage, referring to Copernicus and Kepler, reveals 
the importance to Smith's theory of the progress of science of the notion of 
'gaps'. A 'gap' for Smith may be an explicit hole in a theory, an area on which 
the theorist has nothing to say yet which is deemed vital t6 the coherence of his 
system; or it may be a weak point where the argument becomes over-stretched 
or over-complicated in order to explain a phenomenon within the terms of the 
theory.9 In either case a 'gap' is perceived which causes uneasiness through the 
1 'we are by nature classificatory animals' (Broadie 2001: 195). Brown (1988: 46) asserts 
that, for Smith, the human mind is a 'classificatory system'. 
8 A similar point is made by Ferguson (Ferguson 1973 yoU: 117). 
9 See RUdiger (1989: 171). 
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theory's inability to lead the imagination along smoothly. This is the prompt to 
new enquiry and to the formulation of new theories. 10 
Newton, according to Smith, was one such 'gap-plugger' whose system 
supplanted those that went before by building upon them and filling in the 'gaps' 
which troubled those who studied them. The strength of Newton's science lay 
not only in his strict methodological oependence on evidence and corroboration, 
but also on the fact that his system was, as a whole, more coherent, more 
understandable and thus more convincing than those which preceded it. This 
shows, for Smith, yet another aspect of the human propensity to seek after 
systematised knowledge. Mankind finds beauty in the 'systematical arrangement 
of different observations connected by a few common principles' (Skinner 1974: 
172), and is thus naturally inclined, in order to ease the mind and to dispel 
wonder, to seek after means to plug 'gaps' in its existing knowledge (Smith 
1982a: 41-42). The role of the philosopher for Smith is that of explaining 
phenomena in a coherent and 'gapless' fashion (Smith 1982a: 43). But more 
than this, it is also a matter of providing explanations which are convincing; and 
this, as in the case of Newton, means not only that they are 'gap' free but that 
they are understandable to an audience. Thus when Smith wrote of Des Cartes' 
philosophy he referred to him as endeavouring 'to render familiar to the 
imagination' (Smith 1982a: 96) a series of difficult ideas through general rules. II 
Hume too asserts the need not only to keep philosophy in line with evidence, but 
also the need to relate it to common experience (Hume 1985: 18). As he puts it: 
'Even Philosophy went to Wrack by this moaping recluse Method of study 
[scholasticism], and became as chimerical in her conclusions as she was 
unintelligible in her stile and manner of delivery. And indeed, what cou'd be 
expected from Men who never consulted Experience in any of their reasonings, 
10 A number of authors have conunented.on the similarity bctween Smith's views here and the 
more recent work of Kuhn (Skinner 1976; O'Brien 1990: 162-165). For a more dctailed 
discussion of the growth of knowledge see below Part Two, Section Three, Chapter 3. 
11 The significance of the notion of general rules in the Scots' thought will be taken up at 
length below. 
or who never searched for that experience, where alone it is to be found, in 
common life and conversation?' (Burne 1985: 535).12 
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The role of the philosopher is to provide 'some chain of intermediate 
events' (Smith 1982a: 44) whose coherence banishes wonder from the 
imaginations of men. Philosophy is thus 'the science of the connecting principles 
of nature' (Smith 1982a: 45), and as such it attempts to make sense of the 
universe and to calm the mind: 'Philosophy, by representing the invisible chains 
which bind together all these disjointed objects, endeavours to introduce order 
into this chaos of jarring and discordant appearances, to allay this tumult of the 
imagination, and to restore it, when it surveys the great revolutions of the 
universe, to that tone of tranquillity and composure, which is both most 
agreeable in itself, and most suitable to its nature.' (Smith 1982a: 45-46). As a 
result philosophers, in order to calm our minds by the ide~tification of the chains 
that bind the universe, are seekers after theory. They are 'lovers of system' 
(Griswold 1999: 152), or purveyors of system (Burne 1985: 161, 180) whose 
aim it is to produce not solely explanations of a discrete phenomenon, but 
explanations of a whole chain of phenomena. 13 
Perhaps the clearest example of this is Smith's discussion of the early stages 
of science. The beginnings of the corpus of human knowledge lie, for Smith, in 
the description and classification of phenomena. Our imagination seeks to 
'arrange and methodise all its ideas, and to reduce them into proper classes and 
assortments', and as 'we further advance in knowledge and experience, the 
greater number of divisions and subdivisions of those Genera and Species we are 
both inclined and obliged to make' {Smith 1982a: 38).14 Thus we begin to form 
a system of knowledge based on the discrete classification of our experience. In 
other words we seek to order the world that we might better understand it, and 
thus calm our minds. Systems, in order to be attractive to us and to fulfil their 
role of plugging gaps in our knowledge, must be explained and understood: a 
12 See also Ferguson (1973 vo1.2: 485). Livingston notes that, for Hume, false philosophy is 
that which over-extends reason (Livingston 1989: 73-74). For a similar view see Conniff 
(1976: 97). 
13 For Smith's definition ofa system see (Smith 1982a: 66). See also Megill (1975). 
14 For a similar argument see Ferguson (1973 vol. 1: 64, 87, 100, 114). See also Hayek's 
psychological thought as discussed in Part Three, Section One. 
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system must be coherent if it is to prove attractive to our sentiments (Smith 
1982a: 63-64, 75).15 There is, then, a real difficulty with systems which are 
over-complex; systems which are, in Smith's terms 'of too intricate a nature to 
facilitate very much the effort of the imagination in conceiving it' (Smith 1982a: 
89). 
This, for Smith, is an explanation for the successive systems that he 
identifies in his History of Astronomy, Over-complexity, which arises when 
abstraction is required to explain phenomena within the terms of an established 
theory, lessens the hold of that system on the imagination. He argues: 'This 
system had now become as intricate and complex as those appearances 
themselves, which it had been invented to render uniform and coherent. The 
imagination, therefore, found itself but little relieved from the embarrassment, 
into which those appearances had thrown it, by so perplexed an account of 
things,' (Smith 1982a: 59).16 It is clear that, as human experience is not static, 
systems of knowledge must contrive to revise themselves in order to classify 
newly experienced events and pheno.mena (Smith 1982a: 40).17 Should a 
problem arise here, if the system is unable to explain a phenomena, leaving a 
gap, or if the explanation is so convoluted as to fail to convince and allow the 
easy passage of the mind (Smith 1982a: 89,91), then philosophers will begin a 
process of immanent criticism which will lead eventually to the development of a 
new system of thought (Smith 1982a: 71, 77).18 Smith's narrative of the shifts in 
the various systems of astronomical thought highlights this and ends, as we have 
seen. with an admiring survey of the work of Newton, lauding him for plugging 
gaps left by previous systems (Smith 1982a: 99). The desire to plug gaps, which 
we have noted before, is vital to the success of systems of understanding. The 
system builder, as Hume would have it: ' .. ,may then display his ingenuity, in 
15 See also: 'When the sentiment of the speaker is expressed in a neat, clear, plain and clever 
manner, and the passion or affection he is possessed of and intends, by sympathy, to 
communicate to his hearer, is plainly and cleverly hit off, then and then only the expression 
has all the force and beauty that language can give it.' (Smith 1985: 25). 
16 See also Hume (1978: 282), 
17 The significance of this belief will be reflected later when we come to discuss the notion of 
'iinmanent criticism', 
18 This process, for Smith, involved saving the best from previous systems and building on the 
work of the past (Smith 1982a: 53): Newton's 'Standing on the shoulders of giants', The 
importance of this observation will become clear as we proceed. 
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assigning these causes; and as a man of any subtilty can never be at a loss in this 
particular, he has thereby an opportunity of swelling his volumes, and 
discovering his profound knowledge, in observing what escapes the vulgar and 
ignorant.' (Hume 1985: Ill). If, despite the system to which the imagination 
has become accustomed (Smith 1982a: 41), we perceive ' ... two events [which] 
seem to stand at a distance from each other; it [the imagination] endeavours to 
bring them together, but they refuse to unite; and it feels, or imagines it feels, 
something like a gap or interval betwixt them.' (Smith 1982a: 41). Then we 
become dissatisfied with our current ~ystem as its explanatory force fails and we 
are again left open to the unease of wonder. 
Systems, in so far as they employ the language of cause and effect to 
explain phenomena, appear attractive to the human mind. Smith, and Dugald 
Stewart, both refer to systems of thought as being 'beautiful'. What Smith calls 
the 'beauty of order' (Smith 1984: 185), and Stewart refers to as 'systematical 
beauty' (Smith 1982a: 292), are sentimental reactions that link the ideas of utility 
and beauty. Men come to develop a love of system. Smith writes of: 'The same 
principles, the same love of system, the same regard to the beauty of order, of 
art and contrivance ... ' (Smith 1984: 185). Not only do we become attached to 
particular systems of thought the more that they calm our minds, but we also 
become more attached to the habit of seeking after systems of thought. 
What the Scots have done in laying out their 'sentimental' theory of the 
origins of science is to downplay the primacy of utility, as advanced by Bacon, 
and the abstracted rationalism of the scholastic tradition.19 This is not to say 
however that the Scots reject all notion of utility as an original prompt to 
science, rather they downgrade its role in the early development of science and 
in the common impulse which prompts us to seek explanation.20 Both Smith and 
Hume devote some attention to the nature of utility as a prompt to action and 
they both draw on the same analysis to relate the two. They view utility as 
something that we regard as beautiful, that is, as something which affects our 
19 They do not completely reject a role for utility in the motivations which prompt science, as 
Cropsey points out they advocate the pursuit of useful knowledge as a focus of enquiry 
(Cropsey 19S7: 6). 
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sentiments and prompts our admiration. Thus while the decision as to the utility 
of an object is based on reason, our attachment to it is rather based on an 
emotional response to this usefulness (Hume 1978: 298, 576-77; Smith 1982a: 
11; 1984: 179,200). We do not seek understanding in order that we might use 
it to our advantage: on the contrary we have an emotional need for 
understanding in order that our minds are able to function smoothly. 
The desire to produce systems of explanation is a long-standing facet of 
human nature which has expressed itself in all our enquiries into the unknown 
and which, to a large degree, has shaped the course of the development of 
science. That thirst for knowledge (Ferguson 1973 vol. 1 : 271) which was so 
excited by Newton's advances in method is not a new attribute of human life, 
but is rather an aspect of human nature which has been slowly, yet gradually, 
developing for as long as man has existed. In Scotland this Newtonian influence 
and the natural propensity to seek explanation developed a particular focus: the 
Scots became determined to apply scientific principles to the study of man and 
society. Writers in the Scottish school became convinced that not only was it 
possible to apply scientific method to the study of man, but that it was vital to 
the foundational stability of the other sciences to do so. 
20 Though it should be noted that Smith criticises Hume's account of justice for its excessively 
utilitarian aspects (Smith 1984: 87-88, 188). 
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Chapter 2: The Science of Man 
Of the Scots Hume is perhaps the most detailed in his explication of this 
issue. He is clear, in the introduction to the Treatise, that the science of man is 
vital to the progress of the other sciences. As he puts it: 'And as the science of 
man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only foundation 
we can give this science itself must be laid on experience and observation.' 
(Hume 1978: xvi). Hume believed that all science depended ultimately on the 
science of man because all knowledge is based on human perception and 
learning. Thus, if we are to pu!sue accurate science to satisfy our emotionally 
driven need for explanation, we must seek to understand how humans 
understand. For Hume this meant, as we saw above, the application of the 
'experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects' (Hume 1978: xi). This 
devotion to the experimental method, together with the aforementioned rejection 
of overly abstract theorising, are the key characteristics of the Scottish thinkers' 
pursuit of the study ofsociety.21 Science for the Scots was the careful study of 
the causal relationships by the means of which our imagination makes sense of 
the universe. Indeed much of the early parts ofHume's Treatise are given over 
to a careful examination of the relationship of cause and effect. Though we need 
not go into specifics here, it is perhaps wise to note Hume's conclusions on this 
matter as they were to prove so influential on many of the other Scots, in 
particular Adam Smith. 
Hume believed that the body of human knowledge is based on a series of 
habitual associations, garnered from experience, which exist in the imagination. 
Notions of cause and effect allow the mind to pass easily from one phenomenon 
to another by the steady flow of the imagination (Hume 1978: 400). Thus when 
we see a flame we expect to feel heat, because we have always done so. Our 
experience allows us to infer, or leads us to expect, phenomena to occur in that 
21 The discipline within which the Scots worked was, broadly, that of moral philosophy; but 
they did not understand this to mean the same as the modern, more narrow, conception of the 
term. For the Scots moral philosophy encompassed all matters relating to man and his 
relations to other men. Thus when the Scots studied and wrote on moral philosophy their 
subject matter included all that is now referred to by the collective name of social sciences -
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order in which we have previously known them to arise. The attribution of a 
causal relationship, from flame to heat, is based on a series of key conditions 
which, for Hume, build a causal relation in our minds drawn from our past 
experience. The principles of contiguity, of succession and of constant 
conjunction - that phenomena are somehow connected in situation, that one 
succeeds the other, and that they are always, in our experience, found in this 
manner - leads us to presume some necessary connection between them. The 
path of our mind, drawing on past experience, leads us to infer, or habitually to 
expect, phenomena to occur in the manner in which they have always done 
(Hume 1978: 650)?2 For Hume this process does not demand that we have an 
understanding of the precise nature of the causal relationship (Hume 1978: 75). 
We need not have any perception or.impression of why the two phenomena are 
related: it is enough thus far that we 'know' them by habit to be related. The 
precise identification of the causal relationship, or 'necessary connection', is not 
necessary for us to accept that such a relation exists. Hume believed that it was 
a far more profitable approach to follow the habitual nature of our attribution of 
cause and effect, and to seek out causal regularities from which we may then 
proceed to our enquiries rather than to proceed by the formulation of abstracted 
hypotheses. The fact that we cannot identify the nature of a causal relationship, 
or in some cases that we cannqt from our current experience find a cause to 
relate to the effect of a specific phenomena, does not for Hume entail that we 
should abandon our enquiries and attribute that phenomena to chance (Hume 
1985: 111-12; 1978: 125). Attributing things to chance cuts off all further hope 
of understanding, so for Hume what is explained by reference to chance is 
nothing but 'secret and unknown causes' (Hume 1985: 112), or causal 
relationships which we have yet to explain from experience.23 
economics, anthropology, psychology, politics, sociology and, moreover, jurispmdence, law, 
history, social philosophy, linguistics, aesthetics and geography. 
22 As Rendall would have it, causal belief is 'a feeling rather than a rational understanding' 
(Rendall 1978: 97). See also Miller (1981: 19). 
23 This overwhelming concern with causation indicates a significant feature of tlle Scots' [and 
Spontaneous Order thinkers more generally] work in tllat tltey are primarily engaged in a 
project of explanation ratlter than one of justification. Campbell and Ross argue that: 'Smitlt's 
works are primarily analytic and explanatory' (Campbell and Ross 1981: 73); while Gee refers 
to Smitlt's 'definitional approach' (Gee 1968: 286) and Becker believes that his aim is to 
'explain' society (Becker 1961: 13).' See also Raphael (1975: 98). Rendall notes tltat what 
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If our knowledge is based on a series of habitual relations grounded in 
experience, then this further supports the pursuit of an experimental approach to 
scientific enquiry. This empirical method is an attempt to formalise and to 
understand the habitual acceptance of causal relations which allow us to carry on 
our lives. The chief difficulty here for the Scots is the same problem which has 
plagued the social sciences since their inception: that there is little or no scope 
for controlled experimentation. Hume realises this early on, in the introduction 
to the Treatise he writes: 'Moral philosophy has, indeed, this peculiar 
disadvantage, which is not found in natural, that in collecting its experiments, it 
cannot make them purposely, with premeditation ... this reflection and 
premeditation would so disturb the operation of my natural principles, as must 
render it impossible to form any just conclusion from the phaenomenon' CHume 
1978: xviii_ix).24 The Scots, then, must find some other way of adapting the 
experimental method to social situations, and, while doing so, be able to retain 
all that makes this method so successful. 
In answer to this problem the Scots hit upon the extension of the 
observational method to human life as it is, and as it has been lived. If the 
natural scientist draws on his observation and experience to build a theory which 
is supported by careful observation of controlled experiments; then the Scots, in 
the absence of controlled experiments, would simply extend the observational 
and experimental bases and seek corroboration for their thought in the records 
of human experience which form history. As Hume puts it: 
'We must therefore glean up our experiments in this science from a 
cautious observation of human life, and take them as they appear in the 
common course of the world, by men's behaviour in company, in affairs, 
and in their pleasures. Where experiments of this kind are judiciously 
collected and compared, we may hope to establish on them a science, which 
will not be inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in utility to any 
other of human comprehension.' (Hume 1978: xix). 
distinguishes Ferguson from Smith and Hume is his greater concern with justification rather 
than analytical explanation (Rendall 1978: 149). 
24 Ferguson also notes the worrying moral implications of conducting deliberate experiments 
on human beings (Ferguson 1973 vol.l: 96). 
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This gives rise to the Scots' peculiar focus on, and fascination with, historical 
writings, and to their own specific comparative approach to the study of history. 
The common pursuit of which is to be found in the work of the whole school of 
thinkers. It is this 'conjectural history' that marks out the Scots in the early 
development of social science.2S 
Dugald Stewart, in his Life of Adam Smith, is clear that the development of 
what he calls 'Theoretical or Conjectural History' (Smith 1982a: 293) was one 
of the key accomplishments of the Scottish Enlightenment. Though most of the 
Scots have something to say on the methodology of conjectural history, the 
clearest definition of what the Scots were attempting can be found in the 
writings of Lord Kames. 26 He argues: 
'In tracing the history oflaw through dark ages, unproved with records, or 
so slenderly provided as not to afford any regular historical chain, we must 
endeavour to supply the broken links, hints from poets and historians, by 
collateral facts, and by cautious conjectures drawn from the nature of 
government, of the people, and of the times. Ifwe use all the light that is 
afforded, and if the conjectural facts correspond with the few fa~ts that are 
distinctly vouched, and join all in one regular chain, more cannot be 
expected from human endeavours.' (Kames 1776: 25-6~ Ross 1972: 208)?7 
What Kames is suggesting here is that it is possible to build up a general theory 
of history, to trace change through time and to identify progress in social matters 
from the careful comparison of the evidence of various sources. 
In many respects the Scots can be regarded as among the first practitioners 
of the comparative method which has become so central to social science 
(Rendall 1978: 123). Hume stresses the vital importance of comparison to our 
mode of thinking. He argues that all reasoning is a form of comparison (Hume 
1978: 73), and that our judgements are all more or less based on comparisons 
25 Brewer has argued that, though each of the Scots has his own particular 'take' on 
conjectural history, the general approach characterises much of the historical enquiry of the 
time (Brewer 1989: 15-16). 
26 Remarks can be found in Hume (1985), Ferguson (1995), Millar (1990) and Robertson 
(1769). 
27 See also Gregory (1788: 221). 
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between phenomena (Hume 1978: 291, 315).28 From this Hume is able to 
develop an argument that our judgements are based on comparison, that is to say 
that we approach objects not in relation to their intrinsic value, but rather in 
relation to their subjective, comparative value (Hume 1978: 372).29 He writes in 
his essay On the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature that our moral 
judgements are 'commonly more' (Burne 1985: 81) influenced by processes of 
comparison than by eternally fixed standards.30 
The Scots believed that the examination of corroborated evidence would 
allow them to draw out rules of behaviour that would amount to a scientific 
history (Robertson 1769: 307). Dugald Stewart discusses this, arguing: 
'In this want of direct evi~ence, we are under a necessity of supplying the 
place of fact by conjecture; and when we are unable to ascertain how men 
actually conducted themselves upon particular occasions, of considering in 
what manner they are likely to have proceeded, from the principles of their 
nature, and the circumstances of their external situation. In such inquiries, 
. 
the detached facts which travels and voyages afford us, may frequently 
serve as land-marks to our speculations; and sometimes our conclusions a 
priori, may tend to confirm the credibility of facts, which, on a superficial 
view, appeared to be doubtful or incredible.' (Smith 1982a: 293).31 
Such a method is based on a number of key assumptions. The most 
important of these is that there exists a universal human nature which is, at base, 
unchanging.32 The habitual expectations which form the basis of natural science 
28 See MacNabb (1966: 49). 
29 This is a point that will become particularly significant later in relation to the Scots' 
analysis of sympathy. See Part Two, Section Two. 
30 Hume also draws on notions of comparison in his theory of aesUletics. In the essay Of the 
Standard of Taste (Hume 1985: 238, 243) he links experience to comparison in the role of the 
critic. Here he is keen to argue that it is possible to develop a universal standard of taste when 
arguments are made in relation to comparison and evidence. This provides an objective 
standard of taste. Where rational comparison is absent we are left solcly with subjcctive value 
judgements with which it is impossible to argue. There is here some considerable similarity 
with the methodology of conjectural history: the objective standard [equilibrium] arising from 
rational comparison and leading to the generation of generalised principles. 
31 It should be noted here that Stewart is not approving of a priori reasoning per se, rather he 
is pointing out that uncorroborated evidence from one source, if held to be true and used as the 
. basis of a hypothesis, is a species of a priori judgement. 
32 'Constancy of Human Nature, for Hume, is a methodological principle which makes history 
possible; that is, possible for there to be any consistency and credibility in what tIle historian 
says.' (Wertz 1975: 491). See also Berry (1982: 57) and Bryson (1968: 25,83-83). Skinner 
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are premised on the notion that nature is in some basic sense unchanging; we 
expect there to be heat with a flame because it has always been so [Hume's 
constant conjunction]. In the social sphere this model of constant conjunction 
must be present to allow us to form habitual expectations. Thus there must exist 
some universal principles of human behaviour, and for the Scots these lay in the 
principles of human nature. These 'known principles of human nature' (Smith 
1982a: 293) are themselves to be drawn from the careful observation of 
historical experience. As with Hume·s view on the possibility of a universal 
standard oftaste which we noted above (Hume 1985: 243i3, the existence ofa 
universal human nature may be discerned from the deployment of the 
comparative method. A conjectural history of human nature is what underpins 
the broader practice of conjectural history (Broadie 2001: 67-68). Smith notes 
that the science of man is impossible without such a conception of a universal 
human nature. He argues: 'Things of so fleeting a nature can never be the 
objects of science, or of any steady or permanent judgement... The objects of 
science ... must be permanent, unchangeable, always existent, and liable neither to 
generation nor corruption, nor alteration of any kind ... Man is perpetually 
changing every particle of his body ... But humanity, or human nature, is always 
existent, is always the same, is never generated, and is never corrupted.' (Smith 
1982a: 121). Drawing on what we know of ourselves and our own actions, and 
corroborating this with examples from history and literature allows us to identify 
key aspects of human behaviour that are in some sense trans-historical. That is, 
they are akin in form to the universality of nature, or that they are as much 
natural laws as those which guide the physical sciences (Hume 1978: 402_3).34 
If the evidence of history and observation may be drawn upon to show 
regularities in human reactions to external stimuli, then we are able to formulate 
some simple principles [or general rules] that apply in all ages and in all cultures. 
As Hume famously put it: 
notes that Smith follows Hume in insisting on a constant and universal human nature (Skinner 
1974: 165); while Livingston compares its role in his thought to that played by the empirical 
regularities of the natural sciences - such as the laws of gravity (Livingston 1984: 222). 
33 Gay notes that Hume's aesthetics rely on the assumption of the underlying universality of a 
constant human nature in order to draw generalisations (Gay 1969: 306-10). 
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'It is universally acknowl~dged that there is a great uniformity among the 
actions of men, in all nations and ages, and that human nature remains still 
the same, in its principles and operations. The same motives always 
produce the same actions: The same events follow from the same 
causes ... Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history 
informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular. Its chief use is only 
to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature by 
showing men in all varieties of circumstances and situations and furnishing 
us with materials from which we may form our observations and become 
acquainted with the regular springs of human action and behaviour.' (Hume 
1975: 83). 
The Scots' conception ofa universal human nature was not, however, a 
species of crude ahistoricism or cultural insensitivity.3s On the contrary the 
Scots made it the centre of their study to examine the differences which arise in 
human actions through time and across cultures.36 Far from seeing these 
aberrations from a universal human nature as a weakness of the Scots' approach, 
Hume instead drew upon them to deepen the Scots' project. He argued: 
'We must not, however, expect that this uniformity of human actions should 
be carried to such a length as that all men, in the same circumstances, will 
always act precisely in the same manner, without making any allowance for 
the diversity of characters, prejudices, and opinions. Such a uniformity in 
every particular, is found in no part of nature. On the contrary, from 
observing that variety of conduct in different men, we are enabled to form a 
greater variety of maxims, which still suppose a degree of uniformity and 
regularity.' (Hume 1975: 85). 
Hume again: 'All birds of the' same species in every age and country, build their 
nests alike: In this we see the force of instinct. Men, in different times and 
34 Rendall refers to Hume's project as being the development of a 'psychology of human 
nature' (Rendall 1978: 96). 
3S The Scots also highlight the need for detachment in the conjectural historian's attitude to 
other cultures. They were aware of the difficulties of approaching other cultures through the 
preconceptions of one's own and cautioned against the danger of ethnocentric bias. See 
Ferguson (1994: 184~ 1973 vol. 2: 142) and Dunbar (1995: 152, 164). 
36 Smith's Lectures on Jurisprudence are replete with examples cited from a variety of nations 
which he uses to highlight differing responses to similar legal problems. 
... 
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places, frame their houses differently: Here we perceive the influence of reason 
and custom.' (Hume 1975: 202). What this illustrates is that the condition of 
society affects the broad manifestation of human nature.37 That is, the 
manifestation of the human need for shelter differs through the influence of 
experience and custom: that is the context is important.38 But beyond this, in 
keeping with the desire to seek out a few simple rules for the science of man, the 
Scots held that there was an underlying universality in the fact that humans do 
indeed always seek shelter and that this underlying universality could be 
identified from the careful observation ofhistory.39 In Hume's assertion we see 
a distinct claim that the explanatory factor for the difference of behaviour in 
different places is 'reason and custom', that is to say that social or 'moral' 
causes explain the differences in human behaviour (Hume 1978: 404; 1985: 
198). Here Hume is asserting a view common to all of the Scots and vital to 
their project of a scientific history. For if physical causes (Hume 1985: 198) are 
held to determine behaviour then the idea of a universal human history is 
exploded into that of discrete geographical histories. The Scots must reject any 
sense of the determination of human behaviour being explained by the physical 
environment if they are to be able to .conduct conjectural history on a grand scale 
to support the science of man. In his essay On National Character Hume 
demolishes the argument from physical causes most famously associated with 
Montesquieu. In so doing he draws on a key premise of the Scots' conjectural 
history. 40 What Hume argues is that the customs and behaviour of humans 
cannot be attributed to the physical environment alone. Indeed he goes so far as 
to argue that moral causes are of equal strength to physical causes in his famous 
example of the prison (Hume 1978: 406). Here a man is kept in prison as much 
by the moral cause of the guard's incorruptibility as by the stone of the walts.41 
37 'the peculiar nature of their history lies in the link which it establishes between the constant 
£rinciples of human nature and the changing environment of man.' (Skinner 1965: 5). 
8 What Berry refers to as 'underlying functional universalities', or in Hume's terms 'constant 
sfrings' (Berry 1982: 59,61). 
3 For an example of this see Millar (1812 vol. 4: 363), and the discussion below on child 
exposure in Part Two, Section Two, Chapter 2. 
40 And also in the essay On the populousness of ancient nations (Hume 1985: 378). 
41 For discussions of tile Scots views on this matter see Bryson (1968: 106) and Charnley 
(1975). 
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Hume's argument against physical causes hinges on two important 
historical facts (Hume 1985: 204-7). First the manners of a people differ 
through time while their physical environment remains the same. Thus the 
inhabitants of Germany described by Tacitus differ vastly from the modern 
inhabitants of the same physical environment: climate cannot be the deciding 
factor in the explanation of this change. Similarly the customs of near 
neighbouring countries, such as England and Scotland, differ to an extent that 
cannot be explained by the small difference in their physical situation. The Scots 
must explain the change in the customary practice of the inhabitants of a 
particular situation through time. To achieve this they draw strongly on their 
conception of moral causes. Or as Hume puts it, that people who interact on a 
regular basis develop customary modes of behaviour that they share through 
socialisation (Hume 1985: 202).42 Through conjectural history the Scots 
developed a 'four stages' theory of cultural change which accounted for 
difference through time by reference to the changing economic condition of the 
country.43 This, they believed, was a more convincing explanation than mere 
physical situation. This is not to say however that the Scots totally rejected the 
significance of physical causes, rather they viewed their influence as operating 
through moral causes. As Dunbar puts it: ' ... causes physical in their nature, are 
often moral only in their operation' (Dunbar 1995: 296).44 The influence of the 
physical environment is filtered through the medium of moral, particularly 
economic, causes. 
The Scots' social science was an attempt to examine and to explain these 
differing customs. By comparing, for example, the records of Tacitus on the 
Germans with those of contemporary writers on the Native Americans [As 
Robertson did (Robertson 1769)], it is possible to corroborate each account by 
noticing the similar characteristics.45 From this we are able to identity common 
42 See Part Two, Section Two, Chapter 1 on sociability. 
43 See below Part Two, Section Three, Chapter 1. 
44 See also Dunbar (1995: 239). 
45 Lopreato criticises this approach in that it posits an unsubstantiated unilinear view of 
progress. He argues that the idea that Native Americans are at the same level as our ancestors 
is inaccurate because they lack the characteristics which turned our ancestors into us (Lopreato 
1984: 53). This view, however, misses the point, in that the nature of conjectural history is of 
a composite model and not an assertion of historical fact. It does not depend on a unilinear 
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features which can be attributed to human societies in a particular stage of 
development. This allows the Scots to produce stadial theories of history and 
Smith, Millar, Kames and to a lesser extent Ferguson, all draw on this to explain 
the customary practices of societies at differing stages of development. 46 
Conjectural history must, however, be undertaken with care and scientific rigour. 
All sources must be considered for their accuracy and veracity, and the 
observations which they recount must be corroborated by like evidence from 
other sources, both historical and from our own experience of human 
behaviour.47 Before building a theory around the evidence of conjectural history 
the Scots wanted to be particularly sure that the evidence with which they dealt 
was genuine. This having been established by the careful selection and 
. comparison of sources, the Scots were then free to search for causal regularities 
and to form theories as to the determining factors in the development of human 
society.48 
model of progress (HOpfl1978: 24) because: 'the subject of conjectural history is not this or 
that society, or [still less] the human race, but the typical "society", "nation", or "people".' 
(HOpfl1978: 25, his italics). Conjectural history is a process of classification, or ordering, 
used to make sense of the world and not to assert necessary or deterministic notions of 
development (HOpfl1978: 39). In Hayek's terms it is a 'composite model' (See Below Part 
Three, Section One, Chapter 2). 
46 Ferguson appears to operate with three stages rather than four [Savage, Barbarian, 
Polished]. 
47 Millar (1990); Hume (1985: 381; 1975: 84); Ferguson (1995); Stuart (1995: vi) and 
Robertson (1777). 
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Chapter Three: Simple Models of Understanding 
Before proceeding to an examination of the Scots rejection of what they 
view as mistaken approaches to the explanation of social phenomena we ought 
to note that many of the problems that they identify with what we will call 
'simple models of explanation' are a direct product of the human desire for order 
and explanation. There is a range of problems that the Scots associate with this 
h~man love of systems. Chief among these is what Smith refers to as the 'spirit 
of system': 'From a certain spirit of system, however, from a certain love of art 
and contrivance, we sometimes seem to value the means before the end, and to 
be eager to promote the happiness of our fellow-creatures, rather from a view to 
. 
perfect and promote a certain beautiful and orderly system, than from any 
immediate sense or feeling of'Yhat they either suffer or enjoy.' (Smith 1984: 
185). There is a danger that, in our desire to hold onto the systems that we 
create, we run the risk of losing our sense of priorities: of elevating the means 
above the end. 
It is possible that our attraction to systems may lead us to over-extend or 
over-simplify them in order to keep ahold of them. Once we hit upon a system 
of thought that seems to serve us well in some areas, we are prone to extend its 
terms of reference beyond that area in which it first arose. Smith makes this 
point when he notes' ... systems which have universally owed their origin to the 
lubrications of those who were acquainted with one art, but ignorant of the 
other; who therefore explained to themselves the phaenomena, in that which was 
strange to them, by those in that which was familiar' (Smith 1982a: 47).49 This 
is reminiscent of Kames' earlier point about our tendency to over-theorise: in 
seeking to extend our system of knowledge we become prone to reasoning 
beyond what the evidence supports. Some philosophers tend to excessive 
abstraction from the original bases of their thought (Hume 1985: 174-75), 
leading to systems of thought which fail to convince the imagination and lead us 
to the confused apprehension of gaps. But beyond this systems themselves are 
48 Lehmann refers to the conjectural method as 'evolutionistic naturalism' (Lehmann 1971: 
178). 
49 As we will see in Part Three this is a favourite quotation of the Modem Liberals. 
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open to the same errors as the practice of all science. A philosopher who builds 
a system on selective or limited grounds is open to the possibility of extending 
his system through sheer devotion to it, of extending it even when faced by 
contrary evidence. Thus it becomes a real danger that the system itself may 
become too abstract (Hume 1978: 254) to fulfil the calming role that it was 
originally conceived to fill. And in the end we might end up deceiving ourselves 
in order to preserve a system in which gaps have become apparent through over-
.complexity (Smith 1984: 233). 
This is particularly the case in moral systems where the Scots identify an 
inclination in some which leads to factionalism and the development of sects 
which hold a devotional belief in a certain system of moral thought. 50 There is a 
real problem here: our attraction to a particular system of belief often becomes 
such that we view it as infallible, our belief in it becomes akin to a faith. Thus 
Burne attacks: ' ... all moralists, whose judgement is ... perverted by a strict 
adherence to system .. ' (Hume 1978: 609). This problem is further compounded 
in the moral sphere by what the Scots identify as problems in the creation of 
systems. Systems of moral thought are often the product of party or factional 
bias, they are created to support political positions rather than to advance 
understanding (Hume 1985: 160,465-66,490). This bias may arise from 
personal temper in the system builder (Hume 1985: 169), or from party bias and 
a desire to legitimise a particular political position (Hume 1985: 64), but in 
either case it can lead to a possible factionalism in terms of responses to the 
system and encourage fanatici~m among the system's adherents. As Smith puts 
it: 'The great body of the party are commonly intoxicated with the imaginary 
beauty of this ideal system, of which they have no experience, but which has 
been represented to them in all the most dazzling colours in which the eloquence 
of their leaders could paint it.' (Smith 1984: 232). 
There is a danger in moral philosophy when the tendency to factionalism 
renders moral debates little more than subjective arguments (Hume 1985: 230), 
. 
but the Scots wish to go beyond this and to seek out objective truth in moral 
matters [Just as they hope to build an inter-subjective standard of taste]. They 
50 See Hume on factions and sects (Hume 1985: 63). And Griswold (1999: 208). 
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believe that moral philosophy, open as it is to error on so many grounds (Hume 
1985: 159, 169; 1978: 180), must be undertaken with the utmost care and 
scientific rigour. We must be cautious, in examining moral matters, to keep our 
speculations in line with the evidence (Hume 1985: 113,366), and in seeking 
clarity of expression that allows a clear debate (Hume 1985: 227). At the same 
time, and in order to remain scientific in our approach, we must relate 
'philosophy' to real life and to 'experience (Hume 1985: 174-75,534): our 
theorising must be explanatory.51 In brief we must exercise extreme care in our 
analysis of political systems (Smith 1982a: 318). 
We have already seen that the Scots had developed their own particular 
scientific methodology for the pursuit of social science and we have noted the 
key role to be played in this by their conception of a conjectural history. Before 
proceeding to an examination of the Scots' understanding of the origin and 
development of social institutions grounded in their conjectural historicising, it is 
perhaps best to examine their use of the 'scientific' method to oppose pre- . 
existing models of explanation and understanding. As we have seen the Scottish 
Enlightenment wished to set the study of society on secure methodological 
foundations akin to those which had recently taken hold in the natural sciences, 
and each thinker in tum rejects the established systems of political study in 
favour ofa new, more 'scientific' in their eyes, understanding of the origins and 
legitimacy of society and government. For a proper understanding of the 
significance of the Scots' arguments .against established models of political 
understanding it must first be noted that each writer argues against models which 
involve the direct intervention of the deity and against models of what we might 
call. after Hayek, 'constructivist rationalism'; and that in opposition to these 
views they advance arguments favouring the gradualist unintended consequence 
style of development which typifies the spontaneous order approach. The Scots' 
rejection of these established systems of understanding, but in particular their 
rejection of contracts and legislators, is premised on a belief in the unlikelihood, 
and in some cases the impossibility, of deliberate human action acting according 
51 We see here that the Scots clearly commit themselves to an explanatory, and not a 
justificatory project A point that will become increasingly apparent in the following Chapter. 
to a prior, rationally conceived plan, having been responsible for the origins of 
society and government. 
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This desire to view society as a deliberately planned artifice is noted by both 
Smith and Ferguson.52 Ferguson argues against such systems of thought, 
contesting that they are simplifications based on the absence of record or 
knowledge. As he puts it: 'An author and a work, like cause and effect, are 
perpetually coupled together. This is the simplest form under which we can 
consider the establishment of nations: and we ascribe to previous design, what 
came to be known only by experience .. .' (Ferguson 1995: 120). Such 
approaches are, for Ferguson, unscientific and at odds with the empirical and 
scientific method that he wishes to pursue. Attempts to explain the origins of 
society which do not ground themselves in established evidence, or reasonable 
conjecture based on that evidence, fail, in Ferguson's view, to provide a firm 
basis for knowledge. He believes that theories such as those that rely on the 
direct intervention of God or upon nptions of contract, or tales of great 
legislators, are attempted projections aimed at filling the gaps in our knowledge 
of history without any real reference to evidence. He argues: 
'We are often tempted into these boundless regions of ignorance or 
conjecture, by a fancy which delights in creating rather than in merely 
retaining the forms which are presented before it: we are the dupes of a 
subtilty, which promises to supply every defect of our knowledge, and, by 
filling up a few blanks in t~e story of nature, pretends to conduct our 
apprehension nearer to the source of existence.' (Ferguson 1995: 12).'3 
Drawing on historical evidence and 'scientific' understanding the Scots set 
out to oppose four such forms of explanation which they regarded as simplistic, 
inaccurate, unscientific and thus misleading. The first of these forms, that of 
direct divine intervention, is dealt with during the Scots' various writings on 
polytheism, superstition, and miracles. Following that is the Scots' rejection of 
indirect divine agency in the form of divine right arguments. The third form is 
52 For a discussion ofHume's views on the matter see Bernard (1994: 227), who argues that 
Hume similarly rejected such notions as anthropomorphic errors. See also Ferreira (1995) and 
Broadie (2001: 135). 
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the classical doctrine of the great legislator which ascribes the institution of 
states and legal systems to the deliberate actions of great men or to direct human 
agency (Kidd 1993: 81). And finally, and closest historically to the Scots own 
time period, they set out to demolish the arguments of the social contract 
tradition which understands the origins of government through the rational 
agreement of many people acting together in a purposive manner.S4 
A) Polytheism 
The Scots, undertaking a conjectural or natural history of religion, generally 
refer to polytheistic religious belief as the earliest and most simple form of 
understanding. As a result it is, for the Scots, the belief system of the 
uninstructed savage. The savage, who lacks understanding because of the 
precariousness of his position - that is to say that his pursuit of subsistence 
narrows his attention to that one activity (Millar 1990: 3; Hume 1985: 59; 
Ferguson 1973 vol. 1 : 168) - is not in a position to reflect on the nature of the 
universe." That which he does not understand, yet which attracts his attention, 
he explains in terms of the direct intervention of anthropomorphic deities. Thus 
the 'irregularities of nature' (Smith 1982a: 48) are attributed to the direct actions 
of a multiplicity of deities which each have power over their set field, and act 
from motivations analogous to· those of man. But, as the Scots note, such 
beliefs were founded on ignorance: they were superstitions (Hume 1975: 119) 
which sought to explain gaps in our knowledge and experience by attributing 
purposive actions to invisible deities. What the savage could not explain from 
his limited experience he attributed to some invisible superhuman being which 
differed from Man not in his motivations but only in the extent of his powers. S6 
53 See also Ferguson (1995: 16) where he refers to our desire to create short cuts to knowledge 
bI the creation of systems that we treat as truths. 
5 It is also worth noting that the Scots are higbJy sceptical about utopian political thought in 
~eneral (Hume 1985: 514; Smith 1981: 471). 
S Hayek makes a similar point regarding the immediacy of savages (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 97). 
56 Smith highlights this by noting that in all polytheistic religions it is irregular events which 
are related to deities (Smith 1982a: 49), that is to say events which inspire wonder in the 
savage by exceeding the bounds of his habitual experience force him to have recourse to 
explanation in tenns of divine intervention. See Part One, Chapter 3 wbere Macfie applies 
tillS to Smith's discussion of the invisible11and of Jupiter. 
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Such forms of understanding, the Scots believe, fall out offavour as society 
progresses economically. As material development occurs in line with the 
growth of experience based knowledge, humans gradually acquire a degree of 
leisure time in which they are able to consider those irregular phenomena 
previously ascribed by them to specific deities. As enquiry grows, according to 
Smith (Smith 1982a: 50), man becomes more favourable to ideas that reveal the 
links between phenomena. Men therefore move away from notions of direct 
divine intervention and develop more complex understandings of phenomena. 
They begin, so Smith thinks, to view the phenomena of nature as regular rather 
than irregular occurrences, and thus begin to enquire into the nature of this 
regularity and the connections between phenomena in order to satisfy the human 
propensity to produce systema~ic knowledge (Smith 1982a: 113).~7 
Understandably this process is accelerated amongst those cultures that have 
achieved the greatest material advance, and within societies by those groups 
which have access to the greatest leisure time. ~8 
Polytheistic religion falls out of favour as society progresses in terms of 
material wealth and knowledge. The advent and pursuit of science hasten the 
demise of a belief in direct divine intervention and it gives way to forms of 
religion that view God as an agent of creation though not of everyday action. 
The creation myths of polytheistic religions, which explained the creation of their 
deities as well as of the world, give way to the notion of a single and 
universalistic Deity responsible for all creation (Smith 1982a: 113). Such a 
Deity becomes progressively refined as the 'natural history of religion' proceeds . 
and is gradually stripped of anthropomorphic features and motivations. This 
process continues until, in the Scot~' view, a position of Theism is reached 
whereby the Deity's actions proceed according to general rules which govern the 
whole of the universe, are observable in nature, and not to be attributed to the 
direct intervention of God (Kames 1774 vol. 2: 404). The Scots were deeply 
suspicious of cases where direct intervention, such as miracles, were claimed. 
Hume in particular rejects the notion of a miracle much in the same manner as he 
51 See above on Science. 
58 As we will see in the following sections the division of labour plays a vital role in this 
process. 
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dislikes attributing phenomena to chance. Miraculous events for Hume are the 
product ofisecret or unknown causes' (Hume 1985: 112; 1975: 109-31) which 
mayor may not be divine in origin but which ought to be examined through the 
same rigorously scientific lens as all other natural phenomena (Berry 1997: 173-
74; Stewart 1994; Whelan 1985: 92). Similarly superstitions, such as the belief 
in witches, will fall out of use as human knowledge and society advance, and a 
key part of that advance was the scientific approach to phenomena and the 
rejection of direct divine intervention. 
B) Divine Right 
Having rejected notions of direct divine intervention in favour of a theistic 
understanding of God as the creator of the whole system the Scots go on to 
reject theories of indirect divine intervention in the origins and organisation of 
society. In particular the Scot~ reject that tradition of argument that had become 
know as the divine right of Kings. As Hume notes in his essay Of the Original 
Contract, the contrasting models of contract and divine right guided the 
factional struggles between Whigs and Tories, Protestants and Catholics, and 
Hanoverians and lacobites in the party politics of 17th and 18th Century Britain 
(Hume 1985: 465).59 Hume and Smith both argue that these contrasting 
theories were the creations of those factions which advanced them (Hume 1985: 
64-72; Smith 1982b: 320, 402). Smith states that the natural inclination 
towards, or the emotional attachment to, Whig or Tory positions predates either 
theory and that the theories themselves were in turn developed to support pre-
existing political positions. The Scots were, as we have seen, instantly wary of 
systems built around factional positions and not drawn from scientific 
examination of the evidence.60 
59 See also Hume (1985: 32-36). 
60 See Smith (1984: 156) where he argues the futility of appeals to God in politics. 
Haakonssen and Raphael both note Smith's preference for secular modes of argument 
(Haakonssen 1990: 205; Raphael 1979). We see here the beginning of a line of argument that 
is characteristic of the spontaneous order approach and which distinguishes them witbin 
liberalism. They are wary of overtly justificatory arguments, and instead base their claims on 
explanatory theories. 
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Although divine right arguments had passed out of favour in Britain with 
the Glorious Revolution and the Hanoverian succession (Bryson 1968: 190), 
they remained nonetheless a powerful force in continental Europe. Of the Scots, 
Hume is the most detailed in his reference to and opposition to this mode of 
thinking, though Smith refers to it disparagingly in the Lectures on 
Jurisprudence (Smith 1982b: 315, 319-20, 402). In Hume's essays OJ the 
Original Contract and OJ the Protestant Succession he rejects divine right 
arguments as inaccurate. He concedes that if one believes in a Deity, then it is 
reasonable to hold that the Deity is responsible for the creation of government. 
. That is to say that the beneficial institution of government is the product of the 
Deity's plan enacted through the actions of men (Hume 1985: 275). This having 
been said, Hume argues, is not the same as accepting the divine right of a 
particular person to act as Sovereign. Without direct divine intervention 
['particular or miraculous interposition' (Hume 1985: 275)] no ruler can claim his 
position as a divinely ordained right. Rather the institution of government itself 
exists as a result of the Deity, and thus no one man may base a claim to title or 
authority solely on the will of God without explicit evidence that God's will 
favours him. Claims of divine right, while arguing for indirect divine 
intervention, are in fact forced by this argument to fall back on some direct 
divine action or miracle which, as we have seen, the Scots had strong concerns 
over. The small amount that the Scots write on the subject of divine right 
arguments is testament to its outmodishness in Britain following the fall of the 
House of Stuart: but it highlights their [particularly Hume's] rejection of indirect 
divine intervention by the Deity in human affairs (Hume 1985: 51). Following 
the Theistic model, premised on the evidence of design, the Scots are able to 
argue that God lays down the general rules by which human society operates, 
without in any way intervening in the specifics of their operation. God, it might 
be said, proceeds along general rules and does not concern himself with 
specifics. 
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C) Great Legislators 
The most detailed rejection of great legislator arguments in the work of the 
. 
Scots is to be found in the writings of Fer gus on and Millar.61 Both of these 
writers utilise similar arguments against what they view as a product of 
mythological history, and instead advance their own 'scientific' understandings of 
the issues involved. Ferguson and Millar present two clear arguments for the 
inaccuracy of great legislator theories. Their first view is that there is no 
accurate and detailed historical record of such figures, and their second is that 
the very notion of one man being able to organise the whole of a society is 
improbable. As Millar puts it: 'as the greater part of those heroes or sages that 
are reputed to have been the founders and modelers of states, are only recorded 
by uncertain tradition, or by fabulous history, we may be allowed to suspect that, 
from the obscurity in which they are placed, or from the admiration of distant 
posterity, their labours have been exaggerated, and misrepresented.' (Millar 
1990: 7), and as Ferguson asserts: 'We are therefore to receive, with caution, the 
traditionary histories of ancient legislators, and founders of states.' (Ferguson 
1995: 120). 
Instead of accurate historical evidence what we have are mythical histories 
based on the human propensity for the assumption of design. 62 Such semi-
historical, semi-mythical figure"s as Lycurgus, Romulus, King Alfred and Brama 
(Millar 1990: 6; Ferguson 1995: 121; Hume 1985: 55) have had the design of 
social systems attributed to them by popular histories which lacked the analytical 
tools to view the institution of laws by any other means than deliberate 
constitution writing.63 Such simple models of understanding demonstrate the 
61 Though Hume also rejects them (Hume 1985: 15). 
62 See also Ferguson (1995: 120) and Dunbar (1995: 93). Hayek expresses approval of the 
Scots views on this matter (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 81, 118). 
63 Smith follows this line of thought when he contrasts Thucydides with Herodotus. arguing 
that the former is the superior historian because he does not digress on the personalities of the 
individuals that he writes about, but rather writes a fluid narrative (Smith 1985: 94). This 
does not however imply that the Scots adopt a form of methodological holism. Both Lehmann 
and Vanberg assert that the Scots are committed to a form of methodological individualism 
(Lehmann 1930: 157~ Vanberg 1986: 80). Jones notes that: 'Hume is loathe to consider 
groups of men as agents, in the strict sense: individual men are agents. motivated by their 
passions rather than by reason and reflection' (Jones 1990: 6-7). 
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most obvious mental approach to filling gaps in our knowledge. An institution 
exists, therefore it must have been created and the simplest model for 
understanding this is to attribute the artifice to a single artificer. Ferguson views 
such mythologising as an 'unscientific' reaction to gaps in human knowledge and 
the historical record. He argues that the origins of society are obscure and come 
in an age before philosophy, which leaves us in a position of ignorance as to the 
origins of our social systems. Proper social science, conducted along scientific 
lines through conjectural history allows us to discount such belief systems by 
explaining them in terms of a primitive lack of awareness coupled with the 
natural propensity of human nature to seek explanation. We invent explanations 
that, in a savage condition, calm the mind, but which, as knowledge evolves and 
advances, no longer fulfil this iole: so undeveloped societies attribute to this 
model of author and creation institutions which instead arose spontaneously, 
through the medium of unintended consequences. 
To underline this argument Millar brings into play the nature of life in 
primitive societies. That is to say that the immediacy of savages, their limited 
attention to their immediate physical needs (Millar 1990: 3; Hume 1985: 59; 
Dunbar 1995: 68), makes it unlikely that a savage society would produce one 
man capable of the conscious creation of an entire system oflaw.64 Leading on 
from this point, several of the Scots point out that even if such an individual had 
existed, he would have faced great difficulties in enforcing his projections on a 
. 
people whose attention was consumed by their immediate needs. Ferguson 
makes this point well: ' ... he who would scheme and project for others, will find 
an opponent in every person who is disposed to scheme for himself.' (Ferguson 
1995: 119).6~ Aside from the difficulty of enacting such plans both Ferguson 
and Millar (Ferguson 1995: 119; Millar 1990: 7) imply that long term rational 
planning, what Millar calls 'visionary speCUlations', is not an accurate manner in 
which to depict the day to day organisation of , law' in early societies. Hume 
argues that in the early ages of society the task of setting down laws is so 
complex that in itself it prevents the possibility of one man shaping the whole 
64 See also Hume (1985: 481). 
6S See also Ferguson (1995: 120)~ Millar (1990: 5,7); Humc (1985: 276) and Stuart (1768: 
222-23). 
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system, he writes: ITo balance a large state or society ... on general laws, is a 
work of so great difficulty, that no human genius, however comprehensive, is 
able, by the mere dint of reason and reflection, to effect it.1 (Hume 1985: 124).66 
Having said this the Scots do not go so far as to completely deny the existence 
of great legislators (Ferguson 1995: 121; Dunbar 1995: 62; Hume 1985: 284; 
Millar 1990: 5), instead they argued against viewing such individuals as the sole 
authors of complete systems of law. Great men have existed and been 
associated with reforms of the legal system - decent historical evidence of the 
more recent figures such as Alfred exists - but their role in this is far from that 
mythologised in popular history. Indeed the Scots point out that the very 
universality of the institution of civil government, and the similarities between 
forms of government in different places and ages strongly suggests that their 
origins cannot lie in the work of single men (Ferguson 1973 vol. 1 : 42). 
Though they argue that the prevalence of government as an institution 
militates against its origins having lain in the genius of particular men (Ferguson 
1995: 121; Hume 1985: 275), they nonetheless accept that the diversity of forms 
of government both between countries and within the same country at different 
times, is an important issue which requires explanation (Millar 1990: 1,4). 
What the Scots hit on to explain this diversity is a development of their view 
regarding the human propensity to systematise. Great legislator myths, as we 
have observed with polytheism, express this facet of human nature; the desire to 
link cause and effect in a direct manner is the most simplistic form of human 
understanding. It is however just that, too simplistic. Hume argues in detail 
about the nature of cause and effect in the Treatise, but it is in his essay On the 
Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences where he applies it to traditional 
views of political foundations. Here Hume argues that the complex situations 
and influences which determine those causes which act upon a vast body of 
people, such as a society, are less subject to the casual interference of one 
particular incident (Hume 1985: 57). That is to say that the forces which shape 
a society, the causes if you like, are far more complex while at the same time 
being far less subject to the control or interference of anyone particular 
66 See also Ferguson (1973 yoU: 289) 
63 
person.67 A further corollary of this is that these forces are thus more easily 
understood through the headings of general descriptive laws, rather than through 
any notion of direct agency. Understanding of the origins of society ought not 
to progress as though there were a creator and creations, a direct cause and 
effect, but instead must seek to proceed by the formulation of general rules from 
the observation of events. 
If complex social institutions an: better understood as the product of the 
interaction of many individuals' within a specific context, then we are able to see 
what the Scots set up as an opposing model of the understanding of the 
development oflaw and government. For the Scots it is the reaction to 
particular circumstances which shapes a 'legal' system and not conscious 
planning, 'The croud of mankind, are directed in their establishments and 
measures, by the circumstances in which they are placed; and seldom are turned 
from their way, to follow the plan of any single projector.' (Ferguson 1995: 
119).68 Thus even when legal codes are consciously set up, such as those 
attributed to Lycurgus or the Twelve Tables at Rome, these are themselves the 
product of immediate concerns and knowledge filtered through the medium of 
popular opinion, and not the result of an attempt rationally to design the entire 
legal system. Approaching the origin and development oflaw in this manner 
emphasises the importance of <?Ustoms. Custom plays a prominent role in the 
Scots' analysis along with its related concept of habit: social practices that are 
found to be useful become habitualised and continue as customary behaviour 
which is refined through use and as circumstances arise.69 For this reason the 
Scots argue that custom and habit inhibit the introduction and enforcement of 
planned legal systems and constrain the action of legislators. As Millar would 
have it: 
' .. .it is extremely probable, that those patriotic statesmen, whose existence is 
well ascertained, and whose laws have been justly celebrated, were at great 
67 Stuart makes a similar point (Stuart 1995: 71) and Millar also suggests it (Millar 1990: 5). 
68 See also Ferguson (1995: 120; 1973 vo1.2: 509); Millar (1990: 2) and Dunbar (1995: 62, 
183). 
69 This is not however to say that such customs are necessarily 'good' or beneficial to the 
exclusion of other alternative practices, as we shall see below in Part Two, Section Two, 
Chapter 2. . 
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pains to accommodate their regulations to the situation of the people ... and 
that, instead of being actuated by a projecting spirit...to produce any violent 
reformation, they confined themselves to such moderate improvements as, 
by deviating little from former usage, were in some measure supported by 
experience, and coincided with the prevailing opinions of the country.' 
(Millar 1990: 7).70 
The key to understanding the process oflaw formation, and the role played 
within it by specific legislators, lies in the concept of the socialisation of these 
legislators (Hume 1985: 114). The Scots take great pains to stress that the 
origin of law lies in custom and established opinion. Thus even where great 
legislators have played a role in framing the codified version oflaws, they have 
merely acted in line with the popular sentiments of their day, and have not 
proceeded from some original and metaphysical plan. Several of the Scots make 
this point explicitly; Ferguson argues: 
' ... The celebrated warrior and statesman, who are considered as the 
founders of those nations, only acted a superior part among numbers who 
were disposed to the same institutions; and that they left to posterity a 
renown, pointing them out as the inventors of many practices which had 
been already in use, and which helped to form their own manners and 
genius, as well as those of their countrymen.' (Ferguson 1995: 121).71 
And Millar also follows this line: 'Before an individual can be invested with 
so much authority, and possessed of such reflection and foresight as would 
induce him to act in the capacity of a legislator, he must, probably, have been 
educated and brought up in the knowledge of those natural manners and 
customs, which, for ages perhaps, nave prevailed among his countrymen.' (Millar 
1990: 6).72 
The thrust of the argument is not simply that a legislator would craft his 
laws to find favour with the established views of the people in order that he 
would be able to enforce them, but it is a broader argument about the origins of 
law and indeed knowledge. Both law and knowledge are the product of the 
70 For similar arguments see Ferguson (1995: 120) and Hume (1985: 125,260). 
71 Similar points are made by Ferguson (1973 vol. 1: 95-96) and Stuart (1768: 248). 
72 See also Hume (1985: 55) and Dunbar (1995: 62). 
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socialisation of individuals within the particular traditions and customs of their 
country. Laws are the product ofthe interaction of people that merely find 
articulation in the specific enactments which become associated with particular 
legislators. Law exists as habit, custom and opinion before it can be consciously 
codified into written form. What the Scots are doing here is downplaying the 
significance of the role played by the deliberate action of individuals in social 
processes in favour of a description which stresses the socialised generation of 
values and institutions. 
For this reason the simplifying myths of great legislators are wholly 
inaccurate as 'scientific' understandings of the origin and development oflaw. 
Law and legal reform are a gradual evolutionary process, not the result of a 
concerted plan: 'No constitution is formed by concert, no government is copied 
from a plan.' (Ferguson 1995: 120).73 Instead the Scots refer to the example of 
experience inherent in habitual and customary practice and propose gradual and 
incremental reform in line with existing knowledge and in reaction to changes in 
circumstances as the model through which to understand the development of 
social institutions. 
D) Social Contract 
Having examined the Scots' rejection of simple models of explanation 
which rely upon divine intervention and upon the purposive action of individual 
great men, we can now move on to a further stage in the Scots' 'demotion of 
purposive rationality' (Berry 1997: 39) where they apply their criticism to the 
notion of a body of individuals acting together in a purposive manner to form a 
social contract. The generations of Scots political thinkers immediately prior to 
the Enlightenment were heavily preoccupied with models of the state of nature 
and an original contract. 74 Protestant social and theological thinkers such as 
Knox, Rutherford and Buchanan developed theories of legitimacy based on 
biblical models of covenant which were designed to hold monarchs responsible 
73 Compare with stuart (1995: 51). 
74 Leaving aside, that is, Fletcher of Saltoun, for whose relation to the Scottish Enlightenment 
see Robertson (1982). 
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to the terms of a contract, whether with the people or with God. Like Locke, 
these Scottish thinkers believed that their theories allowed some scope for 
legitimate rebellion by the people against a monarch who had breached the terms 
of the original agreement by the grace of which he held office. The enlightened 
Scots however, fast in their pu~suit of a proper scientific approach to social 
studies, were adamant in their rejection of this mode of thinking (Bryson 1968: 
39, 172). In direct opposition to the contract based theories of their Scottish 
predecessors, and the more famous work of the likes of Hobbes, Locke, Grotius, 
Pufendorf and Rousseau, the Scots set about a detailed critique of contract 
thinking. Their approach is characterised by a desire to explain the origins of 
-
social institutions rather than an attempt justify particular forms of institution. 
The first line of attack deployed by the Scots was a dismissal of theories of 
a state of nature upon which contract theories were usually grounded. Ferguson 
is explicit that such states of nature as described by Hobbes and Rousseau had 
never existed (Ferguson 1995: 8; 1973 vol. 1: 197),7s Arguing from the 
historical record and from the comparative evidence of recently discovered 
primitive societies such as the American Indians, Ferguson forcefully makes the 
point that there is no historical' evidence to back up the sorts of states of nature 
which have been used as the basis for contract theories.76 Indeed Ferguson goes 
so far as to advance the view that such states of nature are fictions created by 
writers in support of their own theories. He argues: 
'the desire oflaying the foundation of a favourite system, or a fond 
expectation, perhaps, that we may be able to penetrate the secrets of nature, 
to the very source of existence, have on this subject, led to many fruitless 
inquiries, and given rise to many wild suppositions. Among the various 
qualities wt:Uch mankind possess, we select one or a few particulars on 
which to establish a theory, and in framing our account of what man was in 
some imaginary state of nature, we overlook what he has always appeared 
7S See also Hume (1978: 493) and Bryson (1968: 44). 
76 See Ferguson (1995: 8, 9, 11) where he repeatedly uses phrases such as 'no record remains', 
'we must look for our answer in the history of mankind', and 'some imaginary state of nature'. 
within the reach of our own observation, and in the records of history.' 
(Ferguson 1995: 8).77 
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If there is no record or evidence.of such a state of nature having existed, or 
of a contract having been the means of man's exit from it, and, more importantly, 
if' ... both the earliest and latest accounts collected from every quarter of the 
earth, represent mankind as assembled in troops and companies ... ' (Ferguson 
1995: 9), then it is clearly a nonsense to have a state of nature and an original 
contract as the basis of a complex political theory through which current political 
establishments are viewed or justified and the origin of society is explained. 78 
Ferguson goes further than this, he seeks to define man in social terms, thus 
what we understand by a human, is a creature who has always existed in society 
with others and whose attributes are framed by this fact. As Ferguson argues 
with reference to the nature of man: 'send him to the desert alone, he is a plant 
tom from his roots; the form indeed may remain, but every facility droops and 
withers; the human personage and the human character cease to exist.' (Ferguson 
1995: 23). 
Returning to the point above, Ferguson is clear that such tales of a state of 
nature are precisely that: that as a result of man's desire to systematise his 
knowledge and to explain the unknown, he creates simplifying myths which he 
then uses to plug the gaps in established knowledge. For Ferguson man is by 
nature sociable, and therefore no cdntract is required to bring him into society. 
The sociability that is the basis of human society is a facet of human nature, a 
fact to which all the evidence of history and experience points (Ferguson 1995: 
9).79 Society, then, is natural to man, as it is in man's nature to be the artificer of 
his own environment (Ferguson 1995: 12-13, 161) just as it is in his nature to 
71 See also Hume (1985: 470) on evidenc~. 
78 The few actual examples of men held to have lived in a state akin to that of a state of nature 
(Bryson 1968: 60, 71, 75), the so-called wild men, are dismissed by Ferguson as mere 
aberrations whose existence is not sufficient grounds to support a theory which claims so much 
as contract theorists would wish it to (Ferguson 1995: 9). 
19 Once again we see the Scots deploy the evidence of conjectural history to support assertions 
ofa universal human nature. Though it should be noted that HOpfl argues that the first 'stage' 
in the Scots' stadial theories of development is pretty similar to a sociable state of nature 
(HOpflI978: 26). 
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group together with others of his kind.80 The unfolding of man's actions and 
abilities is the true state of nature, and this means that every condition in which 
we find men is equally natural. As Ferguson puts it: 'If we are asked therefore, 
Where the state of nature is to be found? we may answer, It is here; and it 
matters not whether we are understood to speak in the island of Great Britain, at 
the Cape of Good Hope, or the Straits ofMageUan.' (Ferguson 1995: 14).81 As 
a result, to think of the origins of society in terms of a rational contract emerging 
from a state of nature, is ahistorical. Rather as man is by his nature sociable and 
is also by his nature an active being, a creator of things, then there is no conflict 
between conceptions of art and nature which implies a prior state of nature 
(Hume 1978: 484; Ferguson 1995: 9-10, 164; 1994: 220,225).82 For Ferguson, 
this is the state of nature, nor are we out of it - for all conditions within which 
man lives are equally natural to this most adaptive of species (Ferguson 1995: 
14-15). Rejecting any sudden transition from a state of nature to a state of 
civilisation is the key to Ferguson's approach. Instead of a revolutionary 
establishment of a rational system, what history instead shows is an evolving 
equilibrium, a system of gradual improvements in line with knowledge and in 
reaction to circumstances (Ferguson 1995: 7, 10, 12; Dunbar 1995: 17). Social 
systems are viewed by Ferguson through the metaphor of spontaneous natural 
growth, akin to that of plants (Ferguson 1995: 10, 13), and quite clearly this 
implies that no radical transition from a state of nature to a social situation ever 
took place. 
The second thread of the Scots' critique of social contract thought takes the 
form of a more detailed look at the applicability of the contract model to social 
situations. Smith rejects the notion of a social contract, and argues that it, in 
part, fails to convince, because its popularity is limited geographically; he argues 
that it is hardly widely held outside of Britain (Smith 1982b: 316) and as such 
cannot be seen as a universal explanation of the origins of government. 
80 Hume deploys a model of natural sociability that traces the origins of society to the 
institution of the family, from where relationships are gradually extended outwards. 
81 See also Dunbar (199S: 17). In a similar argument which enlarges on Ferguson's point, 
Dunbar argues that man is social before he is rational (Dunbar 1995: 16), indeed that his 
intellectual powers are derived chiefly from the influence of socialisation within the group. 
82 See also Ferguson (1973 voU: IS2; 1973 vo1.2: 192). 
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Government, as Hume asserts, is indeed founded wholly on the consent of the 
governed (Hume 1985: 276); this does not however imply that government has 
its origins in a contract, or, more importantly, that its continued justification 
relies on the force of the contract model of consent. Hume's famous critique of 
contract thought places its foundations on the basis of historical record. Again 
and again in the essay Of the Original Contract Hume draws on the idea that 
contract thought is unscientific and ahistorical (Hume 1985: 276-282). There is 
no record of such a contract and, as a result, it cannot be considered as having 
the force requisite to justify the allegiance of a people to their present rulers.83 
If there was no explicit contract, and what instead existed was a hypothetical 
contract based on tacit consent, then for Hume this is hardly solid enough 
grounds for a system of political justification (Bryson 1968: 200-202; Berry 
1997: 32-33). After analysing the bindingness of promises and their relation to 
legitimacy (Hume 1985: 280; 1978: 516-525)84, and concluding that the notion 
of a promise, if it is to be considered as binding, must be based on a prior 
convention obliging the honouring of promises (Buckle and Castiglione 1991: 
460), Hume concludes that the consent model of the type utilised by contract 
theorists, in either its explicit or tacit form, is not feasible as the basis of political 
legitimacy.8s 
The Scots sought to provide an explanation of the impetus to and nature of 
science. They grounded this explanation in what they saw as a universal 
characteristic of human nature: the emotional need for order and explanation to 
stabilise expectations. This leads to a human propensity to classify experience 
under generalised rules and categories. Cause and effect are understood as 
habitual relations based on experience, and explanations invoking cause and 
effect [scientific explanations] represent a formalisation of the mental habit of 
classification that constitutes the human mind. The body of scientific thought 
83 Smith's discussion of this matter in the Lectures on Jurispntdence closely follows Hume's 
discussion here (Smith 1982b: 207, 316-17). See also Forbes (1975: 181). 
84 See also Smith (1982b: 472-485). 
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evolves through a process of' gap-plugging' to provide increasingly satisfactory 
and coherent explanations. In the social sciences the chief source of empirical 
evidence is history, and through conjectural or theoretical history the Scots form 
an explanatory social theory that accounts for the existence of human 
institutions. Drawing on comparative analysis, they develop a composite model 
of social development based on an underlying universal conception of human 
. 
nature that interacts with different circumstances to produce social diversity. 
The Scots have rejected a series of pre-existing explanatory models on the 
ground that they are un-scientific over-simplifications. By conducting a 
'natural', or conjectural, history of religion the Scots demonstrate that the belief 
in direct divine intervention is an 'uninstructed' belief that calms the mind of 
those in less developed states, but which increasingly fails to satisfy the 
imagination as society advances. Similarly, they argue that the notion of a great 
legislator or founder of a state is a simple model of explanation that plugs a gap 
in human knowledge regarding the origins of political societies. They trace this 
simplification to a propensity to view that which exhibits order as having been 
deliberately designed. The Scots reject this view as implausible given the 
circumstances of the societies in which government first arose. Political 
establishments are the result of a gradual reaction to circumstances: they do not 
represent a planned or deliberately patterned system. Even when legislators 
have acted they have done so in line with opinion and, more significantly, they 
have acted as individuals socialised within the cultural traditions of the group. 
They also reject the social contract approach, arguing that there was no state of 
nature and no contract. There is no need to seek to understand the origins of 
political establishments through a contract model: for, if we c~n provide a 
'scientific' explanation of the origins of political societies, then we have no need 
of an alternative hypothetical justificatory model. The Scots viewed these 
existing models as simplistic rationalisations that fail to proceed in a properly 
scientific manner and, as a result, fail to provide satisfactory explanations. 
85 See Hume (1985: 280-284) and, on tacit or 'metaphorical' consent Smith (1982b: 317, 321, 
323) and Ferguson (1973 vol.2: 45). 
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Section Two: Morality 
Chapter 1: Sociability 
Having laid the ground for ,their rejection of established theories of the 
origin of social institutions the Scots are then free to develop their own 
understanding of how such institutions came about. As intimated in the previous 
section, this understanding is strongly grounded in notions of habit. The Scots 
regard habit as a universal attribute of human nature. Ferguson defines a habit 
as 'the acquired relation of a person to the state in which he has repeatedly been' 
(Ferguson 1973 vo1.1: 209)1, while Hume argues, with relation to the habitual 
behaviour of all animals, that what is commonly referred to as instinct, can in 
fact be understood as a form of habitual behaviour. He writes: 
'This instinct, 'tis true, arises from past observation and experience; but 
can anyone give the ultimate reason, why past experience and observation 
produces such an effect, any more than why nature alone shou'd produce 
it? Nature may certainly produce whatever can arise from habit: Nay, habit 
is nothing but one of the principles of nature, and derives all its force from 
that origin.' (Hume 1978: 179). 
In terms of mankind, the Scots' understanding of human psychology and 
the nature of science itself are" as we have seen, stated in a language of habit and 
habitual relations. The Scots' 'sentimental' theory of psychology draws strongly, 
on notions of habit. 2 Hume argues that 'the far greatest part of our 
reasonings ... can be derived from nothing but custom and habit' (Burne 1978: 
118), and, as we saw above, his ideas about the customary transition or ideas in 
,the imagination (Hume 1978: 103), and of constant conjunction (Hume 1978: 
125.631). treat our mental faculties as highly subject to the force of habit. 
1 'Habit, which Ferguson considered to be the most important single factor detennining most 
men's sentiments, opinions, and judgements, derives from men's experiences.' (Kettler 1965: 
194). 
2 Walton notes the explanatory nature of the Scots' approach and suggests that Hume's 
thought provides a 'natural history of moral psychology' (Walton 1990; 38). Similarly, 
Haakonssen highlights the psychological explanation that lies behind Smith's work viewing: 
'his sympathetic theory of morals as a general framework for how a common morality emerges 
in a given society' (Haakonssen 1982: 205). See also Rosenberg (1990b: 1). 
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Reasoning in terms of cause and effect was, for Hume, a species of mental habit 
grounding our expectations which are drawn from past experience (Hume 1978: 
93,212).3 Thus belief and reasoning are a customary process. We become 
habitually accustomed to a particular chain of events and come to form 
expectations regarding them (Hume 1978: 115). 
A habit of behaviour is acquired in the same manner as a mental habit in the 
Scots' analysis. Habits are acquired through practise, yielding a constant 
conjunction in the mind (Hume 1978: 130, 424; 1985: 171); and this conjunction 
is strengthened, growing 'more and more rivetted and confirmed' (Smith 1982a: 
41), through repetition. We come to accept a habit [or custom] (Hume 1978: 
291) because it falls in with our experience of the world and as such acts to calm 
the mind (Hume 1978: 423). Habit is one of the strongest forces that attaches 
men to certain practices or modes of thought: 'Nothing causes any sentiment to 
have a greater influence upon us than custom, or turns our imagination more 
strongly to any object' (Hume 1978: 556). Smith also follows this line of 
argument and believes that the strength of habit is such that it shapes our 
emotional responses to external phenomena, making us 'used' to certain things. 
He writes: 
'It is well known that custom deadens the vivacity of both pain and 
pleasure, abates the grief we should feel for the one, and weakens the joy 
we should derive from the other. The pain is supported without agony, and 
the pleasure enjoyed without rapture: because custom and the frequent 
repetition of any object comes at last to form and bend the mind or organ to 
that habitual mood and disposition which fits them to receive its impression, 
without undergoing any very violent change.' (Smith 1982a: 37). 
Habits, drawn from experience, act as a non-deliberative guide to our 
behaviour (Hume 1978: 652), they allow us to form expectations around which 
we are able to order our actions.4 One example Hume gives of this is: 'One who 
3 See Burne (1978: 108) where the terms custom and cause and effect are used 
interchangeably: • ... connected by custom, or if you will, by the relation of cause and effect'. 
See also Ferguson (1973 yoU: 233). 
<4 Non-deliberative in the sense of gestalt psychology. Which is to say that habits are not 
unthinkingly performed, but rather they represent 'subsidiary' knowledge drawn upon in the 
performance of a 'focal' activity. Instead of proceeding by a deliberative rational analysis of 
the situation, we draw on 'rules ofthurnb' developed from experience to assist us in attaining 
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concludes somebody to be near him, when he hears an articulate voice in the 
dark, reasons justly and naturally; tho' that conclusion be derived from nothing 
but custom, which infixes and inlivens the idea of a human creature, on account 
of his usual conjunction with the present impression (Hume 1978: 225).5 Such 
habitual inferences provide us with a degree of stability which is sufficient for us 
to carry on our lives (Hume 1978: 64). We draw on our experience to form 
mental habits of cause and effect that we are then able to use to stabilise our 
expectations and to reduce uncertainty in the mind (Hume 1978: 312-13). This 
stabilisation of expectations by habituation is extended into our relations with 
. 
others who also operate on a like model of understanding. 
The Scots commence their conjectural history of social phenomena by 
building on their rejection of a state of nature that existed prior to the formation 
of society. Mankind, the Scots contend, 'are to be taken in groupes, as they 
have always subsisted' (Ferguson 1995: 10; 1994: 115).6 The universality of this 
observation leads to the conclusion that man is by nature sociable, that human 
nature is social (Ferguson 1995: 23, 59; Hume 1985: 37).7 But the Scots' 
analysis is more sophisticated than this simple assertion: they go on to examine 
the dynamics of sociability which develop around the 'habit of society' 
(Ferguson 1995: 11). What the Scots seek to explain is the reason why man is 
always found in groups, the reason why he is sociable: in other words they seek 
to discover, to use Ferguson's term, 'the principle of union' (Ferguson 1995: 21) 
which binds men together. The Scots' answer to this question as to what binds 
society together is to be found in a complex interrelation of the concepts of 
. utility and sympathy. 
our aims. For more on this see below Part Three, Section Two. See also Ferguson (1973 
voU: 210). 
5 See also Hume (1978: 134-35, 165~ 1985: 290). And 'We can give no reason for extending 
to the future our experience in the past; but are entirely determined by custom, when we 
conceive an effect to follow from its usual cause.' (Hume 1978: 654). 
6 See also Ferguson (1973 voU: 192,256). Sociability, then, is a feature of the underlying 
universalities that make science possible. Wilson presents a modem expression of this view: 'I 
want to acknowledge human differences while arguing for an underlying similarity with 
respect to the central fact that shapes our moral sense: sociability.' (Wilson 1997: 134). See 
also Swingewood's view that morality, for the Scots, was 'pre-eminently social' (Swingewood 
1970: 169). 
7 Lehmann refers to this as the 'fact of society' (LehmanllI930: 48); while Bryson argues 
that, for the Scots, empiricism proves sociability (Bryson 1968: 148), See also Sher (1994: 
382) and Chitnis (1976: 111). 
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Sociable individuals come to form unwritten or non-deliberatively generated 
conventions of behaviour - In Hume's famous example, 'Two men, who pull the 
. 
oars ofa boat, do it by an agreement or convention, tho' they have never given 
promises to each other' (Hume 1978: 490) - which develop into customary 
modes of behaviour as we repeat them and see the utility in them (Hume 1978: 
553,494).8 The convention that arises is a spontaneous order that is an 
unintended consequence of an adaptation to circumstances. An example of 
such a process is Hume's discussion of the institution of marriage (Hume 1978: 
570-71) where he describes how a convention arises from a common interest 
and develops into a customary.practice, attaining as it does so, emotional 
strength which underlines the convention's utility. The convention then becomes 
widely recognised, its utility accepted, and thus enters Into our conception of 
morality.1I 
Smith also describes a like process in the Theory of Moral Sentiments. He 
begins from the now familiar notion of the 'habitual arrangement of our ideas' 
(Smith 1984: 194) and proceeds to note that our notions oftaste are in a large 
part formed by the influence of custom and habit (Smith 1984: 194-96). He 
goes on to examine the diversity of customs that have arisen, along the way 
distinguishing between a custom and a fashion, the latter being more transient 
and of a weaker influence upon the sentiments (Smith 1984: 194-99). 
Discussing the aesthetics of Pope, Smith notes his view that 'The whole 
charm' of our notions of taste ~would thus seem to arise from its falling in with 
habits which custom had impressed upon the imagination.' (Smith 1984: 199). 
Smith though believes that this is not sufficient. For if all of our judgements of 
beauty were made with reference to past habits, then no innovation would be 
possible. On the contrary Smith believed that men were highly attracted to new 
phenomena and that these, far from depending solely on fitting in with 
established tastes, drew their beauty from their utility; a principle which acts 
independently of custom. 10 As he puts it: 'The utility of any form, its fitness for 
8 This repetition is posited on the success of the action in the first place. That is it must 
effectually fulfil some purpose if it is to be repeated. It is this idea that underlies Hume's 
notion of utility. 
II Compare with Stuart (1995: 16). 
10 See also Hume (1985: 50), where Hume argues that men are attracted by novelty. 
the useful purposes for which it was intended, evidently recommends it, and 
renders it agreeable to us, independent of custom. , (Smith 1984: 199). 
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As we become familiar with an innovation whose utility is apparent to us, 
we absorb it into our habitual practice. 'Custom has rendered it habitual' (Smith 
1984: 201), to us and we draw on our experience of it habitually and non-
deliberatively rather than through constant reference to its utility. Custom 
shapes our behaviour and our expectations of the behaviour of others (Smith 
1984: 202). We judge others' .behaviour according to how it fits our habitually 
formed expectation of what we expect a person in their position to do. ll Our 
sympathy with their action is in a great measure dependent on a comparison with 
our habitual standards. Another aspect of this process is that our opinions 
regarding the behaviour of others are dependent on the context of the actor and 
his actions. We draw from our experience of society to assign standards of 
appropriate behaviour; but more than this our own behaviour, and that of others, 
is shaped by a like socialisation. We take on the habitually accepted behaviour 
of our social positions through practise: and thus we expect a lawyer to act like 
a lawyer, a clergyman like a clergyman and a soldier like a soldier. 
Circumstances habituate us and guide our behaviour just as they guide our 
standards of appropriate behaviour in others (Smith 1984: 205). Ferguson uses 
the metaphor of a twig being forced out of its path and bending to pursue a new 
. . 
direction which, through time, and even if the force is removed, becomes its 
natural path (Ferguson 1973 voU: 210). Custom, and the habitual conventions 
which develop with it, are formed in a large part by context and. as we shall see 
later, this is of central importance to the Scots' notions of social change through 
time. The Scots' focus on the idea that a practice must be repeated to become 
habituated leads them to develop a complex theory of socialisation to explain the 
development of customs of behaviour amongst a people. Ideas and practices 
become general by custom (Hume 1978: 24), that is to say that constant 
repetition leads to conventional expectations and relations developing amongst a 
1 J A custom develops as an inter-subjective equilibrium of behaviour that becomes settled as 
the group becomes habituated to it. . 
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people.12 This, then, is the basis of socialisation, the habituation through time, of 
an individual through interaction with others (Hume 1978: 486, 500-1; 1985: 
40). One short cut, if you like, in this process that the Scots identify and dwell 
upon is the notion of education. In education children are deliberately taught 
forms of behaviour which have arisen through time. They are intentionally 
socialised in order to speed up the process of acquiring that experience which 
forms the basis of socialised expectations. Through socialisation and education 
(Hume 1985: 270) we come to follow accepted modes of behaviour in an non-
deliberative manner (Hume 1985: 168-69) which cannot, of itself, be fully 
broken by the rational reflection of the individual himself(Hume 1978: 147), so 
strongly have our minds become accustomed to it. 13 
From what we have seen it is clear that some part of the social bond is 
founded on utility, on the notions of gains received by individuals from acting in 
. 
a social setting. Hume argues that social interdependence compensates for the 
defects in the powers of each individual (Hume 1978: 485), and Smith notes that 
man needs others to 'improve' his position (Smith 1984: 13). Social interaction, 
as well as being 'natural', is beneficial to individuals. But Ferguson is also quick 
to note that these explanations are not in themselves sufficient to explain the 
universality of human society. He points out that the social bond is frequently 
strongest in times of great peril, such as war, when men act out of social feeling 
to defend their group even though in terms of personal utility that action is often 
unprofitable to them (Ferguson 1995: 23). He argues: 'Men are so far from 
valuing society on account of its mere external conveniences, that they are 
commonly most attached where those conveniencies are least frequent. ' 
(Ferguson 1995: 23). 
Ferguson concludes that 'neither a propensity to mix with the herd, nor the 
sense of advantages enjoyed in that condition, comprehend all the principles by 
12 Sugden offers a defence of Hume's views on convention by stressing the role that they play 
in stabilising expectations. He argues that: 'The belief that one ought to follow a convention is 
the product of the same process of evolution as the convention itself.' (Sugden 1989: 87) and 
relates this tendency to equilibrium to the natural propensity to seek order. 
13 See also Ferguson (1973 voU: 97). 
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which men are united together.' (Ferguson 1995: 22).14 A further principle of 
sociability is traced by the Scots to human psychology and to the emotional 
reactions of specific actors. All men, they argue, are happier in society than in 
solitude (Ferguson 1995: 23; Smith 1984: 84; Hume 1978: 363). There is an 
emotional need for company that is a part of the human psychological make up. 
Men may be able to survive in a desert, and even to prosper there, but they will 
be miserable until they are admitted to society. This, for Ferguson, is why 
sociability is part of human nature. The emotional need for society is a deeper 
explanation for the universality of society than any consideration of utility. 
Smith traces this emotional need for society to his conception of sympathy. He 
argues that humans have a psychological need for approval from others. Man 
'longs for that relief which nothing can afford him but the entire concord of the 
affections of the spectators with his own' (Smith 1984: 22).1' Nor is this desire 
or need for sympathy to be traced to self-love alone in Smith's view (Smith 
1984: 13), people do not desire the sympathy of others from considerations of 
utility or in order to profit by it (Smith 1984: 85-86): they desire it because they 
need it to function on a psychological level. As Hume noted the origins of 
human society are to be found in family groups. This is why, rather than 
referring to the significance of self-interest, Hume instead prefers the term 
'confin'd generosity'. That is to say that our concern naturally extends to those 
close to us (Hume 1978: 486-87), or those related to us (Hume 1978: 482). 
Moreover we are more cl<;>sely interested in or concerned with the interests 
of others when they relate to our own concerns (Hume 1978: 405). Those that 
we live with and are related to are closer to our affections and concerns than 
others more distant from us or unknown to us. Hume defines these circles of 
concern in the following manner: 'our strongest attention is confin'd to 
ourselves; our next is extended to our relations and acquaintance; and 'tis only 
the weakest which reaches to strangers and indifferent persons.' (Hume 1978: 
14 Ferguson seeks to distinguish sociable animals into those who herd together by instinct, and 
those which are 'gregarious', or associate in a rational manner (Ferguson 1973 voLl: 21, 24, 
125). 
I' Dwyer argues that Smith's approach here is based on: 'the idea of a sentimental polity held 
together, not by the rules of the legislator or the wisdom of the statesman, but by small-scale 
sympathetic exchanges which gradually linked individuals to the larger national unit. t (Dwyer 
1998: 9). See also Reisman (1976: 68). 
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488). 16 Our exercise of sympathy and concern and interest in the actions and 
fortunes of others is limited by this confinement of generosity. It is not that we 
do not sympathise with strangers, but rather that our sympathy with them is 
restricted by the absence offamiliarity (Burne 1978: 519). Confin'd generosity 
is shaped by perspective (Smith 1984: 157): our feelings are strongest for those 
closest to us, those whom we know. Smith's famous example of this 
confinement is designed to stress the significance of this localised perspective. 
He writes: 
'Let us suppose that the great empire of China, with all its myriads of 
inhabitants, was suddenly swallowed up by an earthquake, and let us 
consider how a man of humanity in Europe, who had no sort of connexion 
with that part of the world, would be affected upon receiving intelligence of 
this dreadful calamity. He would, I imagine, first of all express very 
strongly his sorrow for the misfortune of that unhappy people, he would 
make many melancholy reflections upon the precariousness of human life, 
and the vanity of all the labours of man ... And when all this fine philosophy 
was over, when all these ~umane sentiments had been once fairly expressed, 
he would pursue his business or his pleasure, take his repose or his 
diversion, with the same ease and tranquility, as ifno such accident had 
happened. The most frivolous disaster which could befal himself would 
occasion a more real disturbance. If he was to lose his little finger to-
morrow, he would not sleep tonight; but, provided he never saw them, he 
will snore with the most profound security over the ruin of a hundred 
millions of his brethren.' (Smith 1984: 136).17 
We begin to see that the process of sympathy operates by bringing home to 
us, by rendering closer to our concern, the experiences of others. 18 Self-
regarding action is limited by the tendency to sympathise; those sympathetically 
16 Smith makes a similar point regarding such circles of concern and their relation to the 
strength of our feelings for others (Smith 1984: 86, 142). Ferguson also dwells on the point 
(Ferguson 1994: 247~ 1973 voU: 30; 1973 vol.2: 293). 
17 Tile full details of Smith's views on the implications of this are to be found at (Smith 1984: 
135-37). Hume also makes a similar point about fingers (Hume 1978: 416). 
18 It is from this point of view that Smith notes that the love of one's country does not arise 
from a generalised love of mankind. Rather it grows outward from our attachment to and 
concern for what is close to us (Smith 1984: 229). See also (Hume 1978: 481). 
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generated norms of behaviour, which are the product of sociability, act to limit 
our tendency to follow those inclinations which are the product of our confin' d 
generosity.19 As Smith puts it: 
'the natural preference which every man has for his own happiness above 
that of other people, is what no impartial spectator can go along with. 
Every man is, no doubt, by nature, fIrst and principally recommended to his 
own care; and as he is fItter to take care of himself than of any other person, 
it is fit and right that it shQuld be so. Every man, therefore, is much more 
deeply interested in whatever immediately concerns himself, than in what 
concerns any other man ... But though the ruin of our neighbour may affect 
us much less than a small misfortune of our own, we must not ruin him to 
prevent that small misfortune, nor even to prevent our own ruin.' (Smith 
1984: 82-83). 
This argument about perspective in moral judgement may be considered in 
the light of epistemological views on the diffusion of knowledge. The circles of 
concern are related to knowledge of, and familiarity with those concerned 
(Smith 1984: 140): our confin'd generosity is a product of familiarity with and 
concern for those whom we know (Smith 1984: 219). Moreover an individual 
placed in a particular set of circumstances is, as Smith argued above, in the best 
position to judge how to act in those circumstances. Subtle moral judgements 
are best made by those closely related to the circumstances which give rise to 
them (Smith 1984: 227), indeed the whole notion of an impartial spectator is 
based on knowledge of the circumstances, on spectating. 
Smith argues that our natural concern and attention is focused on that 
which we know and those whom we know (Smith 1984: 229). The capacity of 
the human mind for knowledge and imaginative sympathy is necessarily 
restricted. As a result of perspective and opportunity we naturally feel strongest 
towards those familiar to us just as our knowledge of that which is close to us is 
greatest. While at the same time we find it more difficult to exercise imaginative 
sympathy with those removed from us, just as we fInd it difficult to understand 
knowledge outside our field of experience or specialisation. Smith believes that 
19 In this sense they form a part of the invisible hand that produces socially beneficial results 
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our limited capacities and abilities restrict our attention to a set field of concern 
(Smith 1984: 237)?O This however will not lead us to a morality of selfishness. 
As Smith argues the force of srmpathy, while attaching us chiefly to those close 
to us, at the same time limits our actions in regard to others. Human action, 
whether benevolent or self-interested (Smith 1984: 137), is confined in its scope. 
That is to say that for Smith it is perfectly acceptable to act in the best interests 
of yourself and those close to you, so long as you do not actively seek to reduce 
the ability of others to do the same. In this manner those best placed to act in a 
situation will be responsible for acting to achieve the best outcome; and such 
actions are reconciled with those of others acting in a similar manner because 
sympathy and the impartial spectator teach us that it is unacceptable to act 
directly to harm another.21 
Society for Smith brings 'tranquillity of mind' (Smith 1984: 23) by 
providing a guide to our actions determined through the medium of sympathy. 
Man, he argues, naturally sympathises with the fortunes and misfortunes of his 
fellow men.22 But as no man can experience in exact detail the feelings of 
another, what he does as an act of sympathy is imagine what he would feel in a 
like situation (Smith 1984: 317). Knowledge plays a limiting role on sympathy, 
we cannot know exactly what another experiences but we can imagine, building 
up from our own experience and our observation of the situation, what they are 
going through.23 However such imaginative sympathy is necessarily ofa lesser 
degree of emotional strength than that experienced by the person in question. 
from the interaction of individuals in pursuit of their own purposes. 
20 The wise man, Hume argues, 'will endeavour to place bis bappiness on such objects chiefly 
as depend upon himself' (Hume 1985: 5). 
21 What Smith is advancing here is an argument which parallels, as we will see below, his 
epistemological argument in relation to economics [and thus represents an invisible hand 
argument]. An individual has the most accurate access to knowledge of his particular 
circumstances: he is most intimately familiar with both his situation and that of those related 
to him. As a result, so long as he does not actively put down others' attempts to achieve their 
goals, he is the person best placed to provide the most efficient outcome for himself and his 
intimates. Individuals then are best fitted to adapt to their circumstances. See Smith (1984: 
83,138). 
22 Wilson links this natural sympathy to our innate sociability (Wilson 1997: 18, 45). 
23 Broadie and Skinner both highlight the epistemic role of the impartial spectator in reaction 
to our limited knowledge (Broadie 2001: 104~ Skinner 1996: 60). While Mizuta develops the 
view that: 'The effort to be sympathised with by moderating the individual's own emotion 
should be increased as the society in which he lives becomes greater and as the distance 
between him and the spectators increases.' (Mizuta 1975: 121). 
To this end sympathy can only be partial. Man also, as Smith notes, needs or 
desires the sympathy of others, naturally seeking approval for his feelings and 
actions. As a consequence men limit their emotional responses to bring them 
closer to that weaker degree experienced by spectators. This is achieved by 
constructing a mental image of what an impartial spectator would think of our 
actions and then using this as a guide to what is acceptable or would be 
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approved of by others.24 By s~eking to match the pitch of emotions to that of 
spectators we develop an equilibrium, or spontaneous order, notion of propriety 
(Myers 1983): a set of conventional or habitual attitudes that guide our actions 
on a level which will be acceptable to those around us (Smith 1984: 27). For 
this reason Smith refers to society as a mirror (Smith 1984: 110), as a device by 
which we are able to assess ourselves through others. So the emotional need for 
sympathy interacts with that propensity for habit formation that we highlighted 
above, and produces in us a habit of acting in reaction to others' opinions. As 
Smith shows: 'The habit which a man, who lives in the world, has acquired of 
considering how every thing that concerns himself will appear to others, makes 
those frivolous calamities turn up in the same ridiculous light to him, in which he 
knows they will certainly be considered by them.' (Smith 1984: 42-43). In this 
manner our emotional need for approval. and for some reference point for our 
behaviour in the views of others, leads to a notion of propriety: a notion of how 
we ought to act and of acceptable behaviour which becomes the basis of praise 
and blame [and indeed the cornerstone of morality itself]. Ferguson notes that 
the force of this aspect of human character is such that: 'Without any 
establishments to preserve their manners ... they derive, from instinctive feelings, a 
love of integrity and candour, and, from the very contagion of society itself, an 
esteem for what is honourable and praiseworthy.' (Ferguson 1995: 156).25 
There is, then, a social generation of conventional values which pre-exists 
written law. Moreover such habitual conventions become widespread within 
groups by a process of socialisation (Ferguson 1995: 85; 1973 vol.1: 232). 
24 Leading Raphael to note that Smith's impartial spectator: 'was meant to be a sociological 
and psychological explanation of soine moral capacities I and not a justificatory moral theory 
(Raphael1975: 96). 
25 Ferguson's language here reveals that this argument is an invisible hand argument where a 
socially beneficial result is produced without purposive organisation. 
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Christina Petsoulas prese~ts an interesting analysis of this approach. She 
argues that: 'For Smith, imaginative sympathy is the mechanism whereby men 
with different experiences, occupying different positions, and frequently having 
conflicting interests, are able to develop common rules of conduct.' (petsoulas 
2001: 152). These rules of conduct become 'crystallised common standards of 
moral evaluation' (petsoulas 2001: 153) as a result of the repetition of mutual 
sympathetic approval. From here Petsoulas introduces a new line of argument, 
such that: 'men purposefully employ the psychological propensities of the 
imagination [custom or habit formation], first to discover rules and institutions, 
and subsequently to enforce them.' (petsoulas 2001: 109, her itatics)?6 This 
leads her to assert that: 'Though the means by which we arrive at impartial 
moral judgements is still sympathy, it is a form of sympathy mediated by 
conscious reflection.' (petsoulas 2001: 121, her italics). This argument does not 
appear, at first glance, to deny that sympathy, moderated by the impartial 
spectator, is a facet of human nature in Smith's theory. Instead Petsoulas 
suggests that men make conscious use of the impartial spectator in a deliberate 
attempt to provide common moral standards of evaluation. This view is clearly 
mistaken. It confuses the individual's conscious reflection on a particular moral 
issue [the conscious evaluation of a tporal dilemma through an interaction of 
reason and sympathy] with a desire purposefully to create a system of 
enforceable moral standards?'· Livingston opposes this view, arguing that: 'The 
conventions of the moral world, though the result of trial and error experience 
over many generations were not intended by any individual or group.' 
(Livingston 1990: 127). Though an appeal to the impartial spectator is 
obviously in some sense deliberate and involves conscious reflection, the 
purpose of this reflection is not the creation of a moral code. For example, the 
human desire to stabilise expectations is not the conscious motive behind our 
moral deliberations, rather it explains why we have moral deliberations. In this 
26 Petsoulas' reason for stressing this reading is to separate the theory of sympathy as laid 
down by Smith from the unconscious imitation that she attributes to Hayek (petsoulas 2001: 
IS7). For a rejection of this view see Part Three, Section Two. 
27 A distinction that mirrors that between our understandings of deliberatively and non-
deliberatively guided actions. 
sense the moral code is an unintended consequence of a series of sympathetic 
reactions and conscious reflection on particular cases of sympathetic approval. 
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As we have seen mankind are, by the Scots' analysis, highly susceptible to 
habit (Ferguson 1995: 16), and in particular to the 'habit of society' (Ferguson 
1995: 11), which Ferguson refers to as a 'habit of the soul' (Ferguson 1995: 53) 
and an integral part of what it is to be human. But we have also seen that the 
interaction of habituated and sympathetic creatures leads to the generation of 
value systems and conventions of behaviour developed from comparison and 
mutual adjustment resulting in equilibrium or spontaneous order. Moral value 
systems are produced inter-subjectively or inter-personally. And such customary 
behaviour affects subsequent actions and our judgements of them. Custom 
habituates us to certain models ofbe~aviour (Smith 1984: 200); indeed the 
experience of an oft-repeated conventional practice means that 'custom has 
rendered it habitual to' us (Smith 1984: 201). Such conventional behaviour 
becomes part of our habitual expectations in the same manner as repeated 
experience of physical phenomena leads us to form habitual expectations. It is in 
this manner that 'accepted' or tather expected conventions of human behaviour 
develop?8 Born into a society man is exposed from childhood to the frequent 
repetition of attitudes and practices which come to be habitual to him. Such 
practices, derived from the sympathetic desire to balance sentiments with those 
expected in the standard of propriety, shape the deliberative education and non-
deliberative socialisation of children. As Hume puts it: 'In a little time, custom 
and habit operating on the tender minds of the children, makes them sensible of 
the advantages, which they may reap from society, as well as fashions them by 
degrees for it, by rubbing off those rough corners and untoward affections, 
which prevent their coalition.' (Hume 1978: 486). Education is in a large part a 
process of socialisation in the customs of society (Smith 1984: 222), whereby 
children learn by example those practices which have been developed as 
conventions among the people.to which they belong (Hume 1985: 270; 
Ferguson 1973 vo1.2: 375). Such socialisation is achieved by repetition of the 
example and subsequently deepens the custom not only through time in each 
individual's life, but also through the life of the people in succeeding 
generations. Hume again: 'Whatever it be that forms the manners of one 
generation, the next must imbibe a deeper tincture of the same dye; men being 
more susceptible of all impressions during infancy, and retaining these 
impressions as long as they remain in·the world.' (Hume 1985: 203). 
Thus we see again a 'contagion of manners' (Hume 1985: 204)29 
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developing through time and forming the basis of the development of customary 
behaviour. However as Smith is keen to note, such socialisation pertains within 
cultures, and as a result the formation of our character within a given cultural or 
national tradition can effect our judgements of other traditions and cultures 
(Smith 1984: 195). What this shows us is that context has a vital role to play in 
the formation of habits and customary behaviour. Humans are socialised within 
the context of particular circumstances, within a particular society (Smith 1984: 
202) whose attitudes have been in tum formed by the particular circumstances 
that the peopie have experienced.30 A savage is socialised into the circumstances 
ofa savage society, his practices developed in the context of his physical and 
social surroundings (Smith 1984: 207). And as we have noted socialisation 
leads to the development of customary expectations, of attitudes and standards 
of propriety which affect our judgements. Smith offers an example of this in the 
behaviour which is expected of certain occupations (Smith 1984: 204). The 
circumstances of a particular occupation shape the conventions of behaviour 
expected of its practitioners. If they behave in an improprietous manner our 
judgement of them is effected. 
Such concerns of reputation, like the desire for sympathy, lead to 
conformity of behaviour based around a desire to preserve reputation (Smith 
1984: 51).31 In the case of professionals this is not simply to ensure emotional 
sympathy, but also to ensure business. A laughing undertaker will soon pass out 
28 Bryson and Lehmann compare this view to the idea of 'folkways' developed by Swnncr 
(Bryson 1968: 157; Lehmann 1930: 75·76). 
29 Ferguson also makes a similar point (Ferguson 1973 vol. 1 : 135). 
30 AB Lehmann would have it: 'differences in manners and customs are essentially matters of 
habit' (Lehmann 1930: 71). What Griswold calls the 'contextuality of the moral sentiments' 
(Griswold 1996: 191·192). 
31 Hayek shares Smith's views on the importance of the notion of reputation (Hayek 1980: 
97). 
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of business as well as become the subject of disapprova1.32 So it appears that 
utility again plays a role in the development of social conventions. Hume argues 
that utility and sympathy interact in custom formation, with reference to justice 
he says: 'Thus self-interest is the original motive to the establishment of justice: 
but a sympathy with public interest is the source of the moral approbation, which 
attends that virtue.' (Hume 1978: 499-500). Moreover utility plays a role in the 
process which links our emotional need for sympathy to the circumstances of 
social life in a manner which moulds the formation of standards of behaviour and 
practices. That is to say, for a practice to become habituated and socialised by 
repetition, it must fulfil some use in order for that repetition to occur . 
• 
32 Kerkhof has noted the function of shame as an inhibitory force in the Scots' moral theory 
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Chapter 2: Circumstances 
We have seen thus far how great an emphasis the Scots place on notions of 
habit and custom, especially in the sense of socialisation and in their formulation 
of scientific knowledge. What we must now consider is how it is that customs 
and habits arise and change. It was noted before that habit is formed by constant 
experience, by repetition until a phenomenon or practice becomes accepted 
unthinkingly. But while this explains the process, how a habit is formed, it does 
not account for why a particular practice becomes habituated into custom. As 
Hume himself puts it in relation to submission to government: 'For the question 
still recurs, what motive first produces those instances of submission, which we 
imitate, and that train of actions, which produces custom?' (Hume 1978: 553). 
The answer which Hume provides is interest. . In other words the practice must 
have some recurring utility that prompts its repetition. For a practice to pass 
from a one off experience into a habituated custom it must be repeated, and for 
. 
it to be repeated it must successfully fulfil some recurring purpose in relation to 
its context. 
As part of their social science the Scots set out to examine this process and 
to discover 'the imperceptible circumstances by which they [peoples] are led to 
have different customs' (Ferguson 1995: 65). We have already noted above in 
our discussion of the Scots formulation of their' science of man', that they 
rejected outright physical determinism in favour of a focus on moral causes. But 
here we begin to see how the Scots co-opt physical conditions into their 
analysis. The physical situation in which a people are placed does playa role in 
the structure of their society (Millar 1990: 2), in the formation of their 
customary and habitual behaviour, but the interesting factor for the Scots is not 
the direct effect of the physical situation, but rather the indirect effect of man's 
adaptation of his behaviour to that environment (Ferguson 1995: 106). Mankind 
adapts its behaviour to its physical situation (Ferguson 1995: 116), and the 
customs of various peoples are shaped by the challenges that they face. Hume 
notes that human institutions, such as justice, are the result of an interaction of 
(Kerkhof 1995: 221). 
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human nature with 'outward circumstances' (Hume 1978: 487). That is to say 
that the practices which arise in different societies do so as a result of a universal 
human nature reacting to particular recurring circumstances?3 Smith follows 
Hume's argument here and, in The Theory o/Moral Sentiments, dwells on how 
habituation to particular circumstances shape human behaviour. He writes: 'The 
different situations of different ages and countries are apt. .. to give different 
characters to the generality of those who live in them ... ' (Smith 1984: 204). 
Thus, for Smith, a savage becomes inured to hardship and his behaviour 
becomes shaped by his circumstances. As he puts it: 'His circumstances not only 
habituate him to every sort of distress, but teach him to give way to none of the 
passions which that distress is apt to excite' (Smith 1984: 205). So experience 
teaches a savage the most profitable way to act, he is socialised by the example 
of others who have similarly learned from experience those practices necessary 
for survival. This behaviour is not unique to savage states: Smith also applies 
the analysis to commercial societies through the example mentioned above on 
the behaviour of different occupations. Thus customary modes of behaviour 
become associated with certain professions and this behaviour is determined by 
the circumstances ofthe profession, the role played in it by the individual and the 
response to that role by others. The behaviour we come to associate with 
clergymen and soldiers is diffe~ent, as the circumstances of their professions and 
their socialisation into the customs of that profession differ. Through sympathy 
a concept of proper behaviour is formed and a notion of propriety developed 
according to the circumstances of each occupation (Smith 1984: 247,273-74). 
This then becomes part of the individual's professional reputation upon which he 
trades for his livelihood. As we noted above we would not expect an undertaker 
who laughed constantly to be much of a financial success, indeed we would 
heartily disapprove of his improprietous behaviour, but we would not think the 
same of a jovial publican.34 
Adaptation to external circumstances accounts for much of the diversity to 
be found among peoples. 'In consequence of habit,' Ferguson writes of man, 
33 Remember also that men can react in different ways to the same phenomena (Hume 1975: 
85; Ferguson 1994: 26). See above Part Two, Section One, Chapter 2 on conjectural history. 
34 An example of propriety acting as an invisible hand to produce a benign spontaneous order. 
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'he becomes reconciled to very different scenes' (Ferguson 1995: 200).3' But 
the circumstances in which men find themselves are not solely physical in their 
nature. They are also social (or moral). Man exists, as we have seen, in a social 
context, and experiences those conventions of behaviour that have been formed 
by his predecessors and contemporaries. Such conventions of behaviour as are 
already existent have been formed in relation to circumstances, or 'accidents' as 
Ferguson calls them (Ferguson 1995: 123), and have been repeated because they 
have been found useful. Individuals become socialised into a culture and 
habitually accept these conventions. 36 This process though does not imply 
either an explicit agreement with or endorsement of these practices by each 
individual. 37 We are dealing with habitual acceptance of circumstances, thus the 
habits of others become part of the circumstances to which we become 
habituated as we are socialised (Smith 1984: 332). We need not have any 
conscious notion of the utility of these practices, but our propensity to habit and 
desire for social acceptance lead us to accept them without any great thought. 
In Hume's example of the two men in a boat we see how human behaviour 
regulates itself and comes into co-ordination to secure a useful end without 
conscious, rational or explicit agreements taking place. The circumstances -
Two men in a boat - and the end - to cross the body of water - shape the 
behaviour of the actors and, when often repeated, lead to a convention becoming 
habitual.38 
This focus on the importance of individual situation is a prominent feature 
of Smith's Theory a/Moral Sentiments. The passages on stoicism in Smith's 
work stress an approval for the adaptation by individuals to the concrete reality 
of their situations. He writes: 'The .never-failing certainty with which all men, 
35 See also Ferguson (1973 voLl: 263) and: • As nature seems to try the ingenuity of man, in a 
variety of problems, and to provide that the species, in different countries, shall not find any 
two situations precisely alike; so the generations that succeed one another, in the same country, 
are, in the result of their own operations, or the operations of those that went before them, ever 
made to enter upon scenes continually varied. The inventions of one age prepare a new 
situation for the age that succeeds; and, as the scene is ever changing, the actors proceed to 
change their pursuits and their manners, and to adapt their inventions to the circwnstances in 
which they are placed.' (Ferguson 1973 vol. 1: 58). 
36 See also Ferguson (1994: 16-17; 1973 vol. 1: 335). 
37 Remember that the Scots interest at this point is explanatory and not justificatory. 
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sooner or later, accommodate themselves to whatever becomes their permanent 
situation, may, perhaps, induce us to think that the Stoics were, at least, thus far 
very nearly in the right' (Smith 1984: 149). What develops from this is an 
analysis of the 'virtue' of prudence (Smith 1984: 262). Ferguson defines 
prudence as the habit of adapting to circumstances (Ferguson 1973 vol. 1 : 232), 
and Smith lays it in a particular relief, arguing: 'The man who lives within his 
income, is naturally contented with his situation, which, by continual, though 
small accumulations, is growing better and better every day ... He confines 
himself, as much as his duty will permit, to his own affairs, and has no taste for 
that foolish importance which many people wish to derive from appearing to 
have some influence in the management of those of others.' (Smith 1984: 215).39 
Self-command (Smith 1984: 145-46; Ferguson 1973 voU: 3) becomes a 
virtue as it teaches man to adapt to the specifics of his particular local situation, 
and though prudence is a 'selfish' virtue, it is not in any sense detrimental to 
society. It is simply a matter of restricting attention to that epistemological field 
which is within the grasp ofa particular mind.40 If you like it is a form of 
specialisation. Our knowledge of our own situation is necessarily greater than 
that of any other person, and so each individual is best suited to utilise his 
specialised knowledge to make effective decisions. Moreover prudence links 
into the natural confin'd generosity ofindividuals and allows them to act 
efficiently within the scope of their most intimate passionate concerns. As Smith 
puts it: 'We shall stand in need. of no casuistic rules to direct our conduct. These 
it is often impossible to accommodate to all the different shades and gradations 
of circumstance, character, and situation, to differences and distinctions which, 
though not imperceptible, are, by their nicety and delicacy, often altogether 
indefinable.' (Smith 1984: 227). In a commercial society the prudent man acts 
within his means: frugality and temperance become virtues as they aid this 
restriction of behaviour to such a field as may effectively be influenced by each 
38 Ferguson argues that convention 'may be supposed almost coeval with the intercourse of 
mankind' (Ferguson 1973 vo1.2: 232). Schmidt and Elsner apply tlle modern game theory 
approach to convention formation to the work of the Scots (Schmidt 2001; Elsner 1983). 
39 See also: 'the object of prudence is to conform our actions to tlle general usage and custom' 
(Hume 1978: 599). 
40 As with propriety, so prudence also forms a part of the invisible hand. 
individual given his particular circumstances (Smith 1981: 350; 1984: 28; 
Ferguson 1973 vo1.2: 109). 
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As we have seen above, Smith argues for a comparative, inter-personal, 
development of moral standards through the medium of an impartial spectator 
(Smith 1984: 137, 193): the desire for praise and praiseworthiness shape man's 
understanding of acceptable behaviour in a social context (Smith 1984: 131). 
The standards that develop are those of propriety - that which is acceptable 
social behaviour is determined by consultation with the impartial spectator 
(Smith 1984: 17,27). It is in this manner that men restrict their emotional 
displays to those acceptable to those around them, limiting the pitch of their 
emotions to that which is suitable to engage the sympathy of their fellows (Smith 
1984: 207). Habit and experience teach men the standards of propriety which 
exist in a given society (Smith 1984: 163), in this sense the psychological need to 
please, itself a facet of human nature, renders a sense of propriety' natural' to 
man (Smith 1984: 116). Prudence is a virtue that arises from men adapting to 
their particular circumstances and acting in an efficient 'economic' manner: 
while propriety is a virtue which arises from men adapting to their particular 
circumstances to act in a socially acceptable manner and both of these form a 
part of the invisible hand that promotes socially benign spontaneous orders. In 
this sense the natural sympathy that Smith describes is limited by the 
circumstances of the individual (Smith 1984: 205), with these circumstances 
rendering extremes of sympathy improprietous given the socially generated 
'norms' of behaviour (Smith 1984: 140). Prudence and propriety have to do 
with individual perspective (Ferguson 1973 vol.2: 336, 340); sympathy and the 
impartial spectator being the psychological media that allow men to extend their 
concern beyond their immediate circle while maintaining an appropriate and 
socially acceptable degree of perspective and detachment. 
One interesting result of this approach to the generation of moral values is 
that it leads to a focus on 'moderate virtue' (Clark 1992: 187); or as Mizuta puts 
it: 'It is not so much the excellent virtues as ordinary propriety that Smith is 
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trying to explain as the main subject of his book.' (Mizuta 1975: 119).41 Instead 
of pursuing an approach that seeks to derme and justify the nature of virtue the 
Scots set out to explain the actual gefleration of the modes of behaviour that 
facilitate social interaction.42 Clark argues that this was a result not solely of the 
explanatory approach of the Scots, but also of their particular stress on the 
conventional, spontaneous order nature of the generation of customs: 'Smith 
attributed to commercial society a kind of moderate virtue, less dazzling than 
that of the saint, the sage or the state-builder, but more useful, because more 
frequently activated.' (Clark 1993: 345). The process of 'adjustment and 
compromise' (Clark 1992: 202) in search of stability leads to a high degree of 
conformity in matters of everyday interaction. The submission to such 
interpersonally generated forms of behaviour eases interaction and reduces 
uncertainty.43 Moreover it represents an expression of the level of civilisation 
attained: the more polite the manners, the more civilised the nation (Smith 1984: 
208; Forbes 1975: 194). 
Custom becomes a part of the external circumstances to which we must 
adapt and, as Hume notes, socialisation makes this experience relatively simple 
for the bulk of mankind: 'As a stream necessarily follows the several inclinations 
of the ground, on which it runs; so are the ignorant and thoughtless part of 
mankind actuated by their natural propensities.' (Hume 1985: 168-69). As 
Hume and Smith stress, habitual behaviour becomes ingrained and hard to shift. 
Customary behaviour, insofar as it shapes part of the circumstances in which we 
find ourselves, becomes hard to change. Men continue to act in a habitual 
fashion even after the circumstances from which that habit arose have changed 
(Ferguson 1995: 132; Smith 1981: 380). There is a problem here. A custom is 
a habituated practice drawn from experience whose end is utility based on a 
certain set of circumstances. But the strength of habit and custom, added to by 
41 This leads Raphael to refer to Hume's focus on ordinary, or 'business' morality (Raphael 
1947: 94). 
42 What Hobbes meant when he referred to manners as 'those qualities of man-kind, that 
concern their living together in Pea~, and Unity.' (Hobbes 1985: 160). Waszek argues that 
Smith makes a clear distinction between virtue and propriety (Waszek 1984: 593). 
43 It is for this reason that Skinner is able to refer to thc 'rules' ofpropricty (Skinner 1996: 
67). A more recent approach to civil society which adopts a similar view is to be found in the 
work of Edward Shils (Shils 1997). 
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long practice and socialisation, is such on the human character that even after 
those circumstances shift the behaviour pattern lingers on. How, then, does an 
individual accustomed to a savage state progress to civilisation? 
The Scots' answer to this question is to be found implicitly in their 
discussion of the practice of child exposure. Smith, Hume and Ferguson all 
make reference to this ancient practice as an example of how a morally 
reprehensible [in their view] practice can become accepted by even relatively 
advanced people (Smith 1984: 209-211; Hume 1985: 398-99; Ferguson 1995: 
135). The explanation that they have for the origins of this practice is once 
again grounded in utility. It is a response to population growth in a situation of 
limited physical resources (Hume 1985: 398; Ferguson 1995: 135). This form of 
behaviour, which the Scots believe is contrary to human nature and feeling 
(Smith 1984: 210), became habitually accepted: men put aside their horror in 
reaction to their circumstances, and the repetition of this practice rendered it a 
custom which became accepted by the people as a whole. As Smith notes such 
behaviour is more understandable, or prudent, in situations of extreme indigence 
where the survival of the parent is also at stake. However once the 
circumstances of subsistence change the practice continues as it has become 
ingrained. Smith argues: 'In the latter ages of Greece, however, the same thing 
was permitted from views of remote. interest or convenience, which could by no 
means excuse it. Uninterrupted custom had by this time so thoroughly 
authorised the practice, that not only the loose maxims of the world tolerated 
this barbarous prerogative, but even the doctrine of philosophers, which ought 
to have been more just and accurate, was led away by the established custom.' 
(Smith 1984: 210).44 
Though Smith condemns this behaviour he recognises that it cannot long 
survive, arguing that no society can persist in customary practices which go . 
against the tenor of human sentiment and feeling (Smith 1984: 211). The 
44 See also Smith (1982a: 37) [Cited above]. Ferguson questions the utility of the practice, 
believing that far from limiting population it created a perverse incentive which removed all 
restraint on sexual activity leading to a gradual growth in population (Ferguson 1995: 135): an 
example of a possibly malign unintended consequence of customary human behaviour. He 
goes on to note that government policies to increase population have universally failed 
(Ferguson 1995: 136; Lehmann 1930: 140), and that the only role for government in this 
matter is to provide the stable conditions that will allow individuals to raise families. 
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customary practices fail because although they supply an answer to the 
circumstances based on utility, they fail to balance sympathy against utility, and 
prudence against propriety, in answering the problem.45 Smith notes that 
customs can be viewed as absurd from the outside (Smith 1984: 199) and that 
our socialisation within particular custom can effect our judgement of other 
customs (Smith 1984: 148); but he also believes that by examining the 
circumstances which produced a particular practice in the light of their relation 
to both sympathy and utility, we are able to undertake a process of immanent 
criticism and to form judgements as to their success and moral value.46 Thus 
when circumstances changed beyond extreme indigence the rational utility of 
child exposure was outweighed by its irreconciliablity with the sympathetic 
elements of human nature [in particular with our attachment to those close to 
us]. The custom of child exposure was continued through habit long after it was 
authorised by circumstances: as a result it can be condemned as morally 
reprehensible. 47 
How, then, did this custom pass out of use, how did people free themselves 
from socialised acceptance of the custom of child exposure? The Scots provide 
two possible answers both of which lay stress on the gradual nature of the 
change in customary behaviour. Smith, as we have seen, suggests that people 
gradually became aware of the incongruity of child exposure with human nature 
and feeling, they came to be repelled by it, and as their material condition 
became more secure, rejected it as a practice to deal with issues of population. 
4S Wilson refers to the fact that 'almost all rules reflect the indeterminate intersection of 
sentiment and circumstance' (Wilson 1997: 225). And, refcrring to infanticide, argucs tlIat 
the exposure of children takes place immediately after birth to lessen the emotional attachment 
to the child (Wilson 1997: 22). He also questions whether we can be sure that such acts did 
not lead to feelings ofremorse (Wilson 1997: 21). 
46 Hope notes a similar bi-focal view in Hume (Hope 1989: 53). TIus line of argument has led 
some to view Smith's approach as essentially functionalist (Campbell 1977: 528; Schneider 
1980: viii-ix; Reisman 1976: 21). 
41 See also Hope (1989: 86-87). For a similar analysis applied to the use of Latin in the 
Roman Catholic Church see Smith (1981: 765). Petsoulas develops a similar argument with 
reference to Hume. She argues that Hume's notion of conscious reflection on evidence 
provides an external standard by which to judge and alter evolved behaviour patterns. This 
trial-and-error approach allows the gradual immanent criticism and reform of moral practices 
(petsoulas 2001: 115). It should be remembered, lest we conceive oftltis as an admission of 
the value of abstract reasoning, that conscious reflection is itself an evolved behaviour pattern 
for the Scots. In Livingston's terms: 'Civilization, then, is a process whereby the conventions 
of common life are raised to the level of critical self-consciousness.' (Livingston 1990: 128). 
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Such a process relies, on at least some level, on a deliberative calculation - a 
weighing up of the pros and cons of the practice - which balances sentiment and 
utility with circumstances. Hume however is even more gradualist in his 
response. He believes that though custom carries force beyond the 
circumstances which shaped it, its focus can shift and evolve as those 
circumstances alter. Thus' A man, who has contracted a custom of eating fruit 
by the use of pears or peaches, will satisfy himself with melons, where he cannot 
find his favourite fruit; as one, who has become a drunkard by the use of red 
wines, will be carried almost with the same violence to white, if presented to 
him.' (Hume 1978: 147). As a result patterns of behaviour are subject to slow 
and insensible change in reaction to the conditions in which they take place. If 
we no longer need to expose children, but can now put them up for adoption, 
our means of dealing with the problem has changed, but the habit of thought and 
behaviour behind it remains much the same or only slightly altered. 
The important thing to draw from this is that custom and habit do indeed 
retain their force after circumstances change, but only for so long.48 The initial 
custom must have had some grounding in utility and should external 
circumstances change to remove the utility of a practice, it will not be long 
before people evolve new customs in reaction to the new circumstances. As a 
result they will modify their behaviour to the new circumstances [adjust the 
equilibrium], and adapt those practices to form new customs (Millar 1990: 41). 
Many of these new practices might share some of the shape of the old, but their 
role as conventions will have altered to reflect the new conditions.49 This slow 
and gradual process is what the Scots termed the progress of manners, a 
phenomenon which represented a key indicator of the progress of civilisation. 
48 Bryson, referring to Ferguson, calls this 'the deep grooves which habit makes' (Bryson 
1968: 141). 
49 Coleman discusses this point in detail noting that: 'It may happen, however, that a tradition 
changes or comes to an end when altered circumstances render it inconvenient and an 
alternative is at hand.' (Coleman 1968: 240). His example is the gradual abandonment of the 
redcoat military practice of marching into battle in columns, which proved lethal in the face of 
the ambush tactics of the American Revolutionaries (Coleman 1968: 243). Though it should 
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It is clear that the Scots adopt a spontaneous order approach to the explanation 
of the origins of morality. Drawing on the underlying universality of human 
sociability and the desire for stability of expectations, they identify a process of 
sympathetic mutual adjustment in reaction to circumstances [prudence] and to 
the views of others [propriety]. Our moral rules are a spontaneous order that 
arises as an unintended consequence of our habituation to such modes of 
behaviour. The order itself evolves in a gradual manner in reaction to changes in 
the circumstances of the people in question. Throughout this approach to the 
morality there is a rejection of purposive rationality and an assumption of the 
significance of the limits of the human capacity for knowledge. Moreover this 
analysis of the development and operation of morality forms a part of the 
invisible hand argument that explains the generation of socially benign 
spontaneous orders. 
be noted that drill practice has been retained to instil discipline - the function of the practice 
has altered. 
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Section Three: Law and Government 
Chapter 1: The Four Stages 
Having developed" a position that acknowledges the centrality of habits and 
conventions formed in reaction to circumstances, the Scots proceed to an 
analysis of the 'spontaneous emergence' (Elsner 1983: 337) of key social 
institutions such as language, property, law and government, which is conducted 
in the light of these insights. They deploy the spontaneous order approach 
through a conjectural history aimed at the explanation of these institutions. 
For the Scots language is a universal phenomenon because it fulfils a 
universal human need and a universal aspect of human nature: the need and 
desire for communication. Hu~e notes this (Hume 1978: 10), and uses it to 
explain why different linguistic traditions develop their own words for common 
external phenomena; all languages have a word for water, though that word 
need not be the same or even similar.- Language, however, develops 
spontaneously (Ferguson 1995: 167): it is not created in an abstract manner but 
rather arises as an unintended by-product of practise (Ferguson 1973 vol. I : 38-
39,42). Languages develop gradually from experience: they are customs rather 
than consciously created modes of communication. 1 In its initial stages language 
is little more than a habitual association of ideas with particular vocal sounds 
(Ferguson 1994: 46-47). The human urge to order and classify, which we have 
noted at length above, leads to a linguistic identification of particular phenomena 
with particular vocal sounds (Smith 1985: 9). Languages develop by a process 
of association and comparison that leads men to categorise their experience and 
develop language as a descriptive and communicative skill (Smith 1985: 204; 
Ferguson 1973 vol. 1 : 44, 64)? As human experience and its classification 
extend so language begins to become more complex, developing as it does so 
1 This is a common view among many of the Scots. See Humc (1985: 209); Smith (1985: 4, 
11,203,217) and Dunbar (1995: 96-98). Monboddo and Kames also express a significant 
interest in the development of language. 
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conventions and general rules to ease interaction (Hume 1978: 22). Abstracting 
and contrasting from observation (Smith 1985: 10), men develop conventional 
modes of classification and description that allow them to communicate about 
external phenomena.3 Language is an expression of customary knowledge 
established by convention and acquired by socialisation within the particular 
linguistic tradition ofa specific community (Smith 1982a: 157; Ferguson 1973 
voU: 137).4 It is not intentionally acquired; rather it is adopted by children 
through socialisation - through experience of the meaning of existing words and 
the conventions of grammar. No one person invented language - it is the 
product of the gradually acquired cumulative experience of a people (Ferguson 
1973 vol. 1 ; 42). Once again the medium of language is individuals. A language 
does not survive and develop in an abstract sense: it does so through the active 
use each individual makes ofit. 5 
For the Scots, and particularly for Hume and Smith, notions of property and 
justice are coeval. Their origins are intimately related (Smith 1982b: 401) and 
indeed explain each other (Hume 1978: 491). For Hume the notion of justice 
can only exist where the conditions for it exist and as these conditions are the 
. same as those which produce conventions of property, then the origins of the 
two concepts are mutually explanatory (Hume 1975: 188, 191).6 
The Scots' analysis is grounded on the premise that human beings fonn 
conventional modes of behaviour in reaction to their circumstances. Perhaps 
naturally the chief focus of human attention is the provision of subsistence. Man 
requires sustenance and shelter to survive, and as a result these matters become 
the focus ofa great deal of their actions. As Ferguson notes: 'the care of 
2 Becker notes that, for the Scots, languages evolve in reaction to circumstance (Becker 1961: 
16). For a discussion of Smith's views on language formation see Berry (l974)~ Land (1977) 
and RUdiger (1989). 
3 See also Hwne (1985: 229). 
.. It is also influenced by context, as Smith suggests when he points out that no one bargains in 
foetry. Prose has developed as the language and style of commerce (Smith 1985: 137). 
Indicating the relation of the spontaneous order approach to a commitment to 
methodological individualism. 
6 Smith makes a similar point (Smith 1981: 710-11). Note here that the Scots did not believe 
that they were providing a moral justification of a particular form of property. rather they 
believed that they were providing an explanation of the historical development of the 
phenomenon (Bowles 1985). 
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subsistence is the principal spring of bum an actions' (Ferguson 1995: 35)', food 
is a product of human industry (Smith 1981: 206), that is to say men must act in 
some way to secure it for their consumption. Thus in all societies the provision 
of subsistence is the primary industry (Smith 1981: 377), for without it the 
survival of the species is impossible and thus other activities are equally 
impossible. In undeveloped, or savage, nations man's first concern is survival. 
As a result his first efforts are to secure subsistence (Millar 1990: 3). This, in 
the Scots' view, accounts for the immediacy of savage so.cieties. The difficulty 
of securing subsistence leads man to focus his attention almost solely upon it 
(Millar 1990: 3}B The conventions and forms of human behaviour are shaped in 
a great measure by the various devices which they develop to provide for their 
subsistence. This, the Scots argue, is a universal phenomenon, occurring as it 
does in all human societies. The underlying universality of the human need for 
subsistence, combined with the similarity of our physical frames, nature and 
intellect means that the development of different modes of subsistence is a 
process that occurs in a similar manner in all human societies. As Millar puts it: 
'the similarity of his wants, as well as of the faculties by which those wants are 
supplied, has everywhere produced a remarkable uniformity in the several steps 
of his progression.' (Millar 1990: 3). From this insight, supported and 
confirmed by the evidence of conjectural history, the Scots develop their stadial 
theories of progress and social change. 
The most clearly defined stadial analysis is that developed by Smith, and 
mirrored by Millar, which has become known as the 'four stages' theory.9 Smith 
divides types of society into four categories based on their reactions to the issue 
of subsistence. The mode of subsistence, he argues, as the primary concern of 
human activity, necessarily shapes other social institutions that develop in each 
7 See also Ferguson (1973 vol. 1 57, 177~ 1973 vol. 2: 37,60). 
8 Skinner notes that the satisfaction of 'basic needs' is a prerequisite for complexity (Skinner 
1975: 174). 
9 Ferguson's 'highly idiosyncratic' (Meek 1976: 154) analysis appears to operate with three, 
rather than four, stages: savage, barbarous and polished. See Kettler (1965: 228); Lehmann 
(1930: 81-86) and Hill (1997: 679). The origins of the 'four stages' approach have been traced 
to Grotius (Meek 1976: 14) and the Physiocrats (Meek 1971). However Bowles points out that 
the Scots' explanatory approach prompts us 'to ask historical questions rather than the moral 
questions of the natural law framework' (Bowles 1985: 197). Traces ofa stadial approach can 
also be found in Hayek's work (Hayek 1960: 40). 
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ofthese types of society. 10 Smith's four stages; '1st, the Age of Hunters; 2ndly, 
the Age of Shepherds; 3rdly, the Age of Agriculture; and 4thly, the Age of 
Commerce.' (Smith 1982b: 14) are laid down as a general schema of social 
development which is applicable to all societies. Thus each stage produces 
conventional, including as we have seen 'moral', behaviours that are appropriate 
for the physical conditions and level of security of subsistence which pertain in 
them. It is through this conceptual framework that Smith and Millar approach 
the gradual development of social institutions. Millar's Distinction of Ranks is a 
series of case studies of basic human interrelations and how each is affected by 
the gradual change in the mode of subsistence. He examines notions of 
subordination, the position of women, the relation between parent and child and 
that between master and servant, tracing in each case the changes in the 
conventions and attitudes around each relationship in the light of changes in the 
mode of subsistence. 11 Smith undertakes similar case studies, in particular 
devoting a chapter of the Wealth of Nations to a 'four stages' analysis of the 
development of the military that forms part of his argument for a standing army 
(Smith 1981: 689-708). In each stage a different method for securing 
subsistence dominates: hunting, herding, agriculture and commercial industry. 
But each stage also absorbs the stage before: hunting and herding do not cease 
because agriculture arises, but they cease to be the sole or chief means of 
securing subsistence. For this reason Smith argues that in a commercial society 
hunting and fishing persist, but as non-essential activities undertaken for pleasure 
rather than through necessity (Smith 1981: 117). By examining the evidence of 
conjectural history the Scots determined that all societies, ifleft alone to 
develop, proceeded roughly according to this pattern of change in the mode of 
subsistence.12 Change between each of the stages is posited on the discovery of 
10 Subsistence here acts as the underlying universality that allows the conjectural 
generalisation (Meek 1976: 152). 
II Smith also discusses changes in the institution of punishment (Smith 1982b: l30). 
12 It should be noted that the 'four stages' is not a deterministic model of inevitable 
development, but rather represents an attempt at explanation through the medium of 
conjectural history (Broadie 2001: 76~ Skinner 1996: 183~ Harpham 1983: 768-769). It is also, 
as Cropsey notes, significant in its downplaying of politics in favour of an underlying 
economic understanding oftbe forces behind social cbange (Cropsey 1957: 57). 
new skills which prove more productive in securing subsistence than those 
developed in the past (Ferguson 1973 voU: 133-34,242; Meek 1976: 100). 
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Smith argues that animals multiply in direct proportion to the provision of 
subsistence (Smith 1981: 97): as a result there exists a constant demand for food 
owing to universal, natural, drives for procreation and survival (Smith 1981: 
162).13 As subsistence becomes more secure in each stage the population grows 
as larger families may be supported (Smith 1981: 98). However population 
growth itself cannot be the reason behind a change in the stage of the mode of 
subsistence.14 It certainly may act as a prompt to that change, but the means 
depend on the acquisition of the knowledge requisite to pursue the new mode. 
Thus the change from hunter to shepherd is brought about by the gradual 
development of the skills necessary for animal husbandry: Similarly agriculture 
is a skill acquired in reaction to circumstances (Smith 1982b: 15). That is to say 
that the desire to supply more steadily the means of subsistence for a greater 
population led to experiments in food production which led in turn to the 
discovery and refinement of new methods. Millar notes this when he attributes 
the changes between stages to 'experience' (Millar 1990: 3). Ferguson in turn 
argues that the development of new skills in the provision of subsistence is 
related to the gradual rise of settled communities. l' Thus a shepherd society 
gradually settles in one geographic location, their growing familiarity with that 
situation opening their attention to possible new means of subsistence and 
leading to the honing of new skills in agriculture (Ferguson 1973 vol. 1 : 58-9). If 
we are to tell the story of the links between the 'four stages' in terms of the rise 
of knowledge of means of subsistence it would be something like this: Hunters 
13 See also Kames (1776: 100) and Berry (1997: 96) 
14 Heilbroner correctly states that population growth is the force behind the change between 
stages, but it cannot, by itself, explain the development (Heilbroner 1975: 527). In Meek's 
terms hunger prompts the search for new knowledge (Meek 1976: 213). Like the mercantilists 
(Hollander 1973~ 58-65), the Scots viewed population growth as an indicator of progress. 
Danford has argued tbat Hume's essay Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations is a 
contribution to the debate over the superiority of classical models of freedom to modem 
'commercial' freedom. Hume uses population levels here to suggest the superiority of the 
modem approach (Danford 1990: 183-186). See also Reisman (1976: 146). Similarly, 
Spengler argues that Smith regarded a decline in infant mortality as an indicator of economic 
advance (Spengler 1983). 
IS The social change brought about by the change in the mode of subsistence is thus an 
unintended consequence of the development of new ways of procuring subsistence (Meek 
1976: 224). 
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are brought into repeated contact with animals and gradually acquire the skills 
which form the basis of shepherdry; shepherds are brought into contact with the 
means of subsistence of animals and gradually acquire knowledge of the crops 
required, their attention is then led to' a possible new source of human 
subsistence and, as they settle geographically, they develop agricultural skills. 
Once humans have developed settled accommodation the division of labour 
increases and commercial industry begins to develop. 16 
Smith is also aware of this when he compares colonists to savages: 'The 
colonists carry out with them a knowledge of agriculture and of other useful 
arts, superior to what can grow up of its own accord in the course of many 
centuries among savage and barbarous nations.' (Smith 1981: 564-65). Thus we 
see that the key factor here is t~e possession of knowledge. Colonists draw on 
the cumulative sum of the experiential knowledge of their mother country to 
provide for their subsistence. Savages on the other hand have yet to pass 
through the 'four stages' and acquire the gradual development of knowledge 
relating to subsistence that it entails. Smith states that the population of a 
country is a mark of its prosperity (Smith 1981: 87-88): that its development of 
subsistence provision allows it to support an increasingly large population is the 
measure of both its wealth and 'progression'. 17 Why this should be so is a point 
to which we will return later in the section on the division of labour: but here 
suffice it to say that for Smith the extent of the division of labour is limited by 
the extent of the market which is, in tum, determined by population (Smith 
1981: 31). The division of labour allows the growth of specialisation, specialist 
knowledge and efficiency which, when related to the primary object of 
subsistence, increases the scope for further growth of population. 
This analysis of social change and of the effect of the mode of subsistence 
on the nature of society and population is the backdrop to the Scots' discussion 
16 For more on the development of comm~rcial society see Section Four below on the division 
of labour. Hont suggests that the fourth stage differs from those prior to it in that it does not 
refer to a productive process related directly to the attainment of subsistence (Hont 1987: 2.54). 
Rather, trade, which is present in all four stages, comes to represent the chief means of 
securing subsistence through interdependence. Meek also notes that tile change to tile fourth 
stage differs to previous changes, in that it is the development of a factor that has always been 
present [trade] that is significant, rather than the acquisition of a practical skill of production 
(Meek 1976: 227). 
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of the interactive development of property, justice and government (Millar 1990: 
141). The Scots define property as a mental concept, as something which ' .. .is 
not anything real in the objects, but is the offspring of the sentiments' (Hume 
1978: 509). Property is not a physical relationship (Smith 1982b: 32), but an 
artificial convention of human behaviour (Hume 1978: 528; 1975: 201) that 
develops in relation to a specific set of circumstances and to serve a specific 
end. IS Property is 'such a relation betwixt a person and an object as permits 
him, but forbids any other, the free use and possession of it, without violating 
the laws of justice and moral equity.' (Hume 1978: 310).19 In terms of the 'four 
stages' theory it is clear that no conception of property exists in the savage or 
hunter society. The immediacy of life in such conditions precludes abstract 
thought and the mode of subsistence is based around securing from what is wild 
for immediate needs (Smith 1982b: 404). As a result of this there is little or no 
government in hunting societies. As Smith puts it 'Till there be property there 
can be no government' (Smith 1982b: 404). When there is no mode of 
distinction between a people, no dependence or security of subsistence, then the 
concept of property and of a government to defend that property is absent. 
However government and property do arise, and they do so in the second 
of Smith's stages, that of shepherds. It is in the age of shepherds that notions of 
property, subordination and government arise and the development of social 
institutions starts apace. Experience teaches men to refine the skills necessary 
. 
for animal husbandry as they see the benefit in this domestication of animals as 
opposed to constant hunting. But shepherdry is discovered and perfected by 
some before others. These people control increasing numbers of animals 
rendering hunting increasingly difficult for others (Smith 1982b: 202). However 
this situation was as yet insecure. The shepherd might domesticate and tend his 
flock, but his claim to them as a result of this could quite easily pass unnoticed 
by others keen to secure subsistence (Smith 1982b: 404). -Some institution to 
17 See Part Three for a similar assertion by Hayek. 
18 This having been said the development of property proceeds according to the unintended 
consequences model. See Hume (1978: 529). In addition Hume's use of the terms nalural and 
artificial is qualified by the assertion that mankind is by its nature an inventive species (Hume 
1978: 484). 
19 See also Ferguson (1994: 218). 
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enforce claims of right was required by shepherds. The origin of that institution 
was also to be found in this inequality of fortune, for those who could not 
practise shepherdry and yet saw the stock of wild animals fall would become 
dependent on those who had mastered the skill. Those who controlled herds and 
flocks came to occupy superior positions as an unintended consequence of their 
possession of the knowledge of shepherdry; knowledge which gave them easier 
access to subsistence through the control oflarge numbers of animals. However 
the control of large numbers of animals is in itself useless because of the physical 
limits as to how much each individual can consume. As a result the successful 
shepherd provides for others who have yet to acquire the skill and, consequently, 
comes to a position of eminen<?e over them and introduces subordination into 
society for the first time. Dependants develop a habit of obedience and accept 
their position as clients in order to secure easy access to the means of 
subsistence. They come, as a result of this process of habit, to accept the 
validity of the shepherd's claim to his flocks (Smith 1982b: 405), forming an 
opinion of his 'right' to the control of them. They also begin to develop an 
emotional loyalty to their particular benefactor and his heirs (Smith 1981: 715) 
that is the foundation of a notion of a nation, or the explicit identification with 
institutions which express the unity of the community. The first institutions of 
government arise with the explicit purpose of defending property and are 
supported by the dependency-led obedience of peoples to those who have 
acquired flocks and herds. In the second stage wealth supplies authority (Smith 
1981: 713) and introduces an inequality into human society which bears little 
relation to physical attributes. 
It is in this manner that the 'habit' of property (Ferguson 1995: 81) arises 
and is adapted in each of the succeeding stages, gradually being refined to deal 
with the particular circumstances of each new mode of subsistence and the 
events that occur in the course of its development. Property is a spontaneous 
order, a settled equilibrium that gradually evolves in reaction to changes in 
circumstance. Thus, Smith argues, in the age of shepherds the centrality of the 
concept of ownership leads to property laws which punish theft with death. This 
practice passes out of use in the age of agriculture where theft is no longer such 
a direct threat to subsistence. In the age of commerce the huge increase in the 
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scope of those things which can be held as property leads to a proportionate 
increase in the laws to defend ~hat property, though once again theft is no longer 
considered of such an immediate threat to subsistence as to give occasion for the 
death penalty (Smith 1982b: 16). 
In the age of shepherds the conception of property refers to herds and 
flocks and the wandering nature of such peoples precludes any definite notion of 
property in land (Ferguson 1995: 96). But in the age of agriculture property in 
land develops in reaction to the fixed habitation of agricultural labourers (Smith 
1982b: 20). For Smith the key step in the development of private property is the 
development offixed habitations in cities and towns (Smith 1982b: 408-9, 460). 
This phenomenon is merely a continuation of the concentration of population 
that had proceeded from hunting through shepherding ages (Smith 1982b: 256). 
In a hunter society social groups are relatively small, each competing for the 
scarce resources of the hunt. Shepherd societies admit of larger numbers by the 
greater ease of subsistence, but these numbers do not settle in a specific location 
to practise their arts (Smith 1982b: 408). They are however open to attack by 
other groups and so, for reasons of mutual defence, erect fortified towns to 
which they might take their flocks to avoid attack (Smith 1982b: 409). The 
concentration of population in these locales leads to a development of the arts, in 
particular agricultural skills; and towns and cities come to develop. As a result 
of this: 'Private property in land never begins till a division be made from 
common agreement, which is generally when cities begin to be built, as every 
one would choose that his house, which is a permanent object, should be entirely 
his own.' (Smith 1982b: 460). The c~ncerted development of private property is 
to be found in early urban areas where people living close together found it 
necessary to define their separate possessions (Smith 1982b: 22, 208). The 
notion of private property arose gradually from a sense of the utility of the 
mutual recognition of claims of right to property (Ferguson 1995: 95). 
The clearest description of the details of this process in the work of the 
Scots is that given by Hume?O Though Hume does not explicitly follow the 
'four stages' schema he does nonetheless provide a conceptual analysis of how 
20 Though Smith questions Hwne's reliance on utility alone (Smith 1984: 179, 188). 
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the concept of property arises from utility. Smith was keen to stress that the 
stability of property is necessary'for the stability of society (Smith 1982b: 35), 
and Hume's analysis explains why this is so. We have already seen that Hume 
shares the common Scots' view that the origins of property and justice are 
interrelated. He believed that justice does not arise from a sense of benevolence 
- this having too weak a hold on the human imagination - but rather that it is a 
product of man's self-interest. We desire to acquire goods to support our 
subsistence and indulge our appetites (Hume 1978: 492), but the danger of this 
urge is that it makes society impossible (Hume 1978: 529). That is to say if we 
do not refrain from other's goods, if we constantly seize them, we are left open 
constantly to the threat that the same will happen to us. To this end man 
discerns the utility, in the long term, of refraining from the goods of others. As 
Hume puts it: 'Now this alteration must necessarily take place upon the least 
reflection; since 'tis evident, that the passion is much better satisfy'd by its 
restraint, than by its liberty, and that by preserving society, we make much 
greater advances in the acquiring possessions, than by running into the solitary 
and forlorn condition, which must follow upon violence and an universal 
licence.' (Hume 1978: 492). What arises though is not an explicit agreement 
over the security of property, but a convention of behaviour, By experience we 
gradually come to see the value of such an institution to promote stability and 
permit the growth ofwealth.21 . Like a habit, the convention: 'arises gradually, 
and acquires force by a slow progression, and by our repeated experience of the 
inconveniences of transgressing it.' (Hume 1978: 490). The gradual increase in 
experiential knowledge leads man to form customs the utility of which are the 
security of possession and the consequent scope for future profit. Our 
expectations become stabilised, we rely upon private property conventions to 
reduce the uncertainty of our position. For example, if! know that my 
21 Hume stresses that, though a system of property is in the public interest tlus is not the 
motive which prompted its establishment. It is the self-interest of individuals who adjust their 
behaviour with their own gain in view. See: 'This system, therefore, comprehending the 
interest of each individual, is of course advantageous to the public; tho' it be not intended for 
that purpose by the inventors.' (Hume 1978: 529). Men do not purposively set out to create a 
system of property, rather it is an unintended consequence of the interaction of self-interest 
and the desire for stability of expectations. 
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neighbour will refrain from stealing my goods so long as I do the same toward 
him, then I need not stay up all night on guard. 
However there is a problem with this model, as it is laid down thus far, and 
it is this problem which leads to the development and evolution of enforceable 
rules of justice and the institution of government. Hume argues that all human 
societies are subject to the same conditions which render justice necessary: these 
being 'the selfishness and confin'd generosity of men', 'the scanty provision 
nature has made for his wants', and the 'easy change' of external objects (Hume 
1978: 494-495). These universal conditions (Hume 1975: 203) mean that all 
societies will eventually develop some sense of property once the utility of such 
a conception becomes apparent. The easy interchange of goods together with 
limited generosity and the scarcity of those goods create a problem for human 
interaction which man seeks to solve by the institution of private property. 
Justice is an artificial virtue that arises around this convention; abstinence from 
the property of others produces long-term utility and this is the original authority 
of justice. Such conventions become part of the customary behaviour of a 
people by repetition and socialisation (Hume 1978: 501), and they gradually 
. 
come to affect the sentiments of the people. As we have seen individuals seek 
the approval of others in terms of sympathy, and so conform to those social 
norms and conventions within which they have been socialised. Thus justice, 
whose original motive is utility,. becomes a virtue (Hume 1978: 496, 499-500). 
Justice and property are both artificial, yet they are both vital to the continuation 
of society (Hume 1978: 497)?2 
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Chapter 2: The Origins of Government 
Conventions develop regarding property and Hume is quick to assert that 
these rules must be general i~ nature if they are to be accepted as conventions by 
all. This focus on the need for general rules is yet another product of the human 
propensity to seek systematised knowledge, classification, and order, to stabilise 
expectations.23 Such general rules, as with habitual expectation, create a 
conception of probability drawn from.experience. Or as Hume puts it: 'General 
Rules create a species of probability. which sometimes influences the judgement, 
and always the imagination.' (Burne 1978: 585). Men are 'mightily addicted to 
general rules' (Hume 1978: 551), and this emotional need for order and 
systematised knowledge leads them to form general rules drawn from their 
experience. General rules of behaviour are evolved from experience of 
circumstances (Smith 1984: 160), but it is difficult to produce rules with a 
specific content which apply in more than one particular set of circumstances 
(Smith 1984: 174). For this reason humans categorise and generalise, they 
develop abstract rules which are not content or context specific, and as a result 
may be applied to a variety of circumstances. 24 As Hume would have it: 'All the 
laws of nature, which regulate property, as well as all civil laws, are general, and 
regard alone some essential circumstances of the case, without taking into 
consideration the characters, ,situations, and connexions of the person concerned, 
or any particular consequences which may result from the determination of these 
laws in any particular case which offers.' (Hume 1975: 305). 
General rules can be distilled from complex situations by the observation of 
broad regularities. In a sense, simple general rules, insofar as they are attempts 
to create a stability of expectation, are a reaction to complexity?S Our 'laws of 
22 And thus form a part of the invisible hand argument for the generation of benign 
~ntaneous orders. 
See above Part Two, Section One. 
24 Smith's notion of propriety is a general rule of behaviour acquired from experience that 
operates through the medium of habit (Smith 1984: 163). As Baumgarth notes: 'Rules, 
whether legal or social, in the sense of mores, have as their task the reduction of uncertainty, at 
least avoidable uncertainty.' (Baumgarth 1978: 12). 
25 This simplification in reaction to complexity will be examined below in the chapter on the 
division of labour, where it will also be noted that an unintended consequence of simplification 
in reaction to complexity, is further complexity. 
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nature' , as with any law, are general rules drawn from the observation of 
experience, or acquired through socialisation with others acting on their 
experience (Smith 1984: 165). They create a sense of certainty and stability of 
expectation that calms the mind (Hume 1978: 453). For this reason conventions 
such as property develop as general rules to stabilise interaction (Hume 1978: 
555). The stability provided by a system of general rules in society is, as a 
result, more important to the success of that society than the outcome of specific 
individual cases where the rule is applied (Hume 1975: 304; Ferguson 1973 
voU: 172). It is because of this, and because agreement to the institution of 
property laws is necessary, that the laws governing property take on a general 
form. The general rule of property is, in a very real sense, more important to the 
stability of society than any concern over which individuals hold which particular 
property (Hume 1975: 309). 
In addition, when first shaping the convention it appears obvious to Hume 
that each individual would only enter into it so long as it secured that which he 
held at that time. As a result first possession becomes a principle of property 
and, indeed, this leads to a notion of the origin of property as being bound up 
with private property. The rules of property, in order to stabilise expectations, 
must be such that ownership can be determined. The Scots lay down various 
criteria that develop as conventional claims to property: first possession, long 
possession, inheritance, and alienation (in the sense of buying and seIling) (Smith 
1982b: 459). From this the Scots believed that disputes over the validity of 
claims made to property by appeal to these principles (Smith 1982b: 203) would 
naturally arise. As a result societies would have to develop some conflict 
resolution mechanism if such disputes were not to tear the society apart. Also 
external goods remain interchangeable by their nature (Hume 1978: 505) and 
this factor, together with the other conditions of justice, means that there is a 
constant temptation to break the convention for private and immediate gain. 
Some institution must be developed to secure the stability of property that is 
necessary for the stability and indeed the existence of society. 
The fact, arising from the conditions which form the conventions of justice 
and property, that society requires some support for the non-physical claim 
which is the convention of property (Smith 1982b: 208) implies that the first law 
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is law determining and governing property (Smith 1982b: 313). This law exists 
as convention and custom, but - just as we saw the utility of property - so we see 
the utility of a body to determine and decide in disputes regarding property 
(Smith 1982b: 324). The need to delimit property in an accurate manner, in 
order to avoid potential conflicts that would destroy society, leads to the 
institution of government (Hume 1975: 192). As the conditions which render 
justice necessary and give rise to the 'habit' of property are universal factors of 
the human condition (Hume lQ75: 203), we see that all societies institute a 
conception of property and develop conventions which decide property disputes 
under the name of justice. 
In terms of the utility of property and government we see that, its sole end is 
security of subsistence and its extension and refmement through industry. By 
reducing conflict and establishing stability the institution of justice and its 
administration by an authority which becomes an institution of government are 
. vital to the provision of the 'space' required to pursue material progress (Smith 
1982b: 338, 522; Ferguson 1995: 163). It is because of this that Ferguson 
argues that the institution of government is a necessary precondition for 
civilisation (Ferguson 1995: 185). Moreover, Ferguson argues that the intimate 
relationship between property, government and progress is such that the 
development and refinement of each is a process of complex interaction. He 
writes: ' ... the commercial and political arts ~ave advanced together. These arts 
have been in modem Europe so interwoven, that we cannot determine which 
were prior in order of time, or derived the most advantage from the mutual 
influences with which they act and re-act upon one another.' (Ferguson 1995: 
247).26 
Therefore the institution of government arises from the recognition of the 
utility of a common court of appeal for the settlement of property disputes.27 
The conventions of property ownership that arise in a society thus begin to be 
26 'The central point about Ferguson's conception of political establishments, stated from the 
actor's point of view, is that they "continue in a state of gradual formation". What appears 
regular and established from the spectator's point of view, proves to be something being 
regulated and in the process of establishment.' (Kettler 1977: 449). 
27 There is an implicit question here as to what extent the Scots believed that their explanation 
of the origins of property and government served as a convincing justification of particular 
forms of government or property. See (Bowles 1985). 
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codified, to become laws, when they are drawn up and made explicit by those . 
appealed to as judges in disputes. This process, the desire for general rules and 
stability of possession (Hume ~978: 555), though it is prompted by a sense of 
interest arising from a view to utility, is not carried on in any explicit and 
intended manner?8 Those who appeal to a judge to decide disagreements over 
the conventional rules of property do not intend to create the institution of 
government. As Ferguson puts it: 
'Mankind, in following the present sense of their minds, in striving to 
remove inconveniences, or to gain apparent and contiguous advantages, 
arrive at ends which even their imagination could not anticipate, and pass 
on, like other animals, in the track of their nature, without perceiving its 
end. He who first said "I will appropriate this field: I will leave it to m¥ . 
heirs" did not perceive, that he was laying the foundation of civil laws and 
political establishments.' (FergUson 1995: 119). 
The Scots believed that governments arose by a complex process of 
unintended consequences (Hume 1985: 39) in reaction to circumstances, the 
chief of which being the desire for property delineation to secure subsistence and 
the desire for protection from external threats.29 Government however develops 
more slowly than the arts of subsistence (Smith 1981: 565), its attentions being 
called upon only when disputes arise. In the meantime the advance of 
knowledge of the arts of subsistence grows. Smith is particularly clear that the 
chief scene of the advance of knowledge of both government and the arts is in 
the burgeoning cities where interaction and trade develop productive techniques 
and institutions (Smith 1981: 405,411; Skinner 1975: 164). People living in 
close proximity have more scope for conflict as well as for trade. Thus 
government develops to more advanced levels in urban areas. However cities 
require to trade their produce for that of the country in order to acquire some of 
28 'Such results are attained through the activities of man in the mass; results of which the 
individual is largely unconscious but which he may later recognize.' (Skinner 1967: 43). This 
view has led some commentators to view Smith and Hume as system utilitarians (Campbell 
and Ross 1981: 73). 
29 Flew describes Hume's thought here as: 'evolutionary as opposed to creationist', noting that 
'a main insight of any such sophisticated understanding is that social institutions, which are of 
course purely human productions, may have functions and consequences which are not the 
fulfilments of anyone's intentions' (Flew 1986: 159). 
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the means of subsistence, for this reason Smith spends some time analysing the 
relationship between town and country. Local farmers can come to town to 
trade on market day, but as trade between communities advances immediate 
exchange becomes unwieldy and the notions of contract and money arise (Smith 
1982b: 91). The enforcement of contracts within a given area then becomes the 
rationale behind the extension of the-judicial power of governments. Moreover 
the need for stability and peace to allow the advance of learning in the 
commercial arts means that commerce gradually alters the practice of 
government reducing the scope for arbitrary uses of authority (Smith 1981: 
412). 
Hume's analysis of the origins of government and property in the Treatise 
and Essays describes the underlying rationale for such institutions; it explains 
how interest and a sense of utility are the original spurs to men establishing 
government and property. But the actual development of these institutions is 
laid out in terms of the formation of conventions. And these conventions arise 
by a series of particular reactions to historical circumstances that become 
habitual. There is no purposive creation of government, no pre-recognition of 
the utility, the sense of its usefulness arises as it is practised and developed. It 
becomes habitually accepted because it is repeated and because these repetitions 
stabilise expectations. Hume highlights this when he argues that though men are 
sensible to the long-term advantages of a system of justice governing property 
and applied by an institution of government, they are also by their nature weak. 
They are predisposed to view matters in terms of short-term advantage (Hume 
1978: 534-39). It is because of this that man can understand the utility of justice 
yet act in a manner pernicious to it (Hume 1985: 38; Ferguson 1995: 81). This 
'narrowness of the soul, which makes them prefer the present to the remote' 
(Hume 1978: 537) is a facet of human nature which leads to the constant threat 
that those conventions of justice adopted out of a sense of utility will fail to bind 
(Hume 1978: 538). There must, then, be some principle that binds a society to 
justice, which overrides this short-termism and encourages the view oflonger-
term utility. This human partiality rowards our short-term goals (Smith 1984: 
185) is related to the evolution of property in terms of general rules. Hume 
argues that general rules of behaviour restrict the operation of our short-term 
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self-interested urges and force us to act in a manner that keeps the long-term 
advantages of institutions such as property in view (Hume 1978: 597). What 
Smith calls 'general rules of conduct' (Smith 1984: 161) restrict our capacity to 
act in a specific manne~ in reaction to specific circumstances. By circumscribing 
ourselves with general rules we are able to keep longer-term utility at least partly 
in view?O 
The Scots answer to this problem again lies in the notions of habit and 
convention, in the habit of obedience or the acceptance of authority. They reject 
simplistic answers such as social contracts that draw on purposive ratiomility and 
instead develop their own unique, more historically accurate [in their view], 
analysis of the origins and bindingness of political authority. This analysis, while 
aware of the function of utility in the underlying rationale of the process, 
highlights how the actual development occurred through a process of evolution 
from the unintended consequences of the human desire for order and stability of 
expectations. The desire for adjudication of disputes about property leads men 
to tum to eminent men within their society, people whose fame - though not 
originally based on impartial judgement - suggests them to the imagination as 
judges (Smith 1985: 174). In his essay on the Origin of Government Hume 
describes how this process occurs in some detail. He argues that: 'The persons, 
who first attain this distinction by the consent, tacit or express, of the people, 
must be endowed with superior personal qualities .... which command respect and 
confidence' (Hume 1985: 39).31 We see that the origin of government, though 
grounded in a rationale of utility, in fact develops in a gradual manner: it evolves 
~ 
from the habitual acceptance of chiefs (Ferguson 1995: 118-19~ 1973 vol. 1 : 
257).32 The role of the chiefis an evolved institution grounded on habitual 
acceptance, it is not the product of a rational plan or contract grounded on an 
explicit attempt to secure a useful end. Hume makes this point clearly: 'it cannot 
30 'In this case [political establishments] it is not love of mankind which is operative, but a 
regard for the conventions and systems of relationships which have been established, tacitly or 
by law, and which have been seen to have useful results.' (Bryson 1968: 158). This includes 
the notion of propriety, as discussed above, and forms a part of the invisible hand. 
31 See also Ferguson (1995: 97; 1973 vol.1: 34). 
32 Smith and Ferguson make similar points (Smith 1982b: 211, 405; Ferguson 1995: 98). See 
also Rosenberg (1976), for a discussion of Smitll'S views on the role of judges and chiefs as a 
manifestation of the division oflaboUf. 
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be expected that men should beforehand be able to discover them, or foresee 
their operation. Government commences more casually and more imperfectly.' 
(Hume 1985: 39).33 
Though the rationale behind motivations of the self-interested actors who 
appeal to a common judge is the desire for property delineation, the process, 
when repeated, creates a new authority in society, it introduces a 'casual 
subordination' (Ferguson 1995: 129) which grows into a natural deference to 
the decisions of the chief (Ferguson 1995: 98; Smith 1982b: 318). Such is the 
force of habit among men that they come to form the opinion that 'Antiquity 
always begets the opinion ofright...' (Hume 1985: 33).34 Through the force of 
habit men come to recognise the authority of a chief or government even though 
the origin of the particular chief or government's power would undoubtedly 
have had little to do with the utility of stable property.3S Likewise, in Hume's 
First Principles of Government, the origins and justification of government are a 
complex interrelation of factors that coalesce around individuals of ability who 
are in the right place at the right time, and then develop through time into the 
modem institution of government. Ferguson also notes that this process of 
habituated subordination and opinion of right through time is a factor that is 
socialised in each member of society (Ferguson 1973 vol.l: 215). The 
'contagion of society' (Ferguson 1995: 156) creates social bonds among a 
people which combine with their moral approval of the claim of being a people. 
Thus each people begin to view the form of government as an intrinsic part of 
the nation, a symbol of what they as a people have achieved. To this extent the 
origins of that government are not important, except in so far as they display the 
achievement of a particular pe<?ple.36 
Government is a convention that arises within a society, is authorised by the 
utility of a central authority to determine property and is strengthened by the 
33 Lelunann refers to Hurne's view that: 'casual adaptations grow gradually into institutions' 
(Lehmann 1930: 202). 
34 See also Hurne (1978: 566) and Smith (1982b: 212, 322, 401). 
35 Hurne makes this point when he refers to all government being founded originally on force 
or usurpation (Hume 1985: 40). While Smith argues that submission to government is 
grounded on opinions of authority and of utility that exist in a complex interrelationship 
(Smith 1982b: 321,402). 
36 See above on Great Legislators in Part Two, Section One, Chapter 3. 
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force of habit and custom. The institutions of justice need not be just in their 
origins (Hume 1978: 556, 558). Indeed the story, as the Scots have told it, of 
the origins of government clearly abandons the focus on individual purposive 
action that marked those simple models of explanation that they had already 
rejected. The instigation of government was a product of a process of 
unintended consequences: it arose from the temporary reactions to present 
concerns and literally 'grew' from there in reaction to new circumstances.37 As 
time passed these conventions among men became habitual and possessed a 
. 
force in their minds which, though the institutions themselves were ultimately 
underwritten by notions ofutil~ty, carried an emotional strength which made 
them part of the social bond. The institution of government is shaped by the 
human reaction to the circumstances in which mankind finds themselves. When 
people come to live in close proximity (Smith 1982b: 408-09) they begin to 
interact in terms of private property relations and, government arising, material 
progress proceeds. Law arises from the decisions of 'judges' in particular cases 
(Smith 1982b: 314) and a convention offollowing precedent arises that has the 
effect of stabilising expectations and allowing social interaction to occur with 
minimal levels ofuncertainty.38 The institutions of government and law are a 
spontaneous order, they arise from local conventions and serve to place order on 
everyday life, arid are accepted as such for that reason. Justice, as with science, 
springs from a desire for systematised knowledge, a desire to reduce uncertainty. 
So too does law fulfil this function of calming the mind, of leading our habitual 
thought processes in an ordered manner in line with our expectations. Laws are 
adapted to the particular circumstances experienced by a people (Ferguson 
1995: 119), and they are determined by these circumstances (Hume 1975: 196) 
and man's reaction to them. As we have seen the need for justice is universal 
owing to the universality of the conditions of justice, but the specific reaction to 
37 Indeed Ferguson refers to society as a plant that grows (Ferguson 1995: 108). 
38 Carabelli and De Vecchi view the role of the judge here to be that of a 'gap-plugger' in the 
same sense as we saw in Smith's views on the role of the philosopher or scientist (Carabelli 
and De Veccbi 2001; 241). Stein refers to the Scots' 'dynamic' conception oflaw as an 
adjustment to circwnstances (Stein 1996: 165). Or, as Livingston would have it: 'law, like 
language or any other profound Human convention, evolves spontaneously, guided by custom 
and tradition. It is not due to the insights of speculative philosophers and the craft of 
constitution makers.' (Livingston 1990: 129) . 
. 
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these universal phenomena is depenqent on the particular conditions of each 
society (Hume 1975: 202). It is because of this that forms of government and 
law differ (Hume 1975: 202; Smith 1982b: 200; Ferguson 1995: 131; Millar 
1990: 3). Indeed much of Smith's Lectures on Jurisprudence is taken up with a 
comparison of the laws of differing nations, showing how the particular 
circumstances moulded their reactions to common problems. But Smith also 
applies his four stages analysis to this, in particular showing how each law 
develops in line with commerce (Smith 1981: 309) and how commerce 
encourages stable government as much as it requires it (Smith 1981: 412). 
Government and law have a progress, just as the mode of subsistence has, and 
the Scots devoted considerable attention to this notion of progress. 
In terms of historical change, human institutions develop in reaction to 
changed circumstances, and the diversity of human institutions increases with 
their increased complexity (Hume 1978: 620). Indeed the character of social 
institutions and man's own character are formed by the experiences acquired in 
different circumstances (Ferguson 1986: 72). It would appear that such 
reactions to circumstances by social groups lead to a situation where: 'The 
multiplicity offorms ... which different societies offer to our view, is almost 
infinite.' (Ferguson 1995: 65). 
Despite this diversity of appearances (Hume 1985: 155) the Scots believed 
that a 'science of man' was possible: that a general theory of society could be 
developed from the significant similarities between societies in similar stages of 
development. As we saw above the stadial theory of social development and the 
Scots' analysis of the origins of government and property were conducted in the 
light of what they saw as universal factors that underlay this diversity. Human 
nature and the conditions of justice ~ould, in their view, be reduced to a few 
general principles that applied to man in all his circumstances. Diversity is 
constituted by the means (both institutional and conventional) of dealing with 
these universal factors within ~ specific context. Or as Hume puts it, speaking of 
human institutions: 'which cause such a diversity, and at the same time maintain 
such a uniformity in human life' (Hume 1978: 402). The Scots' stadial theories 
and conjectural history are underpinned by a series of universal principles of 
nature and human nature (themselves identifiable by the comparative method and 
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conjectural history) that can be developed upon to provide a 'scientific' basis 
through which to approach society. Context does indeed shape human 
experience, but underlying universals such as the desire for subsistence and the 
conditions of justice lie behind every circumstance in which mankind is found. 
Where the differences arise is in different social groups' reactions to them. 
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Chapter 3: Progress 
In addition to being a theory of social change the Scots' stadial approach is 
also a theory of progress. From similar barbaric origins some human societies 
'improved', became 'polished', and civilised as a result of their having passed 
through stages of development typified by the mode of subsistence. The Scots 
believed that man has 'a disposition and capacity for improving his condition, by 
the exertion of which, he is carried on from one degree of advancement to 
another.' (Millar 1990: 3). This uniquely human propensity for progress (Smith 
1982b: 334) is grounded in human nature.39 Smith believed that: 
'the principle which prompts to save, is the desire of bettering our 
condition, a desire which, though generally calm and dispassionate, comes 
with us from the womb, and never leaves us till we go into the grave. In 
the whole interval which separates those two moments, there is scarce 
perhaps a single instant in which any man is so perfectly and completely 
satisfied with his situation, as to be without any wish of alteration or 
improvement, of any kind.' (Smith 1981: 341). 
This belief in social progress is a result of the Scots' belief that individuals 
learn by experience.4O Man is always progressing on an individual level in the 
sense that he is always acquiring experiences through which he can form 
expectations (Ferguson 1995:.161). But men are social beings who are highly 
subject to habit formation, socialisation and conventional behaviour. For this 
reason, the Scots believed that Man is progressive on both an individual and a 
species level (Ferguson 1995: 7).41 On a species level this progress is dependent 
on the development of conventions in reaction to circumstances that are 
transmitted to the next generation. In brief, if history is to be viewed as the 
progress of the species (Ferguson 1995: 10), then that progress is in the 
extension of human experience and the development and retention of human 
39 For the Scots on man's naturally progressive nature see: Dunbar (1995: 4); Ferguson (1973 
voU: 257; 1973 vol.2: 85); Kames (1751: 97,100; 1776: 64; 1774 voU: 230); Stuart (1768: 
217) and Smith (1981: 540). 
40 'They rested their faith not in the inexorable laws of a theological or secular determinism, 
but in the belief that progress lies in the exploitation of the advantages offered by a potentially 
rewarding environment.' (phillipson & Mitchison 1996: 4). 
41 See also Ferguson (1973 yoU: 175) and Dunbar (1995: 14). 
118 
conventions and institutions created to 'deal' with that experience. Progress is 
the growth of the cumulative sum of human experience, and as all knowledge for 
the Scots was based on experience, progress is equally the growth of cumulative 
human knowledge (Sampson 1956: ~3).42 
Progress is at base the growth and retention of human knowledge drawn 
from experience.43 As Ferguson puts it: 'the history of every age, when past, is 
an accession of knowledge to those who succeed.' (Ferguson 1995: 33).44 This 
progression of human knowledge is the basis for the progression of human 
institutions, and as a result 'industry, knowledge and humanity are linked 
together by an indissoluble chain' (Hume 1985: 271). In practical terms this 
means that each human society has a progress of its own, a national progress 
(Ferguson 1995: 220), which is but a part of the progress of the species as a 
whole.4s The gradual development of human institutions in reaction to 
circumstances and based on past experience and example leads to a progress in 
all areas of human endeavour. Thus government and law have a progress (Burne 
1985: 272) that is observable by such features as the development and 
refinement of notions of property (Smith 1982b: 107). Progress on a national 
and social level is in reality the result of advance in a vast area of interconnected 
human institutions. As human knowledge broadens and deepens every area of 
human activity is subject to refinement. As a result a 'polished' or civilised 
nation is marked by refinement in a number offields (Ferguson 1995: 195; Smith 
1984: 208). The growth of knowledge and of the arts and sciences refines 
human behaviour, civilises and 'softens' their tempers and interactions (Hume 
1985: 170, 274). It changes attitudes towards society and other individuals. For 
example there is a progress of opinion that alters the moral and political outlook 
of men as society progresses.46 More than this, the Scots argue that progress is 
also an extension of freedom: that progress in the arts supports freedom within 
42 We will deal later with the question as to the Scots' views on the possibility of decline as 
well as progression (Ferguson 1995: 198,-204). Suffice it to note that the Scots viewed 
progress as favourable, but did not believe that it was inevitable or assured (HOpflI978: 37). 
43 What Lehmann, referring to Ferguson, calls 'an ever-increasing fund of experience' 
(Lelunann 1930: 69). 
44 Also at (Ferguson 1973 vo!.l: 2). 
45 Chitnis stresses the explanatory nature of the Scots' views here. He argues that their 
conception of progress implies 'no qualitative judgement' (Chitnis 1976: 96). 
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social groups (Hume 1985: 277; Ferguson 1995: 203) a point to which we will 
return later. 
The Scots' analysis of progress does however lay stress on its universal 
aspects, on those which allow a science of progress as part of the 'science of 
man'. As we have seen the Scots stadial theory is based on the universality of 
the need for subsistence. As a result Smith is able to trace all progress, in its 
origins, to this concern. The desire to secure subsistence, to cater for the 'three 
great wants ofmankind ... food, doaths, and lodging' (Smith 1982b: 340) is the 
root of almost all human art and science (Smith 1982b: 337). Such a universal 
concern forms a great part of the concern of each member of a social group: the 
desire for survival and sustenance being a core aspect of every man's interest. It 
is because of this, Smith argues, that the progress of material goods may be 
traced to a universal self-interest displayed by each human (Smith 1982b: 487-
88). Material progress may be' a result of the growth of knowledge, but its cause 
is traceable to a mixture of self-interest and a desire for subsistence (Smith 
1982b: 489).47 As we saw when we considered the Scots' notions of the 
immediacy of savages [in connection with the growth of understanding in 
science and the concept of property] the concern for subsistence consumes 
human attention when it is hard to come by. But when subsistence is safely 
secured man's attention is turned to other areas and industries (Smith 1981: 
193). It appears that material progress is necessary for intellectual and artistic 
progress (Smith 1985: 137): that some measure of security and ease is required 
before man is able to develop his understanding of the arts.48 As security and 
law develop from barbarity, through habitually accepted conventions grounded 
in utility, and government becomes accepted, so learning advances (Hume 1985: 
115-116). 
In terms ofthe central concern of subsistence we have seen that man uses 
his knowledge on the physical environment to provide for subsistence (Ferguson 
1995: 9). In this sense man seeks 'useful knowledge' (Ferguson 1995: 171): he 
46 See also above on Child Exposure in Part Two, Section Two, Chapter 2. 
47 This explains Hume's belief that the growth ofindividual wealth and happiness were the 
surest measures of progress (Robertson 1983: 156). 
48 Compare this with the view above on the place of polytheism in the natural history of 
religion in Part Two, Section Two, Chapter 2. 
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may learn a great deal from experience but his attention will, in a great measure, 
be drawn to that knowledge of which he is able to make use (Ferguson 1995: 
33). Knowledge is not simply pursued for its own sake, rather its significance 
arises from the use to which it is put by those who hold it (Hume 1978: xix). 
This is the basis of the Scots' rejection of scholasticism and learning in retreat 
(Ferguson 1995: 242). Knowledge is acquired through experience (Hume 1985: 
135) and not from abstract reasoning. For this reason, as we saw, the Scots' 
concept of science is guided by the utilisation and analysis of experience rather 
than by abstracted rationalism. It is because science and knowledge are based 
on experience that the Scots believe the progress of knowledge is based on the 
examination and use of past experience (Ferguson 1995: II). By learning from 
our own prior experience and by observing that of others we are able to judge 
better in our future actions (Millar 1990: 1). The growth of knowledge then is 
the growth of experience, of human reactions to circumstances or 'accidents' 
(Ferguson 1995: 162). 
Moreover such knowledge can exist in forms that are not immediately 
explicit. Habit and custom for the Scots were forms of experience based 
knowledge; knowledge which is non-verb ali sed yet vital to the success of our 
actions. As Smith notes: 'And from all those volumes we shall in vain attempt to 
collect that knowledge of its [agriculture] various and complicated operations, 
which is commonly possessed even by the common farmer' (Smith 1981: 143). 
The complexity of the knowledge held in the form of habits on a social level is 
such that it is both hard to assess and difficult to encompass fully. Its basis is 
indeed experience but it is individual experience. So when the Scots argued that 
the growth of experience is necessary for progress they are aware that such 
experience is experienced by individuals: that though progress is the growth of 
cumulative experience, the medium of that progress is the experience of specific 
individuals.49 It is for this reason that Hume notes that the growth of the 
cumulative sum of human knowledge does not lead us all to become geniuses 
(Hume 1985: 210). Rather knowledge is diffused in line with the individual 
experience of circumstances. We each have a unique individual sum of 
49 Again reinforcing the Scots' individualist approach. 
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knowledge, but that sum is limited by our individual experiences; and this kind of 
tacit or habitual knowledge reinforces the Scots' point about the customary 
nature of human knowledge and understanding. Habit and not reason is our 
guide in the conduct of our every day life (Hume 1978: 652) in the sense that 
our habits embody ways of acting and thinking which prove useful to us in the 
conduct oflife (Hume 1978: 198). 
We have already seen that the Scots viewed population size as an indication 
of progress and also that they consi~ered it to be the driving force behind the 
advance in modes of subsistence. However we have also seen that population 
pressure is not the means for that advance; rather the means lies in the 
acquisition of new knowledge to support that population (Smith 1982b: 15). 
Progress generates population (Hume 1985: 382). It also means that, 
subsistence having been secured, there are a larger number of people who are 
able to apply their attention to the development of the various arts of human life 
(Ferguson 1995: 138). In other words, the greater the population, then the 
greater the scope for the advance of cumulative knowledge and, as a result, the 
greater the advance in material production and in other human institutions such 
as government and law. It is the gradual extension of knowledge of the means 
of subsistence that allows increases in population (Hume 1985: 256). Indeed the 
arts that improve the provision of subsistence become the origins of other areas 
of human art. Smith argues that as with law, so writing and arithmetic develop 
and are refined to meet needs suggested by trade and the acquisition of 
subsistence (Smith 1982b: 337). Trade also brings societies into contact and 
allows a flow of ideas, an acquisition of knowledge gleaned from the experience 
of others, which spurs progress in society (Hume 1985: 328). The retention and 
transferral of knowledge is vital to the sustained material position of a society. 
Progress is not just the increase in cumulative knowledge, but it is also, in 
Dunbar and Dugald Stewart's terms, 'the diffusion of knowledge' (Dunbar 
1995: 317; Smith 1982a: 311) within a society and between societies. so The 
centrality of the 'thirst' for knowledge (Hume 1985: 82) has already appeared in 
our examination of the Scots' theory of the motivations behind the practise of 
so Ferguson also employs this argument (ferguson 1973 vol.l: 281). 
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science. There we saw that man has}n his nature a desire, indeed an emotional 
need, for systematic knowledge to calm his mind and allow him to proceed about 
his life (Smith 1982a: 50-51). We also saw that the acquisition of knowledge 
increases our curiosity. So it is that progress leads to new fields of enquiry as 
our attention is piqued by new phenomena and gaps in established systematic 
knowledge (Ferguson 1995: 203). Knowledge itself is a prompt to action and 
further enquiry leading to a situation of ever growing complexity and extension 
of the cumulative sum of human experience (Ferguson 1995: 205). 
The progress of knowledge on a social or cumulative level is based on the 
development of experience, thus each stage is based on that before it (Ferguson 
1995: 14; 1973 voU: 44). Cumulative knowledge is a 'chain' of development 
(Ferguson 1995: 162) that draws upon and refines historical precedent 
(Ferguson 1995: 168). For this reason it is often difficult to trace the origins of 
a particular art or practice bec~use it represents the cumulative result of 
countless modifications and innovations (Ferguson 1995: 163). Social progress, 
the cumulative sum of human knowledge, requires that knowledge, once gleaned 
from experience, is preserved and transferred rather than being lost at the death 
of the individual who held it (Ferguson 1995: 199). This is why, as we saw, the 
species of man has a progress [through history] greater than that achieved by any 
specific individual. As Dugald Stewart would have it: 
'It is fortunate that upon this, as upon many other occasions, the difficulties 
which had long baffled the efforts of solitary genius begin to appear less 
formidable to the united exertions of the race; and that in proportion as the 
experience and the reasonings of different individuals are brought to bear 
upon the same objects, and are combined in such a manner as to illustrate 
and to limit each other, the sci~nce of politics assumes more and more that 
systematical form which encourages and aids the labours of future 
inquirers.' (Smith 1982a: 309).51 
The progress of knowledge, and progress more generally, does not occur 
by sudden leaps of understanding made by specific individuals. Just as the Scots 
demoted purposive rationality in their attacks on legislators and social contracts, 
123 
so too are they aware that this is not how societies experience progress. The 
Scots, and Ferguson in particular, deploy organic and biological metaphors to 
underline the gradualist nature of social change (Ferguson 1995: 7, 10, 13; 1973 
vol. 1 : 18_19).52 Indeed Hume argues that our proclivity for habit formation to 
stabilise expectations and ease the mind, implies that we are emotionally 
prejudiced against sudden change (Hume 1978: 453) - just as it was previously 
argued that a legislator would find it hard to persuade a people to follow his 
innovations if they departed radically from previous practice. The whole of the 
Scots' 'four stages' schema is posited on the notion of such evolutionary, 
spontaneous order, approaches to progress. This human distaste for sudden 
change does not however lead the Scots to believe that men are hopelessly 
conservative, for if this were the case then no concept of progress would be 
possible. Rather men are attracted by novelty (Hume 1985: 221) so long as it 
does not occur in a sudden, wonder-inducing manner. The inventions of men, 
the Scots believed, were subject to constant change (Hume 1978: 620; 1985: 
597), but this change occurs slowly and over an extended period of time (Hume 
1985: 50-51). Change and progress in human society occur in an evolutionary 
and not a revolutionary manner (Hume 1985: 260). 
Another aspect of the gradual ~ature of social progress is that such change 
is often imperceptible (Hume 1985: 378; 1978: 256; Ferguson 1973 voU: 43), 
or insensible (Smith 1981: 343-44). That is to say that it occurs so slowly that 
we do not notice it until it has happened. Ferguson makes the point well: 'But 
he does not propose to make rapid and hasty transitions; his steps are 
progressive and slow; and his force, like the power of a spring, silently presses 
on every resistance; and effect is sometimes produced before a cause is 
perceived; and with all his talents for projects, his work is often accomplished 
before the plan is devised.' (Ferguson 1995: 12-13). Social change and the 
progress of knowledge are not only often unnoticed as they gradually occur, but 
SI See also Ferguson (1995: 199) where he describes the 'accumulating advantages' of the 
transfer of knowledge between generations. 
S2 The Scots take great pains to stress that progress occurs gradually and cumulatively (Smith 
1982b: 521, 578; Hume 1985: 497). 
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are also often unintended. 53 Our reactions to specific circumstances and the 
knowledge we draw from repeated experience of them occur in a moment, we 
react to the specific conditions and then pass on (Ferguson 1995: 119) absorbing 
the knowledge and adapting our practice in the light of it. Mankind progresses 
by 'gradual advances' (Millar 1990: 4): rational deliberation oflong-term 
advantage plays little role here. The Scots' analysis of the origins of government 
and property shows that it is limited attention to the moment, repeated often, 
which leads to the development of social institutions. 
The gradual growth of knowledge is the result of a chain of inventions 
drawn from every aspect of human experience (Ferguson 1995: 161; Hume 
1985: 273). Men are always experiencing things and they are always in search 
of experience, they are constantly adapting to new circumstances as they arise. 
As a result: 
'Those establishments arose from successive improvements that were 
made, without any sense of their general effect; and they bring human 
affairs to a state of complication, which the greatest reach of capacity with 
which human nature was ever adorned could not have projected; nor even 
when the whole is carried into execution, can it be comprehended in its full 
extent.' (Ferguson 1995: 174). 
The means by which knowledge is retained and transferred is thus of equal 
importance for society as its initial discovery or development. Without retention 
and transferral society would not have a progress distinct from that of the 
individuals that compose it. We saw in the Scots' rejection of scholasticism 
(Ferguson 1995: 78) that they focused on drawing knowledge from experience, 
and equally that they stressed the importance of building upon past examples to 
enhance the cumulative sum of human knowledge. We also saw that the process 
of socialisation is a key part of this transferral of experience from past to 
present. Socialisation transfers knowledge by accustoming children to those 
habitual and conventional practices that a particular society has developed to 
S3 Again unintended consequences come to the fore. We see that the progressive elements in 
society: law (Millar 1990: 164)~ contracts (Smith 1982b: 205); the division oflabour (Smith 
1981: 25); liberty (Smith 1982b: 271) and commerce and manners (Smith 1981: 412) - are 
spontaneous orders produced by the process of unintended consequences. They thus represent 
an invisible hand argument regarding the formation of benign orders. 
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deal with its particular circumstances (Ferguson 1973 vol. 1: 83). However the 
Scots also highlight the importance of education as a kind of intentional 
socialisation. Thus Smith is able to argue that though the original development 
of an art requires the careful accumulation of experience from observation, after 
this has been achieved the knowledg~ possessed by the craftsman can then be 
taught to others (Smith 1981: Q9-40). These apprentices are then able to 
habituate the art and practice it themselves. It is in this way that education 
transfers knowledge, it is a process of observation, repetition and habit forming: 
in short, it is a short cut to experience (Hume 1978: 117). 
However, a potential danger to the transferral and extension of knowledge 
is the practice of apprenticeships itself Such a guild system is often 
accompanied by restricting the number of people with access to the knowledge 
and skills necessary for a particular occupation. Therefore under the guise of 
producing educated experts guilds seek exclusivity and power over the 
knowledge embodied in their members. The transferral of knowledge is thus 
restricted for self-interested reasons, it becomes a sort of monopoly of 
knowledge which is then used to extract increased 'price' from the rest of 
society. S4 As we hinted before trade is also a source of knowledge allowing a 
people to draw on the experiences of those other peoples with whom they come 
into contact. Hume notes the importance of the spread of knowledge by 
emulation and imitation (Hume 1985: 330, 264) and describes them as short-cuts 
to the acquisition of knowledge in that they circumvent the trial-and-error 
process. Such transfers of knowledge also occur through the process of 
colonisation, where colonists apply knowledge developed in one geographic area 
in another (Hume 1985: 328).55 The difficulty with this model is that those 
deploying the knowledge have been a part of the original people who developed 
it in a cumulative manner (Smith I982b: 579). It would appear that a people 
who come into contact with new modes of behaviour utilised by the colonists 
drawing on the cumulative knowledge of their mother country, must be almost in 
54 A point to which we will return below when we discuss monopoly in Part Two, Section 
Four, Chapter 3. 
55 Dunbar argues that not only is this the case, but that colonists also adapt their knowledge to 
the new circumstances in which they find themselves (Dunbar 1995: 325). See above on 'four 
stages' for furtber implications of colonialism. 
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a position to acquire it for themselves in order for it to be immediately useful to 
them (Ferguson 1995: 162). Moreover colonies are based on the cumulative 
knowledge of a people, so in learning from colonists natives run the risk of 
becoming copiers and not rivals. Societies can develop their own cumulative 
bodies of knowledge over time, the strength of these being their basis in 
experience, and attempting short-cuts to the growth of knowledge can, at times, 
according to Ferguson, lead to illusory progress (Ferguson 1995: 168). 
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Chapter 4: The Role of Government 
Having discussed the Scots' analysis of the evolution of political institutions 
we now pass on to examine their analysis of the role, or proper function, of 
government in a commercial society. In broad terms the ultimate end of 
government for the Scots is the securing of subsistence (Smith 1982b: 338) and 
the advance of the people (Ferguson 1995: 133). As Ferguson puts it: 'The 
great object of policy .. .is, to secure to the family its means of subsistence and 
settlement; to protect the industrious in the pursuit of his occupation; to 
reconcile the restrictions of police, and the social affections of mankind, with 
their separate and interested pursuits.' (Ferguson 1995: 139).s6 Smith, in 
discussing the role of governm~nt in his system of natural liberty assigns three 
duties to the sovereign: 
'first, the duty of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of 
other independent societies; secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as 
possible, every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of 
every other member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration 
of justice, and, thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain publick 
works and certain publick institutions, which it can never be for the interest 
of any individual, or small number of individuals, to erect and maintain' 
(Smith 1981: 687-88; 1982b: 398). 
Protection from external threat, maintenance of order through the justice 
system and the provision of certain public works encompass the whole of the 
scope of government action. 57 Drawing on our previous discussion of the 
evolution of government we see that though protection from external threat 
played an instrumental role in the Scots' analysis of the rise of chiefs, the major 
benefit of the emergence of government is the enhancement of the delineation of 
property and the administration of justice (Ferguson 1995: 250). Government, 
as Hume argued, is an invention to execute justice (Hume 1978: 543): the 
S6 See also Ferguson (1995: 131). 
" Teichgraeber notes that the Scots worked with 'a de-politicized view of individual morality 
and a de-moralised view of politics' (Teichgraeber 1986: 10), which led to 'the demotion of 
political activity as the primary vehicle for the attainment of human values. t (Teichgraeber 
1986: 18). 
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system of justice being necessary for society and civilisation itself to flourish. 
Government evolved to settle disputes over property and to protect the 
individuals holding that property. As we noted above the chief utility of 
property delineation is that it brings stability to society, and so we may conclude 
that the internal role of government is to provide stability (Smith 1982b: 268; 
Hume 1985: 37), and security to individuals (Smith 1981: 199,256,669, 723). 
This internal stability is also a feature of the external defence offered by 
government in the sense that it creates the 'space' in which the internal order can 
be kept stable (Smith 1984: 231). The provision of impartial justice (Smith 
1981: 610) becomes a key step in creating a stable society and, more 
particularly, in allowing the development of trade and commerce (Hume 1985: 
508): Smith goes so far as to argue that its importance is such that it outweighs 
other moral concerns (Smith 1984: 226) because it is essential to the very 
existence of human society. Such peace is essential to the gradual development 
of trade (Hume 1985: 118), w~ch is the basis of specialisation (Ferguson 1973 
vol. 1 : 252), and to the growth of the cumulative sum of human knowledge that 
we have identified as progress (Hume 1985: 240). Civilisation depends on 
peace, with the development of knowledge, commerce and the progress of 
manners all dependent on the internal stability of the society (Hume 1985: 115-
16, 132, 274, 508). 
The gradual development of the role of government through the 'four 
stages' schema (Smith 1982b: 129-30,326) shows that the scope of government 
increases with the growing complexity of society. Laws develop and increase 
with material progress and the growth of knowledge, so, in a sense, the very 
institution of government itself requires a degree of peace and stability in order 
to develop to its advanced level of function in a commercial society. This having 
been said, though government is vital in a society which is progressive, the 
actions of particular governments can often be severely detrimental to the 
progress of a nation. Smith argues that progress sometimes occurs in spite of 
the interference of governments (Smith 1981: 345, 377). The 'injustice of 
human laws' (Smith 1981: 378) can retard the economic progress ofa nation by 
the pursuit of policies that pervert the operation of the system of 'natural liberty' 
which facilitates economic progress. It is because of this that the Scots air 
doubts over the competence of governments to act effectively in areas of 
commercial and economic concern. Smith argues: 
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'The stateman, who should attempt to direct private people in what manner 
they ought to employ their capitals, would not only load himself with a 
most unnecessary attention, but assume an authority which could safely be 
trusted, not only to no single person, but to no council or senate whatever, 
and would nowhere be so dangerous as in the hands of a man who had folly 
and presumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it.' (Smith 1981: 
456).S8 
The Scots believe that the role of government in economics and the 
promotion of industry is restricted to the provision of that stability and peace 
which allows individuals to pursue their own economic concerns and mutually to 
adjust to each others' actions (Smith 1982b: 577). Smith in particular argues 
that the spontaneous order of free trade is a more efficient medium of economic 
progress than any system burdened by the interference of governments [however 
well intentioned] (Smith 1981: 687).S9 The reasons for the Scots' doubts over 
. 
the ability of governments to act effectively in economic matters are, once again, 
related to their epistemological concerns. We have seen, from the Scots'. 
critique of great legislator theories, that they believe that it is impossible that one 
'man of system' (Smith 1984: 233) could effect a complete reform of the social 
system. When these two elements are combined we begin to see why the Scots 
have concerns about one man or group of men being moved to attempt radical 
intervention in the organisation of society (Hume 1985: 52). The 
epistemological difficulties which move the Scots' concerns in this matter, what 
has been referred to previously as the 'demotion of purposive rationality' (Berry 
1997: 39), lead them to warn against the possible abuse of the institution of 
58 Smith is clear that governments should avoid interference with the system of money lest 
their actions should prevent the suc~essful operation ofa system of prices (Smith 1981: 437). 
And Ferguson is similarly scathing as to the ability of a government to act successfully in 
economic matters arguing that statesmen can • do little more than avoid doing mischief 
(Ferguson 1995: 138). However, as we will see later, Ferguson expresses doubts about Smith's 
restriction of the scope of government action. 
59 This, as we will see in the following section, is an invisible hand argument. 
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government (Hume 1985: 492) by those who believe that their vision qualifies 
them to enforce certain policies upon a society.60 
These doubts over both the effectiveness and desirability of systematic 
attempts to reform society and mankind through the policy of government lead 
the Scots to call for certain constraints to be placed on the actions of 
governments. 61 Foremost among these is the belief that it is not the proper 
function of government to seek the reform of man's character (Hume 1985: 
280).62 Government policy cannot, in the Scots' view, change human nature 
(Ferguson 1995: 195). Indeed~ though the Scots stress the role of government 
in securing peace in a society, they equally stress that this role bears no relation 
to the fostering of virtue among men in such a society. While the policies of 
government can shape the habits of men to a certain degree (Ferguson 1995: 
181) by influencing the circumstances in which habits are acquired, they cannot 
hope to affect a radical change in human nature. A government's inability to 
affect such a change is based partly on the universalistic nature of human nature, 
but it is also based on a degree of ineffectiveness that characterises human 
policies.63 The effectiveness of government is constrained by epistemological 
factors that it cannot overcome. 
Perspective and the limits of human reason place constraints on the ability 
of governments to perceive the information necessary to act in an effective 
manner on a national scale. This limitation placed on government by its lack of 
knowledge is especially apparent to the Scots in the field of economics. Smith is 
explicit that governments cannot act to regulate wages effectively because they 
lack the knowledge requisite to make such decisions. He writes: 'Where wages 
are not regulated by law, all that we can pretend to determine is what are the 
most usual; and experience seems to show that law can never regulate them 
60 One of the chief reasons the Scots doubt the effectiveness of such sweeping intervention is 
related to their unintended consequence approach. If progress is posited on the unintended 
consequences of social interaction producing an effective utilisation of the cumulative sum of 
human knowledge, then no one man can hope to form a vision of a more efficient society from 
his own, limited, reason (Smith 1982a: 318-19; Hume 1985: 351). Smith also has misgivings 
about the national prejudices on which governments often act (Smith 1982b: 512). 
61 Note how Hume stresses that malign unintended consequences may be produced by well-
intentioned actions, he cites the example of Brutus (Hume 1985: 30). 
62 See also Hume (1985: 170-72); Dunbar (1995: 51) and Smith (1984: 187). 
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properly, though it has often pretended to do so.' (Smith 1981: 95). The 
spontaneous adjustment of 'naturalltberty' is more effective than any 
government attempt to assess and regulate the price oflabour. A similar 
argument about the limited ability of governments to act to secure desired policy 
goals in an effective manner is to be found in Ferguson's discussion of 
population. As we saw above he argues that population growth is an unintended 
product of the self-interested action of individuals to improve their situation and 
supply for their subsistence, noting that no government policy to encourage 
population has ever affected it to such an extent as this principle. He ends by 
cautioning against future attempts by government to encourage population 
growth: 
'It is indeed happy for mankind, that this important object is not always 
dependent on the wisdom of sovereigns, or the policy of single men. A 
people intent on freedom, find for themselves a condition in which they may 
follow the propensities of nature with a more signal effect, than any which 
the councils of state could devise. When sovereigns, or projectors, are the 
supposed masters of this subject, the best they can do, is to be cautious of 
hurting an interest they cR:Jlllot greatly promote, and of making breaches 
they cannot repair.' (Ferguson 1995: 135_36).64 
There are certain areas where governments are constitutionally ineffective 
owing to the vast degree of knowledge that would be required to act effectively. 
Instead, the Scots argue, the systems of mutual interaction and adjustment which 
man has evolved through time are more efficient in such matters. This argument 
ties in with the Scots' view that governments ought to proceed according to 
general rules. Under a system governed by general rules [a system of the rule of 
law] the decisions requisite to control, say, prices would require a level of 
arbitrary action and local knowledge beyond the comprehension of the legislator, 
while at the same time breaching the principle that he ought to act in the form of 
generalised principles. Hume has this type of argument in mind when he 
discusses distributive justice. He argues against a criterion of desert in the 
63 Ferguson dissents from the HumeiSmith position on tIllS. See below Part Two, Section 
Four, Chapter 4. 
64 Also cited above in Part Two, Section Two, Chapter 2 in reference to child exposure. 
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assignment of property distribution because it contradicts the notion of general 
rules that is necessary for the stability of society.6s If desert were the decisive 
factor in property distribution then the constant need to assess the deservingness 
of each property-holder would lead to a degree of arbitrariness which would 
preclude any certainty in the system of property (Smith 1984: 168). 
Justice for the Scots is a matter of securing stability by the impartial 
administration of general rules that allow a stability of expectation. 66 In this 
sense Smith refers to it as a negative virtue (Smith 1984: 82). One implication 
that the Scots draw from this is that the provision of charity or welfare is not a 
question of justice. Smith writes: 'when a man shuts his breast against 
compassion, and refuses to relieve the misery of his fellow creatures ... though 
every body blames the conduct, nobody imagines that those who might have 
reason, perhaps, to expect more kindness, have any right to extort it by force. ' 
(Smith 1984: 81).67 The distribution of property is not a question of desert, for 
it cannot be if government is to proceed as an impartial generator of general 
rules. The Scots' desire to separate questions of welfare or charity from 
questions of justice is not solely related to their concern about general rules and 
the effectiveness of government. Rume, who had already stressed that justice 
could not be reduced to benevolence, nor could it be based on it as a result of 
the 'confin'd' nature of our generosity, is also quick to note that benevolence, as 
a virtue, cannot be instilled into a people (Hume 1985: 280). One can compel an 
individual to honour the general rules of justice, but one cannot meaningfully 
compel a person to act from benevolent motives (Rume 1978: 518; 1985: 
280).68 Moreover such extreme sympathy as would be required for such a 
benevolent conception of justice would require an exercise of the sympathetic 
imagination so extensive as to be unnatural (Smith 1984: 140). 
65 For the difficult of assessing merit and desert see Smith (1984: 97-104). 
66 See also Millar (1812 vol. 4: 266-8;). Teichgraeber argues that the Scots' conception of 
justice was characterised by 'a procedural or strictly legal equality of treatment. ' (Teichgraeber 
1986: 99). 
61 See also: 'Ifbenefits were to be enforced, beneficence would cease to be known as a virtue, 
and what ought to be a voluntary act of good will would become the effect of mere 
compulsion.' (Ferguson 1973 vol. 2: 287). See also Ferguson (1973 vol. 2: 315-18) and 
Kames (1751: 41-42). 
68 See also Ferguson (1994: 137,235,249). 
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Having argued that distributive justice cannot be based on desert and that 
welfare provision and charity, though benevolent virtues, cannot be considered 
as a part of the virtue of justice, the Scots go on to reject the notion of an 
equality-based system of distributive justice. Equality, as Hume notes, is a 
relation and not a quality (Hume 1978: 46). One object is equal to another: it is 
not equal in itself. Thus a society based on equality would require a constant 
comparison between its individual members in order to maintain such equality. 
From here Hume deploys an argument reminiscent of that later advanced by 
Robert Nozick in reference to patterns of distribution. He argues: 
'historians, and even common sense, may inform us, that, however specious 
these ideas of perfect equality may seem, they are really, at bottom, 
impracticable; and were they not so, would be extremely pernicious to 
. 
human society. Render possessions ever so equal, men's different degrees 
of art, care, and industry will immediately break that equality. Or if you 
check these virtues, you reduce society to the most extreme indigence; and 
instead of preventing want and beggary in a few, render it unavoidable to 
the whole community.' (Hume 1975: 194).69 
Smith makes a similar point about the vast difficulty of maintaining a system 
of equality in distributive justice: 'The course of human affairs, by marriage, by 
succession, and by alienation, necessarily deranged this original division, and 
frequently threw the lands, which had been allotted for the maintenance of many 
different families into the possession of a single person.' (Smith 1981: 557). 
As we have seen above the Scots do not believe that a government is 
capable of reforming human nature. If politicians cannot change men and cannot 
practicably enforce a pattern of equality of distribution without constant and 
arbitrary intervention, then communism is not a viable policy for distributive 
justice (Hume 1978: 521). All of this however is not to say that the Scots 
oppose the provision of welfare and charity to relieve the poor (Smith 1982b: 
343; Millar 1990: 288). What they do say however is that such provision is not 
a question of justice, but rather a matter of benevolence and humanity. They are 
also clear, as we saw above, that such concerns must be secondary to the 
69 See Nozick (1974: 160) and also Dunbar (1995: 364, 420). 
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institution of justice which alone provides the stability necessary for society to 
• 70 
survlve. 
Thus far we have dealt chiefly with the role of government in the provision 
of justice and that stability which allows social interaction and conunercial 
advance. What we now pass to are those other responsibilities of government 
that Smith groups under the heading of police. Police 'comprehends in generall 
three things: the attention paid by the public to the c1eanlyness of the roads, 
streets, etc; 2nd, security; and thirdly, cheapness or plenty, which is the constant 
source of it.' (Smith 1982b: 331).71 There are, beyond the concerns of internal 
and external security, certain activities which may be deemed public goods, the 
provision of which it falls to government to ensure. Smith believes that: 
'The third ·and last duty of the sovereign or commonwealth is that of 
erecting and maintaining those publick institutions and those publick works, 
which, though they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great 
society, are, however, of such a nature, that the profit could never repay the 
expence to any individual or small number of individuals, and which it, 
therefore, cannot be expected that any individual or small number of 
individuals should erect or maintain.' (Smith 1981: 723). 
The relatively low profits attainable from the provision of these services 
leads to a situation where price signals and incentives are insufficient to promote 
private provision. Such a lack of profit transmits a price signal that the provision 
of these services is unprofitable and they become unpopular occupations, 
discouraging labour from pursuing them as a livelihood. They are however, in 
many cases [such as roads and transit] requisite for the pursuit of trade as a 
whole (Smith 1981: 815). Smith believes that these police expenditures are the 
proper field of government activity~ that they provide the stage upon which 
conunercial activity is undertaken. Like justice and security they promote the 
advance of a society in the sense that they are conditions that foster industry and 
70 This is vividly demonstrated by Smith!s assertion that a man may be perfectly 'just' by 
doing nothing (Smith 1984: 82)~ thus demands to act to relieve the poor cannot meaningfully 
be based on appeals to justice. Smith's view was that only intentional actions could be 
considered as a subject of justice. The product of a process of unintended consequences, while 
it may be regrettable, was not unjust (Smith 1984: 97-103). See Part Three, Section Three for 
a similar argument made by Hayek. 
11 See also Smith (1981: 814-15) and Hume (1978: 539). 
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ease trade. Public goods exist, to a certain extent, below the market.72 That is 
to say they facilitate its operation but are not determined by the same principles 
and incentives that guide wider commerce. The expenditure of police is 
necessary to the smooth operation of society, to the effective operation of the 
wider market, and as SUC? must be provided by the government. This is not to 
say however that everything that is not provided by the market as a result of the 
absence of incentives ought to be provided by the government. Smith's police 
functions are strictly limited to those services necessary to the support of a 
commercial society. 
We have seen that the Scots apply a spontaneous order approach to the 
explanation of the origins and development of law and government. Grounding 
their approach on the underlying universal characteristics of sociability and 
order-seeking, they provide a conjectural history of the gradual evolution of the 
institutions of law and government as an unintended consequence of the reaction 
to the circumstances that grou~s of men find themselves in. The analysis dwells 
on the conventional development of the acceptance of authority from a sense of 
its utility in conflict resolution. Their 'four stages' schema stresses the 
significance of the development of different modes of subsistence to the form 
that the institutions of a society are likely to take, while at the same time 
highlighting the role of the growth of knowledge in the Scots' conception of 
social progress. The tasks that are considered the proper function of 
government are similarly related to the desire to provide stability of expectations 
in order to facilitate the emergence of benign spontaneous orders, particularly 
those related to the development of trade, and thus represent another facet of the 
invisible hand within the society. 
72 A view shared by Hayek, see Part Three, Section Three, Chapter 2. 
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Section Four: The Market 
'Chapter 1: 'The Age of Separations' 1 
As we have seen the use and transferral of knowledge is the key element in 
. ." . . . ". ~ .: '. . , . . . .:~ , . . 
the Scots' understanding of the nature of social progress. This is clearly 
exemplified by their analysis of the concept of the division of labour: an aspect of 
their thought that has secured them great fame. As Smith famously begins the 
Wealth of Nations: 'The greatest improvement in the productive powers of 
labour, and the greater part of the skil~ dexterity, and judgement with which it is 
any where directed, or applied, seem to have been the effects of the division of 
labour: (Smith 1981: 13). It is through their analysis of the division oflabour 
that the Scots explain the phenomenon which results in a situation where the 
most ordinary labourer in a commercial society has more material resources, is 
better provided for, than the m.onarch of a savage or undeveloped country 
(Smith 1981: 24; 1982b: 340, 564).: But more than this, though Smith's famous 
example of the productive improvements of the division of labour in the 
manufacturing of pins (Smith 1981: 14; 1982b: 343) graphically illustrates the 
material benefits of the process, the Scots are also keen to stress the social 
implications of the division and the wealth which it generates. Thus Ferguson is 
led to state that the division o~labour ~ progress, while Smith clearly links the 
development to progress, freedom and civilisation (Smith 1982b: 50, 563, 361).3 
Indeed Smith goes so far as to state that civilisation itself is dependent on the 
division oflabour: he writes: 'In an uncivilized nation, and where labour is 
undivided' (Smith 1982b: 489). This juxtaposition of civilisation with the 
division oflabour indicates how central the concept is to the Scots' theory of 
society and social progress. 
The division of labour is central to civilisation but it is the result of a 
process of unintended consequences. As Smith would have it: the division of 
1 (Ferguson 1995: 175). 
2 For the links between the division oflabour and the 'four stages' tbeory see Millar (1990: 
87). 
3 As Brown puts it the division of labour is the 'vehicle' of social evolution in Smith's thought 
(Brown 1988: 73). 
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labour 'is not originally the effect of any human wisdom, which foresees and 
intends that general opulence to which it gives occasion' (Smith 1981: 23; 
1982b: 570); rather 'it is the necessary, though very slow and gradual 
consequences .. .' (Smith 1981: 23) of the interaction of human nature with the 
circumstances in which it finds itself: in brief it is the result of the growth of 
experiential knowledge (Smith 1982b: 570-71). Again and again the Scots 
stress that the division of labour is not the product of purposive or deliberative 
human action guided by rational analysis. Smith claims that: 'No human 
prudence is requisite to make this division' (Smith 1982b: 351t, and that 'This 
division of work is not however the effect of any human policy.' (Smith 1982b: 
347). Ferguson is even more explicit about the unintended nature of what he 
calls the 'Separation of Arts and Professions' (Ferguson 1995: 172), he writes: 
'Those establishments arose from successive improvements that were made, 
without any sense of their general effect; and they bring human affairs to a state 
of complication, which even the greatest reach of capacity with which human . 
nature was ever adorned, could not have projected; nor even when the whole is 
carried into execution, can it be comprehended in its full extent.' (Ferguson 
1995: 174).' 
The division of labour is not the product of deliberative human action, a 
commercial society is not fore~een and planned; rather it arises gradually because 
of certain 'natural' forces.6 The 'complication' to which Ferguson refers applies 
not only to technological and material advance, but also to the increased, and 
increasing, interdependence that results from the division oflabour.7 A division 
of labour is dependent on an inclination and capacity to trade, and it is here that 
the Scots find the unconscious spring that allows the development of the division 
and ultimately of civilisation itself. Smith notes the significance of the fact that 
man is the only animal which trades (Smith 1982b: 352), that while other animals 
co-operate to achieve ends [Two greyhounds running down a hare is his 
4 Compare with Smith (1982b: 492). 
5 See above Part Two, Section Three, Chapter Three. 
6 Smith argues that: 'a great society, naturally divides itself (Smith 1981: 278). Young notes 
that: 'Markets operate in a moral and institutional framework which must evolve prior to and 
along with the evolution of speciali~ation and trade as social activities.' (young 2001: 95). 
7 See Smith (1981: 23; 1982b: 337, 339, 342). 
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example (Smith 1981: 25)] this is the result of 'the accidental concurrence of 
their passions in the same object at that particular time' (Smith 1981: 25-26). 
This, and other animal behaviour [such as fawning puppies] is not the same as 
conscious trade and exchange. 'Nobody', Smith writes, 'ever saw a dog make a 
fair and deliberate exchange of one bone for another with another dog.' (Smith 
1981: 26). 
Trade is a uniquely human activity. Smith illustrates this by noting that, 
although unaware of the concept of the division oflabour (Smith 1982b: 335, 
521), savages nonetheless practise the exchange of surplus that is the origin of 
the phenomenon (Smith 1982b: 490). This for Smith indicates a 'disposition' 
(Smith 1982b: 351; 1981: 27) or a 'propensity' (Smith 1981: 25) in human 
nature to 'truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another' (Smith 1981: 25; 
1982b: 351). The division oflabour is an unintended consequence of this facet 
of human nature: men seek to exchange what they have for what they want. The 
system is not developed intentionally, the propensity has, in Smith's words 'in 
view no such extensive utility' (Smith 1981: 25). The concept of utility involved 
is far more localised and short-term. As Smith put it: 'Twas thus a savage, 
finding he could by making arrows and disposing of them obtain more venison 
than by hunting, became an arrow maker. The certainty of disposing ofthe 
surplus produce of his labour in this way is what enabled men to separate into 
different trades of every sort. ~ (Smith 1982b: 351; 1981: 27). This division is 
the result of self-interest (Smith 1981: 27), the initial exchanges being based on a 
desire to satisfy individual wants, and the eventual decision to specialise resulting 
from the observation - drawn from experience - that these needs are better 
provided for as a result of concentration on one productive activity which may 
then be traded. Individuals become increasingly interdependent as a result of 
such specialisation (Smith 198 i: 23-, 26), and men come to depend on each other 
to supply for their needs through the medium of trade. 
A further important factor is that trade is based on the interaction of 
individuals seeking to fulfil short-term utility. Thus experience soon teaches 
them that the quickest and most efficient means of securing the co-operation and 
trade of others is to appeal to their self-interest. As Smith famously states: 'It is 
not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we 
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expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address 
ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of 
our own necessities but of their advantage.' (Smith 1981: 26-27). The maker of 
arrows appeals to the self-interest of the hunter. The hunter will no longer be 
required to produce his own arrows if he can exchange his surplus for those 
produced by another, and that surplus will grow as a result of the time freed up 
from arrow making which he can then devote to more hunting. The division of 
labour is based on the recognition that: 'the certainty of being able to exchange 
all that surplus part of the produce of his own labour, which is over and above 
his own consumption, for such parts of the produce of other men's labour as he 
may have occasion for, encourages every man to apply himself to a particular 
occupation, and to cultivate and bring to perfection whatever talent or genius he 
may possess for that particular species of business. ' (Smith 1981: 28). 
Though Smith provides little in the way of explanation behind the 'trucking' 
principle he does make one revealing aside which links it with his conception of 
sympathy. He argues: 'If we should enquire into the principle in the human mind 
on which this disposition of trucking is founded, it is clearly the naturall 
inclination every one has to persuade. Men always endeavour to persuade 
others to be of their opinion even w~en the matter is of no consequence to 
them.' (Smith 1982b: 352). This desire to persuade is clearly related to Smith's 
argument in the Theory of Moral Sentiments about the human emotional need 
for the approbation and approval of others. In terms of trade this principle is 
compounded with the desire for subsistence: with utility teaching men from 
experience that the surest way to secure the co-operation of others, the surest 
way to persuade others to assist in the satisfaction of your wants, is to trade - to 
persuade by bargain and exchange. As a result the wider the scope for trade the 
wider the scope for specialisation (Smith 1981: 31-36; 1982b: 355). The greater 
the number of potential trading partners, the greater the incentive to specialise. 
In scattered communities 'every farmer must be butcher, baker and brewer for 
his own family' (Smith 1981: 31; 1982b: 562), interdependence is not possible 
because of geographic isolation. Specialisation is not possible unless a market of 
sufficient size is available, unless there are enough potential trading partners. 
The division oflabour advances in proportion to the scope for trade: 
specialisation and interdependence lead to increased contact between people, 
and through trade to a concomitant increase in population centralisation. 
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Distinct industries or employments develop with this specialisation, with the 
original suggestion of career path being an apparent 'natural' talent for a 
particular form oflabour. But though this forms the basis of the impetus to 
specialise in a particular task in the early stages of the division, we see that, as 
specialisation advances, the notion of 'natural' talent begins to take a back seat. 
What instead comes to matter is the specialised knowledge that each individual 
acquires from devoting his attention to a particular profession. Smith seeks to 
make it clear that he is not arguing that differing natural attributes and inherited 
faculties are the basis of specialisation and the benefits which arise from it. 
Rather that skills and attributes are ~cquired as a result of the division itself. He 
. says: 'The difference of natural talents in different men is, in reality, much less 
than we are aware of; and the very different genius which appears to distinguish 
men of different professions, when grown up to maturity, is not upon many 
occasions so much the cause, as the effect of the division of labour.' (Smith 
1981: 28). He follows this by asserting that: 'The difference between the most 
dissimilar characters, between and philosopher and a common street porter, for 
example, seems to arise not so much from nature, as from habit, custom and 
education' (Smith 1981: 28-29).8 The point which Smith is trying to make is not 
so much that natural abilities are unimportant, but rather that under a system of 
specialisation the differences brought about by application to a particular field of 
work are a more decisive factor in explaining the broad variety of different 
individuals and their respective skills and sums of knowledge. 
However just as we require trade to allow specialisation, so too does the 
increase in specialist skill which it produces depend on the interaction of 
individuals through trade. To highlight this it is worth quoting Smith at length: 
, As it is this disposition which forms that difference of talents, so 
remarkable among men of different professions, so it is the same disposition 
which renders that difference useful. Many tribes of animals acknowledged 
to be all of the same species, derive from nature a much more remarkable 
8 See also Smith (l982b: 348). 
141 
distinction of genius, than what, antecedent to custom and education, 
appears to take place among men. By nature a philosopher is not in genius 
and disposition half so different from a street porter, as a mastiff is from a 
greyhound, or a greyhound from a spaniel, or this last from a shepherd's 
dog. Those different tribes of animals, however, though all of the same 
species, are scarce of any use to one another. The strength of the mastiff is 
not, in the least, s':lpported either by the swiftness of the greyhound, or by 
the sagacity of the spaniel, or by the docility of the shepherd's dog. The 
effects of those different geniuses and talents, for want of the power or 
disposition to barter and exchange, cannot be brought into a common stock, 
and do not in the least contribute to the better accommodation and 
conveniency of the species. Each animal is still obliged to support and 
defend itself, separately and independently, and derives no sort of advantage 
from that variety of talents with which nature has distinguished its fellows. 
Among men, on the contrary, the most dissimilar geniuses are of use to one 
another; the different produces of their respective talents, by the general 
disposition to truck, barter, and exchange, being brought, as it were, into a 
common stock, where every man may purchase whatever part of the 
produce of other men's talents he has occasion for.' (Smith 1981: 29-30). 
Having discussed the factors which lie behind the separation of arts and 
professions, and examined how this is related necessarily to the notion of trade, 
the Scots then go on to examine the division oflabour as it develops within the 
various, now delineated, industries and professions. As Smith's analysis here is 
the most famous and the most clearly developed we shall follow his argument. 
Smith lays down three reasons why the division oflabour produces productive 
benefits when introduced to the internal operation of a particular productive 
industry. He attributes this: ' ... first, to the increase of dexterity in every 
particular workman; secondly, to the saving of time which is commonly lost in 
passing from one species of work to another; and lastly. to the invention of a 
great number of machines which facilitate and abridge labour, and enable one 
man to do the work of many. , (Smith 1981: 17; 1982b: 567). 
What is immediately striking about these three explanations, given what we 
have already seen about the role of specialised knowledge in the separation of 
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arts and professions, is that two of them, the first and the third, refer to benefits 
which are the result of improved skill and knowledge. The second is 
categorically different, referring instead to the actual nature of the working 
environment. The second explanation is also the weakest and least productive of 
the three. While Smith is right to note this difference between simpler models of 
production where a craftsman works on each stage of production and the more 
compartmentalised chain of production under the division of labour, the savings 
oftime attained by the prevention of 'sauntering' (Smith 1981: 19; 1982b: 491) 
surely cannot be considered to be of so great an improving force as the increase 
of dexterity and the invention and use of machines. Indeed once the division of 
labour has first been introduced to an industry it is doubtful as to how great a 
difference the elimination of time wasting in the change between functions will 
truly be. On the other hand the role of the other two explanations of the 
productive powers of the division of labour are not so limited and may fairly be 
said to be of constant relevance as each industry progresses. It is the increased 
dexterity of workers and the invention of machines which are the truly 
progressive elements of the division oflabour. 9 Further, the first and third 
explanations are logically linked together in Smith's argument. The initial 
explanation for the increase in dexterity is the simplification of the task in hand: 
' ... the division oflabour, by reducing every man's business to some one simple 
operation, and by making this operation the sole employment of his life, 
necessarily increases very much the~dexterity of the workman.' (Smith 1981: 
18). By confining man's attention to a simple field the division oflabour focuses 
attention and creates a specialist whose skill and knowledge of this operation 
allow him to perfect it to levels beyond the power of a generalist. 10 As we saw 
earlier in our discussion of science and gap-plugging, specialists are more 
intimately familiar with and focused upon their particular field, as a result they 
are able more easily to apprehend 'gaps' in that system or operation, and are 
able to apply their focused knowledge to plug those gaps (Smith 1982a: 45). 11 
9 A point also highlighted in Ferguson and Hume's respective analyses of the division of 
labour (Ferguson 1995: 172~ Hume 1978: 485). 
10 Barnett refers to this phenomenon as 'competence' (Barnett 1998: 48). 
11 The suggestions of utility underlie Smith's economic analysis ofthe division oflabour in 
the Wealth of Nations and Lectures on Jurisprudence (Smith 1982b: 351), but he also provides 
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What emerges from this is the notion of an occupation as a 'study' (Ferguson 
1995: 58), perhaps the first definition of the idea of human capita1. 12 As Smith 
puts it: 'Those talents, as they make a part of his fortune, so do they likewise of 
that of the society to which he belongs. The improved dexterity of a workman 
may be considered in the same light as a machine or instrument of trade which 
facilitates and abridges labour.' (Smith 1981: 282). 
Such knowledge gained from experience and repeated exposure to a 
particular field is held within the individuals concerned. For this reason such 
knowledge often takes on a non-verbalised, tacit or habitual form. Ferguson 
notes this when he argues: 
'Accessions of power in us are sometimes termed skill, and consist in the 
knowledge of means that may be employed for the attainment of our end: 
they are also termed a sleight or facility of performance; and are acquired by 
mere practice, without any increase of knowledge. The first is the result of 
science; the second is the resub of habit. And there are few arts or 
performances of moment, in which it is not requisite that both should be 
united.' (Ferguson 1973 voU: 227-8).13 
It is not simply the possession of specialised knowledge that counts, but 
also the manner in which it is exercised: the skill we have in utilising our 
knowledge. For specialisation to work what is required is that the specialist is 
proficient in his own field; that he is able to act in a relatively efficient manner on 
the objects that are the focus of his attention. Indeed Smith notes that one of the 
advantages of such specialisation is the scope which it allows for the conduct of 
a psychological account of specialisation that can be related to those human tendencies that 
prompt man to science. We have already noted that the Scots discern a natural human 
propensity to seek order in the understanding of the world. From this they drew a notion of 
the human mind as functioning by classification (Smith 1982a: 38-39), and as this 
classification naturally develops in line with experience, so the differentiation of experience 
that occurs creates different fields or objects for human study. However the psychological 
explanation of the pursuit of specialist knowledge is linked to both utility and sympathy. 
Smith argues that men naturally admire the knowledge of specialists (Smith 1984: 20), and 
moreover they see how specialisation has provided these people with a safe route to wealth and 
reputation (Smith 1984: 213). There is a sense in which we pursue specialised knowledge 
from an emulation of the rich and successful (Smith 1984: 55). Inspired by their success we 
seek to acquire knowledge and express our talents in order not only to secure financial reward, 
but also to enjoy the acclaim that goes along with expertise (Smith 1984: 181). 
12 Spengler (1983) and Brown (1988: 79-80) both make this point. 
13 A similar argument is developed by Polanyi. See Below Part Three, Section Two. 
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experimentation by informed practitioners: a process which is vital to the 
progress both of knowledge and of wealth (Smith 1981: 287). As specialisation 
advances more people become specialists in the same field resulting in a situation 
where, according to Smith: 'More heads are occupied in inventing the most 
proper machinery for executing the work of each, and it is, therefore, more likely 
to be invented.' (Smith 1981: 104).14 
The productive benefits of specialisation are related to experience and to 
the acquisition of specialised knowledge. IS Smith links this specialisation to his 
third explanation. He argues: 'Men are much more likely to discover easier and 
readier methods of attaining any object, when the whole attention of their minds 
is directed towards that single ~bject.' (Smith 1981: 20).16 This argument is 
further underlined when Smith admits that some great mechanical innovations 
are not the result of the experiences of workmen, but rather are the product of 
those who specialise in making machines: a further example of the benefits of 
specialisation (Smith 1981: 21). The restriction of attention to one field of 
study, or occupation, naturally increases the scope of the observations that may 
be made in that field by anyone individual. 
The process of specialisation however does have limits and equally gives 
rise to potentially serious problems. Men are restricted by the limits of their 
mental functions, they are only capable of processing so much knowledge and 
even then the nature of human knowledge, founded as it is on habitual 
association and experience, is imperfect (Smith 1984: 335). As a result the 
concentration of our attention on one field of study, though efficient, naturally 
restricts our ability to process knowledge from other fields. For this reason it is 
inevitably the case that we cannot fully comprehend the details of the fields of 
other specialists as these lie outside our experience (Smith 1982a: 44).17 Hume 
14 There is a link here to the changes between modes of production in the 'four stages' theory: 
an increase in population allows specialisation and increases the likelihood of useful 
observations being made that. in turn, lead to further increase in population. 
IS What Hollander calls the technical progress 'induced' by the division of labour (Hollander 
1973: 209). 
16 Smith links this theme to an unintended consequences argument about the motivations of 
workers: where workers improve a machine in order to reduce the amount of labour required 
of them (Smith 1981: 20-21). See also Ferguson (1995: 162, 173). 
17 Smith argues that this phenomenon, and the interdependency which it creates, is a further 
reason why we admire specialists (Smith 1984: 336). 
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is also quick to note that specialisation does not render us all experts, or 
geniuses, in our chosen field. Rather we are merely specialists (Rume 1985: 
210) proficient in the skills required for the operation of our own field but 
necessarily constrained in our understanding of the wider system within which 
our field operates.1S One danger of this process is that specialists may acquire 
tunnel vision, focusing their attention on one field and blinding themselves to the 
significance of other fields of study (Ferguson 1995: 173). This results in a 
situation where specialists only acquire experience of other fields second hand, 
through the teaching of others or observation. As Smith puts it: 
'Let any ordinary person make a fair review of all the knowledge which he 
possesses concerning any subject that does not fall within the limits of his 
particular occupation, and he will find that almost every thing he knows has 
been acquired at second hand, from books, from the literary instructions 
which he may have received in his youth, or from the occasional 
conversations which he may have had with men of learning.' (Smith 1982b: 
574). 
There is, then, a potential danger, highlighted by Ferguson (Ferguson 1995: 
32, 206-7), that concentration on a specialist area of study leaves us ill-equipped 
for involvement in other specialists areas: or that our proficiency in one field is 
bought at the expense of our ability to interact in vital social activities. 19 
Knowledge specialists, as we saw in our examination of the division of 
labour, must interact for their specialised knowledge to be useful (Smith 1981: 
30). Moreover specialists become dependent on the knowledge and labour of 
others (Hume 1978: 485) to an extent that interaction and trade become vital. 
We become dependent on the skill and knowledge of others (Smith 1982b: 574) 
and, as individual fields of experience are focused further and further to reap the 
benefits of close study, so society becomes increasingly complex, experience 
18 Rosenberg agrees with this view (Rosenberg 1965: 128-129), and develops it into an 
argument that a decreasing intelligence in particular labourers, resulting from their 
concentration of attention on a particular task, need not prevent the continuation of overall 
technical progress. His view is that the division of labour represents a process of 
simplification in reaction to comple~ty, the result of which is that 'the collective intelligence 
of society grows as a result of the very process' that restricts the breadth of individual 
knowledge (Rosenberg 1965: 134-135). 
increasingly diverse, and interdependence gradually greater and greater. 
Knowledge is indeed increased in its cumulative sum, but it is also diffused 
among an ever-wider field of specialists (Hume 1985: 299-300). This 
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cumulative growth in knowledge, which we have observed before, shows us that 
knowledge itself is a chain of development conducted through the medium of 
specialists. Specialists build on the work of those who have gone before them. 
As Ferguson notes: 'Inventions, we frequently observe, are accidental; but it is 
probable, that an accident which escapes the artist in one age, may be seized 
upon by one who succeeds him, and who is better appraised of its use. ' 
(Ferguson 1995: 162). Moreover this 'accumulating advantage' (Ferguson 
1995: 199) from specialisation depends upon the focus and skill of each 
specialist in his own field. The gradual efforts of individual specialists to exert 
themselves in their own field, and in their own interest as we shall see below, 
benefit the whole of society by increasing the stock of cumulative knowledge. 
What becomes clear is that specialisation reinforces the notion that the 
knowledge of the whole of a society exceeds that of its discrete members (Smith 
1982a: 309). But specialisation also encourages the growth of the sum by 
focusing attention on individualised fields leading to a development of 
proficiency in them which benefits all through trade and interdependency. All of 
this is posited on the interaction of the individuals who compose a society: 
interaction and trade are vital if specialised knowledge is to be gathered or 
utilised to the benefit of all. If cumulative social knowledge is to mean anything, 
then there must be social interaction through which to make use of it. In a 
complex commercial society knowledge must be transferred (Millar 1990: 31-
33), indeed, as Smith put it, knowledge must be traded (Smith 1982b: 573). 
Interaction to utilise individualised specialist knowledge is essential to the 
progress of the cumulative sum of human knowledge which the Scots have 
identified as the basis of their conception of progress. Just as Smith notes the 
vital role of the desire to trade~ arising from the propensity in human nature to 
truck and barter, in allowing the development of the division of labour so, it 
becomes clear, is trade also vital to the development of the specialist knowledge 
19 See the Chapter 4 below on the problems of the division oflabour, especially the possible 
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which underlies the process. Hume argued that the stability of property and the 
recognition of its free transfer by consent laid the foundations for society while 
at the same time creating the conditions for the development of trade (Hume 
1978: 520). Moreover just as stability of property promotes peace in a given 
society so trade, by bringing people into peaceful contact, promotes civilisation 
and encourages the exchange ofideas.20 Commerce, in supplying for the needs 
of subsistence, becomes the great 'study' of mankind (Ferguson 1995: 58). 
But market relationships differ from other forms of human interaction. As 
Smith noted, to appeal to the self-love of the butcher, brewer and baker is a 
more efficient means of securing that which we desire, and, as Hume also notes, 
market relationships differ from friendship and appeals for the sympathy of 
others (Hum~ 1975: 209).21 The truth of these statements becomes even more 
salient as trade develops and specialisation increases. We become dependent on 
the skills of others to supply our wants, while at the same time they become 
equally dependent upon us. Such interdependence grows up to a great 
complexity as the division oflabour advances. As Smith famously asked us to 
observe: 
'the accommodation of the most common artificer or day-labourer in a 
civilized and thriving country, and you will perceive that the number of 
people of whose industry a part, though but a small part, has been employed 
in procuring him this accommodation, exceeds all computation. The 
woollen coat, for example, which covers the day-labourer, as coarse and 
rough as it may appear, is the produce of the joint labour of a great 
multitude of workmen.' (Smith 1981: 22)?2 
The example of the labourer's coat indicates the vast web of 
interdependency which develops as a result of the division of labour; but it also 
shows how this complexity supplies for our needs in an efficient manner, and in a 
ill-effects on the mental faculties of ordinary workers. 
20 Of which more later. 
21 Though it has been argued that the 'trucking' principle springs from a sympathetic desire to 
persuade (Rothschild 2001). Ridley has argued that trade and the division oflabour are based 
on an evolved notion of reciprocity (Ridley 1996: 45, 140). 
22 Smith goes on to highlight this by listing some of the chain of interconnections (Smith 
1981: 22-23). The argument is taken up by Hayek as evidence of the impossibility of 
calculation in a collectivist economy. See Part Three, Section One. 
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manner that depends on a market exchange which allows us to depend on people 
unknown and unrelated to us. The various stages of production interact to serve 
their own ends, the sheep farmer having no inclination or idea that his wool will 
eventually supply the clothing needs of a labourer. All that concerns him is 
. 
exchanging his product for his own advantage in order to procure the 
satisfaction of his own needs.23 This complex of interdependency, of reliance on 
the skills and labour of other specialists, is what allows the modem labourer to 
be better provided for than the African chief (Smith 1981: 24). The 
interdependency of specialists through trade depends, for the Scots, on the 
extent of the market, on the number of possible trading partners (Smith 1981: 
31). As trade extends it also develops, as Hume notes, geographically distant 
areas come to enter trading relationships extending the market and the scope for 
trade still further (Hume 1985: 299).24 This trade brings people into contact 
with new civilisations and their ideas and products, allowing the exchange of 
ideas as well as goods promoting the further enhancement of knowledge. The 
key to the success of the division oflabour is the extent of the market (Smith 
1981: 34): with the implication being that as the division of labour improves 
products and the division of knowledge extends the cumulative sum of human 
knowledge, so the market of the greatest possible extent is a desirable situation 
for mankind. It is from these principles that Smith launches his argument for the 
efficiency of free trade and open competition (Smith 1981: 362).25 
An interesting feature of the Scots' argument here is their belief that 
interaction through trade is vital not only to material progress and the progress 
of knowledge, but also to the progress of manners (Smith 1982b: 223,538). 
Market exchanges and trade lead to improvements in civility and morality, 
fostering such 'virtues' as probity and honesty as the 'reputation' of a trader 
becomes as much a part of his product's attraction as the goods themselves 
23 Goldsmith, referring to Mandeville, notes this and argues that it is grounded on an assertion 
that selfishness is tamed, not by virtue, but by interdependence (Goldsmith 1988: 592). 
24 This of course is the basis of Smith's arguments for free trade based on comparative 
advantage. 
2S See also Hume (1985: 324). Note here that Smith's support for free trade is a result of 
conclusions drawn from his descriptive analysis of the operation of the division of labour. It is 
in this sense an instrumentalist and not a normative argument. 
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(Smith 1982b: 539)?6 Similarly bargaining and contract making become skills in 
themselves and encourage specialists to develop in that field [merchants] whose 
livelihood depends on their proficiency in striking deals (Smith 1982b: 494). 
Underlying the efficiency of the trading relationships which foster the division of 
labour and the division of knowledge is an assumption about human motivation 
which has often led to debate around the Scots' theory, especially that of Smith 
and in particular the relationship between his Theory of Moral Sentiments and 
Wealth of Nations. 27 The Scots analysis of trade, though based at bottom on a 
'natural' propensity in human nature, is conducted in terms of self-interested 
utility maximisation. 
26 For Smith on reputation, trade and the advance of manners see (Smith 1984: 57,213; 
1982b: 13). See also above on prudence and propriety. Hirschmann examines the historical 
development of this style of argument, referring to its core assumption that views 'money-
making as a calm passion' (Hirschmann 1977: 63). 
27 The so-called Adam Smith problem: for a discussion of which see (Dickey 1986; 
Teichgraeber 1981; Otteson 2002) .. 
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Chapter 2: Self-Interest and Trade 
As we have seen market r~lationships are not based on love or sympathy, 
but rather upon self-love (Smith 1982b: 347-48). Men play on each other's self-
regard to satisfy their needs through exchange (Smith 1982b: 493). The reason 
for this becomes clear when we consider the Scots' notion of' confin' d 
generosity': because sympathetic relationships are based on familiarity, or 
imaginative familiarity, while market relationships are based on interdependency 
among a large number of people, trade simply becomes an easy way of 
interacting without taking the trouble to build the bonding relationships or 
undergo the imaginative sympathy necessary for appeals to sentiment to be fully 
effective (Hume 1978: 519)?8 As barter is more efficient than emotional appeal 
(Smith 1982b: 352, 571) in a society where individuals who interact are 
necessarily ignorant of most of those with whom they interact, self-interest 
becomes a conventional standard wgich is easily recognisable and 
understandable to individuals previously unknown to each other. Harking back 
to the labourer's coat example, we see that there is quite simply no way in which 
a web of interdependency so complex as that required to produce the coat could 
have arisen if the process depended on a direct sympathetic relationship between 
individuals. 
Such appeals to self-interest are related to the Scots' contentions over the 
need for and effectiveness of general rules. The laws that govern commercial 
exchange are designed to allow a stability of expectation in trading relationships 
with the honouring and enforcement of contracts becoming a key feature of a 
trade-based society (Hume 1978: 519). As we have seen an appeal to self-
interest is more effective, in the Scots' view, than reliance on the sympathy of 
others who will quite probably be unknown to US.29 Thus general rules of 
interaction governing trade exchanges do not require any notion of friendship 
(Hume 1975: 209): such general rules of behaviour stabilise expectations 
28 A point explicitly endorsed by Hayek (Hayek 1988: 47). See also Dwyer (1998: 14); 
Censolo (2001: 123) and Fonnan-Barzilai (2002: 405). 
29 See Yellin (2002: 379). 
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precisely because they reach beyond sympathy (Hume 1978: 499).30 They 
allow us to understand each other and to interact without detailed knowledge of 
each other's situations (Hume 1978: 581), and without the need extensively to 
exercise sympathy. We govern our behaviour by socially generated habitual 
expectations such as propriety, and such general rules (Smith 1984: 159) reduce 
the prospect of uncertainty and ease interaction. 
The Scots did not believe that all human motivation could be reduced to a 
principle of self-love or self-interest (Hume 1985: 26), and they took especial 
care to distance themselves from Mandeville's analysis of vice and virtue and his 
attitude to self-interest (Hume 1985: 280; Smith 1984: 308-12; Ferguson 1995: 
9). But they are equally forceful in noting that human motivation, virtue and 
morality cannot likewise be reduced to a simple motivation of the opposite 
impulse of benevolence (Fergu·son 1995: 55). What the Scots instead argued 
was that human motivations are more complex and that they are difficult to 
reduce to single principles. The Scots refer to humans as having motivations 
which are both selfish and social (Hume 1985: 84; Ferguson 1995: 53; 1973 
vo1.1: 126), arguing that though self-interest is a strong influence on human 
behaviour it is not sufficient alone to explain social interrelation and behaviour.31 
Indeed, though they condemn excessive self-regard, they are also quick to note 
that self-interest is an integral part of human motivations. Smith argues that 
selfish passions are neither social nor anti-social (Smith 1984: 172): they are 
simply facts about the nature of man just as it is a fact that human nature is 
sociable (Smith 1984: 40).32 What is required to understand human motivation 
and to discern the nature of 'virtue' is an acceptance of the reality that extremes 
of self-interest and benevolence are equally undesirable and unrealistic as bases 
for morality. Instead the Scots accept the 'reality' of the situation and seek 
30 See also Smith (l982b: 572). There is an implicit epistemological argument here that 
Vernon Smith picks up on. He argues: 'Not knowing of the invisible good accomplished by 
the self-interest in markets, but knowing of the good we accomplish by doing things for 
friends, we are led to believe we can do good by interfering in the market.' (Smith 1997: 30). 
Reisman extends this view to argue that there is a sense in which it is inefficient to concern 
ourselves with those we cannot hope to help (Reisman 1976: 84). 
31 See Hume (1985: 34, 42-43) and Ferguson (1995: 141). 
32 It is a feature of Smith's explanatory project that, though he may personally disapprove of 
excessive self-interest, he stakes no moral argument against it in his analysis of commerce. As 
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'virtue' in the avoidance of extremes of either motivation or passion (Hume 
1985: 161).33 Motives are themselves difficult to discern (Smith 1985: 171) as 
we cannot fully experience the passions and thought processes of another 
human. As Hume puts it: 'Man is a very variable being, and susceptible of many 
different opinions, principles, and rules of conduct. What may be true, while he 
adheres to one way of thinking, will be found false, when he has embraced an 
opposite set of manners and opinions.' (Hume 1985: 255-56). This is the source 
of the Scots' focus on and concern with sympathy. Sympathy is an attempt to 
understand the motives of others in order that we might be able to understand 
their actions and make judgements about them. Man's complex motivations 
(Ferguson 1995: 20) imply that even while engaged on self-interested economic 
exchange, he is also embedded in a series of inter-relations which do not depend 
on self-interest for their motivations (Ferguson 1995: 38f). As Ferguson puts it: 
'Even while the head is occupied with projects of interest, the heart is ~ften 
seduced into friendship; and while business proceeds on the maxims of self-
preservation, the careless hour-is employed in generosity and kindness.' 
(Ferguson 1995: 40-41).34 
The impulse for self-preservation is observable in all animals and is linked to 
a natural fear of death (Smith 1984: 13). Mankind, like other animals, is greatly 
concerned with self-preservation and by the nature of his animal frame is 
required to provide for his own subsistence (Ferguson 1973 vol. 1 : 52; Smith 
1982b: 488). We all possess the urge for self-preservation: this is simply a fact 
of nature that is neither a virtue nor a vice.35 As we have discussed at length 
before, the role of commerce and much human industry is to provide for 
subsistence (Ferguson 1995: 60). As a result of this relation of economic 
. 
activity to the securing of subsistence, and of a similar link between subsistence 
Bishop notes: 'Smith did not feel the need to draw moral conclusions from the invisible hand 
argument because his view of natural liberty made it redundant.' (Bishop 1995: 177). 
33 This is highlighted by Smith's focus on the importance of'self.cOlnmand' (Smith 1984: 
25), and in Smith and Ferguson's cases is drawn from the classical tradition of stoicism. 
34 As Holmes notes, the Scots did not operate with a model of a rational economic man 
(Holmes 1995). 
35 For the Scots self-preservation and self-interest only become the subject of moral 
disapprobation when they are 'perverted into excessive self-love (Ferguson 1995: 18). 
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and the natural urge for self-preservation, economic activity comes to hold as its 
chief motivation a principle of self-interest (Smith 1984: 183). 
Trade is more efficiently carried out by appeals to self-interest, and as its 
end is the satisfaction of individual needs and wants [such as subsistence], men 
come to accept the utility of dealing with each other in terms of self-interest in a 
complex market. For this reason Smith links self-interest to progress by way of 
the principle of self-preservation and a further concept of self-improvement 
(Smith 1982b: 487). As we discussed before the Scots believed that human 
society was undertaken within a series of factual limitations, most clearly 
described by Hume, and which may be referred to as the human condition or the 
conditions that render justice necessary. Hume argues that because of the 
interaction of'confin'd generosity' (Hume 1975: 185), scarcity and the easy 
interchangability of property, justice becomes a necessary convention if human 
society is to persist and develop. Self-interest, or confin'd generosity, becomes 
significant only in relation to scarcity (Hume 1978: 494): if there were no 
scarcity then self-interest would, theoretically, be unimportant and there would 
likewise be no need for a concept of justice. We noted also the role played by 
self-interest in the origins of the institutions of government (Hume 1978: 554), 
. 
noting that though, in Hume's view, self-interest is the original motive behind 
the concepts of justice and government, it plays little role in its subsequent moral 
force (Hume 1978: 499-500).· Behind all of this lies a further assertion about the 
usefulness of self-interest. Smith makes the point that benevolence is not 
necessary to the continued existence of justice and society. It may very well be 
an admirable moral principle, but it only has scope to develop within a social 
context: and society is only possible as a result of a conception of justice, a 
concept which has its origins not in benevolence, but in interest (Smith 1984: 
86). 
We have a link in the Scots' analysis from self-interested trade, to the 
motivations behind that trade that relies on self-preservation and self-
improvement (Smith 1981: 409). The Scots even link this to their concept of 
sympathy, arguing that we sympathise with and admire the wealthy (Hume 1978: 
154 
357-8), seeking to emulate them.36 Though Smith agrees with this psychological 
analysis he also sounds a cautionary note that our sympathy with the advantages 
of the wealthy does not ensure that the acquisition of wealth will actually lead to 
tranquillity of mind (Smith 1984: 50). It is the desire for self-preservation and a 
regard to our own interest that prompt us to industry (Smith 1982b: 340). 
Moreover this prompt leads us to exert our talents to the full. As Ferguson 
notes: 'in the result of commercial arts, inequalities of fortune are greatly 
increased, and the majority of every people are obliged by necessity, or at least . 
strongly incited by ambition and avarice, to employ every talent they possess.'. 
(Ferguson 1995: 206). The desire for self-improvement becomes the incentive 
that drives commercial activity, a fe~ture which sits comfortably with the self-
regarding exchange that forms the medium of trade. Idleness, Smith believed, is 
caused by a lack ofincentive (Smith 1981: 335), and chief among the incentives 
that prompt man to action is his admiration for the conveniences of the wealthy. 
Industry develops around the gratification of vanity and the desire to emulate the 
rich (Smith 1981: 190-93; 1982b: 335). 
Self-interest and self-improvement are powerful motives that encourage 
human industry and endeavour in a variety of social arenas. There is a very real 
sense in which man's self-interest may be incited, through the institutions that 
constitute the invisible hand, to encourage his labour and the utilisation of his 
skills in order to benefit not only himself, but also the public as a whole. In 
terms of knowledge, if a man is given incentives to study and increase his 
understanding this adds to the cumulative sum of human knowledge which 
moves progress regardless of the motives for undertaking the work. Moreover 
certain human institutions partly make use of self-interest to control self-
interest. 37 Property and justice are, in their origins, grounded in self-interest; but 
they also depend on recognition of the long-term advantages of the restraint of 
excessive self-interest (Hume 1978: 492). In this sense the public interest is 
reconciled with self-interest (Hume 1978: 529). Justice and property are 
36 Skinner links the desire to better our condition to our desire to be sympathised with: 'the 
point that the fundamental drive to better our condition is rooted in a desire to be approved of 
or at least to be admired' (Skinner 1996: 65). 
31 Leading Benton to write, of Ferguson, that he considered the market to be beneficial in 'an 
appropriate institutional context' (Benton 1990: 103). 
certainly in the public interest, but that is not originally why men subject 
themselves to them. The systems of property and justice reconcile self-
interested motivations, create peace, and allow the development of social 
passions and 'virtues'. 
ISS 
Perhaps the clearest indication of how the Scots' thought self-interest and 
the market links with their unintended consequence approach is to be found in 
their analysis of historical change: particularly in their analyses of the decline of 
slavery and feudalism.38 The Scots were universally opposed to the institution of 
slavery (Smith 1982b: 185), but they sought to explain the 'happy concurrence 
of events' (Millar 1990: 261) that led to the decline of slavery in terms of an 
unintended consequence argument. They stress that claims to a decisive, 
intentional role in the abolition of slavery, such as that made by the Catholic 
church, are inaccurate and unrealistic (Millar 1990: 273; Smith 1981: 389-90). 
Instead, they argued, the fall of slavery and the rise of emancipation were 
brought about by a process of unintentional action (Millar 1990: 269). The 
institution of slavery died out gradually as the result of a 'natural progress in 
manners', it fell into disuse before any legal move was made to outlaw it (Millar 
1990: 263,278). The Scots' reasoning behind this argument is related to the 
gradualism and evolutionism of their historical analysis. They believed that 
slavery passed out of favour b~cause it failed to provide sufficient incentives to 
encourage industry on the part of slaves (Millar 1990: 250-51,264,267,282). 
Slavery hinders industry because a slave has no share in the product, or profit, of 
his labours, and as a result has no incentive to maximise his efforts (Millar 1990: 
286).39 Slavery gradually falls out of use as slave owners realise the gain in 
productivity to be had by liberating slaves and treating them as dependent 
tenants or employees with some share in the product of their labour. Slavery is 
uneconomic, and as awareness of this grows it falls out of favour as a system of 
economic organisation (Smith 1982b: 454, 580). Slave-owners become 
landlords and employers as they realise the benefits to be gained by exploiting 
the self-interest and desire for self-improvement of their dependants. Such 
38 Their analysis here is undertaken within the 'four stages' schema (Reisman 1976: 129-38). 
Though, as Salter points out, in the case of feudalism the balance being struck is as much 
political as economic (Salter 1992: 440). 
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appeals to self-interest as an incentive are more economically efficient than the 
abject dependence of slavery (Smith 1981: 387-88). The slave system's 
inefficiency is highlighted not only by the disincentive of labour which it 
produces amongst slaves, but also by the disincentive it provides for slaves to 
improve their skills and knowledge by application to various trades. As Smith 
notes: 'Slaves, however, are very seldom inventive; and all the most important 
improvements, either in machinery, or in the arrangement and distribution of 
work which facilitate and abridge labour, have been the discoveries of freemen. ' 
(Smith 1981: 684). As slavery declines and freedom advances so industry and 
commerce begin to develop in an efficient manner, harnessing the self-interest of 
freed-men to promote industry· (Burne 1985: 383). Freedom grows along with 
commerce (Millar 1990: 284): the system of tenancy replaces that of slavery 
(Smith 1981: 391) and there is a gradual increase in equality in society (Smith 
1982b: 195). Slaves, who were by their nature unequal with freemen, acquire 
the same legal status as them. This process of emancipation and the exploitation 
of self-interest leads in turn to a growth in productive output and to a growth in 
trade (Smith 1982b: 189). 
The Scots apply a similar system of analysis, focusing on unintended 
consequences and self-interest, to their study of feudalism. They undertake a 
historical analysis of the feudal era (Smith 1982b: 52) which is grounded, 
especially in the case of Smith and Millar, within their stadial theory of historical 
. development (Smith 1981: 712).40 The Scots analyse both the rise and fall of the 
feudal system in terms of unint~nded consequences. The rise of feudalism, 
Smith argues, destroyed the nascent system of trade that had developed after the 
fall of classical slavery (Smith 1982b: 248), but its advent was the result of the 
interaction of various features related to the system of economic production. 
The feudal system was, in the Scots' view, the product of a balance of powers 
between the various eminent nobles of the nation (Ferguson 1995: 127; Hume 
1985: 278).41 This balance, or spontaneous order, evolved gradually as 
39 The inefficiency of slavery is discussed in (Rosenberg 1965). 
40 Gilbert Stuart also provides a detailed historical study of the feudal system which he traces 
from the manners of the early Germanic tribes (Stuart 1995: 35, 85). 
41 See Forbes (1954: 667), and Teichgraeber. who refers to the feudal balance as 'stalemate' 
(Teichgraeber 1986: 150). 
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landlords became aware of the balance of powers within each particular locality 
(Smith 1982b: 252; 1981: 402). Moreover, as Millar argues, this was not a 
conscious balance (Millar 1990: 188). The unintended consequences that 
produced the stable feudal system (Millar 1990: 197; Smith 1982b: 259, 270) 
produced a system of law that recognised the balance of power between feudal 
lords and between the lords and the sovereign (Smith 1981: 417). Each noble 
acted from self-interest to preserve his position, but the nobles gradually 
developed a group interest to defend their feudal rights against the power of the 
crown, and this balance of nobles and monarch characterises the feudal system 
(Hume 1985: 17).42 Feudalism gradually developed a customary and legal 
framework (Smith 1981: 383), grounded on this balance of powers and the 
economic system of dependent tenants. The feudal system was based on the 
concentration of property (Hume 1985: 48; Stuart 1995: 41, 87), with the feudal 
lordship over a geographic area being the basis ofa lord's power. As a result it 
. 
became vital to preserve the integrity of property in land. For this reason the 
feudal system was particularly characterised by its emphasis on the legal concept 
of primogeniture as a means of securing the maintenance of power by preserving 
an estate intact at the time of inheritance (Hume 1985: 413; Smith 1982b: 56-
57). The need to preserve the integrity of feudal estates also led to the 
development of such legal features as entailed legacies (Smith 1981: 384) where 
ownership of the feudal right and enjoyment of the power which went with it 
depended on the preservation of the estate and its value (Smith 1982b: 70).43 
The Scots believed that feudalism arose as the result of a process of 
unintended consequences, but they also held that this was how the system passed 
out of existence. Under feudalism the landlord's sole aim was to protect his 
position of influence by protecting the extent of his estate. His prestige was 
measured not only by the extent of his land but by the number of dependants 
who worked this land for their subsistence and who were thus dependent on the 
feudal lord for their survival. Under the feudal system the powerful have no 
42 This is perhaps made most clear by the Scots analysis of Magna Charta in terms of 
unintended consequences (Hume 1983 vol. 1: 437-444, Stuart 1995: 70; Millar 1812 vol. 2: 
80-81). 
043 Smith attacks the effectiveness and morality of both primogeniture and entails (Smith 
1982b: 71, 524). 
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other means to exercise their wealth than in maintaining dependants: their 
spending is limited simply by the fact that there is nothing to buy (Smith 1982b: 
50,202; 1981: 413). The feudal system began to decline only when objects 
arose which the feudal lords could buy (Smith 1982b: 420). In other words, 
when some individuals began to specialise in the production of non-essential, 
'luxury' goods, the landlords suddenly acquired an object upon which to expend 
their incomes (Smith 1982b: 262-4) .. By seeking to satisfy their desire for these 
non-essential goods as status symbols the feudal lords began to lose their focus 
on the importance of the concentration of property. Trading land for money in 
order to fund their taste for the luxurious, for goods that they themselves could 
consume and enjoy, the lords unwittingly destroyed the very basis of their 
power. The feudal system was destroyed as an unintended consequence of the 
self-interest of the feudal lords and the consequent rise in specialised labour to 
meet this demand (Millar 1990: 230-31). Smith describes this best: 
'But what all the violence of the feudal institutions could never have 
effected, the silent and insensible operation of foreign commerce and 
manufactures gradually brought about. .. as soon, therefore, as they could 
find a method of consuming the whole value of their rents themselves, they 
had no disposition to share them with any other persons. For a pair of 
diamond buckles perhaps, or for something as frivolous and useless, they 
exchanged the maintenance, or what is the same thing, the price of the 
maintenance of a thousand men for a year, and with it the whole weight and 
authority which it could give them.' (Smith 1981: 418-19). 
And so, in Smith's terms: 
'A revolution of the greatest importance to the publick happiness, was in 
this manner brought about by two different orders of people, who had not 
the least intention to serve the pub lick. To gratify the most childish vanity 
was the sole motive of the great proprietors. The merchants and artificers, 
much less ridiculous, acte~ merely from a view to their own interest, and in 
pursuit of their own pedlar principle of turning a penny wherever a penny 
was to be got. Neither of them had either knowledge or foresight of that 
great revolution which the folly of the one, and the industry of the other, 
was gradually bringing about.' (Smith 1981: 422). 
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The principle of self-interest promotes both the decline of feudalism and the 
advance of commerce and the division of labour (Smith 1981: 409~ Ferguson 
1973 vo1.2: 342). Feudalism operated on a restricted level of incentive, and 
once the opportunity to enjoy greater profit arose - both for the lord in the 
enjoyment of non-essential goods, and for the labourers in the opportunity to 
enjoy the product of their own labour - the feudal system entered a 'natural' and 
inevitable decline (Smith 1981: 389). Feudal wealth gradually declined as 
property was sold otTto fund the purchase of luxury goods: feudal dependants 
were freed from their association with a particular lord and left able to practise 
their increasingly specialised trades for their own profit (Smith 1981: 407).44 
The decline of feudalism was characterised by the diffusion of previously 
concentrated wealth and power through the medium of trade (Millar 1990: 271, 
Smith 1981: 333,421).45 This diffusion of wealth and power led to a gradual 
improvement in the position of those who had previously been dependent on a 
particular lord alone for their s~bsistence (Millar 1990: 235).46 As Smith 
describes it: 'In the present state of Europe, a man often thousand a year can 
spend his whole revenue, and he generally does so, without directly maintaining 
twenty people, or being able to command more than ten footmen not worth 
commanding. Indirectly, perhaps, he maintains as great or even a greater 
number of people than he could have done by the antient method of expence. ' 
(Smith 1981: 419-20). Another unintended consequence of the decline of 
feudalism was the growth of cities and townS.47 Newly emancipated serfs began 
to congregate in urban areas in order to practise specialised labour and enjoy the 
benefits of trade allowed by a more extensive market (Smith 1981: 419; 1982b: 
256, 408-9). 
We have already seen that Smith believes that the division of labour and the 
division of knowledge arise as an unintended consequence of human action and 
44 An interesting sideline of Smith's argument here is his view that one unintended 
consequence of the process of decline was the formalisation of the taxation system as the Lords 
sought to exploit their tenants for profit in order to expend their income on lUXUry goods 
(Smith 1981: 394). 
4S Miller offers a reading of Hume's History of England as a description of the growth of 
liberty through the feudal era (Miller 1990). See also Cropsey (1957: 94). 
46 This, of course, is an example of an invisible hand argument. 
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that the commercial system has evolved gradually through his 'four stages'. This 
unintended process produces a system of specialisation and trade that 
characterises progressive commercial societies. We are left with a question: 
Smith must explain how, given his focus on specialised, localised, self-regarding 
action, ' ... the private interests and passions of individuals naturally dispose them 
to tum their stock towards the employments which in ordinary cases are the 
most advantageous to the society'? (Smith 1981: 630).48 The phrase that Smith 
uses to describe such incidents, where self-interested actions and circumstances 
combine to form benefits for t~e public good, is 'accidents' (Smith 1981: 78, 
235). It is in the study of these 'accidents' that Smith seeks the nature and 
causes of the wealth of nations. The interaction of self-interested individuals 
possessed of an urge to trade is the arena within which such accidents occur. As 
Smith puts it: 'Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the 
most advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command. It is his 
own advantage, indeed, and not that of the society, which he has in view. But 
the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily leads him to 
prefer that employment which is most advantageous to the society.' (Smith 
1981: 454).49 Smith is advancing a~ epistemological argument: our superior 
knowledge of our own particular circumstances and our desire to exploit them 
efficiently leads, if successful, to the most efficient exploitation of the 
circumstances of the whole of the society. The benign spontaneous order that is 
produced is attributed by Smith to the operation of an invisible hand. The 
invisible hand here is the efficient exploitation of local knowledge in a social 
context. so 
47 A point that, we have noted before, was a vital step in the development of the division of 
labour. 
48 See also Millar (1990: 242) and Ferguson (1973 vol. 2: 19, 102). 
49 See also Smith (1981: 366) and Ferguson (1995: 124). Porta and Scazzieri stress that, for 
Smith, this intemction occurs within the context of a system of intersubjectively generated 
rules: 'Economic coordination presupposes a structure of beliefs, symbols and communicative 
codes, that is, a body [tmdition] of mutual adjustments and interdependent decisions by which 
the outcome of social intemction is constrained.' (porta and Scazzieri 2001: 2). 
so Dunbar refers to an 'undesigning hand' rather than an invisible hand, stressing that the 
order produced is a result of human action but not human design (Dunbar 1995: 77-78). Flew 
believes that Smith's invisible hand is an explanation of the coordination device which solves 
a knowledge problem within the economy (Flew 1987). 
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In the Introduction we noted that MacFie distinguishes between the first use 
of the term invisible hand, in the History of Astronomy where it appears as the 
'invisible hand of Jupiter' (Smith 1982a: 490), and its later appearances in The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations. He believes that in all 
three cases the hand referred to is that of a Deity, but that the nature of the Deity 
in question changes from a polytheistic context to a Christian context (MacFie 
1971: 595-596). In the Section One above we examined the Scots' rejection of 
a series of explanatory models that relied upon a specific role undertaken by a 
Deity, building a case for a reading of the Scots that sees them as undertaking a 
self-consciously secular explanatory inquiry. On this reading of the Scots it 
makes little sense for Smith suddenly to have recourse to divine intervention in 
order to explain the results of social interaction. Nonetheless a number of critics 
have argued that the invisible hand is indeed a metaphorical description of either 
the direct intervention of God, or the unfolding of the plan of providence. S 1 
Where the Scots do make passing reference to providence it generally has little 
to do with the central explanatory thrust of their arguments and sits oddly with 
their professed scientific approach. A more plausible reading is that offered by 
Gray, who notes that Smith's use ofthe term to describe the 'self-adjusting 
machinery' (Gray 1931: 151) of society is a cover for the fact that he cannot 
describe in precise detail the nature of the co-ordinative device. s2 
Emma Rothschild has recently advanced the view that the focus on the term 
invisible hand in much Smith scholarship is misplaced. She believes that Smith 
viewed it as a 'mildly ironic joke', which he uses in a 'cursory' manner 
(Rothschild 2001: 116, 118) and, that if taken as a substantive theory, it is 
distinctly 'un-Smithian' (Rothschild 2001: 123-124). One of her arguments that 
51 For example, Evensky views the invisible hand as the hand of God (Even sky 1993); while 
Kleer sees God as the final cause behind all of Smith's work (Kleer 1995); and Davis, Martin 
and MacFie all view the invisible hand as a metaphor for providence (J. B. Davis 1983; Martin 
1983; MacFie 1971: 597). Evidence for this view is generally drawn from Smith's occasional 
references to his belief in aTheistic conception of God (Smith 1984: 105-106,128,166; 1987: 
68), what Brown has called his 'theistic platitudes' (Brown 1988: 136). 
52 Others who reject the religious reading of the invisible hand include: Cropsey, who traces it 
purely to self-preservation (Cropsey 1957: 27); Carnic, Haakonssen and Rashid, who view the 
Scots as secularists with little interest in invoking God as an explanatory device (Carnic 1983: 
59-63; Haakonssen 1982: 205; Rashid 1998: 219); Rosenberg, who claims that the invisible 
hand 'bas nothing to do with divine guidance'. but is instead the product of competition 
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the invisible hand is 'un-Smithi"an' is precisely that it has superstitious or 
religious connotations. She believes that Smith's work is essentially secular in 
character and, as a result, that the invisible hand sits uneasily with his style of 
approach. This is congruent with our reading in so far as it rejects the idea that 
the invisible hand is that of the Deity; however, the conclusion that its possible 
interpretation as referring to a Deity renders the idea 'un-Smithian' requires 
further support. With this end in view Rothschild advances three arguments in 
support of her case.53 First, she undertakes a literary compari~on of Smith's 
invisible hand to prior uses of the phrase of which Smith may have been aware, 
in Macbeth and Ovid, and concludes that it carries superstitious or miraculous 
connotations (Rothschild 1994: 319-320; 2001: 118-121). The Scots, as we 
have seen above, disliked the notion of miracles and favoured causal explanation; 
which supports the idea that if Smith drew the term from one of these literary 
sources, then it is not a style of argument with which he had any great sympathy. 
The second line of argument advanced is that the invisible hand adopts a 
condescending and contemptuous attitude towards individual intentions 
(Rothschild 2001: 123). This, Rothschild argues, goes against the very tenor of 
the Enlightenment idea of freedom through reason. The idea that we are led by 
forces other than our reason to produce outcomes that were no part of our 
intention seems at odds with the notion of Enlightenment (Rothschild 1994: 320-
321). This line of argument depends on Rothschild's reading of Smith as being 
closely related to the French Enlightenment. That he is more properly 
understood as being situated in a uniquely British school of thought has been the 
focus of much of our study this far. This British school of Enlightenment is 
partly characterised by its appr,eciation that macro level outcomes of social 
interaction often have little to do with the particular intentions of the actors 
involved.'4 Indeed the entire discussion in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, that 
(Rosenberg 1990a: 21); and Flew, who afgues that 'Smith's invisible hand is not a hand, any 
more than Darwin's natural selection is selection' (Flew 1985: 58). 
53 Rothschild admits that her evidence for these assertions is 'indirect' (Rothschild 2001: 
117). 
54 Rothschild argues that by 1770 the idea of unintended consequences was a cliche used as a 
justification for policies against free trade (Rothschild 1994: 320-321): a view that appears to 
neglect Smith's explanation of historical change and the fact that his project was explanatory 
rather than justificatory. 
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only intentional actions are the proper subject of assessments of merit, reflects a 
keen awareness on Smith's part that some outcomes are not the product of 
intention and thus not properly regarded in terms of merit (Smith 1984: 97-103). 
Rothschild's final argument is that the invisible hand posits a theorist with 
privileged universal knowledge who is able to identify the hand, while the 
individuals who are guided by it remain unaware of its operation (Rothschild 
2001: 124).sS This idea is distinctly 'un-Smithian' ifit is regarded as referring to 
some superior exercise of reason on the part of the theorist that would allow him 
to predict the outcomes of interaction. Smith's use of the invisible hand is, as 
we shall see, as a retrospective explanatory device. The theorist cannot see 
more than the actors, but with hindsight he can identify the operation of the hand 
that produces results other than those intended by the actors. The invisible hand 
is not necessarily 'un-Smithian', and it now remains for us to identify the 
particular role that it plays in his work. 
In the Theory of Moral Sentiments the invisible hand appears in a section 
dealing with the effect of utility on the conception of beauty. Smith argues that 
the rich in a society are subject to the same physical constraints as the poor, that 
is to say that their corporeal frames restrict the amount which they can 
absolutely consume. As a result they are compelled to use their wealth to 
purchase the product of others' labour, and consequently they diffuse their 
wealth through society. As Smith would have it: 
'They consume little more than the poor, and in spite of their natural 
selfishness and rapacity, though they mean only their own conveniency, 
though the sole end which they propose from the labours of all the 
thousands whom they employ, be the gratification of their own vain and 
insatiable desires, they divide with the poor the produce of all their 
improvements. They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same 
distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the 
earth been divided into equal portions among all of its inhabitants, and thus 
55 A view also advanced by Rosen with regard to unintended consequences arguments (Rosen 
1996: 101). 
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without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, 
and afford the multiplication of the species.' (Smith 1984: 184-85). S6 
Here he is attempting to show that economics is not a zero-sum game. 
That is to say that the nature of economic interdependence implies that the 
ownership of more wealth by some does not entail a loss of subsistence by 
others. The invisible hand here is the mechanism by which a benign spontaneous 
order, one that is in society's interests in general, can be produced by the self-
interested actions of individuals. 
Similarly, in the Wealth of Nations, the appearance of the invisible hand is 
again related to the co-ordination of self-interested action in order to produce 
benefits for the whole of society. Here the question is the balance of trade. 
Smith writes: 
'By preferring the support of domestick to that of foreign industry, he 
intends only his own security; R?d by directing that industry in such a 
manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own 
gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to 
promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the 
worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest 
he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he 
really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those 
who affected to trade for·the publick good.' (Smith 1981: 456). 
As with Smith's other examples of the role of economic self-interest in 
historical change the term invisible hand refers to the process, or mechanism, 
which brings about socially beneficial spontaneous orders from the interaction of 
self-interested actors. S7 Whether the result is in the distribution of subsistence, 
or in the support of domestic industry, the process is the same. 
It is for this reason, the efficient exploitation of local and specialised 
knowledge, that we begin to see why Hume argued that self-love is connected to 
the interests of the community (Hume 1975: 218), and why Smith stressed the 
point that national capital and wealth is nothing more than the sum of the capital 
56 Ahmad argues that there are actually two invisible hands at work in this passage: the 
invisible hand arising from the landlord's self-interest and the invisible hand of biology that 
limits the size of his stomach (Alunad 1990). 
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and wealth of the individuals who compose the nation (Smith 1981: 366). Public 
and private goods are interdependent (Ferguson 1995: 59), and the desire to 
improve their position held by individuals is the force that improves the position 
of the nation as a whole (Smith 1981: 343). As Smith argues: ' .. .in the political 
body, the natural effort which every man is continually making to better his own 
condition, is a principle of preservation capable of preventing and correcting, in 
many respects, the bad effects of a political oeconomy, in some degree, both 
partial and oppressive.' (Smith 1981: 674).58 All of this having been said it 
becomes clear that, just as the ~ivision of labour depends on trade to allow the 
interdependence of specialists, so trade plays a vital role in the co-ordination 
necessary to utilise the dispersed knowledge of those specialists. For the 
cumulative sum of specialist, individuated knowledge to be useful it must be 
brought into co-ordination. The efficient use of local knowledge by individuals 
interacts to create social benefits through the medium of the invisible hand. 
What must now be determined is the nature of that hand. 
57 See above on slavery and feudalism. • 
SB Even the sceptical Ferguson, with his concern public spirit. admits that self-interested 
action plays a decisive role in the progress ofa nation (Ferguson 1995: 245). 
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Chapter 3: Price 
We have already discussed how Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments 
portrays a subjective, inter-personal, generation of moral value; how the desire 
for approbation and the impartial spectator lead us to ' see ourselves as others 
see us' (Smith 1984: 110) and consequently to moderate our emotional displays 
(Smith 1984: 21). This, we argued, shows that the generation of moral values is 
the adaptation to social circumstances of sympathetic beings (Smith 1984: 22, 
207). Virtues such as prudence and propriety are inter-subjectively generated 
and become objective in the sense that they become habitual and socially 
accepted. Value arises from comparison (Smith 1984: 193): it is a subjective 
standard dependent on a comparison undertaken within a specific set of 
circumstances. 59 In a psychological sense, phenomena such as sympathy and the 
impartial spectator allow us to understand the actions and motivations of others. 
We are unable to experience precisely what they feel, but we can, through 
imagination, place ourselves in their shoes. As Smith puts it: [by] 'bringing your 
case home to myself, from pu~ing myself in your situation, and thence 
conceiving what I should feel in the like circumstances.' (Smith 1984: 317). Our 
knowledge of others is based on our knowledge of ourselves: indeed it is an 
imaginative extension of it. In terms of economic exchange we know from our 
knowledge of ourselves that we are self-interested in acquiring the means of 
subsistence; we then extend this principle to others, of whose motivations we are 
necessarily ignorant but suppose to be similar to our own, and simple exchange 
by appeal to self-interest becomes possible (Smith 1981: 44). Though the same 
. 
analysis may be applied to benevolent action this is less efficient as a mode of 
exchange, as it requires more extensive sympathetic imagination and greater 
intimacy with those with whom we exchange. We cannot know, or accurately 
imagine, if another feels benevolently towards us unless we are familiar with 
them, but we can far more accurately suppose that they will act out of reference 
S9 Hume makes this clear when he traces moral merit to a subjective or comparative 
evaluation of action (Hurne 1978: 302). 
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to their own interests. 60 Once again self-interested trade and appeals to self-love 
are the most efficient medium for economic action. 
Smith argues that there are two subjective senses of value in the economic 
exchange of goods. Goods have a value in use, we value a good for its utility to 
us, and they have a value in exchange, we value a good for what we can swap it 
for (Smith 1981: 44). The complexity of determining value in exchange between 
differing goods, though it may be achieved by barter, renders trade unwieldy. 
Questions over how many bags of corn a sheep is worth, or how many sheep a 
cow is worth slow down and complicate the process of exchange. The 
acceptance and common valuation of money arises spontaneously as the result of 
the desire to ease exchange (Smith 1981: 284). Rather than exchange raw 
goods, and face the prospect of not being able to reach a mutually advantageous 
bargain, man comes to accept some conventional token of common value: 
Money (Smith 1981: 37-46). This allows man to exchange his goods for their 
'price' and then exchange through the medium of money for goods produced by 
others. Money becomes 'the great wheel of circulation, the great instrument of 
commerce' (Smith 1981: 291; 1982b: 374, 377). It comes to be an indication of 
the value of goods, having a subjective value of its own in comparison to the 
amount of those goods that it can buy (Hume 1978: 311). For this reason, 
because money only has comparative value rather than any intrinsic or objective 
value ofits own, it is not the object of men's activities. It is sought not as the 
end of activity but rather as a means to the attainment of those goods for which 
it can be exchanged: it is a medium of exchange, an indicator of value and wealth 
rather than value and wealth itself (Smith 1982b: 370,384).61 
Money thus is an instrument which eases exchange by simplifying 
calculations of subjective value.62 The price ofa good, expressed in monetary 
terms, arises from interaction through trade. As Smith puts it: 'It is adjusted, 
60 See above on 'confin'd generosity'. 
61 Menger offers a later, more detailed conjectural history of money (Menger 1996: 131-135). 
It should also be noted at this point that the Scots, like Hayek, did not operate with an idealised 
view of the market Their analysis is concerned with 'real' markets rather than with the 
construction of models of perfect competition (Dwyer 1998: 197). 
62 Yet another example of the tendency which we have identified for humans to seek 
simplification in reaction to complexity, an unintended consequence of which is the 
development of still greater complexity. 
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however, not by any accurate measure, but by the higgling and bargaining of the 
market.' (Smith 1981: 49). He goes on to point out that there are two types, or 
senses, of price. There is the natural price, what a good costs to make, and there 
is the market price, what a good can be exchanged for. 63 This division, 
analogous to that between value in use and value in exchange (Smith 1982b: 
358), shows that price in exchange - market price - need not be the same as the 
natural or 'real', if you like, cost of producing the good (Smith 1981: 73; 1982b: 
361). The market price of a good is determined by the interaction of supply and 
demand (Smith 1981: 76), and is in !his sense subjective - that is dependent on 
the circumstances of the particular exchange (Smith 1981: 57).64 Price tells us 
as much about the conditions of exchange as it does about the value of a good: 
the market serves as not only an arena for the exchange of goods, but also as an 
arena for the exchange of information about those goods and their production 
and retail. The key factor in this process is the market price, an indicator which 
may be read by individuals and' which guides their actions. 'The market price', 
Smith writes, 'of every particular commodity is regulated by the proportion 
between the quantity which is actually brought to market, and the demand of 
those who are willing to pay the natural price of the commodity, or the whole 
value of the rent, labour and profit, which must be paid in order to bring it 
thither.' (Smith 1981: 73). The market price ofa good or service depends not 
solely on the cost involved in its production, but also in a large measure on the 
'effectual demand' (Smith 1981: 73), the demand of those who are in a position 
to act on their desire for the good. The market price is determined by the 
interaction of consumer, producer and retailer. This interaction produces, in 
Smith's view, a spontaneous order or equilibrium (Smith 1981: 74, 206) which 
becomes the price of the good and which embodies information about those 
63 Governor Pownall, in a letter to Smith, criticises this distinction arguing instead that there 
is only one real sense of price, market price (Smith 1987: 337-376), For discussions of 
Smith's views on value see Hollander (1975: 315-316) and Vickers (1975), Hutchison argues 
that, apart from the labour theory of value, Smith's approach is largely subjectivist (Hutchison 
1990b: 92-93): while Paul follows Pownall's critique of the labour notion of value in the light 
of Smith's views on trucking (paul 1977: 294). Skinner believes that the notion oflabour 
value was part ofa 'vain' search for an absolute measure of value (Skinner 1996: 146-150). 
For a direct comparison of Hayek and Smith on the spontaneous emergence of equilibrium 
prices see Recktenwald (1990: 114), 
64 See also Ferguson (1994: 270-71). 
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involved in the transaction and the circumstances under which the good was 
produced and exchanged. This reliavce on circumstances implies that market 
prices are strongly affected by 'accidents' (Smith 1981: 78), particular 
circumstances of say, geography or weather, which alter the value of the good.65 
Prices change because producers and consumers continue to act from the 
same motives [that is to say in pursuit of their own interests] as the 
circumstances around them change. If a good becomes scarce a consumer who 
still wants that good and is able to offer more will do so in order to secure the 
good. The producer, acting on the information he receives from this will then 
raise his price accordingly. As we discussed before the 'mercenary exchange of 
good offices' (Smith 1984: 86), though only one feature of human motivation 
and interaction, is the force that drives such commercial activity (Ferguson 1995: 
135).66 If self-interest is the incentive to production (Smith 1981: 335; Millar 
1990: 284), and trade operates through the medium of appeals to self-interest 
(Millar 1990: 267t7, then the motive that drives this process, the desire to fulfil 
our immediate desires (Hume 1978: 537), plays a key role in the determination 
of the market price of a good. It is this self-interest that keeps prices accurate. 
As a price indicates the interaction of supply and demand so it is itself 
determined by the motives of suppliers and consumers and its accuracy is 
ensured by the regard of each for his own best interest.68 The desire to profit 
from our labour is the incentive that prompts us to work (Millar 1990: 264,267; 
Ferguson: 225; Smith 1981: 140). Gain, or the satisfaction of our natural urge 
to improve our position is the prime motivation of economic activity.69 And as 
specialisation advances, and the market expands, producers come into 
competition with each other. The desire to profit, to secure business, leads to an 
improvement in the provision of goods as well as of the goods themselves 
(Hume 1985: 302). Productive techniques are honed to ensure success, the 
6S Smith gives a detailed example of this at (Smith 1981: 194). 
66 Smith is ambivalent in his attitude to the force which moves the market, he sees its value 
but notes also its possibly distasteful' results (Smith 1984: 181). 
67 See also Smith (1984: 184,213). 
68 In this sense the co-ordination achieved by the price mechanism can be understood as an 
expression of the invisible hand (Skinner 1990: 137). 
69 We have already seen above how this point is used by the Scots in their analysis of the 
decline of slavery. See especially (Millar 1990: 250-51). 
goods themselves are improved to attract customers, and the competition 
between suppliers drives the price down as they each seek to undercut their 
rivals (Smith 1981: 595). 
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For Ferguson commerce becomes an object of study (Ferguson 1995: 58). 
Man's desire to fulfil his self-interest in competition with other producers 
adduces him to apply himself to the improvement of his skills, his production and 
the product of his labour. The drive of self-interest prompts technological 
progress and the refinement of productive methods: in short it promotes an 
increase in human knowledge. For this reason the key to success in economic 
activity is to know yourself and your situation and to act accordingly, or 
prudently (Hume 1978: 597). Self-awareness becomes an advantage, a skill in 
itself (Smith 1982a: 311) which assists men in the pursuit of their goals.70 
Moreover, and related to our earlier epistemological points, each individual is 
best placed to exploit their own situation efficiently (Smith 1984: 219; 1981: 
531). Price, in addition to carrying information about supply and demand and in 
being kept accurate by self-interest and a desire to improve our position, also 
carries information about the concrete circumstances of individuals. As Smith 
describes it: 
'the private interests and passions of individuals naturally dispose them to 
tum their stock towards the employments which in ordinary cases are most 
advantageous to the society. But if from this natural preference they should 
tum too much of it towards those employments, the fall of profit in them 
and the rise of it in all others immediately dispose them to alter this faulty 
distribution. Without any intervention of law, therefore, the private 
interests and passions of men naturally lead them to divide and distribute 
the stock of every society, among all the different employments carried on 
in it, as nearly as possible in the proportion which is most agreeable to the 
interest of the whole society.' (Smith 1981: 630). 
Prices are complex information signals rendered in a monetary form (Hume 
1985: 285; Smith 1981: 533). The signals that are encoded in prices may be 
read by the various parties and used as information upon which to base their 
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decisions regarding the good in question. Smith indicates this when he shows 
how the focus oflabour is guided by the price of a good, and how the notion of 
comparative advantage is indicated through the medium of prices. He writes: 'It 
is the maxim of every prudent master of a family, never to attempt to make at 
home what it will cost him more to make than to buy. The taylor does not 
attempt to make his own shoes, but buys them of the shoemaker. The 
shoemaker does not attempt to make his own doaths, but employs a taylor.' 
(Smith 1981: 456-57). The actions of producers and consumers are guided by 
the information held in prices. The price of a good carries information about the 
profitability of a particular occupation and guides people in their decisions as to 
their choice of specialisation (Smith 1982b: 353). The price oflabour (Smith 
1981: 103) being in a high degree influenced by the level of skill attained, by the 
human capital (Smith 1982b: 354-55), and also by the supply of suitable 
labourers, ~p1ies that wages become similar information signals.71 They fulfil 
the same information-exchanging role and are guided by the same self-interest to 
reflect accurately the conditions of the industry in question. The argument is 
that prices are used by both consumers and producers to transmit information 
regarding a good: with the efficient operation of this price mechanism allowing 
individuals to adjust their behaviour to the concrete circumstances of supply and 
demand. The central point here is that this informational role of prices is not 
intended or consciously created or undertaken: we do not intend to send signals 
by our production and consumption, all that is desired is the satisfaction of our 
own wants and needs. 
Now this, as we know, occurs in a system where, owing to specialisation, 
consumers and producers are ignorant of the details of each other's situation 
with their attention being focused on their own narrow field. So the price 
mechanism acts as a simplifying device that allows an individual to process the 
~mplications of knowledge which he cannot profitably possess ifhe is to 
concentrate on his own specialised occupation. This is achieved at the same 
time as the simplification of trade as a whole. And the result is that monetary 
70 Goss has argued that Smith's notion of prudence and self-command leads to an implicit 
approval for frugality and abstinence (Goss 1983). 
71 See Rees (1975). 
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pricing acts as a simplifying medium between the inhabitants of a complex and 
interdependent economy. Ind~ed the manipulation and study of prices comes to 
be of such importance in developing commercial societies that a distinct 
profession of individuals arises whose occupation and livelihood depend upon 
the successful reading of price signals. This group of merchants develop skills 
related to the reading and processing of price signals and the information that 
they contain about supply and demand (Smith 1981: 530).72 The activity of 
merchants as specialists facilitates trade by removing the bargaining process 
between individual consumers and producers. A producer who sells to 
competing merchants limits the number of individuals with whom he must trade 
allowing more simple flows of information and simplified interaction. As Hume 
puts it: 'Merchants ... beget industry, by serving as canals to convey it through 
every corner of the state' (Hume 1985: 301). Competition between merchants 
adds a further level of efficiency to the process of exchange, benefiting 
consumers by the manipulation of profit margins that characterises such 
competition (Smith 1981: 669). 
The efficiency generated by competition allows Smith to argue that the 
price mechanism operates most efficiently when left free from restriction, giving 
competition rein to govern price (Smith 1981: 116). We have already seen that 
the Scots link the growth of freedom with their notion of progress (Ferguson 
1995: 203), but here we see that freedom, in the sense of free trade, is also 
related to progress by the efficient functioning of competition and prices.73 
Freedom is both enhanced in the process of progress and vital for the 
continuation of the process (Smith 1982a: 311; 1981: 687; Hume 1985: 52). 
Freedom arises gradually and through a process of unintended consequences 
(Smith 1982a: 315; 1982b: 271), and as we saw in the Scots' analysis of the 
decline of slavery and feudalism and the development of the division of labour, 
progress towards a commercial society is related to the extension of liberty 
throughout a society (Smith 1982b: 50). The function of a commercial society, 
of a system of 'natural liberty' and free trade, is to increase wealth (Smith 1981: 
72 Mercbants also tend to specialise in particular fields in order to enhance their 
understanding (Ferguson 1995: 139). 
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324,372). Freedom of trade acts to do this by allowing the efficient functioning 
and reading of price signals leading to the efficient exploitation of comparative 
advantage (Smith 1981: 533). Smith highlights this in his argument against 
restraints on trade aimed at supporting certain home markets, he writes: 
'By means of glasses, hotbeds, and hotwalls, very good grapes can be raised 
in Scotland, and very good wine too can be made of them at about thirty 
times the expence for which at least equally good can be brought from 
foreign countries. Would it be a reasonable law to prohibit the importation 
of all foreign wines, merely to encourage the making of claret and burgundy 
in Scotland? But if there would be a manifest absurdity in turning towards 
any employment thirty times more of the capital and industry of the country, 
than would be necessary to purchase from foreign countries an equal 
quantity of the commodities wanted, there must be an absurdity, though not 
altogether so glaring, yet exactly of the same kind, in turning towards any 
such employment a thirtieth, or even a three hundredth part more of either.' 
(Smith 1981: 458)?4 
We have already seen that the decline of feudalism and the advance of the 
division oflabour leads to a diffusion of wealth throughout society, and that 
interdependence allows increased and improving material production leading to a 
situation where even the simplest worker in a commercial society enjoys a level 
of material comfort beyond that experienced by the wealthy in previous times. 
The interdependence which produces the labourer's woollen coat (Smith 1981: 
22) may provide better for his needs than an Mrican chief, but it does not 
provide for his needs in an equal measure to others within his own commercial 
society. Smith notes that the commercial system and the division oflabour are 
based on a prevalence of inequality in society. The worker is better provided for 
materially and in terms of freedom than he was in prior ages (Smith 1981: 420), 
but this does not result in any greater sense of material equality. There is a 
gradual trickle-down of wealth and freedom through the process of historical 
73 An instrumental justification of liberal economics based on the explanatory analysis of the 
market. 
74 Smith qualifies this by noting that comparative advantage ought not to be extended to those 
industries vital for the defence of the nation (Smith 1981: 522-23). 
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progress (Smith 1982b: 566).7S The pursuit ofluxury goods by the feudal lords 
encourages the practice of commerce while simultaneously freeing the peasants 
from dependency and opening the route to prosperity to them Smith 1981: 421; 
Hume 1985: 277). 76 In this sense as national wealth is increased by the 
development of commerce, so too, as a result of the invisible hand, is this wealth 
diffused through society (Smith 1981: 87). Wealth diffuses (Smith 1981: 91, 
333) and the value of wages rises (Smith 1981: 96), but inequality remains. 
Indeed for a commercial society to operate efficiently it must remain. The rich, 
in general terms, remain rich, but this is not a problem for the Scots' analysis of 
commercial society because commerce also enriches the poor. The advantages 
once enjoyed as luxuries by the wealthy are gradually made available to the 
whole of society (Smith 1981: 260). Smith offers a clear example of this: 'What 
was formerly a seat of the family of Seymour, is now an inn upon the Bath road. 
The marriage-bed of James the First of Great Britain, which his Queen brought 
with her from Denmark, as a present fit for a sovereign to make to a sovereign, 
was, a few years ago, the ornament ~f an alehouse at Dunfermline.' (Smith 
1981: 347). Material advantages spread gradually through society with progress 
being characterised not by the sudden acquisition of a product by the whole of 
society, but by the gentle diffusion of advantages with the passing of time. 
An interesting side feature of this analysis of the Scots' attitude to price 
systems is that it ties in with their thoughts on the problematic nature of 
economic calculation.77 Trade and prices operate through self-adjustment 
(Hume 1985: 311), ifleft alone human interaction efficiently proceeds along the 
signals offered by prices. Just as a great legislator could not have been 
responsible for shaping the whole of a society, so a politician cannot hope to 
direct economic activity as efficiently as the price mechanism.78 The price 
15 In DWlbar's tenns the 'circle' of wealth 'widens' (Dunbar 1995: 365). 
76 The Scots' views on luxury are part of a wider debate: suffice it to say here that the Scots 
believed that luxury was not necessarily a debauching phenomenon which destroyed virtue 
(Hume 1985: 276). Luxury was a relative concept (Ferguson 1995: 232), which could produce 
both beneficial incentives and possibly dangerous degrees of avarice if made the sole focus of 
action (Ferguson 1995: 109). See Berry (1994: 163-164). 
77 See Smith (Smith 1981: 105) for the difficulty of assembling the infonnation required to act 
efficiently in economic decisions. 
18 The Scots draw on their social scientific study of economic exchange to rule out conunand 
economics and support free markets in the efficient pursuit of material improvement. 
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mechanism operates efficiently precisely because it is not restrained or directed 
(Smith 1981: 116), it is free to react to circumstances and the accuracy of the 
information that it passes depends on this. The perversion of prices can be 
harmful because it imbalances the information which they conduct and affects 
man's ability to make informed judgements from prices (Smith 1981: 632). A 
number of forces can pervert prices but chief amongst these is the activities of 
government. As Smith writes of his system of natural liberty: 
'The sovereign is completely discharged from a duty, in the attempting to 
perform which he must always be exposed to innumerable delusions, and 
for the proper performance of which no human wisdom or knowledge could 
ever be sufficient; the duty of superintending the industry of private people, 
and of directing it towards the employment most suitable to the interest of 
the society.' (Smith 1981: 687). 
Perhaps the most obvious perversion of the price mechanism arises from the 
phenomenon ofmonopoly.79 A monopoly for Smith is a combination of 
individuals that seeks to pervert the price mechanism to their own advantage by 
controlling the supply of a good (Smith 1981: 599). He says of mercantilist 
restrictions: 'the merchants of the favoured country, enjoying a sort of monopoly 
there, will often sell their goods for a better price than if exposed to the free 
competition of all other nations.' (Smith 1981: 545). Monopoly is, for Smith, a 
bad thing. He believes that it exists as the result of a particular relationship 
which develops between merchants and the government (Smith 1982b: 527; 
1981: 452, 613), that is to say that some group of merchants is able to persuade 
the government that it is in the national interest that they be given special 
support, usually in the form of restricting entry to their markets, which will place 
them at an advantage (Smith 1981: 462). Smith argues that this advantage for 
the merchants is bought at the expense of the consumer (Smith 1981: 617) and 
of other producers (Smith 1981: 662). Moreover he is clear that it is the direct 
result of government action (Smith 1981: 174). Monopolies work by raising 
prices to 'unnatural' levels (Smith 1982b: 363). The policies that guide them 
operate by focusing on production alone rather than on production and 
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consumption (Smith 1981: 660). Smith believes that such a situation is a 
perversion of the interaction of suppiy and demand~ that focusing on the balance 
of trade from the point of view of producers perverts the efficient operation of 
the market (Smith 1981: 488-89). This is a result of the effect of monopolistic 
or mercantilistic restrictions on the information carried by prices. As he puts it: 
'No regulation of commerce can increase the quantity ofindustry in any 
society beyond what its capital can maintain. It can only divert a part of it 
into a direction into which it might not otherwise have gone~ and it is by no 
means certain that this artificial direction is likely to be more advantageous 
to the society than that into which it would have gone of its own accord. ' 
(Smith 1981: 453). 
Restrictions on trade misdirect capital and labour by perverting the accuracy 
of prices (Smith 1981: 367,604-5). Perhaps this is most apparent in the area of 
international comparative advantage. Here the price of a home produced 
product is compared with that of importing the same product. If the import is 
cheaper, in Smith's view, then any restriction which discourages importation of 
that good misdirects the flow of capital and labour within the country and 
creates an inefficient industry (Smith 1981: 457). Monopolistic and 
mercantilistic restrictions lead to inefficiencies in trade (Smith 1981: 493) by 
restricting the 'free concurrence' of prices that provides accurate information 
(Smith 1982b: 364; 1982a: 316). As we noted above, Smith links such practices 
to the actions of government (Smith 1981: 604-5), he argues that: 'Such 
enhancements of the market price may last as long as the regulations of police 
which give occasion to them.' (Smith 1981: 79).80 A monopoly of the 
mercantilist sort cannot subsist without the connivance of a government (Smith 
1981: 613). Smith believes that merchants are able to secure this support 
. 
because they are able to persuade governments that what is in the interests of the 
merchants is the same as the national interest (Smith 1981: 475; Smith 1982a: 
316). That this is possible is because the merchants' knowledge of their field 
79 For a discussion of the historical background to Smith's critique of mercantilism see Coats 
(1975). 
80 Smith's language here is particularly revealing about the nature of the misdirection caused 
by price perversion. Note the phrases 'taught to run'. 'artificially swelled' and 'forced to 
circulate' (Smith 1981: 604-5). 
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and their understanding of the origins of their profits is superior to that of any 
government official (Smith 1981: 434). By appealing to an identification of their 
own interests with those of the nation, merchants were able to exploit the 
prestige of their supposed specialist knowledge of trade to extract concessions 
which were indeed in their interest but which bore little relation to the national 
interest as a whole.81 For this reason Smith is wary about trusting businessmen 
in matters of policy (Smith 1981: 471), for it becomes clear that their interests as 
a class are never wholly at one with the best economic interests ofthe nation 
(Smith 1981: 145; Rosenberg 1990a: 17). Ferguson supplies a similar argument, 
noting that merchants fail as legislators precisely because they are specialists. 
They have a limited knowledge of a particular field of trade which they seek to 
exploit to their advantage (Ferguson 1995: 139), but while doing so display their 
ignorance of the operation of the system as a whole. 
Another area of the perversion of prices by group interests is the case of 
guilds. Guilds operate by controlling a monopoly ofthe practice of a particular 
trade (Smith 1982b: 84). By their control of skilled labour they are able to 
pervert the price oflabour by limiting access to the profession. As a result they 
work by restricting trade through the restriction of access to the skills necessary 
to that particular trade, or in other ~ords, they control access to experiential or 
non-verbalised knowledge through restrictions on numbers and apprenticeship 
schemes (Smith 1981: 143). The reason traditionally advanced for these 
restrictions is analogous to the arguments of those merchants seeking 
monopolistic privileges: that they are best placed to understand and control the 
interests of the nation in a particular trade. By enforcing professional standards 
through apprenticeships the nation benefits by the increased skill of the guild 
approved tradesmen. Smith however rejects this view, arguing instead that: 
'The real and effectual discipline which is exercised over a workman, is not that 
of his corporation, but that of his customers. It is the fear of losing their 
employment which restrains his frauds and corrects his negligence. An exclusive 
corporation necessarily weakens the force of this discipline.' (Smith 1981: 
81 See also Hume (1985: 308). 
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146).82 Smith is dismissive ofthe claims of unions and local corporations to 
provide increased levels of professional knowledge (Smith 1981: 144-45), 
arguing instead that their chief purpose is to pervert prices to the advantage of 
their members. However behind such restrictive practices always lurks the 
complicity of a government who, by giving legal force or recognition to such 
monopolistic practices, allows the monopolists to perpetuate them by rendering 
them immune from competition. 83 
82 Competition prevents the self-interested businessman from exploiting his position to pervert 
the price mechanism (Rosenberg 1990a: 21; Teichgraeber 1986: 135). 
83 Although Smith is on the whole dismissive of the alleged benefits of monopolies he does see 
the case for some temporary monopolies being granted to those who open up new areas of 
trade (Smith 1981: 754-55). However he is clear that, like a copyright, such an indulgence 
should only be for a limited period after which free competition ought to be allowed. Once 
again though Smith notes that the granting of such privileges depends on the support and 
acquiesence of governments. 
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Chapter 4: The Division of Labour and Public Goods 
We have dealt thus far with those aspects of government activity that the 
Scots considered as necessary to the continued effectiveness of a commercial 
society. There are, however, other areas in which the Scots believed that 
government action was required in a commercial age. Ferguson notes that: 'The 
boasted refinements, then, of the polished age, are not divested of danger. They 
open a door, perhaps, to disaster, as wide and accessible as any of those they 
have shut.' (Ferguson 1995: 219).84 Problems, malign unintended consequences, 
arise from the process of the division of labour and the division of knowledge; 
and these problems threaten to undercut the process itself by de stabilising 
society. The division of knowledge leads, as we have shown, to a fragmentation 
of knowledge. Specialisation necessarily restricts the attention of workmen to 
one particular field and this field, in the case of many workers, will be a simple 
operation requiring little thought for its exercise (Ferguson 1995: 175). Smith 
waxes eloquent on the danger of this phenomenon: 
'The man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple 
operations ... has no occasion to exert his understanding, or to exercise his 
invention in finding out expedients for removing difficulties which never 
occur. He naturally loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion, and 
generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human 
creature to become. The torpor of his mind renders him, not only incapable 
of relishing or bearing a part in any rational conversation, but of conceiving 
any generous, noble, or tender sentiment, and consequently of forming any 
84 West and Heilbroner have produced the most notable discussions of the 'paradox' that can 
be identified in the Scots' attitude to the division of labour (Heilbroner 1975; West 1975). Lisa 
Hill identifies the 'paradox' in Ferguson's work as that between his faith in spontaneous 
evolution and the material progress afforqed by commerce on the one hand, and his critique of 
the political institutions of modernity on the other (Hill 1997: 683). This paradox leads 
Kettler to assert that: 'Ferguson cannot be simply classed with civic humanist pessimists or 
with historicist progressivists' (Kettler 1977: 439). A view shared by McDowell who reads 
Ferguson's work as an attempt to create a fusion that balances republicanism and commerce 
into a 'commercial republicanism' (McDowell 1983). See also Kalyvas and Katznelson 
(1998: 173-174). 
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just judgement concerning many even of the ordinary duties of private life. ' 
(Smith 1981: 782). as 
There is a very real danger that, as the cumulative sum of human knowledge 
advances by specialisation, the individual sums of knowledge [or the scope of 
those sums] of a large part of the population may fall to levels below that which 
they would hold in an less developed society.86 Smith advances a possible cure 
for this apparently necessary evil of the process of specialisation: a cure that is 
itselfa spontaneous order and is to be found in yet another division of labour 
, 
and species of specialisation. That is the creation of a specialist group of 
professional teachers whose job it is to provide a universal system of education 
(Smith 1981: 786). Education becomes a method of enlightenment and social 
control, preventing the possibility of disputes that may arise from the 
susceptibility of a deadened workforce to the forces of enthusiasm, by socialising 
them and providing them with a degree of understanding that they would not 
gain from their every day employment.s7 Education and the growth of leisure 
industries provide an outlet for individuals in those specialisations that 
discourage extensive thought (Smith 1981: 796). Education also has the 
advantage of increasing the knowledge of individuals, which in turn contributes 
to the cumulative sum of human knowledge and encourages the possibility of 
innovation. Moreover the division of labour that creates a leisure industry opens 
up a new area of commercial activity and a new market which offers the 
possibility of employment and profit. Smith also describes in detail the nature of 
his proposed education system, arguing that the levels of education ought to 
cater to the intended career of the individual allowing him the opportunity to 
acquire a level of skill that might prove useful to him. Smith's system of 
education is to be subsidised by the government: he argues in favour of private 
85 Or as Ferguson puts it: 'Under the distinction of callings, by which the members of polished 
society are separated from each other, every individual is supposed to possess his species of 
talent, or his particular skill, in which the others are confessedly ignorant; and society is made 
to consist of parts, of which none is animated with the spirit of society itself.' (Ferguson 1995: 
207). 
86 This regardless of the fact that material conditions are enormously improved. 
87 Skinner rightly notes that if, for the Scots, morality is the product of socialisation and 
contact with others, then the division of labour has the potential to reduce the interaction on 
which the generation of conventional morality depends (Skinner 1996: 205-206). It is as a 
result of this that the Scots stress tbe importance of socialising outside the workplace. 
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teachers whose wages are paid partly by the government and partly by the 
parents of the pupils in an attempt to ensure the provision of incentives which 
encourage effective education (Smith 1981: 723, 759, 780-81, 815; Smith 1984: 
222). 
Ferguson however is not so sure that education and entertainment are 
sufficient to counteract the possible ill-effects of the division oflabour. He 
believes that the problem is not so much one of ignorance, but rather one of self-
interest detracting from individuals' ability to act in the public sphere (Ferguson 
1995: 177-78). His chief preoccupation in this matter is the effect of the division 
oflabour on military forces, in particular the famous 'militia question' of the 
Scottish Enlightenment. 88 Millar notes that the spread of commerce and the 
. 
diffusion of wealth lead men to be less willing to enter into military service on 
behalf of their country. As a result the institution of standing armies funded by 
taxation replaces the ancient practice of citizen militias (Millar 1990: 222). 
Ferguson is convinced that this is a ~angerous development. He argues at length 
for the superiority of citizen militias, making frequent reference to classical 
precedent and to the potential danger to the state of a standing army.89 His 
admiration for the citizen armies of Athens and Sparta is qualified by the 
realisation, as Hume and Smith note, that such institutions were only possible 
because of the prevalence of slavery in the ancient world.90 Nonetheless 
Ferguson argues that the development of standing armies is dangerous to the 
political stability ofa nation (Ferguson 1995: 219; 1830: 468; 1756). Such 
armies become dangerous as they are open to alignment with political factions 
and can become a force in internal politics that threatens the stability of 
government (Ferguson 1995: 256). 
Smith however is more sanguine. While deploring the advent of cowardice 
among a people (Smith 1981: 787) he points out that standing armies are 
undoubtedly more effective for national defence in a modern commercial age 
88 See Sher (1989) and Robertson (1985). 
89 See Ferguson (1995: 140, 142, 144, 146). 
90 See Ferguson (1995: 155,176); Hume (1985: 253); Smith (1982b: 182,226-27) and Forbes 
(1967: 43). Gilbert Stuart traces the origin of the English standing army to the reign of 
Charles II, arguing that it as an unintended consequence of the instability of the King's 
position (Stuart 1995: 126). 
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(Smith 1982b: 541).91 Smith's argument is a detailed study of the military 
viewed through his four stages schema. He argues that standing armies are a 
necessary development as they reflect the unfolding of the division of labour. As 
technology and skill advanced, the military became a distinct profession 
practised by specialists who made use of their specialised knowledge. The 
advance of technology introduces the division of labour within the military 
profession: artillery and modem weapons lead to the development of distinct 
sub-disciplines within the armed forces (Smith 1981: 689-708). Where Smith 
does approve of the militia it is not from any beliefin the military effectiveness 
or superiority of citizen troops, but rather it is from the encouragement which 
participation affords to the fostering of social cohesion and a sense of civic 
virtue (Smith 1981: 787). 
Ferguson's concerns however about the 'dismemberment' (Ferguson 1995: 
218) of the human character as a result of specialisation also lie in this area. He 
believes that the self-interested pursuit of private gain distracts citizens from the 
serious business of the public good (Ferguson 1995: 212). Action in the pursuit 
of the public good is, in Ferguson's view, an essential part of the human 
character (Ferguson 1994: 290-91). Self-interest in wealth accumulation renders 
individuals unwilling to expend their attention on matters of public concern 
(Ferguson 1995: 213). Just asa standing army proves dangerous to a state, and 
the loss of martial skill leaves. it open to attack, there begins to develop a 
political division of labour which is equally threatening to the stability of the 
state. Ferguson argues: 
'Every department of state is made the object of a separate profession, and 
every candidate for office must have passed through a regular 
education ... With all these resources, and this learned preparation, which is 
made to tum these resources to use, the state is in reality weak~ ... and 
among the doctors of war or of policy, among the millions who are set 
apart for the military profession, can find none of its members who are fit to 
stand forth in the dangers of their country .. .' (Ferguson 1995: 215).92 
91 See also Millar (1990: 236). 
92 See also Ferguson (1995: 175). And Ferguson (1995: 254-55) where he attacks the 
professional Chinese bureaucracy. Gellner notes that Ferguson has far greater concerns about 
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The separation of political and military skills into distinct professions, in 
Ferguson's view, damages social cohesion and goes against human character. It 
tends to break the 'bands of society' (Ferguson 1995: 207), and leaves the care 
of the public good ill provided for as each individual immerses himself in his own 
concerns.93 No one is left qualified to act in the public interest. Ferguson asks: 
'Where shall we find the talents which are fit to act with men in a collective 
body, if we break that body into parts, and confine the observation of each to a 
separate track?' (Ferguson 1995: 32). It is for this reason that Ferguson argues 
for the restriction of the division oflabour in military and political matters. 
Smith however does not go along with this explicitly civic republican view. He 
argues instead that the rise of a profession of specialist politicians can in fact be a 
positive development: 
'In a civilized state ... though there is little variety in the occupations of the 
greater part of individuals, there is an almost infinite variety in those of a 
whole society. These varied occupations present an almost infinite variety 
of objects to the contemplation of those few, who, being attached to no 
particular occupation themselves, have leisure and inclination to examine 
the occupations of other people. The contemplation of so great a variety of 
objects necessarily exercises their minds in endless comparisons and 
combinations, and renders their understandings, in an extraordinary degree, 
both acute and comprehensive.' (Smith 1981: 783). 
Specialist politicians are able to benefit from the same advantages of 
focused attention and specialist knowledge that move the rest of the division of 
labour. They are able to administrate and legislate in an effective manner in 
reaction to the increasing complexi!y of a commercial society. Indeed this 
increasing complexity, in Smith's view, positively requires the division oflabour 
in government. Smith argues that the division of labour in the departments of 
government and branches of the justiciary are the product of an unconscious 
this political division of labour than he does about the possible ill-effccts on industrial workers 
(Gellner 1994: 75). This reading downplays the claims that Ferguson pre-figures Marxian 
views on the alienation of industrial workers (Brewer 1986). 
93 MacRae points out that, though Ferguson highlights the possible negative results of the 
division of labour, he does so while maintaining the spontaneous order approach. The 
negative results take the form of malign unintended consequences of the development of 
commercial society (MacRae 1969: 23). 
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reaction to the circumstances of an increasingly complex society (Smith 1985: 
176). That is to say departments of government and legal institutions such as 
minor magistrates and juries are introduced to ease the work of law making and 
application through the utilisation of specialist knowledge (Smith 1982b: 88, 
283; Millar 1990: 225). To ease the workload ofa superior magistrate there 
develops a gradual delegation of power that diffuses responsibility throughout 
the legal and political system in reaction to increased complexity and workload. 
A further unintended consequence of which is the diffusion of power through 
society in a process that enhances freedom. 
Ferguson's concerns are the concerns of an inhabitant ofa classical 
republic, but he was not living in or writing about small city state republics. 94 
Rather he wrote at a time when a nascent commercial society was developing: a 
society whose complexity and reliance on specialisation demanded a form of 
representative rather than direCt democracy. Hume and Smith are particularly 
quiet on the republican concerns that moved Ferguson. This, perhaps, was 
because of their realisation that they were indeed experiencing a new form of 
society where specialisation was essential to continued progress. But it is more 
likely that their focus on the social generation of values through socialisation and 
sympathy as a central aspect of human society, led them to believe that the 
natural sociability of man and, indeed, human nature, would prevent the bands of 
society from being broken in an age of increasing interdependence. 
We have seen that the Scots' analysis of the origins and internal operations 
of a market economy is conducted through their spontaneous order approach. 
The division of labour evolves from the unintended consequences of particular 
self-interested actions to produce a system of interdependency that allows the 
exploitation of complex specialist knowledge. The benign spontaneous order 
that is produced as a result of this process is explained by an invisible hand 
argument. This argument refers to the particular combination of evolved 
94 Goldsmith argues that the civic republican ideal was rendered obsolete by the advance of 
the division of labour, and that, by Ferguson's time, it was utterly impracticable as a guide to 
reform (Goldsmith 1988: 591; 1994). 
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institutions [the rule oflaw and money] and practices [self-interested trade and 
competition] that allows the efficient exploitation and co-ordination of specialist 
knowledge. Further this descriptive argument is then linked to an instrumental 




Having completed our analysis of the Scots' approach to the explanation of 
science, morality, law and government and the market, we now move on to 
examine the same topics in the writings of the theorists of the Twentieth Century 
Classical Liberal Revival. As we move through our analysis we will see how this 
group of thinkers develop the key concepts that we identified as typifying the 
spontaneous order approach in the work of the Scots. The central figure in our 
discussion, and the foremost exponent of the idea in recent times, will be F.A. 
Hayek. And by examining his work, and that of his fellow liberals, we will 
further develop our composite model of the spontaneous order approach. 
Section One: Science 
Chapter 1: The Impetus to Sci~nce 
When Hayek comes to consider the philosophy of science it is clear that he 
agrees with Adam Smith's analysis of wonder as the root of the human desire to 
practise science. Hayek argues: 'Man has been impelled to scientific inquiry by 
wonder and by need. Of these wonder has been incomparably more fertile. 
There are good reasons for t~s. Where we wonder we have already a question 
to ask.' (Hayek 1967: 22).1 Hayek argues that the recognition ofa regularity, or 
pattern, leads us to pose the question as to why and how this arises. A newly 
experienced pattern or recurrence of events surprises us, piques 0.ur curiosity, 
and leads us to enquire after the principles behind it. We seek to understand 
such patterns in terms of some common feature or regularity of circumstance 
that links the occurrences. In brief we seek understanding to stabilise our 
expectations and to satisfy our curiosity." 
1 Hayek admits his debt to Smith on this point in a note (Hayek 1967: 22 n. 1). The emphasis 
on the pursuit of science from a desire to dispel wonder is also to be found in Oakeshott, who 
refers to the human desire to 'abate mystery' (Oakeshott 1990: I), and in Polanyi, who follows 
Smith's line in downplaying considerations of utility in favour of attempts to dispel the 
uneasiness which wonder induces (polanyi 1951: 6, 69; 1958: 43, 395-96; 1969: 149; 1946: 
19). 
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Karl Popper agrees with Hayek on this point, noting that the impetus to 
science is the desire of 'satisfying our curiosity by explaining things' (popper 
1972: 263). So that when an event surprises us, it induces wonder in our minds 
and impels us to seek an explanation (popper 1989: 47). Popper, however, 
develops a far more complex ~d nuanced analysis of this situation: one which 
he deploys throughout his philosophy of science. Beginning from the assertion 
that our responses to the environment are the basis of enquiry (popper 1972: 
266), and grounded in the importance and centrality of wonder, he develops a 
detailed critique of notions of induction. Popper argues that science does not 
begin from the position of conscious observation of a phenomenon, rather it is 
prompted by a problem-situation which arises from practice or everyday 
experience (popper 1972: 258). His point in making this assertion is to 
demonstrate that scientific enquiry does not start from the conscious observation 
of data, but rather arises from the arousal of our interest in that data (popper 
1961: 121). What he means by this is that science cannot simply be observation 
- For what are we to observe? - but is instead 'focused observation': 
examinations prompted by and focused upon a particular problem (popper 1989: 
46)? 
Science is not the collection of observed data, it is in reality the collection 
of theories about phenomena: it is not the study of discrete facts, but is the study 
of relationships and interrelationshi~s between phenomena (Hayek 1967: 259). 
It deals with relationships between phenomena in such a way that our 
understanding is always comparative. Such comparisons give rise to 
classifications of like events in a process that mirrors the discernment of 
regularities which is constitutive of the human mind (Hayek 1967: 23). These 
classes form the basis of the problem situations with which science is a conscious 
attempt to deal. As Hayek would have it: 
'Science consists .. .in a constant search for new classes, for "constructs" 
which are so defined that general propositions about the behaviour of their 
elements are universally and necessarily true. For this purpose these classes 
2 Oakeshott shares this approach which views science as theorising in relation to problem 
situations mther than data accumulation (Oakeshott 1933: 184; 1990: 3, 16). Indeed he refers 
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cannot be defined in tenns of sensory properties of the particular individual 
events perceived by the individual person; they must be defined in tenns of 
their relations to otherindividual events.' (Hayek 1976: 174). 
All perception, and all science, is based on a process of comparison and 
classification (Hayek 1976: 142), which explains what is new in terms of its 
relationship to what is familiar. As Berlin notes: 'To comprehend and contrast 
and classify and arrange, to see in patterns of lesser or greater complexity, is not 
a peculiar kind of thinking, it is thinking itself.' (Berlin 1969: 2). Such 
classifications are mental conceptions that bear no physical relation to the 
phenomena observed, but rather reflect the ordering process of our own 
consciousness. Hayek believes that the process of scientific classification is a 
conscious rendering of an already extant subconscious process of classification 
that typifies the operation of the human intellect and human perception (Hayek 
1976: 108; 1978: 38). The mi~d itsMfis defined as an order of classification, a 
regularity of neural impulses affected by discerned regularities between external 
phenomena (Hayek 1976: 16). All classification is the manifestation ofa human 
propensity to order that which is experienced (Hayek 1979: 97). One 
implication of this is that the classificatory structure of the mind exists as a series 
of higher order rules (petsoulas 2001: 15; Birner 1994: 9), by which Hayek 
means that consciousness is necessarily dependent on the non-conscious pursuit 
of the ordering process ofthe·mind.3 Popper follows a similar line of argument 
when he notes a human psychological need for regularity (popper 1972: 23). He 
views the 'propensity' to search for regularities (Popper 1989: 49; 1972: 11) as 
a key feature of the human mind. However Popper stresses the point that this 
process of ordering is a mental phenomenon: we do not passively wait for an 
order to become apparent to our minds, but instead actively seek to order that 
which we experience. For Popper this active ordering is a product of the desire 
to dispel wonder and to stabilise expectations (Popper 1972: 24).4 
to science as 'adjectival' in the sense that it is relational and concerned with descriptive 
theorising about relationships between phenomena (Oakeshott 1933: 211). 
3 Gray refers to this as the 'supraconscious mechanism' upon which consciousness depends 
(Gmy 1986: 22). 
4 In this sense Popper follows Kant as opposed to Humc, noting that he was partly correct to 
theorise that the human intellect imposes order on the world (popper 1972: 68). 
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One feature of this approach of Hayek and Popper is that it leads them to 
stress the point that such mental classifications are necessarily abstract (Hayek 
1978: 36) in that they reflect the mind's 'construction' of classes of phenomena 
rather than any essential physical similarity of those phenomena. The order that 
arises from such classifications is a mental phenomenon (Hayek 1976: 46), based 
around our understanding of our own perceptions rather than anything which 
exists essentially in the phenomena so ordered. It is the process of simplification 
in the face of diversity (Hayek 1976: 71; 1988: 85), the process of discerning 
similarities and regularities in the external world. If mental classification is based 
on theorised similarities about experience of the external world (Hayek 1979: 
44), this suggests the view that the ordering of the mind is a relational or 
comparative order (Hayek 1976: 18-19). We classify phenomena by subjective 
comparison in a process that presupposes the possibility of similarity through the 
selection of shared characteristics (Hayek 1979: 48; 1978: 72). In Popper's 
terms the expectation of order is logically and psychologically a priori (Popper 
1989: 48) as a result of the fact that this is fundamentally how all human 
understanding proceeds. Comparison produces theorised generalisations that 
typify the classes which the mind discerns. Hayek refers to this process of 
classification as the creation of mental 'maps' or 'models' (Hayek 1976: 115, 
179) which constitute human understanding. Scientific inquiry is the conscious 
pursuit of this process of classification (Hayek 1979: 31) or, to be more 
accurate, the pursuit of the refinement of the classifications that form the order 
of the human mind (Hayek 1976: 6).5 Popper defines the aim of science as being 
the provision of satisfactory explanations (Popper 1972: 191), explanations that 
dispel our sense of wonder by presenting a theory which is supported by factual 
observations. The improvement or advance of science is the development of 
increasingly satisfactory theories that dispel doubts, or fill 'gaps', in previous 
theories (popper 1972: 193).6 
Though science is a formalised rendering of the ordering process of the 
human mind it should be remembered that the original mental ordering takes 
S As Popper puts it science 'systematises the pre-scientific method of learning from our 
mistakes' (popper 1994; 100). 
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place on a subconscious level. It is not deliberately undertaken: rather ordering 
is carried on subconsciously by all humans as it typifies the very nature of our 
mental processes. This is highlighted by the significance of our habit of 
responding in a similar manner to like phenomena (Hayek 1976: 87). Habit, in 
this sense, is an essential and subconscious manifestation of the very nature of 
the working of the human mind. Hayek adds that he believes that just as habits 
must be acquired through repetition, so the content of the classificatory order of 
the mind is acquired by exposure to perceived regularities of action or the 
repetition of phenomena which the mind has ordered, through the process of 
comparison, as being similar (Hayek 1976: 47).' This in itself implies that the 
retention of experience, memory, is itself a process akin to habit. That is to say 
it is an 'expression' ofthe observation of repeated regularities of phenomena 
(Hayek 1976: 136). Our mental 'maps' of classification are drawn from the 
comparison of experiences (Hayek 1976: 42); we observe similarities between 
phenomena and generalise principles from these similarities which form the 
distinguishing features of our mental classifications (Hayek 1976: 165-168). 
Our entire mental process of classification is based on a discernment, or more 
accurately an imposition, of regularity: a habitual acceptance of the similarity of 
certain phenomena based on the observation of perceived common 
characteristics in line with principles developed in our minds (Hayek 1976: 121). 
Hayek's analysis of the operation of habit is not wholly shared by Popper. 
Popper rejects Hume's causal model with its reliance on habit and repetition 
(popper 1989: 42-44; 1972: 7). He argues at length against Burne's solution to 
the so-called problem of induction, poting that Hume's belief that induction was 
invalid, though nonetheless was how the mind worked (popper 1972: 272), 
grounded science on an unnecessary assertion of the power of belief and habit . 
(popper 1972: 100).8 He rejects Hume's psychological explanation of causation 
6 See Part Two, Section One, Chapter 1 where Smith's theory of science is discussed in the 
same terms. 
1 The mental process of classification, in Hayek's model, bears some similarity to Hume's 
principle of 'constant conjunction' in causal analysis in its stress on the role of repetition: a 
feature that distinguishes it from Kant's theory in that the mind ordering is a posteriori. 
(Hayek 1976: 107). 
8 Though Polanyi, while rejecting Humcan induction (polanyi 1958: 168), nonetheless 
grounds his theory of science on a fundamental act of belief or faith (polanyi 1951: 15-16). 
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(popper 1972: 85) and links his argument into a general sense of misgiving about 
classical empiricism (Popper 1989: 23). Popper argues that such empiricism, the 
belief in the key role of observation, opens reason up to problems of infinite 
regress and, more importantly, that it fails to account for the fact that it is 
possible to construct a theory about a phenomenon without observing it (Popper 
1989: 138).9 Moreover, and related to his argument about wonder, Popper 
argues that if repetition or similarity 1S the basis of causal assertions then this 
presupposes the existence or development of a theory of similarity, which in 
itselfis a conscious act of theorising about that which is observed (popper 1972: 
24). 
He goes on to develop his own approach to the philosophy of science in an 
attempt to solve such problems of classical empiricism. As we noted above 
Popper argues that in order for observation to take place effectively it is 
necessary for the attention to be focused by the consideration of a problem or 
question (popper 1972: 259). He asserts that humans react to such problems by 
conceiving prescriptive theories that they then examine through observation. 
Human beings then are always theorising (popper 1972: 301), and, as the mind 
is a process of classification, all human understanding is posited upon a 
subconscious process of theorising (Popper 1989: 220).10 What Popper notes is 
that classical empiricism is flawed because of its mistaken belief that theories are 
drawn from observation. In his view the reverse is the case, observations are 
made to test theories. In scientific terms these theories are tentative hypotheses 
(popper 1961: 87) that are submitted to the test of the observation of the factual 
circumstances which they purport to explain (popper 1972: 258). Observation 
and experimentation are used to eliminate those theories, or aspects of the 
theory, which fail to conform to the evidence (Popper 1961: 98): that fail to 
explain what they claim to explain. This leads Popper to his famous assertion 
that the true scientific nature of a hypothesis is not that it is open to absolute 
II Oakeshott shares these doubts about the observational focus of empiricism (Oakeshott 1933: 
199, 21S). 
10 It is precisely this point which leads Hayek to talk of the mind as operating with 'higher 
order rules' beyond our conscious perception. Polanyi shares a similar view, his concept of 
faith or belief as the basis of science is grounded in his assertion of 'the ubiquitous controlling 
position ofunformalizable mental skills' (polanyi 1969: 105-6). See also Polanyi (1958: 59-
60; 1969: 114-15). 
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verification, but rather that it is open to falsification by a process of empirical 
observation (popper 1989: 36). Attempts to falsify a theory allow the' 
identification of weak points or 'gaps' in its formulation thence allowing us to 
'weed out' unsuccessful theories and enquire after new, more satisfactory, 
explanations (popper 1961: 133). One such empirical test is, of course, that of 
repetition or constant conjunction, which, rather than being the source of our 
habitual belief in causal links, is instead a criterion against which to measure our 
tentative hypotheses and theories about causal links (popper 1989: 53). 
Popper illustrates his theory of the advance of scientific understanding in 
precisely the same manner as that deployed by Adam Smith, by demonstrating its 
unfolding in the history of astronomy. 11 Popper argues, as Smith did, that all 
theories are tentative hypotheses that may be overthrown (popper 1972: 29). As 
a result there is no guarantee that because a theory has survived empirical testing 
in the past that this will continue to be the case in the future (popper 1972: 69). 
In this sense a theory can be regarded as positive, or the best which we at 
present have, solely on the grounds that it has survived testing thus far and not, 
on any account, because it represents absolute truth (popper 1972: 15,20). 
Popper illustrates this by arguing that neither Newton nor Einstein believed that 
their theories were the 'last word' or represented absolute truth (popper 1972: 
57; 1966 vol2: 245). Rather they both worked on the assumption that they 
were engaged in a process of immanent criticism, reacting to 'gaps' or problem 
situations in existing theories that had become over-stretched or dissatisfactory 
in terms of explanatory power (popper 1989: 71). Popper argues that new 
hypotheses, if they are to fulfil the role of plugging a 'gap', must both succeed 
. 
where the previous theory succeeded and surpass it by filling the 'gap' (Popper 
1972: 14). He illustrates this by noting that Newton's theory succeeds Kepler 
and Galileo, but also manages to contain them (popper 1972: 16). It succeeds 
where they succeeded and also in areas where they left' gaps' . Newton's theory 
unifies Kepler and Galileo (popper 1972: 175, 197; 1989: 188). But this 
unification is not achieved by a sleight of hand or an innovation within the 
existing theoretical framework. Newton did not deduce from past theories, 
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instead he reformulated the problem situation (popper 1972: 198) and developed 
a new hypothesis that took cognizance of the 'gaps' in past attempts (popper 
1972: 357). The process is not one ofa gradual aggregation of theories, ofa 
collective bundle of observed or tried and tested approaches which must be 
absorbed, but rather is a process of theories being supplanted or overthrown by 
new hypotheses which are equally open to falsification (popper 1989: 215).12 
As Popper notes: 'The advance of knowledge consists, mainly, in the 
modification of earlier knowledge.' (popper 1989: 28). 
Hayek broadly shares Popper's views on these matters. Science is the 
process of plugging 'gaps' in existing knowledge (Hayek 1967: 17; 1960: 41). 
But of course, following Popper, Hayek is keenly aware that such a process of 
theorising is grounded on the formation of hypotheses which are open to 
falsification through experimentation (Hayek 1979: 29; 1967: 28, 32).13 The test 
of a hypothesis is if it holds in experiment, if it is consistent and not contradicted. 
In this sense the strength of a scientific assertion is not the evidence which 
supports it so much as its openness to refutation by future experimentation, what 
Popper calls critical rationalism (Hayek 1993 vol. I : 5). Such an approach 
suggests that the advance of human 'knowledge is often about eliminating what is 
false and thereby moving closer to truth. Explanation is a negative process of 
trial and error, one of weeding out false or ill-conceived assertions and 
hypotheses once the 'gaps' in them have become apparent through observation 
(Hayek 1979: 74; Popper 1972: 74). In this sense scientific enquiry is Socratic, 
it tells us what we know by showing us what we don't know. 14 As Hayek, 
11 Polanyi deploys a similar technique (polanyi 1951: 11, 70-72, 74; 1958: 4-.5, 152; 1969: 
67). 
12 Popper though is quick to dissociate this approach from any type of classical dialectic 
(popper 1989: 315). Such scientific revolutions occur within Popper's 'world 3' and differ 
from the piecemeal reform that he advocates in politics [See Part Three, Seclion One, Chapter 
Two). It should also be noted that Popper launches a sustained critique oftlle inductive 
method favoured by the Scots. 
\3 Hayek compares this process to both the natural selection of Darwinism (Hayek 1984: 327) 
and to the universalisation principle of Kant (Hayek 1993 vol.2: 43). 
14 Hayek, Popper and Polanyi also make the point that there is no way that mankind can 
explain its knowledge (Hayek 1979: 86, 158; Polanyi 1951: 77, 89). For it, logically, would 
have to 'know' more than its knowledge in order to explain it (an infinite regression problem). 
The same principle that leads Hayek to talk of the higher order rules that guide consciousness, 
but can never themselves be perceived. As a result the advance of science cannot be planned 
(Hayek 1960: 33), because it would mean having knowledge about that which we have yet to 
acquire knowledge of. A further corollary of this is that scientific method itself cannot be 
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following Popper, puts it: 'science does not explain the unknown by the known, 
as is commonly believed, but, on the contrary, the known by the unknown' 
(Hayek 1967: 5). This is not however to say that Hayek and Popper have 
forgotten about the role of science in stabilising expectations. Far from it, the 
process of hypothetico-deductive falsification is a process of whittling down or 
lessening the variables in a given situation (Hayek 1984: 274). The elimination 
of false, or flawed, assertions narrows the scope for future error (Hayek 1993 
vol.2: 54); it stabilises our expectations and it brings us closer to the truth by 
reducing the chance of possible wondrous events. 
As a result of this approach to lhe human mind Hayek follows Hume in his 
assertion that the science of man is necessarily the basis of all science (Hayek 
1979: 40). IS If all our understanding is based on our mental classification of the 
external world (Hayek 1979: 124; 1993 vo1.l: 64), then a proper understanding 
of man is a necessary prerequisite for the further advance of the natural sciences. 
A further point should be made here, namely, that this process of classification 
which typifies the human mind is supposed to be universal. Though the modem 
liberals have grave doubts as to the accuracy of any detailed conception of 
human nature (Hayek 1960: 86; Oakeshott 1991: 413), attributing much of what 
the Scots believed the concept to include to the influence of traditions of 
morality (Hayek 1960: 65; Popper 1966 vo1.2: 89-90), they nonetheless reject 
the more extreme forms of cultural relativism (Hayek 1991: 120). Hayek in 
particular appears to operate with a 'pared-down' conception of human nature 
that posits a series of underlying universal phenomena which apply to all 
humans. In The Sensory Order he expresses the belief in certain universal 
emotional and 'biogenic' needs and drives which can be discerned in all creatures 
that we recognise as human (Hayek 1976: 96-101). Biogenic drives such as 
hunger and thirst are universally experienced by the corporeal frame and in tum 
induce certain attitudes in the order of the mind - the desire for food and water. 16 
proved in the strict sense but only upheld because of its continued success in stabilising 
expectations (Hayek 1984: 256). See below on Historicism. 
IS Rowland likens Hayek's theory of the mind to an evolutionary psychology leading to an 
evolutionary epistemology (Rowland 1987: 47-50). 
16 Both Smith and Ferguson make use of similar concepts. Smith refers to physical 'drives' 
(Smith 1984: 77); while Lehmann notes Ferguson's focus on 'animal desires' (Lehmann 1930: 
112). 
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Originating in the physical needs of the body they provide a series of typical sets 
of attitudes and 'actions that may be !dentified as underlying much human 
behaviour. Thus Hayek argues that men universally desire to preserve their lives 
(Hayek 1988: 69), they universally desire and seek food, shelter and sex (Hayek 
1967: 314), and such underlying universal characteristics, drawn from biology, 
affect a series of universal mental attitudes in human psychology. 17 
Beyond such biogenic similarities, the species also expresses a universal 
underlying similarity in the operation of the human mind.1s The mind, as we 
have seen, is a system of classification and categorisation and, while the content 
of such classifications is largely learned from experience and socialisation, the 
fact that this is how the mind operates represents an underlying universal 
characteristic of what it is to be human (Hayek 1979: 134). Our understanding 
of others is based upon our self-understanding, which is to say that the process 
of the classification of experience that constitutes the human mind recognises 
like actions in others (Hayek 1976: 133-34). Hayek's example here is that, 
based on our own experience, we are able to recognise in another a distinction 
between a conscious action an~ an unconscious response. Understanding is 
possible because of an underlying similarity in how the human mind operates 
(Hayek 1984: 117). We are able to recognise another as being human because 
our mind classifies them as such when it becomes aware of them as a classifying 
form of being (Hayek 1980: 63_65).19 It is this which lies behind Hayek's 
~ssertion that man is 'by nature' a rule following animal (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 11). 
The human mind operates by a classificatory system the contents of which are 
drawn from experience, and though the particular experiences may differ beyond 
the biogenic drives (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 19), the fact of rule following remains 
constant. That all individuals' minds proceed by a like process of classification 
11 It should be noted that, for Hayek, the implications of the biogenic drives are nowhere near 
as extensive as they were for the Social Darwinists, or for that matter the modern 
sociobiologists. See Lumsden and Wilson (1983) for a sociobiological approach to biogenic 
drives. 
18 A point closely related to evolutionary psychology. See: 'tins view implies that cultural 
differences are vastly overstated, because beneath existing surface variability all humans share 
the same set of preference-generating and decision-making devices.' (Cosmidcs and Tooby 
1994: 328-329). 
19 For a discussion of the implications of this for the methodology of social science see 
Lessnoff(1974) and Winch (1990). 
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by generalised 'rules' (Hayek 1979: 43) is the underlying assumption that allows 
human communication (Hayek 1979: 134)?O Mankind develops shared or 
similar systems of classification that are most clearly observed in the 
development oflanguage (Hayek 1976: 135, 141; 1988: 106), itself a process of 
classification which expresses mental classes. As individuals are born and 
socialised into specific language groups, which in turn shape their expression of 
mental categories, Hayek is able to argue that the human mind is a product of 
culture. 21 He notes: 'It is therefore misleading to repre~ent the individual brain 
or mind as the capping stone of the hierarchy of complex structures produced by 
evolution, which then designed what we call culture. The mind is embedded in a 
traditional impersonal structure oflearnt rules, and its capacity to order 
experience is an acquired replica of cultural patterns which every individual mind 
finds given.' (Hayek 1993 vol.3: 157). The adoption and refinement of shared 
mental classifications achieved through communication, especially as typified by 
language, is a process that occurs on a non-deliberative level. The shared orders 
or mental 'maps' which it produces represent the basis of human understanding 
and culture. This suggests a way around the problem of cultural difference. If 
the human mind operates in a universally similar manner, then it is possible to 
understand others and to recognise them and their behaviour as human 
behaviour. Berlin refers to this process as 'acute and sympathetic' insight 
(Berlin 1990: 58): we are able through 'imaginative insight' (Berlin 1990: 10-11) 
or sympathy (Berlin 1969: 101) to 'see through their eyes' (Berlin 1990: 60)?2 
So, even if we do not share the values or particular rules of another culture, we 
are able to recognise them as human and as acting in a human manner (Berlin . 
1990: 79).23 Such an underlying universality is necessary not just for 
interpersonal communication, but also for inter-cultural communication (Berlin 
1969: 103). 
20 A similar view can be found in Menger (1996: 11). 
21 On the significance of socialisation see below Part Three, Section Two. 
22 Vernon Smith approaches this phenomenon through the idea of 'mind reading' (Smith 
1997: 8). 
23 Unlike Hayek, Berlin does use the term human nature in a restricted fashion (Berlin 1969: 
xxxii, 92). Kley notes that, though Hayek has doubts about using the term human nature, his 
reference to internal drives reveals a 'naturalist undercurrent' that produces an undefined 
notion of human nature (Kley 1994: 46-48, 177). 
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Chapter 2: Social Science 
For Hayek, all science is theorising based around classification and general 
rules (Hayek 1967: 259; 1979:.29). That this creates a distinctly subjective 
framework is particularly apparent in the social sciences. Our categorisation of 
social phenomena is what constitutes them. Social phenomena, such as class, 
nation, government and so on, are mental constructions rather than objective 
facts or entities (Hayek 1980: 74). As a result to study a social collectivity, such 
as class, as though it were an objective entity is a fundamental error (Hayek 
1980: 69; 1979: 95-97). Instead, Hayek argues, we ought always to proceed in 
our studies with a clear awareness that such classifications are precisely that: 
abstractions created by the mental process of classification rather than objective 
facts. 24 It is for this reason that Hayek proceeds with a methodological 
individualist approach. Methodological individualism, in its Hayekian form, 
stresses that in the social sciences we are never dealing with facts as such, but 
rather with individuals, concep~s and opinions (Hayek 1979: 6~). To speak of a 
social entity as 'acting' is a category error for Hayek, an example of a naive and 
uncritical anthropomorphism that is at odds with the true understanding of 
individualism (Hayek 1984: 135). Popper refers to this approach as a 'holistic' 
error of 'naive collectivism' and argues, along with Hayek, that it must be 
replaced by a methodology that focuses its attention on the central role of 
individuals (popper 1989: 133,341; 1961: 17). Methodological individualism 
does not argue that men do not associate in social groupings, and it cautions 
against viewing men as unattached atoms while at the same time rejecting the 
view that social groupings are objective facts in any true sense (Popper 1966 
vo1.2: 91,98). The approach does not neglect the fact of human interaction 
(popper 1961: 82), nor does it depend on any psychological theory of self-
interest; rather it is the acceptance that the base unit in the consideration of 
social phenomena, the starting 'point of enquiry, must be on the level of 
individuals (Hayek 1991: 44). In addition the approach stresses the importance 
24 And Popper agrees (popper 1966 vo1.l: 175; 1961: 135; 1989: 368). 
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of the limited nature of human knowledge and is aware that social phenomena 
are the result ofan 'inter-individual process' (Hayek 1979: 152). That the 
mental categories which we create to explain social phenomena are at base 
constructed on the actions and opinions of the individuals that compose them 
rather than on any 'real' or objective claim about the nature of the group as a 
whole (Hayek 1979: 160-61). The task of social theory, as Popper sees it, is to 
adopt a methodological individualist approach and use it to build mental 
'models' or reconstructions of.sociallife (popper 1961: 149) in terms of the 
individuals that compose them (popper 1961: 136). 
In this sense opinions, in the social world, are true to the extent that they 
are believed to be true by those who hold them (Hayek 1979: 44)?S Following 
Hume, Hayek argues that social order is based on opinion (Hayek 1993 vol. 3 : 
33), and thus social science must be as much an understanding of what 
individuals believe themselves to be doing, as it should be a study of what they 
are 'objectively' doing.26 Hayek also stresses that we are compelled to observe 
society from the inside (Hayek 1980: 76), as a social being man can never 
remove himself wholly from a society or its classificatory order if he is to study 
it. We deploy a sort of parody of Smith's impartial spectator in order to 
understand others. That is to say that just as communication is made possible by 
the supposition of a like system of classification of perception, so we, to a great 
extent, understand the actions of others by understanding our own minds (Hayek 
1980: 59-63). This however is not to say that a social scientist's object of study 
is defined wholly by his own subjective opinions, rather it is to assert that his 
subject matter is the opinion of those whom he studies (Hayek 1979: 47). Social 
science and its conclusions must be grounded in an awareness of the ultimate 
subjectivism of human understanding (Hayek 1988: 97).27 
Hayek argues that the confusion of thought which he calls 'scientism' is 
based on a failure to grasp this subjectivism in the methodology of social science 
and on a desire to extend the methodological assumptions of natural science into 
the social sphere (Hayek 1979: 21). Though he dislikes the term social science 
25 The opinion of the scientist studying such individuals is, on the other hand, true in the 
sense of not-yet-falsified. 
26 Compare with Winch (1990: 107). 
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itself (Hayek 1980: 57), Hayek is keen to stress that the phenomena studied in 
social matters are necessarily more complex and difficult to pin down than those 
in the natural sciences {Hayek 1967: 25). There are for Hayek two distinct types 
of social science. There are those which are akin to the natural sciences, such as 
geography and ethnology, and there are those which are more fuIIy focused on 
the significance of human opinion and motivation and which are, as a result, 
more fully subjective (Hayek 1979: 42, 67). These social sciences are, in 
Hayek's understanding, not objective but subjective in their subject matter 
(Hayek 1980: 59, 74)?8 
The social sciences are necessarily complex in their subject matter, based as 
they are on theories about complex interactions of human opinion and action 
(Hayek 1984: 269). The explanation of complex phenomena such as morality 
must be based on a study ofthe individuals who hold ,such beliefs (Hayek 1984: 
314): individuals who to a large extent may be unaware or incapable of 
expressing the opinions which guide their actions. As a result social science 
must be pursued with an awareness of the peculiar role of individuals who hold 
opinions and also with the recognition that these individuals possess only partial 
knowledge of the social processes through which they interact (Hayek 1980: 54; 
1979: 50). Methodological individualism is intimately linked with the concept of 
dispersed knowledge and unintended consequences (Hayek 1984: 135).29 
Society and civilisation are, for Hayek and Popper, the result of this process of 
individual interaction in conditions of limited or partial knowledge (Hayek 1988: 
6; 1979: 145). So the subject matter of social science is necessarily the 
unintended consequences of the interaction of individuals with only limited 
knowledge of the consequences of their actions (Hayek 1978: 73; 1979: 41, 693; 
1993 voU: 20; Popper 1966 vol.2: 93, 97).30 Popper agrees with Hayek on this 
point, arguing that the proper subject matter of social science are the unintended 
27 With a major qualification, about which see below. 
28 For an analysis of Hayek's subjectivism see Caldwell (1994). 
29 Having said this it is possible to be a methodological individualist without holding concerns 
about dispersed knowledge and unintended consequences: equally it is possible, though more 
difficult, to be concerned with unintended consequences and dispersed knowledge without 
being a methodological individualist 
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consequences, which are inescapable, of human action (popper 1989: 69, 124; 
1961: 158; 1972: 117; 1966 vo1.2: 95). He believes that it is the task of the 
social sciences to trace the unintended consequences of human action (popper 
1989: 342) and to build causal models in order to help explain them. Where 
Hayek and Popper diverge though is over the relationship of a social science 
thus constituted to the methodology of the natural sciences. 
Hayek argues that the social sciences differ from the natural sciences in 
their handling of their subject matter (Hayek 1984: 117; 1979: 67). The social 
sciences proceed, according to Hayek, by a subjective or compositive method 
.' 
(Hayek 1984: 201; 1979: 67). They build conceptual models in order to account 
for regularities in their complex subject matter rather than search for explicit 
universal 'laws' (Hayek 1967: 42). The conclusions of such a social science are 
necessarily subjective and limited in their application. As Hayek notes, there are 
no laws in economics, economics is merely a theory about people with theories 
(Hayek 1988: 98). 
While Popper agrees with much of this approach he also denies that it 
signals a difference in methodology between the social and natural sciences. 
Popper believes that this traditionally perceived difference between the 
methodology ofthe natural and social sciences is a mistake (popper 1972: 183; 
1966 vo1.2: 324). He admits Hume's point about the difficulty of conducting 
experiments in social science, but he does not believe that this leads to a 
fundamental difference in methodology (popper 1961: 9, 85). Popper argues 
that both natural and social sciences share the same underlying methodological 
approach in that they are both concerned with problem solving and proceed by a 
process of conjecture and refutation (popper 1972: 185).31 He argues that this 
common commitment to a hyp~thetico-deductive approach indicates a 'unity' of 
method common to all science (Popper 1961: 130-31) and that the difference 
which leads Hayek to refer to the 'scientism' of applying natural science 
methods in the social sphere, is in fact based on a misunderstanding of the 
30 For more on this see Part Three Section Four, Chapter 1 below on the division of 
knowledge. It should also be noted that Hayek credits Mandeville, the Scots and Menger as 
the first to realise and develop this approach (Hayek 1984: 180; 1979: 146). 
31 Berlin follows Hayek's early view that Popper 'underestimates' the differences between 
natural and social sciences (Berlin 1969: 49 n. 1). 
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scientific method of the natural sciences by those thinkers (popper 1966 vol. 1 : 
286). Once the inductive process has been rejected in all science, so Popper 
argues, there is essentially no difference in approach (popper 1961: 136-37). 
That is to say that Hayek's compositive method for social science is at base, for 
Popper, compatible with his own hypothetico-deductive method of 
understanding of the nature of science (popper 1961: 141).32 
Before passing on to discuss how Hayek and Popper view the various 
'mistaken' approaches to social science, it may be pertinent to pause and say a 
word about a more explicit example.of the compositive method, about how 
social science research ought to be undertaken. As we noted in Part Two, social 
scientists are faced with the problem of the difficulty of experimentation that the 
Scots resolve by turning to history as a source of evidence. The problem here, 
we noted, was the distinct lack of eviderice pertaining to the origins of social 
institutions and practices. This lack of evidence led the Scots to produce their 
method of conjectural history. 33 Hayek and Popper are also aware of this 
problem for social theory (Hayek 1988: 38; 1960: 34). They both argue that the 
Scots were in a great measure correct in their assertion that in the absence of 
direct evidence it would be useful to construct carefully corroborated (Popper 
1972: 189) reasonable models of how social practices might have come about 
(Hayek 1993 vol. 3 : 156). In the absence of evidence we might attempt rational 
reconstructions [with no claim to their being actual history] that aim to 
understand and account for the function of certain social practices in past ages 
(Hayek 1988: 69).34 Popper refers to this approach as 'situational analysis' 
(popper 1972: 179) and argues that it is based on a critical reconstruction of 
'problem situations' (popper 1972: 170) in order to provide a hypothetical 
explanation of the adoption of practices. All such studies will necessarily be 
32 Though it has been widely noted that Hayek eventually became persuaded by Popper's 
argument over this and modified his views (Butler 1983: 145; Kley 1994: 44; Popper 1994: 
140). Gray however doubts that Hayek was ever fully won over to Popper's view (Gray 1986: 
12). 
33 Note also that Hayek follows the Scots on the primacy of moral over physical causes (Hayek 
1960: 73). 
34 An example of this, in a more theoretical form, might be Nozick's account of tile rise of the 
minimal state in Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Ullman-Margalit 1977: 1-4). For discussions of 
Hayek as a conjectural historian see Walker (1986: 94) and Butler (1987: 124), both of whom 
suggest that the approach lies at the heart of Hayek's social theory. 
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conducted with a degree of abstraction and be based on general observations and 
classifications of the nature of past social practices (Hayek 1979: 117). They 
will be, in Popper's terms, 'generalised historical hypotheses' (popper 1972: 
272) which will provide a model of , meaning' in history (Popper 1966 vo1.2: 
278). However Hayek is keen to caution against the temptation to treat such 
rational reconstructions as 'facts' (Hayek 1979: 128) or as objective phenomena 
in a physical sense. Such theories are not, and ought not purport to be, absolute 
reconstructions of actual events (popper 1961: 49). They should be viewed as 
the product of situational analysis rather than a re-enactment or re-telling of a 
series of demonstrable events (popper 1972: 188). The construction of such 
social models means that they are not objective facts, or assertions of historical 
truth (Hayek 1979: 126-27; 1967: 75), but instead represent a 'compositive 
social theory' (Hayek 1979: 151).35 Conjectural history in this sense is not a 
universalistic claim about historical laws or necessary processes (Hayek 1979: 
115-16) but is an explanatory model of how historical practices might have 
arisen which allows us to approach the analysis of their function with an 
awareness of context and circumstances. 
The compositive method of social science that Hayek and Popper identify is 
predicated on the notion of the centrality of the unintended consequences of 
human action in the formation of those practices that the social scientist seeks to 
analyse by the reconstruction of critical models of explanation. The 'anti-
historical' (Hayek 1979: 113) and unintended consequence approach of the 
Scottish conjectural historians to social change militates against the danger of 
mistaking their conjectural abstractions for facts. The purpose of conjectural 
history, and indeed of social science as a whole, is to seek the function of social 
rules and practices which have emerged from the unintended consequences of 
human interaction; and which are, a'S a result, to be treated neither as the 
consciously designed product of historical actors nor as factual wholes which 
may then be examined and treated as objective entities. 
Finally something ought to be said here about the implications of all of these 
subjectivist approaches. Hayek and Popper are not arguing that in some sense 
35 Hayek identifies Smith, along with Burke, as the founders of this approach (Hayek 1979: 
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all truth is subjective, they are not in a strict sense relativists (popper 1966 vo1.2: 
261, 269). Popper notes that in the past a focus on critical judgement was 
criticised by some thinkers, such as Bacon and Descartes (Popper 1989: 15), 
because they viewed it as leading to an unacceptable and isolated subjectivism. 
The problem of subjectivism mirrors that of taste~ knowledge becomes plastic 
and open to individual interpretation in a manner that appears to preclude any 
scientific unity or advance ofkriowledge as a whole (popper 1972: 254). We 
have already seen how Hayek seeks to avoid this charge by stressing the 
socialised and cultural nature of the human mind. However this still leaves open 
the charge of excessive subjectivity. The question remains how to move from a 
subjective methodology to an objective situation that can be the object of debate. 
Popper's solution to this issue is to be found in his identification of three 
worlds.36 He defines these as: ' .. the physical world "world 1", the world of our 
conscious experiences "world 2", and the world of the logical contents of books, 
libraries, computer memories, and suchlike "world 3".' (Popper 1972: 74, his 
italics). 
What Popper is stressing here is that objective criticism is only possible of 
objective assertions. That is to say that once a subjective position is laid down, 
is published along with arguments in support of it, it becomes an 'exsomatic 
artefact' (popper 1972: 286) and we are able to indulge in critical reflection 
(popper 1972: 25}.37 The written statement becomes the object for discussion 
by critics and experts who are able to apply rational argument in an attempt to 
refute the hypothesis (popper 1972: 41). Popper asserts this in order to show 
that the 'problem situation' of science is in reality the state of the critical debate 
at any given time (popper 1972: 107). The 'problem situation' is precisely the 
discussion of those gaps and problems with hypotheses that have arisen as a 
result of immanent criticism (popper 1989: 129). Objective knowledge is the 
state of the debate.38 It is the critical discussion of those hypotheses which have 
113). 
36 A view endorsed by Hayek (1984: 274, 325; 1967: 4). 
37 Magee argues that Popper's world 3 represents the 'whole of our cultural heritage' (Magee 
1973: 61). 
38 There is an obvious parallel here with Hume's views on the Standard of Taste, where 
critical discussion allows an objective standard to arise from subjective opinion. 
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thus far survived the process of falsification (Popper 1972: 19). For Popper this 
approach is a key development in the growth of civilisation because, put 
roughly, we have reached a situation where ideas can evolve or die out in the 
critical discussion of written statements rather than through the death of those 
who hold them (Popper 1972: 66)?9 It is ideas that die rather than the 
individuals who hold them. Objective knowledge, as the state of the debate, is 
the generation of an objective standard from subjective opinion, it is an 
interpersonally generated objective value or spontaneous order.40 As science 
evolves by seeking confonnity with facts, so our knowledge evolves through an 
interpersonal standard or equilibrium that is the state of the debate between 
scientists.41 The attention of scientists is directed by the problem situation which 
defines current debate, their observations and reasoning have an aim in view: to 
stabilise expectations and dispel that wonder which makes us curious about gaps 
in the hypotheses which represent the current level of our knowledge. 
A similar argument is advanced by Michael Polanyi, who also notes that the 
problem situation of science is defined by the state of the critical debate (polanyi 
1969: 50; 1951: 12), but he advances the argument a stage further by suggesting 
that the individual scientist's awareness of the state of the critical debate acts as 
an invisible hand mechanism which allows them to react to the work of other 
scientists (polanyi 1969: 51). A scientist's attention is directed to areas of 
interest by the published work of other scientists (polanyi 1951: 34-36) and, 
moreover, by participating in this debate the scientist comes to accept a series of 
professional standards ofinquiry which are necessary to engage others in 
discussion (polanyi 1969: 52). These standards of scientific propriety are 
enforced by the critical discussion of the results of the scientist's work by his 
peers (Polanyi 1969: 55).42 From this there emerges not only a consensus as to 
39 Thus for Popper a scientific revolution is possible and tolerable because it avoids the 
bloodshed of a political revolution (popper 1994: 68; Quinton 1976: 159). 
40 Note here also the similarity to Smith's notion or the interpersonal generation or mora! 
value through sympathy. 
41 What is objective is that which has been inter-subjectively tested (popper 1959: 44) leading 
to an instrumental justification offree debate, or a 'liberal epistemology' (Barry 1986: 115) 
along the lines of Mill's On Liberty (Gray 1989: 24). See Jacobs (1998: 20) for a similar 
reading of Polanyi. 
42 Polanyi views the editors of journals as the informal enforcers of the conventions of 
scientific propriety (polanyi 1946: 33-37). 
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the state of the debate, but also a consensus as to what is required, in terms of 
rigour, for a scientist's contribution to be accepted as part of the debate (polanyi 
1958: 217).43 Scientists become socialised into the tradition of the practice of 
science (polanyi 1951: 57; 1969: 66l reacting to the criticism and praise of their 
fellows to produce contributions to the debate (polanyi 1969: 85).44 In 
Oakeshottian terms they participate in the 'conversation' of science (Oakeshott 
1991: 490) by pursuing 'intimations' from the tradition of scientific debate 
(Oakeshott 1990: 240). The body of science, for Polanyi, is based on the 
opinions of the practitioners of science (polanyi 1951: 10-11), with the results of 
a scientist's work altering the content of the tradition but not the overall form of 
science (polanyi 1951: 40). The scientific division of labour leads to a situation 
whereby individual scientists specialise in distinct areas within the tradition 
(polanyi 1951: 52) which in themselves form state of debates which direct 
attention. Such specialisation means that scientists become interdependent. 
Those in particular fields interacting to criticise, praise and enforce standards of 
professional propriety within their specialism, with overlapping fields of 
expertise providing the chain which binds the discipline as a whole together 
(polanyi 1958: 163). Science and scientific progress are a spontaneous order; 
they are based on 'twin principles; namely, self co-ordination by mutual 
adjustment and discipline under mutual authority.' (polanyi 1969: 84). 
The problem with such discipline is that it necessarily restricts the debate in 
the sense that, when discussing a current notion or theory, the debate will ignore 
or fail to pay attention to a contribution which is off subject (Polanyi 1969: 79). 
Polanyi discovered the truth of this assertion himself when his theory of 
adsorption was ignored for almost fifty years because it went against the 
established debate - even though it eventually became the established view 
(polanyi 1969: 94). Dissent from the orthodoxy can be futile until such time as 
the debate shifts to a gap in the consensus that the dissenter is able to exploit to 
surpass and explain it.4!1 Science is !it base a discussion ofa tradition of thought 
which is subject to immanent criticism in the sense that the established view is 
43 Polanyi calls this a 'mediated consensus· (polanyi 1958: 375). 
44 Popper argues that scientists are initiated into the discipline (popper 1994: 122). 
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debated and gradually improved upon without the wholesale rejection of the 
tradition itself (polanyi 1951: 97; Popper 1966 vo1.2: 215).46 Or as Polanyi 
himself would put it: 'Though each may dissent ... from some of the accepted 
standards of science, such heterodoxies must remain fragmentary if science is to 
survive as a coherent system of superior knowledge, upheld by people mutually 
recognizing each other as scientists, and acknowledged by modern society as its 
guide.' (polanyi 1958: 375, his italics). Dissent and debate are vital to the 
advance of science (popper 1994: 34), but the freedom to engage in such dissent 
is limited by the strictures of scientific propriety. 
4S Popper endorses a similar view when he argues that 'a limited amount of dogmatism is 
necessary for progress' (popper 1994: 16). 
46 Note the similarity here to Oakeshott's views on politics as a conservatively disposed 
activity (Oakeshott 1990: 164, 178; 1991: 56 422) where he approaches tradition and reform 
through the notion of immanent criticism. 
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Chapter 3: Scientific Hubris 
Just as the Scots had taken issue with many of the prevalent approaches to 
political theory in their own time, so too do the theorists of the classical liberal 
revival take issue with many of the prevailing methodological assumptions of 
their immediate predecessors in social thought. They launch a sustained critique 
of the methodology and fundamental principles which had dominated the social 
sciences from the Nineteenth Century onwards. Hayek is clear that the errors of 
what he refers to as constructivist rationalism stem from a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the nature of society and the subsequent development of a 
wholly erroneous approach that, ultimately, misses the point of social 
phenomena. He argues that the hostility displayed by constructivist rationalists 
to the operation of social phenomen!l such as the market is grounded in a naive 
form of anthropomorphism which, though easily fallen into, is fatal to the study 
of social institutions (Hayek 1988: 73). 
A) Anthropomorphism 
As we have seen Hayek's theory of the mind conceptualises human thought 
as a process of classification grounded on a desire for order and stability of 
expectation. Natural science represents the ordering through classification of 
our experience of the natural world, while social science follows a similar 
process with the vital qualification that in social science our classifications refer 
not to concrete physical phenomena but rather to mental reconstructions that are 
necessarily only partial and selective.41 One result of this is that language has 
developed in such a way that the words used to connote order usually imply or 
specify an ordering agent (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 26-29). From here it is but an easy 
step to viewing social phenomena, phenomena produced by men acting in a 
47 Though as we have seen Popper doubts the value or significance of this division. 
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social context, as an order produced by those men in a deliberative manner. It 
follows that the personification of society and social institutions, that is to say 
the viewing of them as conscious ordering entities whose workings are akin to 
those of the mental processes ofthe human mind, becomes an obvious and 
'simple' means to make sense of the complexities of human societies (Hayek 
1979: 29; 1967: 52; 1993 vol.3: 141). It is this error, the failure of the social 
scientist to conceive of an order other than in anthropomorphic terms, which 
leads to many of the failings of constructivist rationalism in Hayek's view. This 
inability to conceive of a non-anthropomorphic, and yet not strictly 'natural', 
ordering process is the fundamental error of the great schools of social thought 
which developed between the Scots and the Moderns (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 37). 
Before moving on to the modem liberals' analysis and critique of these 
mistaken schools of thought it is of importance to realise that, for them, this 
error is a product of a significant and understandable feature of the development 
of human thinking about society. The human predilection for ordering 
experience leads to a propensity in men to find pleasure in that which they see as 
being ordered.48 Moreover this extends to a sense of pleasure that is the result 
of deliberate ordering (Hayek 1979: 179). It appeals to the pride and ambition 
of men if they are able to view an order and believe that they have played a 
decisive role in its ordering (Hayek 1960: 56). One manifestation of this is a 
human love of system is the extent to which we often create mental systems of 
justification for what might otherwise he considered to have been emotional 
prejudices (Hayek 1991: 116).49 The human desire, one might also say the 
human need, for order is such that the most convoluted justifications can be 
accepted so long as they give the appearance, to the mind, of ordering and 
making sense of an action or phenomenon. The belief in invisible deities acting 
from anthropomorphic motivations may be the simplest model of religious belief, 
48 What Smith identified as a love of system and the danger of a man of system. A view 
shared by Hayek (1993 voU: 35) and Oakeshott, who writes of 'l'honune a' progranune' 
(Oakeshott 1991: 55) and the 'slave of system' (Oakeshott 1991: 231). 
49 Popper develops an argument similar to that of Kames, seeing the love of system as an 
expression oflaziness and a desire to find a short cut to understanding (popper 1966 vo1.2: 
27). See above Part Two, Section One, Chapter 1. 
209 
but it also represents the thirst for order, and for understanding the purpose of 
that order, which defines the human mind. 
The development of conscious attempts to make sense of the natural world, 
by which we mean classification or ordering, led to the creation and refinement 
of the scientific method. The success of natural or physical science in ordering 
our experience of natural phenomena led to a sort of worshi p of science whereby 
scientists replaced men of religion as the revered experts to whom we apply for 
understanding of the world (Hayek 1984: 214; Berlin 1969: 14). The scientist, 
like all men on a basic level, dislikes phenomena in which he cannot perceive an 
order, but unlike other men he has the means, in scientific methodology, through 
which to impose a sense of order. Training in the physical sciences leads to a 
prejudice that commits the scientist or engineer to a particular understanding of 
ordering processes (Hayek 1984: 114), one that though perfectly appropriate to 
the physical sciences might not be best applied to social phenomena. so The 
engineering or scientistic mindset which Hayek identifies is fundamentally a 
belief in the ability of the human mind not only to perceive order which is already 
extant, but to impose order on the physical world. All that is required is that the 
relevant information and materials are available to the engineer (Hayek 1979: 
91).Sl This type of thinking leads to a belief that if we have identified a desirable 
goal, then all that is required is that we 'plan' an order that will bring that goal 
about (Hayek 1991: 40). This belief is supported by the view that since society 
is a product of the actions of men, since it is man made, it can consciously be 
remade by men to meet predetermined goals (Hayek 1993 vol. I : 59).52 
50 The modem writers all choose to highlight this point by citing Smith's view from the 
History of Astronomy on the application of the technique of one field to another. See Hayek 
(1979: 18), Oakeshott (1991: 35), Berlin (1990: 197), Popper (1972: 182) and Menger (1996: 
17, 115). 
51 Hayek notes that this type of behaviour is often associated with very intelligent people. The 
attraction of socialism for the intelligent is that it flatters their intelligence by asserting that it 
is possible intelligently to order society (Hayek 1979: 91; 1967: 178-194). 
52 The worship of science instils in men a belief in the omnicompetence of 'experts' in their 
field of expertise. We trust experts because we believe them best suited to understand an order 
(Hayek 1960: 511). The desire for order and system which typifies human behaviour leads to 
an admiration of those who possess knowledge of tlle nature of order in tlle physical sciences. 
A man who can provide a 'scientific' explanation of a phenomenon is trusted by the people at 
large in the same way as they once revered the priest who explained the phenomenon in terms 
of the action of a deity. This worship of science leads to a prejudice among scientists in the 
physical sciences for their own methods and approaches. A prejudice which is a result of these 
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The Eighteenth Century's growing admiration for science, the very essence 
of the term Enlightenment, led to a worship of scientists, particularly, as we saw 
in Part Two, to a worship of Newton (Hayek 1979: 219). This admiration led to 
a desire to emulate the success of the natural sciences by applying their methods 
in social studies. 53 According to Hayek this trend led to a misapplication of the 
legitimate methods of the natural sciences in areas where that approach was not 
strictly applicable. This is the train of thought which he refers to as 'scientism' 
(Hayek 1984: 267). The admiration accorded to scientists and 'science' led to 
the over eager acceptance of that which gave the appearance of science (Hayek 
1984: 272). In terms of the social sciences it was accepted that the result of 
'scientific' enquiries were indisputable. 54 These regrettable errors are traced by 
Popper and Hayek to an important mistake made in the early development of the 
social sciences. They argue that, starting from Descartes, a species of thought 
infected the methodology of the nascent social sciences (Hayek 1993 vo1.1: 95; 
Popper 1989: 4,26). Hayek argues that Descartes' assertion that we should 
hold as truth only that which is logically derived from explicit premises was 
merely a reformulation of the anthropomorphic models of thought which had 
typified previous attempts at human understanding (Hayek 1993 vol. 1: 9-10). 
The assertion that we ought only to believe what we can 'prove' in this manner 
led to the development of a process of 'reasoning', which, in its very 
foundations, asserted the primacy of the construction of 'logical' models that 
identify the purpose of phenomena (Hayek 1993 vol. 3 : 173). When applied to 
social matters this method produced a 'naive' theory which saw purpose in all 
action and phenomena (Hayek 1988: 107). The naive anthropomorphism that 
persists in seeing something akin to human motivations and purposes in all social 
phenomena was, for Hayek, merely a repetition of the errors of the Great 
Legislator myths which the Scots sought to demolish (Hayek 19?9:.148; 1988: 
scientists having been socialised into a particular tradition of enquiry (See above Part Three, 
Section One, Chapter 2). 
53 Though Hayek exempts the Scots from the charge of scientislll as a result of their rejection 
of constructivist rationalism (Hayek 1979: 19). 
54 Popper stresses that this mistaken approach identified by Hayek is not a result of a 
misapplication of scientific method, but rather is the result of a misunderstanding of the nature 
of science itself (popper 1961: lOS; 1972: 186). His understanding ofscientism is that it is a 
form of pseudo-science rather than a misdirection of a fundamentally sound method. 
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33; 1960: 112; 1993 vol.I: 10,36).55. This simple model viewed all law and 
social institutions as the deliberate constructs of a single human, or human-like 
mind, designed to serve some purpose determined by that mind. This simplistic 
view of the origins of social institutions, aside from being factual1y inaccurate, 
was also conceptually wrong in its very approach to the study of society. To 
view social institutions as serving a purpose, in the sense of being designed to 
fulfil the goals of a 'mind' that operates along the same principles as individual 
human minds, was the cardinal error of constructivist rationalists. 
Hayek applies the generic name 'constructivist rationalism' to those 
approaches to social science which ~e believes to be based on a mistaken 
assumption of anthropomorphism. He defines constructivistic rationalism as: 
'the innocent sounding formula that, since man has himself created the 
institutions of society and civilisation, he must also be able to alter them at will 
so as to satisfY his desires or wishes.' (Hayek 1978: 3; 1993 vol. 1 : 59), or put 
another way: 'a conception which assumes that all social institutions are, and 
ought to be, the product of deliberate design.' (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 5). It should 
be noted that the second formulation introduces something of that supposed 
superiority of the organised, deliberate ordering which is a feature of the 
scientistic approach to society. That is to say there is a presumption that what is 
deliberately designed is superior to what merely 'is', and that if men do indeed 
make social institutions, then it is desirable that they should make them in line 
with a deliberate, rational plan. Hayek believes that this approach is an error 
because, quite simply, it is factually wrong (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 6; 1988: 6). It 
presupposes that since men make social institutions that they do so in a 
deliberate or conscious manner. 56 
Constructivist rationalism presupposes that social institutions serve some 
definite purpose, and that they were constructed to serve that purpose (Hayek 
1978: 72). This approach, of course, implies that there was a pre-existing 
agreement as to the purpose which the institution was to serve. Constructivist 
rationalist approaches must have an end in view, they must be organised for the 
55 Popper also criticises this way of thinking about social matters (popper 1961: 47, 6S, 148~ 
1989: 123, 342). 
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attainment of a purpose: for otherwise such an institution would be 'irrational' 
and have no place in a 'planned' society. In this sense constructivist rationalism 
contains a high degree ofteleologicaJ supposition. That is to say, constructivist 
rationalists presume not only design, but design for a specific purpose (Hayek 
1979: 45). They are constitutionally incapable, as a result of their premises of 
design and purpose, of accepting the existence and successful functioning of 
institutions that are the product of a process of unintended consequences. It is 
for Hayek the 'hubris of reason' to judge institutions and spontaneous orders 
that are the result of a process of cumulative unintended consequences as though 
they were the product of deliberate design (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 33). In other 
words, the constructivist rationalist's assumption that design and conscious 
direction are more efficient prejudices him against any form of association not 
based on these principles (Hayek 1979: 153). This failure to see the value, or 
even in some cases the very existence, of non-purposive, undesigned institutions 
is the root of the failure of their approach (Hayek 1960: lS9).H 
Hayek traces the anthropomorphic fallacy, which lies at the heart of 
constructivist rationalist approaches to social science to two ancient dichotomies 
set up by the Greeks between 'physei' [by nature] and 'nomo' [by convention] 
or'thesei' [by deliberate decision]. These dichotomies entered European 
thought through the influence of Aristotle (Hayek 1967: 96) and led to a habit of 
thought which dealt with strict distinctions between types of phenomena.'8 
Hayek notes that: 'The distinction intended may be either between objects which 
existed independently and objects which were the results of human action, or 
between objects which arose independently of, and objects which arose as the 
result of, human design.' (Hayek 1993 yoU: 20, Hayek's italics). Hayek argues 
that these 'crude' distinctions (Hayek 1988: 144), and especially the conflation 
of the last two, 'nomo' and 'thesei', led to a conceptual misunderstanding which 
has plagued social thought. It prodl,lced a situation where different authors refer 
56 Popper develops his own tenn for this error, referring to it as essentially a fonn of 
'conspiracy theory' (popper 1989: 341, 348, 12S~ 1966 vol. 2: 94). 
57 All of which bears obvious similarities to Oakeshott's critique of rationalism. It is here also. 
that Hayek begins to draw a vital distinction in his approach to the analysis of social 
institutions. He makes a clear distinction between the concepts of function and purpose 
(Hayek 1979: 144), a point to which we will return. 
58 Though Popper traces it to Plato (popper 1966 vol. 1 : 74). 
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to the same social phenomena as natural or artificial; a confusion of terminology 
that encouraged the identification of the artificial with that which is the product 
of design. Hume in particular was quick to stress that his use of the term natural 
as opposed to artificial contained none of these implications of deliberate 
design.!l9 In this sense certain social phenomena, which were often called 
artificial, were considered by Hume to have an equal claim to be natural in the 
sense that they were a product of the nature of men. Moreover institutions, such 
as Justice, which Hume terms artificial, contain in his analysis no necessity of 
their having been the product of deliberate human design. 
Hayek credits Mandeville and the Scots with the identification of this 
difficulty (Hayek 1967: 99; 1978: 71; 1993 vo1.2: 59; 1988: 145-46).60 He notes 
that they became dissatisfied by the use of the terms natural and artificial with 
relation to social institutions and began 'to play about' with the distinction in 
order to create a degree of conceptual clarity (Hayek 1984: 180). For example, 
Hayek argues that for Hume morality could be considered as being both natural 
and artificial: natural in the sense that it was not deliberately designed and was 
part of the nature of the species, and artificial in the sense that it was a man 
made artefact, albeit one which was not the product of conscious design (Hayek 
1993 vo1.2: 59). The success of the Scots, in Hayek's view, was to recognise a 
third category of phenomena which escaped the Greek conflation of'nomo' and 
. 
'thesei' (Hayek 1967: 97; 1988: 145). This third category, which Hayek defines 
with a phrase from Ferguson, are those phenomena which are the result of 
human action, but not the product of human design. Into this category, Hayek 
claims, fall the human social institutions that have traditionally and erroneously 
been approached as being the product of deliberate design (Hayek 1993 vo1.3: 
155). On this way oflooking at things the 'social' is necessarily a human 
product, but not a conscious or deliberately designed product: rather it is the 
product ofa process of unintended consequences (Hayek 1979: 154).61 The 
59 See above Part Two, Section One and Hume (1978: 484). Hayek follows Hwne on this 
point (Hayek 1988: 19). 
60 Such a recognition is also to be found in Menger's work (Menger 1996: 110). 
61 Hayek detects the same anthropomorphic error in legal postivism. He argues that the legal 
positivists essentially repeat the error of the great legislator myths that were debunked by the 
Scots (Hayek: 1993 voU: 28, 73, 81; 1993 vol.2: SI-S2; 1993 vol.3: 34, 129). His point being 
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constructivist rationalist approach represents an alternative to the spontaneous 
order approach for the understanding and explanation of social phenomena. It is 
the thrust of the modems' position that it is deeply flawed as an approach and 
particularly inappropriate when applied to social phenomena. 
B) Socialism 
The practical political manifestation of the errors of constructivist 
rationalism is to be found in the phenomena of socialist planning. Though the 
critique of this school of thought will receive more detailed attention in the 
following sections on knowledge, it is important to stress here that it is a 
product of the erroneous anthropo~orphism of constructivist rationalism.62 
Socialists, according to Hayek, are guilty of a number of factual and conceptual 
errors arising from the crude rationalism and oversimplification of constructivist 
rationalism (Hayek 1960: 406; 1991: 86). Socialism is a species of collectivism 
that is, in essence, an attempt to organise or plan society in such a way as to 
advance specific ends of a primarily economically egalitarian nature (Hayek 
1991: 24-25). Such planning is posited on the belief that it is possible and 
desirable to organise national economies in line with a consciously developed 
plan to achieve specific goals (Hayek 1991: 26).63 This belief, according to 
Hayek, is based on what he terms the 'synoptic delusion ... the fiction that all the 
relevant facts are known to some one mind, and that it is possible to construct 
from this knowledge of the particulars a desirable social order.' (Hayek 1993 
vol. 1 : 14). The engineering mindset of constructivist rationalists and socialists 
leads them to assume that it is possible to centralise all of the knowledge 
necessary to direct an economy along a plan in an efficient manner (Hayek 1979: 
that legal positivism is committed to viewing law as the product of the design and will of a 
legislator. 
62 For a history of tile socialist calculation debate and Hayek's contribution to it see Keizer 
(1994). 
63 Hayek also makes clear links between the socialist movement and the 'atavistic' forces of 
tribalism and nationalism (Hayek 1991: 163; 1993 vol.3: 145). Moreover he shows that the 
need to organise an economy to pursue the goals of the planner leads to a perpetual 'war' 
mentality where society is focused on one supposedly national goal (Hayek 1991: 84). 
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173). Here suffice it to say that Hayek believes this to be a factual 
impossibility.64 No statistical method can centralise all of the information 
required (Hayek 1984: 59,47), and no human mind is capable of holding all of 
this information and appreciating it at anyone time (Hayek 1984: 55-56,212-13; 
1960: 160).6s Hayek advances the view that the attitude to planning implicit in 
socialism will lead, inevitably, to greater and greater intervention and control of 
economic transactions in order to preserve a favoured plan, and that such 
intervention and control will lead to totalitarianism (Hayek 1991: 68). 
Totalitarianism is the malign unintended consequence of attempts to plan 
society. 
The anthropomorphic misconception that lies behind attempts at social and 
economic planning is, for Hayek, the root of the errors of all socialist 
movements. Socialism, with its ideal of social justice, is guilty of a fundamental 
error of categorisation. That is to say, the very concept of social justice is itself 
an anthropomorphic misconception that attributes the human value of justice to 
a phenomenon [ society] which is not itself a human agent. As Hayek puts it: 
' ... our inveterate habit of interpreting the physical world animisticatly or 
anthromorphically often leads us to such a misuse of words, and makes us seek a 
responsible agent for all that concerns us, unless we believe that somebody could 
and should have arranged things differently, it is meaningless to describe a 
factual situation as just or unjust.' (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 32). As we shall see in 
the following sections this is precisely the situation which Hayek believes is 
impossible: society is not a phenomenon that is deliberately ordered but, rather, 
one that is based on certain fundamental independent self-ordering principles: 
society is a spontaneous order. The failure to grasp this 'fact' by those 
committed to anthropomorphic concepts such as social justice is a result of an 
atavistic personification of society (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 62). To say that society 
ought to act is to adopt the attitude that society is an agent capable of conscious 
action in the pursuit of desired goals (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 79). This attitude 
64 Hayek's critique of socialism is not based on a dispute over values, but rather on an 
assertion that socialists have fundamentally misunderstood the nature of society in such a way 
that their proposed political and economic reforms arc doomed to fail to achieve their stated 
aims (Gissurarson 1987: 66, 77). 
6S Socialism is an 'epistemological impossibility' (Gray 1986: 40). 
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approaches society as some anthropomorphic, though super-human, entity which 
is capable of acting deliberately to frustrate or satisfy our desires (Hayek 1993 
vo1.2: 69). 
What Hayek wishes to stress, however, is the fundamental misapprehension 
of such an anthropomorphic attitude. Society is not a person, it is an association 
of persons, and while persons are perfectly capable of acting in a deliberative 
manner it is meaningless to refer to society itself as so doing. To speak of social 
justice is a misapplication of the term justice. Justice, for Hayek, as we will see, 
is a procedural process whereby individuals follow rules. In other words, an 
action may be just if conducted in line with the rules of the game, but the result 
of the game is only just in the sense that the players played by the rules. Put 
another way: it is possible for individuals to act in a just manner, it is even 
possible for justice to exist within a formal and deliberate organisation, but 
society is neither of these and, as a result, can only be just in a procedural sense 
(Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 103). Just~ce is a human value that refers to the deliberate 
action of a mind, and the results of social interaction are not the product of a 
single mind nor, as they produce unintended consequences, can they be 
considered as being deliberate (Hayek 1993 vol.3: 136). If the term social 
justice is to have any meaning, then society must be cons~iously and deliberately 
organised. 
Socialism can be considered as a sort of anthropomorphic pseudo-religion 
which deifies an abstract and super-human entity that it terms society and to 
which it hopes to attribute the value of social justice (Hayek 1988: 108). Under 
such an approach the ills experienced by individuals may be blamed upon this 
imagined agent or collectivity (Hayek 1993 vol.2: 149). In a very real sense this 
represents a return to the conception of tribal gods and tribal organisation 
(Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 134), with the difference that the belief in reason and science 
leads to the view that the members of the tribe are capable of conscious 
collective action, of playing God, so as to arrange the tribe. Hayek traces this 
attitude to society, a sort of tribal altruism which is the emotional attraction of 
socialism, to the human behaviour patterns which grew up during the millennia 
that mankind actually existed in these small tribal groups (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 
143). These 'primordial emotions' (Hayek 1993 vo1.3: 165) became ingrained 
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human practice when men existed in small groups, where all members knew each 
other and were related by strong bonds of tribal dependence (Hayek 1993 vol.2: 
91). Such simple models of association are, for Hayek, perfectly acceptable in a 
small simple society, but they are fundamentally ill-suited to the larger and less 
homogenous associations such as modem nations (Hayek 1993 vol.l: 13).66 
This is essentially the same argument as that offered by Popper in his The Open 
Society and its enemies. Popper argues that the reaction to the great social 
upheaval, which resulted from the shift from a closed, tribal society to a law 
based open society, was the source of the atavism of theorists such as Plato and 
Hegel (popper 1966 vol.1: 1,56; 1966 vol.2: 30). The emotional desire to 
return to a closed society (popper 1966 vo1.2: 242) with a sense of group unity 
(popper 1966 vol. 1; 108) was the source of the totalitarian aspects of Plato and 
Hegel's theories. Constructivist rationalism is a species of atavism. Under the 
mask of science it appeals to old, tribal emotions and seeks to plan society: its 
desire to build society anew is ~ided by millennia old yearnings and 
anthropomorphic misunderstandings of the nature of modem, open societies 
(Hayek 1993 vol.3: 169).67 
C) Historicism 
A further manifestation of the scientistic approach of constructivist 
rationalism is to be found in the development of what Hayek and Popper call 
historicism (Hayek 1980: 75). This tradition of thought, on their own particular 
understanding of it, is produced by an erroneous application of supposedly 
scientific methods to the study of history (popper 1966 vol.2: 264). Its cardinal 
error is to treat its theorised concepts as though they were historical facts 
(popper 1972: 354). This inclination leads to the belief in 'laws' of historical 
66 The relation of this point to epistemological concerns will emerge in the sections on 
knowledge. Compare with the Scots' views on 'confin'd generosity', above Part Two, Section 
Two. 
67 Lukes neatly summarises Hayek's critique of socialism under six headings: socialism is 
'meaningless, religious, self-contradictory, ideological, unfeasible and will destroy liberty' 
(Lukes 1997: 67). 
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development which seek not only to order our understanding of history, but to 
give it meaning (popper 1966 vol.2: 278). For this reason historicist theories 
often emerge during periods of great social upheaval or change when the human 
desire for order and stability prompts thinkers to interpret events as in some 
sense inevitable or proceeding according to understandable principles (popper 
1966 vol. 1 : 17, 19). Hayek and Popper reject this approach arguing that 
although history is indeed necessarily selective and partial, abstract and theorised 
to a high degree (popper 1961: 150; Hayek 1979: 126-127), it is wrong to 
assume that a new scientific method must be developed 'properly' to approach 
historical study (popper 1961: 94-95). They link historicism to a species of 
methodological essentialism (popper 1966 vol. I : 33; 1961: 33; 1972: 3 1) 
traceable to the thought of Plato and, to a lesser degree, Aristotle (popper 1966 
vo1.2: 5). The search for the true essence, or purpose, of a phenomenon - which 
Popper rejects as a mistake from the outset (popper 1966 vol.2: 18,37) -leads 
historicists to follow Hegel in seeking the causes of historical events in essences 
or inevitable historical forces. These forces are believed to be objectively true 
and to exist independently of the historically conditioned actors who are, if you 
like, the material upon which they act. Historicism proceeds by identifying 
historical trends and then formulating them into principles that determine 
historical change and allow historical prophecy. It is yet another 
misapprehension of the nature of science which is misapplied to the social 
sphere. Hayek and Popper both reject the notion of historical laws (Hayek 
1979: 128-29; Popper 1961: 143; 1989: 364) for the simple reason that history 
is adaptation to changing circumstances, it is an evolutionary rather than a 
teleological or essentialist process: The historicist desire to use sociology as a 
form of theoretical history (popper 1961: 39) leads to a beliefin the possibility 
of using historical laws as prophetic devices.68 Historicist laws are both 
essentialist and determinist (popper 1966 vol. 1 : 164): they are posited on an 
assertion of a meaning in history which reveals the inevitability of specific future 
events (Hayek 1991: 140). 
68 This belief in the predictive powers of historical laws differentiates historicism from the 
conjectural history approach of the liberals. For the liberals conjectural history explains the 
past but does not allow the formulation of accurate predictions as to the future course of events. 
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Hayek and Popper reject this notion of universal historical laws (Popper 
1989: 364) and the claims of historical prophecy that are based upon it. They 
argue that the admiration of the success of the natural sciences by social 
scientists led them to view the ability to produce large scale social predictions as 
being one of the scientific credentials of their discipline (Hayek 1979: 130). 
Sociology as theoretical history becomes associated with the view that it is the 
task of the social sciences to provide accurate predictions of the future course of 
history (popper 1989: 338; 1961: 3). Such prediction would be used to guide 
policy in a manner that fitted in with the inevitable development of the identified 
historical laws. Both Hayek and Popper reject this view as being theoretically 
impossible and factually erroneous. They go to great lengths to dispel the notion 
that man is capable of accurate historical prophecy. 69 
They begin their critique by noting the distinct failure of all previous 
attempts at detailed historical prediction, pointing to the examples of Keynes 
and, more importantly, Marx (Hayek 1967: 262; Popper 1966 vo1.2: 82); and 
suggest that such past failures ~emonstrate the futility of such attempts. Hayek 
then goes on to attack the notion that scientific prediction is applicable as a 
method to the study of social theory. He believes it to be a false view that 
historical science is capable of producing detailed prediction of future events 
(Hayek 1979: 344). What he argues here is not that social science is incapable 
of tentative hypotheses of types of possible future events, but that the precise 
nature of these events is impossible to predict. Popper however holds a different 
view. He argues that the errors of historicism do not reveal that the method of 
the natural sciences are inapplicable to the social sciences, but rather that 
historicists have misunderstood the nature of scientific laws. Scientific 
prediction, Popper argues, is not the same thing as historical prophecy (popper 
1966 vol. I : 3). Moreover the more conditional claims of scientific prediction are 
in no way essentially related to a notion of determinism (popper 1966 vol.2: 85). 
69 A view shared by Hume who argued that accurate prediction of the form of social 
interactions and institutions is impossible 'on account of our imperfect wisdom' (Hume 1978: 
404). Hume concludes that 'no prudent man, however sure of his principles, dares prophesy 
concerning any event, or foretell the remote consequences of things.' (Hume 1985: 47). 
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For as we noted before, Popper understands all scientific knowledge as tentative 
hypotheses open to falsification by future events.'o 
Having dismissed the scientific pretensions of historicists they move on to 
criticise the actual method applied to discern these predictions. First they note 
that experimentation is impossible, historical prophecies can only be falsified by 
events [as Marx's were] (Hayek 1979: 73). This introduces what Popper calls 
the 'Oedipus effect' (popper 1989: 38~ 1961: 13) whereby the prophecy itself-
say Marx's beliefin the inevitability ofa revolution - plays an instrumental role 
in a future event - the Russian Revolution for example.71 However, as Popper 
notes, the Russian Revolution did not occur for the reasons or in the location 
which Marx predicted: it was a product of the belief in the prophecy rather than 
an expression of the truth of Marx's 'laws' of history. Hayek goes on to argue 
that accurate historical prophecy is a practical impossibility as a result of the 
complexity of the factors concerned (Hayek 1967: 34). Social phenomena are 
by their nature enormously complex and interrelated and, as a result, are highly 
resistant to being reduced to simple laws (Hayek 1967: 20). If the complexity of 
social events defies prediction by its nature, then the reverse of this assertion is 
also true. Which is to say that the limited nature of the human mind, the 
restricted nature of human knowledge, means that no individual or group of 
individuals could ever command the complete knowledge which would be 
required to make detailed social predictions (Hayek 1979: 73-74~ 1993 voU: 
41).72 
However, though detailed prediction is limited by the complexity of the data 
and the nature of human knowledge, this is not to say that conditional 
predictions are beyond the social sciences (Hayek 1976: 185). These predictions 
are necessarily highly tentative and dependent on a long series of absolute 
qualifications. They might only occur in exactly those situations to which they 
are designed to apply: which is decidedly not to say that these precise conditions 
will necessarily occur. Leading on from this Hayek notes a further obstacle to 
10 See Part Three, Section One, Chapter 2 for a discussion of the differences between Hayck 
and Popper over the practice of social science. 
71 There is also a kind of reverse Oedipus effect whercby the prophecy plays a role in the 
r:revention of the event. 
2 See also Hayek (1980: 33-34; 1979: 75). 
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accurate, detailed historical prediction: as we have seen both he and Popper 
define the subject matter of social science as being the unintended consequences 
of human action. From here Hayek argues that it is impossible to foresee all of 
the consequences of an action that takes place in a complex social environment 
(Hayek 1993 vo1.1: 102). Logically this is true by definition, for if one were 
capable of predicting an unintended consequence, then it would become a part of 
the reasoning process before an action and in a sense would cease to be 
unintended (Hayek 1993 vo1.1: 111).73 If we are constitutionally incapable of 
seeing even all the immediate consequences of our own actions (Hayek 1993 
vo1.2: 17), owing to the limited nature of our natural capacities, then we cannot 
hope ever to be able to discern the more remote consequences of our actions 
(Hayek 1978: 80). Accurate predictive foresight in social matters is precluded 
by the operation of both complexity ~nd the resultant unintended consequences 
of our actions in a social environment. Even if it were possible to have a social 
action without unintended consequences, a highly doubtful proposition in a 
social context, such an action would be of little interest to a social scientist as it 
would produce no problems for social thought beyond psychology. It could be 
understood in elementary terms (popper 1966 vo1.2: 96).74 If total and accurate 
historical foresight were possible then, in a sense, there would be no social 
problems. There would be no need to adapt to unforeseen change because there 
would be none (Hayek 1980: 101). Moreover such a view would compel 
government action. If the state could foresee the course of history, then surely it 
would have to act to move events towards that end, once again raising the 
spectre of the Oedipus effect (Hayek 1991: 57). 
Hayek dismisses such approaches and instead argues that human history is 
retrospectively discemable as the adaptation to unforeseen events and 
unintended consequences (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 54). He argues that it is possible 
73 Both Merton and Karlson note this, leading Merton to prefer the term the 'unanticipated 
consequences' of action rather than the unintended consequences (Merton 1976). Karlson 
rejects this terminology arguing that it is intention, and not anticipation that is the significant 
factor (Karlson 2002: 27). For example, we might anticipate that the free market produces 
collective benefits, but we do not intend the creation of these benefits when we act in market 
transactions. 
74 Popper notes that the likelihood of such a phenomenon is rare, so rare in fact that it might 
be an object of curiosity as to why there were no unintended consequences. 
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to advance hypotheses about the future so long as they are restricted to 
assertions about types of phenomena rather than specific events (Hayek 1984: 
256, 328~ 1967: 13-15, 35~ 1960: 40). Hayek cites two examples of this kind of 
prediction. First he compares it to the formation of a crystal, arguing that 
science allows us to predict the growth of a crystal in specific conditions but, he 
notes, it does not provide us with the· means to foresee the shape or precise 
nature of the crystal's appearance (Hayek 1967: 28). He then compares this 
non-specified prediction (Hayek 1960: 40) to the Darwinian model of evolution. 
Both Hayek and Popper view Darwin's theory as a historical rather than a 
historicist theory (popper 1972: 270). Which is to say that evolution describes a 
process, but provides no specific predictions as to the precise outcomes (Hayek 
1993 voU: 23_24).75 Biological life will evolve, but the precise nature of that 
evolution is unpredictable. Popper follows this line of thought arguing that it is 
possible to identify broad historical trends, but that this gives us no grounds to 
expect any specific manifestation of the trend in the future (popper 1966 vo1.2: 
193). Darwin describes what has happened in the past in evolutionary terms, but 
cannot give any guide as to what will occur in the future. In this sense evolution 
is not falsifiable by future observation. There is no 'law' ofev~lution (Popper 
1989: 340~ Hayek 1993 voU: 24). We could not have foreseen the outcome of 
the evolutionary process because it is by its nature an adaptation to changing 
conditions (Hayek 1993 voU: '37, 117) which could not in themselves have been 
accurately foreseen. Popper however stresses that this does not exclude the 
possibility of the scientific examination of society or history provided that such a 
study is undertaken in full awareness of the conditional nature of the knowledge 
acquired. 
This leads however to the final, and decisive in Popper and Hayek's view, 
criticism of historical prophecy.76 Such predictions are impossible because the 
adaptation to change that is the very stuff of history is one and the same process 
as the growth of human knowledge. As a result even if the circumstances could 
be predicted the reaction to them, the result of the trial and error process of 
• 
adaptation, could not. This links back to Popper's earlier assertion that we 
75 Polanyi agrees here (polanyi 1951: 16). 
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cannot explain our knowledge as that would require the possession of more 
knowledge than we had.77 The same applies to prediction: to predict the future 
growth of knowledge we would have to have knowledge of knowledge which 
we have yet to attain: a logical impossibility (popper 1961: vi; 1972: 298).78 In 
order for such predictions to be possible we would have to end the growth of 
human knowledge, and even then we would have to know more than that in 
order to explain it (Hayek 1979: 160; 1993 vol.3: 169). 
We ought to mention briefly here that Popper and Hayek link this critique 
to their instrumental justification of freedom from epistemological efficiency. 
Intellectual and individual freedom is essential, they argue, if we are to adapt to 
unforeseen circumstances (Hayek 1993 vol. 1: 56; 1960: 29). For there to be a 
chance of accurate historical foresight such freedom for adaptation would have 
to be restricted to reduce the complexity and impose sufficiently definite 
conditions to allow prediction (Hayek 1991: 120).79 However such freedom for 
adaptation is vital, especially on the edge of our knowledge where we are 
incapable even of conditional predictions (Hayek 1960: 394). Theories th.at 
claim to be able accurately to predict the future path of human history are to be 
considered as irrational (popper 1966 vo1.2: 202). This prophetic feature of 
historicism, the view that social science has as its aim the delineation oflaws 
which allow the accurate prediction of future events (popper 1966 vo1.2: 106; 
1989: 356) is a dangerous error. 
The modem liberals reject the historicist approach to social theory as a 
constructivist rationalist error, a misunderstanding of the nature of scientific 
.. 
method that is misapplied to the study of the development of social phenomena. 
What they go on to elaborate is their own understanding of rationalism, the 
16 A similar line of argument is developed by Oakeshott (1983). 
17 Popper links this to 'holistic' approaches to the study of society. One cannot study the 
'whole' of society because one's study would be a part of that whole leading to a problem of . 
infinite regression (popper 1961: 80). Note also how this line of thought compares to Hayek's 
views on the higher order rules that govern consciousness (Barry 1979: 14). 
18 Shackle makes a similar point that 'Rationality cannot span a temporal succession of 
situations' (Shackle 1972: 84). 
79 Popper also notes that historical predictions make nonsense of social policy if they are held 
to be inevitable: Why act to secure a goal if the outcome of history is predetermined? (popper 
1966 vo1.2: 83). 
-spontaneous order approach, and its application to the study of social 
phenomena. 
Chapter 4: Critical Rationalism 
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Having examined the modems' critique of constructivist rationalism it 
remains for us to make explicit the alternative understanding of human reason 
that they advance: what Popper and Hayek call critical rationalism. We have 
seen that Hayek traces the error that led to the development of constructivist 
rationalism to the work of Descartes.80 He argues: 'Reason was for the 
[constructivist] rationalist no longer a capacity to recognize the truth when he 
found it expressed, but a capacity to arrive at truth by deductive reasoning from 
explicit premises' (Hayek 1967: 107}. This focus on purposive rationality, of 
using reason as an instrument for the independent deduction of truth (Hayek 
1993 vol. 1 : 58), became popular along with the rising admiration for the 
methods of the natural sciences. It led to an attitude that viewed reason as 
something objective, something outside men which could be used by them to 
deduce universal truths. Such an 'erroneous intellectualism that regards human' 
reason as something standing outside nature and possessed of knowledge and 
reasoning capacity independent of experience' (Hayek 1960: 24), leads to 
fundamental errors and a misplaced belief in the effectiveness of reason. The 
notion that reason exists as a single entity - Reason with a capital R if you like-
is simply false in Hayek's view (Hayek 1984: 140). In his view there is no 
objective entity of Reason, rather there exist only the limited stocks of reason 
held by individuals who exist within a social context (Hayek 1984: 136, 145). 
While constructivist rationalism assumes Reason with a capital R, Hayek instead 
draws upon a tradition of thought which is often, and he believes wrongly, 
referred to as anti-rationalist or sceptical. Hayek builds on the approach to 
80 As does Oakeshott (1991: 19). 
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human rationality advanced by Bernard Mandeville and the Scots (Hayek 1967: 
84,94).81 This critical rationalism entails an acceptance of the fact that human 
reason is fundamentally limited. That is to say, reason is an attribute possessed 
by individuals, it does not exist as an independent entity which can be appealed 
to in an objective manner, but rather represents the adaptation to experience of 
individual humans.82 This being the case, 'reason properly used' (Hayek 1988: 
8), or reason with a small r, is reason made effective by an awareness of its 
limitations (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 29). Rather than irrationalism, critical rationalism 
is 'not an abdication of reason but a-rational examination of the field where 
reason is appropriately put in control.' (Hayek 1960: 69). Critical rationalism is 
constitutionally aware that reason is limited in its scope, experimental in its 
nature (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 15) and only possessed in a partial or limited sense by 
individuals. Moreover critical rationalism recognises that non-rational modes of 
behaviour, such as habits and skills, playa central role in the success of our 
actions. 
Popper picks up this argument about the crucially limited nature of reason 
(popper 1966 vo1.2: 224) and uses it as the basis of his two theses of the core of 
the critical rationalist approach. He writes: 'i) we are fallible, and prone to 
error; but we can learn from our mistakes. ii) We cannot justifY our theories, but 
we can rationally criticize them, and tentatively adopt those which seem best to 
withstand our criticism, and which have the greatest explanatory power.' 
(popper 1972: 265). Reasoning is immanent criticism: it is a process of trial and 
error, conjecture and refutation (Popper 1989: 51), based on the notion that we 
learn from our mistakes (popper 1966 vol. 1 : 163; 1966 vol. 2: 396). This is 
reason properly understood. It is to say: 'that rationalism is an attitude of 
readiness to listen to critical arguments and to learn from experience' (Popper 
1966 vol.2: 225). Reason is critical argument over theories about experience 
and, as with Popper's conception of 'world three' and objective knowledge, so 
with his notion of the advance of reason; it is the current state of critical debate 
(popper 1966 vo1.2: 238). What he advances is an 'interpersonal' theory of 
reason (popper 1966 vo1.2: 227), reasoning as a critical debate within a tradition 
81 Note also that Hayek refers to Kant as a constructivist rationalist. 
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of thought, rather than as an isolated. and abstract process of deduction. Again 
this stresses the cultural or social nature of reason, the process of reasoning 
takes place within a social context of critical debate.83 As with the advance of 
objective knowledge, that which it is 'rational' to accept is the theory that has 
survived criticism and testing up to the present time (popper 1972: 15, 22). In 
this 'natural selection of hypotheses' (popper 1972: 261) we pursue a process of 
trial and error, error elimination through the feedback mechanism of 
experimentation and criticism, which does not provide us with eternal truths, but 
rather allows us to avoid making the same errors in the future. 
Throughout this focus on the key role of inter-individual debate, critical 
rationalists maintain a methodological individualist outlook and are clear that 
they do not view reason as an entity detached from the individuals who 
undertake it. Hayek argues that reason is not eternal and objective even in this 
procedural sense. Rather he argues that the human mind is a product of culture 
(Hayek 1993 vol.3: 157).84 Reason is a product of the wider process of the 
evolution of culture as it effects the human mind (Hayek 1993 vol. 3 : 162). 
Cultural evolution and cultural selection have shaped human rationality (Hayek 
1993 vol.3: 166) and as a consequence reason is a social product as well as a 
social process; and it ought not to be considered as apart from the social 
conditions which generate it (Hayek 1960: 38). 8S Social institutions ought not to 
be approached as though they were the product of deliberate rational design: this 
is an error because reason developed in tandem with these institutions in a social 
context.86 Hayek notes that systems of human morality are not rational 
constructs and, in a sense, canilot be justified rationally or constructed anew 
along rationalist lines (Hayek 1960: 63).87 This is because if reason develops 
alongside other social phenomena, *en it is itself intimately inter-related with 
B2 Popper defines reason as: 'clear thought and experience' (popper 1966 vol.2: 224). 
B3 Lopreato likens this immanent change to the idea of evolutionary system stability in 
biology. Under this theory a system is in flux but there is a preference for change which fits 
with the system at large (Lopreato 1984: 258). 
B4 A theme also to be found in Oakeshott's work (Oakeshott 1991: 129). See above Part 
Three, Section One, Chapter 1. 
85 Popper refers to reason as a 'tradition' (popper 1989: 135). 
86 It is because of this that Hayek argues that reason always works in combination with the 
non-rational (Hayek 1993 vol.l: 32). 
B7 They can however, as we will see later, be subjected to the process of critical rationalism. 
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them. We did not acquire reason and then shape morality and other social 
phenomena: rather we were able to develop reason in part because we developed 
other social institutions that supported its exercise.88 This means that social 
practices existed and functioned before men were aware of the nature of the role 
which they fulfilled (Hayek 1988: 23). It was not reason and understanding of 
the purpose of the practice that led to its repetition but rather its successful 
serving of some function. All this leads Hayek to his conception of the true role 
and focus of social science: 
'Most of these [legal] rules have never been deliberately invented but have 
grown through a gradual process of trial and error in which the experience 
of successive generations has helped to make them what they are. In most 
instances, therefore, nobody knows or has ever known all the reasons and 
considerations that have led to a rule being given a particular form. We 
must thus often endeavour to discover the functions that a rule actually 
serves. If we do not know the rationale of a particular rule, as is often the 
case, we must try to understand what its general function or purpose is to 
be if we are to improve upon it by deliberate legislation.' (Hayek 1960: 
157). 
As we have seen Hayek follow~ the Scots in rejecting approaches that 
ascribe the origins of social phenomena to deliberately or rationally intended 
action. He rejects a notion of purpose - where that implies any sense of 
intention - in the creation of social institutions (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 39). 
However, like Hume before him, he accepts the notion that social institutions 
might be considered to serve a 'purpose' in another sense: a sense that does not 
imply deliberate or rationally conceived intention (Hayek 1993 vol. I : 113-14, 
149). To avoid terminological confusion Hayek refers to this latter approach as 
one which analyses, or seeks to discern, the function of social institutions. He 
describes such functions as playing 'a role which was not designed but 
88 This is why Hayek constantly cites Hume's view tllat morality is not tile product of reason 
(Hayek 1988: 8, 66; 1960: 63, 436 n. 37; 1967: 87). 
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developed because it assisted human endeavour without people understanding 
how' (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 80).89 
Functional explanations are not, in Hayek's view, deterministic (Hayek 
1979: 150-51), they do not proceed in a manner akin to the historical laws of 
historicism which, once discovered, can serve as a guide to the prediction of the 
future. Rather social institutions are formed by individuals who are unaware of 
their function - and in this sense are purposeless (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 110; 1984: 
257-58) - yet in some sense are aware of the beneficial results which arise from 
them. Hayek advocates an approach whereby the social scientist seeks to 
discover the function of social institutions in order to understand them. This 
approach rejects anthropomorPhic interpretations of interpersonally generated 
institutions and, instead, seeks to un~erstand why these institutions and practices 
have persisted. Like the Scots before him, Hayek operates by assuming that 
practices that persist fulfil some function with a degree of success. There is a 
'utility,90 based selection of behaviour that decides between the functional 
efficiency of human practices (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 80). Or as Hayek puts it: 'The 
only "utility" which can be said to have determined the rules of conduct is thus 
not a utility known to the acting persons, or to anyone person, but only a 
hypostatized "utility" to society as a whole.' (Hayek 1993 vol.2: 22).91 
More significantly, human practices can perform their function without 
knowledge of that function being possessed by those who act in accordance with 
the practices (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 28). With Hayek's IIumean notion of utility he 
is able to assert that human practices exist and function to allow the survival of 
89 Popper adopts a similar view when he asserts that most social institutions arc 'grown' 
(popper 1961: 65). This can be compared with Dawkins' assertion that evolution is a 'blind' 
forocess (Dawkins 1986: 5). 
This sense of utility is Hume's notion not the latcr classical notion of Bcntham and Mill 
which, as we noted above, Hayek rejects as a species of constructivist rationalism (Hayek 1993 
vo1.2: 17). Gray and Butler refer to it as 'indirect utilitarianism' (Butlcr 1983: 16, Gray 1986: 
59) or 'evolutionary-system utilitarianism' (Gray 1989: 92). 
91 This line of thought is also to be found in Oakeshou's analysis of the dcvelopment of 
practices. A practice for Oakeshott, like a skill for Polanyi [sec bclow], is not consciously 
applied but rather emerges from use and can only come to be undcrstood through examination 
of the use made ofit (Oakeshott 1990: 120-22). As Oakeshou would have it: 'More commonly 
however, a practice is not the outcome of a performance. It emerges as a continuously 
invented and always unfinished by-product of performances rclated to the achievement of 
imagined and wished;.for satisfactions other than that of having a procedure, and it becomes 
recognizable when it has acquired a certain degree of definition and authority or acknowledged 
utility.' (Oakeshott 1990: 56). 
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.the group long before that group is aware of the function that they serve (Hayek 
1993 voU: 75).92 As a result, he believes, human civilisation is built on the 
functional efficiency of practices that are followed without being understood 
(Hayek 1978: 13). Hayek seeks to understand civilisation as a 'functioning 
order' (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 98) whereby individuals adjust to complex 
circumstances by making use of practices whose function it is to preserve that 
order (Hayek 1991: 151). OUf institutions are the adaptation to circumstances 
by individuals who possess only limited knowledge: they are adaptations to our 
ignorance (Hayek 1993 voU: 13; 1993 vo1.2: 95).93 He notes: 
'the result of such past experience gained through trial and error is 
preserved not as a recollection of particular events, or as explicit knowledge 
of the kind of situation likely to occur, but as a sense of the importance of 
observing certain rules. The reason why one rule rather than another was 
adopted and passed on will be that the group that had adopted it did in fact 
prove the more efficient, not that its members foresaw the effects the 
adoption of the rule would have.' (Hayek 1993 vot.2: 4-5). 
A further implication is that a practice can be repeated by an actor because 
they believe that it fulfils some purpose other than the actual function which it 
does fulfil. Popper notes: 'When tracing back traditions and institutions to their 
origin, we must find that their introduction is explicable in psychological terms, 
since they have been introduced by man for some purpose or other, and under 
the influence of certain motives.' (Popper 1966 vo1.2: 91).94 Through a process 
of unintended consequences the actors believe the practices to fulfil one function 
and so repeat it, while their repetition allows the practice to function in other 
manners.9S 
As the following sections progress we will see how Hayek and others 
advance this approach by noting how men have formed rules in reaction to 
92 A part of the Humean analysis to which Popper also subscribes (popper 1961: 65). 
93 Hayek even suggests that the term 'institution' possesses unfortunate suggestions of 
deliberate design and instead suggests the.term 'formations' (Hayek 1979: 146-47). 
94 This line of argument is highlighted by Merton's concepts of manifest and latent function 
(Merton 1957: 19-84). 
95 Oakeshott notes this when he writes: 'certain procedures in the House of Commons may, in 
fact, achieve certain specific purposes, but since they were not expressly designed to achieve 
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circumstances which allow the functioning of a social order (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 
12; 1993 vol.2: 21). These rules are not consciously designed but rather non-
deliberatively adapted in reaction to circumstances (Hayek 1960: lSI): 
successive adaptations to circumstances are perpetuated by a process of 
imitation or socialisation (Hayek 1960: 2S) that leads to these rules becoming a 
part of the circumstances to which men must adapt (Hayek 1993 vol.2: 26; 
1979: lIS). We will also see how Hayek couples this analysis with a notion of 
selective competition between groups holding different practices (Hayek 1960: 
36).96 Hayek lays a great deal of stress upon what he refers to as the 'twin ideas 
of evolution and the spontaneous formation of order' (Hayek 1984: 177). In 
terms of social theory what he means by this is that society is a spontaneous 
order and that, as spontaneous orders form and change through an evolutionary 
process, so social change ought to be understood as a process of evolution 
(Hayek 1993 vol.1: 37). Hayek argues that the general rules that allow a social 
order to form are the product of a social evolution rather than deliberate 
institutions (Hayek 1967: 243). Such rules and institutions embody the 
knowledge of circumstances garnered by past generations and they are 
transmitted by traditions rather than by deliberate understanding of the function 
served. The evolution of these practices displays the evolutionary 'growth' or 
development of human knowledge. Behind Hayek's functional analysis is a 
model of evolutionary epistemology (Hayek 1988: 10), a model which he 
compares directly to the evolutionary epistemology of Popper (Hayek 1975: 43). 
Social change is a gradual and largely non-deliberative process (Hayek 1991: 15; 
1993 vol.1: 43) that is a product of the growth of human experience and the 
successful transmission of efficient models of how to deal with recurrent 
circumstances. 
these purposes their character as means to ends often remains hidden and unformulated. ' 
(Oakeshott 1991: 104). 
96 Though he seeks to understand the function of these rules Hayek is aware that the overall 
order which they fonn, the 'cosmos' of civilisation, has itself no 'purpose' in any meaningful 
sense (Hayek 1978: 74), but rather exists to serve the purposes of its individual members. 
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We are able to draw a number of common themes from the conception of 
science as a spontaneous order concerned, in social science, with unintended 
consequences. First, the approach depends on a particular conception of what it 
is to be human: that man is an order-seeking being whose mind is classificatory 
and, further, that such mental classification is originally non-deliberative but 
becomes the model for the conscious act of science as men seek stability of 
expectations. Second, the pur~uit of science is the examination of problem 
situations which arise from the conventionally generated 'state of the debate' 
equilibrium and, with relation to the social sciences, the objects debated are 
subjectively theorised concepts. Third, that the subject matter of social science 
is primarily the study of the unintended consequences of human action and that 
this leads to a preference for functional explanations acquired from conjectural 
history. Fourth, that scientific debate evolves by trial and error or through the 
immanent criticism of a tradition by those scientists socialised within it. Finally, 
that as science is a debate, a degree of freedom is justified from considerations of 
epistemological efficiency in order to facilitate both adjustment and discovery. 
The modem writers, like the Scots before them, have developed their own 
understanding of the practice of science and social science. They have criticised 
rival approaches which they term constructivist rationalist, and have advanced 
instead a spontaneous order approach which they refer to as critical rationalism. 
We may now proceed to examine how they apply this spontaneous order 
approach to the explanation of social institutions. 
Section Two: Morality 
Chapter 1: General Rules and Stability of Expectations 
Hayek believes that man is essentially a 'rule following animal' (Hayek 
1993 vo1.1: 11).1 If the human mind is a system of general rules adapted to 
. '" 
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experience and typified by the classification of phenomena (Hayek 1967: 57) 
then this shapes a great deal of human behaviour and leads to a propensity to 
develop - both deliberatively and non-deliberatively - rules ofbehaviour.2 He 
argues that human integration in a social context is not the result of an 
association to serve common goals, but rather is to be understood as being the 
result of rule following by individuals (Hayek 1978: 85). Rules, Hayek notes, 
are necessary to create any type of order (Hayek 1993 vol. 3: 17), in the sense 
that they are regularities that allow mutual adjustment and adaptation (Hayek 
1978: 9). As quoted above, he cites the example of crystal formation whereby: 
'The important point is that th~ regularity of the conduct of the elements will 
determine the general character of the resulting order but not all the detail of its 
particular manifestation.' (Hayek 1993 vo!.l: 40). In this sense, while the 
abstract entity remains the same, the crystal, the adjustment of particles in line 
with the general rules in particular circumstances shapes the precise form the 
crystal takes (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 120). In the case of spontaneous orders such 
rules are not commands issued with the conscious intention of creating a specific 
particular fonn (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 14), rather they are rules which facilitate the 
formation of the order itself. This relates to Hayek's assertion that the social 
order has no purpose, but rather serves the purposes of its individual 
constituents. The function of the general rules that facilitate the social order is 
to serve the purposes of the individuals concerned as they adjust to each other 
and their circumstances in order to form the order itself (Hayek 1993 vol. 3 : 
1 See Part Three, Section One. 
2 As Shearmur notes this approach views rules as constitutive of us: 'Hayek pictures human 
beings as following various rules and procedures which are the product of their past 
experience. Indeed, we have no option but to follow such rules, as they are constitutive of us -
of our rationality and of the way in which we perceive the world.' (Shcarmur 1996a: 107). See 
also Galcotti (1987). 
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109).3 Such general rules are fonnann the sense that they are purpose 
independent and apply generally to all particles in a given situation (Hayek 1984: 
371).4 
Hayek defines a rule as: 'Rule in this context means simply a propensity or 
disposition to act or not to act in a certain manner, which will manifest itself in 
what we call a practice or custom.' (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 75). Generalised rules 
deal with 'kinds' of behaviour (Hayek 1993 vol.2: 22), they specify conditions 
for the fonnation of an order rather than act as a deliberate attempt to secure a 
particular manifestation of that order.' Hayek refers to the resultant order as an 
'isonomy' (Hayek 1960: 164), or rule fonned order whose particular form is the 
result of particle adaptation to those rules.6 General rules in this sense are 
universally applicable to all the relevant particles/parties (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 50, 
122). Indeed a measure of the generality of a rule is precisely that it takes this 
universal form (Hayek 1993 vol.2: 27-29, 36). 
Before proceeding further we should pause and give some attention to what 
has been identified as a 'tension' in Hayek's work between the influence of 
Hume and Kant on his conception of general rules. John Gray and Chandran 
Kukathas have devoted a great deal of attention to what they perceive as 
Hayek's Kantian aspect,' Their chief grounds for attributing Kantianism to 
Hayek lie in his psychological theory of an order imposing mind (Hayek 1978: 
45)8, his use of a universalisation test for the consistency of rules, and his 
discussion of freedom in terms of a~tonomy or the absence of coercion. There 
remain however a number of difficulties with this reading of Hayek as a synthesis 
of Kant ian and Humean views (Gray 1986: 7-8,96), not the least of which are 
3 Law as a general rule takes this 'purpose-independent' form as a generalisation whose 
function it is to encourage order without specifying in detail the form which that order will 
take (Hayek 1993 yoU: 85-86). 
" Oakeshott refers to such purpose independent rules as 'adverbial' (Oakesholt 1983: 130), for 
a comparison with Hayek see Barry (1994: 150). 
5 What Oakeshott, referring to rules, calls their nature as an 'abstract' guide (Oakeshott 1990: 
126). 
6 Compare with Oakeshott's 'rule governed association' (Oakeshott 1990: 128). 
7 Indeed it is Kukathas' conclusion that the chief failing of Hayck's thought is the 
inconsistency between the Humean and Kantian strains in his work (Kukathas 1989: 21S). A 
view shared by Walker (Walker 1986: 31). 
S Though Rothschild has argued that tIns view, of the mind as an ordering device, can also be 
attributed to Hume and Smith whose psychological theories both dwell on the ordering of 
experience (Rothschild 2001: 140). 
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Hayek's own views on this reading of his work. He explicitly refers to his 'main 
intellectual forebears' as Hume, Mandeville and Menger (Hayek 1967: 84) and, 
in the Constitution of Liberty. refers to Hume as 'our constant companion and 
sage guide' (Hayek 1960: 420 n.9).9 Hayek also openly rejected Gray's views, 
believing that he exaggerated any Kantian influence on his work (Hayek 1994: 
139; Gissurarson 1987: 164, 205n. 3). A number of other critics have attacked 
the GrayIKukathas line. Shearmur believes there is no 'systematic Kantianism' 
in Hayek (Shearmur 1996a: 177), and, in a point echoed by de Vries, that The 
Sensory Order is more deeply influenced by Mach and realism than anything 
Kant wrote (Shearmur 1996a: 242 n. 6; de Vries 1994). Kley argues that the 
universality test is not really a Kantian abstraction but a part of the process of 
'immanent criticism' (KIey 1994: 214-220), a view shared by Gissurarson who 
regards it as a practical test to ensure a Humean stability of expectations 
(Gissurarson 1987: 147-48). Moreover, as Gissurarson and Kley both point out, 
Kant could never be considered an evolutionist and so stands at odds with the 
core of Hayek's approach. They also reject the notion that Hayek's definition of 
freedom as autonomy is significantly Kantian: noting that the thrust of his 
argument is not moral but instrumental (Gissurarson 1987: 145). 
Hayek's evolutionary approach and concern for the unintended by-products 
of human action sit uneasily with the abstract rationalism of Kant (Hayek 1960: 
66) which he believed was 'tinged' with constructivist rationalism (Hayek 1967: 
94).10 Indeed where Hayek does admit to having been influenced by Kant he 
generally asserts that Kant was in tum influenced by Burne. Thus he argues that 
Kant's theory of rules in morality is essentially a rationalist rendering ofBume's 
analysisoftheruleoflaw(Hayek 1978: 77n7; 1967: 108, 116-17). As he puts 
it: ' ... Kant probably did not, as is generally assumed, discover the principle of 
the categorical imperative in morals and afterwards applied it to law, but that he 
9 A detail borne out by the sheer volume of references to Hume and the Scots in the body of 
his work (171 references to the Scots, 27 to Kanl), and, in particular relation to his views on 
general rules, by his constant reference to Hume (Hayek 1993 vol.2: 1, 16). Gray admits the 
'ubiquitous and profound' influence of Hume (Gray 1986: 58), a view which is shared by this 
analysis. 
10 Leading van Dun to argue that we 'must avoid the Scylla of seeing Hayek as a Kantian as 
well as the Charibdis of seeing Hume as a utilitarian.' (van Dun 1994: 276). Roos and 
O'Brien also reject the Kantian reading of Hayek (O'Brien 1994: 346-47; Roos 1994). 
rather found the basic conception in Hume's treatment of the rule oflaw and 
then applied it to morals.' (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 166-67 n. 24). 
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For Hayek general rules and the universalisation test, which is deployed to 
criticise a tradition of such rules, have been 'stumbled upon' (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 
39) by men and are not the product of abstract thought. The usefulness of the 
universalisation test, as we will see, arises from its ability to secure stability of 
expectations in the Humean sense. 11 
Hayek believes that men as rule following animals have built civilisation 
upon the practice offorming and obeying general rules (Hayek 1988: 12). It is 
his central assertion that we exist in a framework of rules which act to facilitate 
civilisation and which we have made but which we do not understand (Hayek 
1988: 14). Moreover general rules do not provide us with certainty, merely with 
a species of probability or stability which facilitates the interaction of particular 
individuals while always leaving open the possibility of there being unexpected 
consequences of human action (Hayek 1993 vol.3: 18). Such a concern for 
stability can be traced, as we saw, to Hayek's view of the human mind as an 
order of classification of experience which men make use of to understand their 
circumstances. 12 Understanding is ordered classification and for this reason, 
Hayek argues, men are most comfortable with experiences that fit their 
established order of classification. It is because of this that men prefer what they 
consider to be predictable in terms of their established mental order (Hayek 
1967: 80). We prefer that which we are able to predict with relative certainty, 
from our mental generalisations, to that which is, in our view, disordered or 
unpredictable (Hayek 1967: 79). Humanity has developed mental orders and 
cultural practices that ease understanding and reduce uncertainty and fear of the 
unpredictable. So long as we follow these established practices in a given 
context the world is fairly predictable (Hayek 1967: 81). It is this function, the 
reduction of uncertainty, which is the key role played by much of our social 
behaviour. 13 
11 It should also be noted that, though Hayek's discussion offrcedom in The Constitution of 
Liberty can be read as being influenced by Kantian ideas about autonomy, in the rest of his 
work freedom is justified instrumentally and is free of almost all moral implications. 
12 See above, Part Three, Section One. 
13 We will discuss how this manifests itself in custom in the next chapter. 
236 
As general rules - or social phenomena that operate through the formation 
of general rules - reason and habit react to the complexity of social situations 
and the limited knowledge ofindividuals, in order to facilitate the mutual 
adjustment of individuals to their cirGumstances and to each other (Hayek 1993 
vol. 1 : 32). This being the case general rules are not only reactions to our 
ignorance, but they are also developed and refined, they evolve, as our 
experience advances (Hayek 1960: 66).14 When rules are formulated in a 
general manner they apply to an unknown number of future cases (Hayek 1960: 
21). They stabilise our expectations in these future situations by placing 
constraints upon the details of the circumstances such that we can adjust our 
behaviour with a reasonable hope of success. This is not however to say that 
they must remain eternal and changeless. General rules are subject to refinement 
as experience grows. 
A generalised rule such as habit, custom or law, provides a stability of 
expectation that increases the knowledge of individuals (Hayek 1960: 149-50) 
by ruling out certain possibilities in given future situations. 15 Law and general 
rules provide data, they act to communicate information (Hayek 1960: 152). In 
terms of the order produced by rule following both Hayek and Oakeshott are 
keen to stress the difference between what they refer to as 'Cosmos and Taxis', 
'nomocracy and teleocracy' or 'enterprise and civil' association. 16 Their main 
point is that a rule-governed order, a civil association or nomocratic cosmos, 
possesses 'no extrinsic substantive purpose' (Oakeshott 1990: 110). It is not an 
association of individuals linked by a common purpose or in the pursuit of a 
specific end, but rather represents individuals linked together by shared 
regularities of behaviour (Hayek 1978: 74; Oakeshott 1990: 112). The order 
that arises as a result of adherence to generalised rules is an unintended 
consequence of the adherence to those rules, it is a spontaneous order; and while 
14 As Oakeshott would have it, they repreSent 'abridgements' of knowledge (Oakeshott 1991: 
lll). 
15 In this sense, as Raphael notes, the rules that constitute cricket allow us the knowledge of 
what is 'not cricket' (Raphael 1998: 41). 
16 Hayek and Oakeshott were aware of the similarity of their views on tltis issue and express 
agreement willi each otlters' analysis in various places: (Hayck 1988: 37~ 1993 voU: 125~ 
1993 vo1.2: 112, 137; 1978: 140; Letters exchanged between Hayek and Oakeshott January 
1968 to May 1968 Friedrich A. von Hayek Papers Box no. 40, Hoover Institution Archlvcs). 
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the rules function to preserve the order they are not adhered to with this end in 
mind. 
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Chapter 2: Habit, Custom and Tradition 
As we observed when we discussed Hayek's psychological theories, he 
considers the human mind to be an order that develops in reaction to experience 
of the surrounding circumstances or environment. The order of the mind is 
shaped by a process of classification of the environment through which new 
events are interpreted in the light of past experiences (Hayek 1976: 165). We 
noted how Hayek viewed science as an attempt consciously to replicate this 
ordering process in a hypothetico-deductive manner. There are, however, other 
forms of human mental ordering which are equally as important as science in the 
framing of human knowledge, but which do not occur in a deliberative manner. 
Chief among these is the psychological phenomena of habit. Habit is a species of 
mental conditioning (Hayek 1976: 87), whereby generalisations and 
classifications are developed hi the mind in a non-deliberative manner. Habitual 
rules of behaviour are the result of experience and develop over periods of time 
(Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 29).17 They embody human knowledge in the sense that 
they are lessons drawn from experience, lessons however which are learned 
unconsciously (Hayek 1979: 150). Hayek asks: ' .. .is knowledge involved when a 
person has the habit of behaving in a manner that, without his knowing it, 
increases the likelihood that not only he and his family but also many others 
unknown to him will survive - particularly if he has preserved this habit for 
altogether different and indeed quite inaccurate grounds?' (Hayek 1988: 139). 
His answer is an unequivocal yes. 
Habits embody knowledge: they provide non-deliberative rules of behaviour 
which act as rules of thumb or guides to man's relations to phenomena which 
resemble those of past experience. For Hayek habits are a form of general rule 
drawn from experience that deal not with specific factual observances, but rather 
with kinds of ways of acting in recurrent situations (Hayek 1993 vol.2: 4).18 
17 Indeed Hayek notes that some particularly long held habits that are successfully transmitted 
between generations have the ability of becoming almost innate (Hayek 1978: 59). 
18 Where Hayek refers to habit as a 'rule' (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 19) Oakeshott seeks to draw a 
distinction between habits and rules grounded precisely on the issue of consciousness. He 
writes: 'Nor are we severely tempted to confuse an observed regularity of behaviour or a habit 
with a rule of conduct. Such regularities may perhaps be used to forecast occurrences and they 
may be the outcomes of the observance of rules, but they are not themselves rules and they are 
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Habituation is a non-deliberative process, which is to say that habits are not 
deliberately acquired nor are they consciously formulated. They represent 
abstractions or generalisations from experience which are deployed in an 
unthinking, second-nature like manner when situations, or similar situations, 
recur (Hayek 1993 vo1.l: 30). A habit then is a general rule which guides action 
and which is followed in a non-deliberative manner (Hayek 1967: 56; 1993 
vo1.2: 27).19 The interesting feature of habits, for Hayek, is their non-
deliberative nature: they are regularities that are followed but never properly 
verbalised or indeed consciously adopted (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 43). He writes: 
'That such abstract rules are regularly observed in action does not mean 
that they are known to the individual in the sense that it could communicate 
them. Abstraction occurs whenever an individual responds in the same 
manner to circumstances that have only some features in common. Men 
generally act in accordance with abstract rules in this sense long before they 
can state them. Even when they have acquired the power of conscious 
abstraction, their conscious thinking and acting are probably still guided by 
a great many abstract rules which they obey without being able to formulate 
them. The fact that a rule is obeyed in action therefore does not mean that 
it does not still have to be discovered and formulated in words.' (Hayek 
1960: 149). 
Habitual thought is generalised but not in the specific theoretical manner 
which the conscious pursuit of science engenders. Habits represent tacit 
presuppositions, expectations in the sense that they are taken for granted, which 
reduce uncertainty and stabilise expectations by guiding man's reaction to his 
environment (Hayek 1993 vol.1: 70).20 
Following Ryle, Hayek stresses the non-deliberative nature of habitual 
behaviour drawing a distinction between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' 
(Hayek 1988: 78; 1993 voU: 99). The point of this distinction being that the 
not decisive evidence of the recognition of rules.' (Oakeshott 1990: 125). Winch however also 
claims that habits may be understood as rules (Winch 1990: 59-60). 
111 Again Oakeshott prefers the term 'unselfconscious': defining habit as 'the unsclfconscious 
following ofa tradition of behaviour' (Oakeshott 1991: 40). 
20 As we will see later Hayek views the verbalisation of habitual practices as society advances 
as being the origin of the human system oflaw (Hayek 1960: 148). 
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successful functioning of a generalised rule of behaviour does not depend on any 
conscious apprehension of its overall function. He couples this approach with 
Whitehead's observation on the importance of non-deliberative behaviour for the 
progress of civilisation (Hayek 1984: 221; 1979: 154; 1960: 22)?1 This 
argument is intended to display the vital 'supporting' role played to civilisation 
by the non-deliberative following of habituated generalisations. The more we 
are able to achieve without deliberative thought, the more of our mental 
capacities are freed up for deliberation on other matters. Perhaps the clearest 
development of this approach is to be found in Polanyi's work. Influenced by 
the gestalt psychology and study of apes by K5hler, he argues that the 
acquisition of habits of behaviour or skills are expressions of 'tacit' or 'personal' 
knowledge acquired in a particular manner; through 'subception' or 'learning 
without awareness' (polanyi 1969: 143; 1946: 19)?2 He draws a distinction 
between 'subsidiary' and 'focal' awareness in human perception, particularly in 
the 'skilful' use of 'tools', such that a pianist is focally aware of playing a 
particular piece of music but is only subsidiarity aware of the feel of the keys 
beneath his fingers (polanyi 1958: 55-57). Both types of awareness are 
necessary for the successful pursuit of the activity, yet subsidiary awareness is 
clearly not deliberative. Polanyi notes: 'If a pianist shifts his attention from the 
piece he is playing to the observation of what he is doing with his fingers while 
playing it, he gets confused and may have to stop.' (Polanyi 1958: 56). This 
leads him to conclude that the pursuit of focal activity is always dependent on 
the support of activities of which we are only subsidiarily aware. Thus I 'know' 
how to swim, but am unable to describe the precise muscular movement which I 
. 
undertake in order to do so (Polanyi 1969: 141). Such subsidiary behaviour is 
however open to examination. Polanyi notes that: 'In performing a skill we are 
therefore acting on certain premises of which we are focally ignorant, but which 
we know subsidiarily as part of our mastery of that skill, and which we may get 
21 See also Hayek (1978: 7, 81). Minogue notes the similarity between Ryle and Oakeshott in 
this connection (Minogue 1976: 131), and Mitchell compares Oakeshott and Polanyi 
concluding that their ideas are similar but based on different theoretical starting points 
[idealism for Oakeshott and realism for Po)anyi] (Mitchell 2001). 
22 Popper also appears to have been influenced by KOhler's work (popper 1994: S). Oakeshott 
refers to tacit knowledge as 'vocational' knowledge (Oakeshott 1991: 191), or as a man's 
'knowledge of how to go about his business' (Oakeshott 1991: 119). 
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to know focally by analysing the way we achieve success (or what we believe to 
be success) in the skill in question.' (polanyi 1958: 162). In other words we 
seek a functional understanding of non-deliberatively generated abilities that 
have emerged from an 'unconscious' process of trial and error (polanyi 1958: 
62).23 
Though habits are unintentionally acquired regularities of behaviour they 
are not eternal, nor are they immutable (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 19). Habits survive, 
in Hayek's view, because they succeed. They allow an efficient reaction to the 
environment which permits the survival of the holder of the habit. This feeds 
into Hayek's theory of cultural evolution, in the sense that successful habits 
assist the survival of both individuals and groups ofindividuals?4 Habits exist in 
a space 'between instinct and reason' (Hayek 1988: 10-11,21): they are neither 
innate, in the sense that they are acquired, nor are they rational, in the sense that 
they are not deliberatively acquired. In this way habits, and their group-level 
equivalents customs and traditions, exist as 'tools' (Hayek 1960: 27) which men 
make use of in a non-deliberative manner. Therefore if we are to study such 
phenomena it must be a study that s~eks to observe their functioning without any 
presupposition ofa rational or intentional purpose (Hayek 1967: 130). 
Hayek also follows the Scots by arguing that man is a naturally sociable 
animal (Hayek 1984: 135; 1993 voU: 162-62; 1967: 47). For Hayek men are 
sociable, but they are also socialised into a particular group. They are, as a 
result, socialised into the habitual or customary and traditional behaviours of that 
group (Hayek 1988: 12).25 The habitual or customary rules, which make social 
life possible, form the basis of human societies and are the origin point of our 
23 Polanyi notes that the tacit knowledge involved in the acquisition of skills is linked to the 
familiarity with the practice of the skill gained by specialists (polanyi 1969: 188). His 
conception is tenned 'connoisseurship' (polanyi 1958: 54). For example, the connoisseur of 
wine or fine tea acquires, through experience, an 'aesthetic' recognition of classifications in 
his field which is not necessarily expressible or communicable. Through familiarity with his 
specialisation the connoisseur is able to make judgements and set standards without explicitly 
fonnulating the grounds upon which they are based (po\anyi 1958: 64-65). Hayek endorses 
Polanyi's views on this matter (Hayek 1967: 44) and a similar argument is to be found in 
Hume's essay Of the Standard of Taste. 
24 See below and Hayek (1993 voU: 17-18). 
2S A common view amongst the modems: for Popper we are sociable prior to being human as 
a result of our genes (popper 1966 vo1.2: 93; Magee 1973: 69); while for Oakeshott 
socialisation is 'coeval with conscious life' (Oakeshott 1991: 469) and Polanyi notes our 
natural 'conviviality' (polanyi 19S8: 210-11). 
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notions of law and government (Hayek 1993 voLl: 44). Hayek argues that 
socialisation, like habituation, is an innate propensity of human beings. The 
acquisition of rules of behaviour by imitation (Hayek 1988: 21) represents a key 
source of the successful transfer of experience and knowledge necessary for the 
survival of the group and the species. Indeed, socialised traditions form the 
backdrop to all human activity. Customary behaviour is learned by imitation, not 
conscious imitation, but rather a non-deliberative process which mirrors that of 
habit formation (Hayek 1993 voU: 19).26 The successful transmission of habits 
through socialisation ensures the persistence and survival of groups of humans 
(Hayek 1988: 16). In this way even reason, which Hayek noted is a cultural 
. 
product, is dependent on this process. He argues: 'In a society in which rational 
behaviour confers an advantage on the individual, rational methods will 
progressively be developed and spread by imitation.' (Hayek 1993 vol. 3 : 75). 
Further, there exists an implicit filtering device in this process of socialisation in 
that, for Hayek, it is the cultural transmission of successful practices (Hayek 
1984: 324). Only successful groups with successful traditions will be able to 
produce offspring who will survive long enough to be socialised: therefore only 
practices which encourage human survival will become customs which are 
transmitted over long periods of time. This evolutionary process lies at the heart 
of Hayek's descriptive theory of social change. Socialisation though, as with 
habit, has no explicit moral criteria. People can be socialised into 'bad' 
practices, as the Scots noted with reference to child exposure, but they will only 
continue to be socialised into a practice if it fulfils a function that allows group 
survival (Hayek 1988: 27). Iqhe circumstances of the group change, then the 
practice, though it may proceed for several generations, will either be discarded 
or adapted to the new circumstances (Hayek 1978: 10) in a manner that better 
functions to support the survival of the group.27 
Custom and tradition playa vital role in the successful survival of mankind 
(Hayek 1993 vol. 3 : 160). While habit operates on an individual level in reaction 
26 Polanyi and Popper similarly stress the vital role of imitation (polanyi 1958: 206~ Popper 
1989: 134). What Gray calls the 'mimetic contagion' (Gray 1986: 34). 
27 This approach does however leave Hayek open to the well-worn criticisms of functionalist 
analysis. Of which more later. 
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to the environment, custom operates through socialisation on a group level. 28 A 
custom is a habitual convention among a group of men. As Hayek puts it: ' ... the 
existence of common conventions and traditions among a group of people will 
.. 
enable them to work together smoothly and efficiently with much less formal 
organization and direct compulsion than a group without such common 
background' (Hayek 1984: 147). A custom is a group habit (Hayek 1984: 319), 
a habitual practice or convention of behaviour among a group (Hayek 1960: 
62).29 While customs stabilise expectations by providing a degree of 
predictability to human actions they function, as with habits, in a non-
deliberative manner (Hayek 1993 vol.1: 97). We act according to custom before 
we have any idea of why we do so; indeed a custom is rarely, if ever, 
deliberatively developed or applied. It operates largely with unorganised social 
pressure acting as the enforcement agent (Hayek 1993 vol.2: 34).30 People are 
expected to act in the expected manner, to act with propriety, and face 
disapproval or social exclusion if they do not.31 Hayek rejects Mill's argument 
that such social pressure is a restriction of individual liberty (Mill 1991: 77-79), 
for rather than acting as a barrier to self-expression, it is one of the key 
conditions which allow social association and which assist individual flourishing 
(Hayek 1960: 147). As customs are not absolutely enforced, but rather rely on 
notions of propriety, they act to stabilise expectations while leaving a degree of 
flexibility that allows both gradual change and individual eccentricity (llayek 
1960: 146). 
The acceptance of customary behaviour does not depend on a rational 
understanding of the utility of the practice, rather it is believed in not because of 
the results which it produces but because of its nature as a custom into which 
28 The evolution of habits proceeds by individual selection II develop a personal habit of 
smoking a cigar after a meal], but that of customs and social conventions must proceed on an 
inter-individual basis if individuals are to be socialised into them [It is a convention that cigars 
are smoked after a meal]. 
29 Thus morality, for Oakeshott, is "the unreflective following of a tradition of conduct in 
which we have been brought up' (Oakeshott 1991: 468). 
30 The parallels with Smith's notion of propriety here are obvious. 
31 Popper also notes the trial and error process involved in the acquisition of "knowledge' of 
standards of propriety (popper 1966 vol. 2: 390). 
244 
people have been socialised (Hayek 1978: 85).32 The 'done thing' is the done 
thing because it is done, and not because the doer has decided that it works well. 
Hayek points to the concept of a taboo as an example of this. Taboos are an 
expression of negative customary knowledge. They restrict behaviour without 
the need to experience the rationale behind the restriction (Hayek 1978: 86). 
Customs largely exhibit negative knowledge in the sense that they restrict 
behaviour to a particular path without conscious awareness of the social function 
of the practice. We do not know the precise results of deviating from customary 
behaviour: all that we know is that custom and propriety dictate that we not do 
so (Hayek 1978: 8). 
The moral values of a social group exist and are held in a largely non-
deliberative manner that is socially transmitted through the process of 
socialisation (Hayek 1978: 87). Morality is a customary tradition that embodies 
knowledge beyond that which any individual is capable consciously of 
formulating. Hayek notes: 
' ... the fact that the tradition of moral rules contains adaptations to 
circumstances in our environment which are not accessible by individual . 
observation or not perceptible by reason, and that our morals are therefore 
a human equipment that is not only a creation of reason, but even in some 
respects superior to it because it contains guides to human action which 
reason alone could never have discovered or justified' (Hayek 1984: 320) . 
. 
Customary conventions of behaviour are the embodiment of generations of 
trial and error experience that constitute groups' notions of right and wrong 
(Hayek 1960: 61-62). Tradition is the transfer of this knowledge gained from 
experience in a non-deliberative manner (Hayek 1988: 25). The notion that a 
form of behaviour is not the 'done thing' arises because in the past it has been 
done and proved harmful. 
32 Indeed this reveals the difference between a custom and a convention. Analyses of the 
development of conventions have in recent years been a product of game theoretical and 
rational choice models. For Example, Ullman-Margalit (1977); Axelrod (1984) and Ridley 
(1996: 74). Lewis shares a similar approach viewing convention formation as the solution to a 
'co-ordination problem' (Lewis 1969: 8, 37) that arises from a leaming process. Smith applies 
this to Adam Smith's views on reciprocity to indicate the evolutionary success which may arise 
from convention fonnation (Smith 1997). For a critique of this approach see Elster (1989a: 
139-40). 
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Chapter 3: Cultural Evolution 
Hayek lays a great deal of stress upon what he refers to as the 'twin ideas of 
evolution and the spontaneous formation of order' (Hayek 1984: 177).33 In 
terms of social theory what he means by this is that s,ociety is a spontaneous 
order and that, as spontaneous orders form and change through an evolutionary 
process, so social change ought to be understood as a process of evolution 
(Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 37). As we noted in the introduction, Hayek argued that 
Darwin's theory of evolution was strongly influenced by the cultural 
evolutionary models of the Scots (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 152; 1967: 103-4, 119; 
1960: 58-59). Theories of social evolution existed long before Darwin's 
biological appropriation of the ,approach (Hayek 1978: 9).34 Moreover Hayek's 
theory of evolution differs in some marked respects from that of Darwin. He 
argues at length that though Smith itifluenced Darwin's approach (Hayek 1988: 
24), the model of cultural evolution to which he alludes contains no genetic or 
biological implications (Hayek 1988: 23-25; 1978: 68). It is not biological man 
who evolves in this model, but rather his knowledge and culture. It is not a case 
of individual level survival of the fittest, but instead of group level evolution of 
cultures through adaptation to circumstances and the efficient use of knowledge. 
Hayek argues that the general rules that allow a social order to form are the 
product of cultural evolution rather than deliberate institution (Hayek 1967: 
243). Such rules and institutions embody the knowledge of circumstances 
garnered by past generations; they are transmitted as traditions rather than as 
deliberate understanding of the function that they serve (Hayek 1960: 291). The 
evolution of these practices displays the evolutionary 'growth' or development 
of human knowledge. Behind Hayek's functional analysis is a model of 
evolutionary epistemology (Hayek 1988: 10), a model which he compares 
33 Twin ideas which he credits the Scots with developing (Hayek 1984: 319; 1967: 106-121; 
1988: 146). 
34 For a discussion of the political uses of Darwin see MacKenzie (1979). while a more 
biological application of Darwinism to politics can be seen in Somit and Peterson (1997). 
" 
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directly to the rendering provided in Popper's theory of science (Hayek 1978: 
43).3' 
Cultural evolution is about the transmission and adaptation of knowledge, 
beliefs and customs (Hayek 1993 vol.3: 205): it refers to the evolution of the 
cultural heritage of a people especially in relation to habits and customs (Hayek 
1993 vo1.1: 17), which, as we have s~en, are characterised by the human 
propensity to classify experience according to rules (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 11). 
Hayek follows Hume in describing this process through a metaphor of path 
formation (Hayek 1979: 70_71).36 He argues that men are socialised into a 
particular cultural tradition which represents an adaptation to circumstance, and 
that the development of that tradition represents the adaptation to changes in 
those circumstances (Hayek 1979: 58-59). Cultural evolution proceeds by an 
'experimental process' (Hayek 1988: 46) of trial and error adaptation to 
circumstances with successful practices being repeated, and through repetition, 
becoming habitual. -As we noted before with relation to the trial and error 
advance of science, such evolution cannot be planned or predicted. Cultural 
evolution proceeds by a process of reaction to the unintended consequences of 
human action (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 9). Moreover it depends upon both adaptation 
and the transmission of successfully adapted practices. Which is to say that as 
well as being based on a growth of knowledge it is also based on the 
communication of such knowledge to other members of the group (Hayek 1988: 
129). Cultural evolution comprises not only the evolution of knowledge in 
reaction to circumstances, but also the gradual aggregation of knowledge as new 
practices and classifications of phenomena are discovered and absorbed. Hayek 
writes: 'Cultural transmission has however one great advantage over the genetic: 
it includes the transmission of acquired characters. The child will acquire 
unconsciously from the example of the parent skills which the latter may have 
learnt through a long process 6ftrial and error, but which with the child become 
3S For Popper evolution in terms of science was cultural evolution, the development of a third 
world of objective artefacts which could be approached in a critical manner and 'naturally 
selected' without the need for the death of the carrier (popper 1972: 66, 70, 230). TillS aspect 
of cultural evolution is a Darwinian process of selection rather than a Lamarckian one of 
instruction by repetition (popper 1972: 144). 
36 See also Oakeshott (1990: 100): 'Practices are footprints left behind by agents responding to 
their emergent situations. • 
the starting point from which he can proceed to greater perfection.' (Hayek 
1978: 292).37 
247 
Cultural evolution is the 'selective evolution of rules and practices' (Hayek 
1993 vol.3: 154) based on a process of 'winnowing or sifting' (Hayek 1993 
vo1.3: 155) grounded in the comparative success of groups which adopt differing 
practices.38 There are two parts to this concept of evolution, there is the change 
or adaptation of a particular tradition of rules, and there is the survival of groups 
who hold those rules in competition with other groups. Unlike biological 
evolution this process can occur relatively quickly in the sense that it 
differentiates men as a species to a far greater degree than biological 
qharacteristics (Hayek 1993 vol.3: 156). As we noted before, Hayek regards the 
mind as a cultural product so, it seems, when he talks of cultural evolution he is 
talking about the evolution of the human mind within the context of a particular 
cultural tradition (Hayek 1993 vol. 3 : 157). As he puts it: 'Tradition is not 
something constant but the product of a process of selection guided not by 
reason but by success .... Cultural selection is not a rational process; it is not 
guided by but it creates reason.' (Hayek 1993 vo!.3: 166). It is the evolution of 
successfully functioning practices that are adapted to the circumstances in which 
the social group exists that represents the operation of a 'successful' tradition. 
Chief among these adaptations is the system of moral rules which, like Hume's 
path, embody knowledge and guide action by ruling out unprofitable behaviour 
(Hayek 1984: 118). Different groups of men develop different cultural traditions 
that they transmit to successive generations, but the groups which develop the 
most efficiently functioning traditions hold a comparative advantage over other 
groups with whom they come into competition. Hayek illustrates this by calling 
on Smith's analysis of the division of labour, arguing that the successful cultural 
37 This aspect of cultural evolution is Lamarckian mther than Darwinian (Karlson 2002: S7, 
71). Karlson distinguishes between evolution by natural selection, which selects by efficiency, 
and evolution by difIused reinforcement, which seleets by imitation of the successful. 
38 Galeotti sums this up well: 'Hayek's conjectural reconstruction of social spontaneity and 
rule formation is the following: From casual human interactions in the various spheres of 
social interchange, patterns emerge Unintentionally. Given the human need for rules, there is 
a tendency to repeat those patterns as a guideline for action in future instances of similar 
behaviour. Then, among the number of spontaneous patterns tllat emerge in a given 
community at a given time, the most successful one has a chance to be repeated until it rules 
out the others.' (Galeotti 1987: 171). 
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evolution of the division oflabour gives the group in question a marked 
advantage over other groups and leads to a process of group selection (Hayek 
1988: 120). 
Hayek argues that Smith discerned the phenomenon of group selection but 
failed to develop it within his work (Hayek 1967: 86, 100). He also points out 
that there is a strong sense in Hume's writing that practices which aided human 
survival, survived themselves and were communicated to succeeding 
generations. Practices which did not aid survival, or which faced alternative 
practices which were more efficient in aiding survival, were superseded (Hayek 
1967: 111). This, in Hayek's view, is what Hume meant by uti1ity~ not a 
deliberative calculation but rather a successful adaptation discerned only because 
those who held it succeeded (Hayek 1967: 114). Group selection is based on a 
non-deliberative functionalism (Hayek 1967: 7).39 Successful groups do not 
know that they prevail or why they prevail, they simply do so (Hayek 1993 
vo1.2: 21, 145).40 It is the persistence of the systems of rules that they develop 
which indicates that they operate in a successful manner (Hayek 1967: 77). 
There is an evolution of knowledge within a particular tradition and a 
selection of traditions between different groups. These two senses are 
highlighted when Hayek argues that the transmission of cultural practices occurs 
on an individual level while the selection of systems of practices occurs on a 
group level (Hayek 1967: 67).. Individuals adapt to their own unique local 
circumstances and the development of shared, social, practices represents a 
group reaction to its environment (Hayek 1967: 71). Successful practices are 
transmitted between members of the group and come to form the cultural 
tradition through which the group operates. In Hayek's terms: ' ... the properties 
of the individuals which are significant for the existence and preservation of the 
group, and through this also for the existence and preservation of the individuals 
themselves, have been shaped by the selection of those from individuals living in 
groups which at each stage of the evolution of the group tended to act according 
to such rules as made the group more efficient.' (Hayek 1967: 72). Individuals 
39 Or in Oakeshott's tenns 'unselfconscious' (Oakeshott 1991: 26). 
~o And though this process is non-deliberative it is not, as we noted before, the same process 
as that identified by the Social Darwinists (Hayek 1978: 67). 
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and groups survive by adapting their behaviour to changes in circumstances 
(Hayek 1960: 61,364) and in relation to the growth of their experience of those 
circumstances. A successful tradition is one that has adapted practices to allow 
social interaction that encourages the survival of the group and its individual 
members. 
However there is also the'process of competition between groups with 
different cultural traditions (Hayek 1988: 76). Hayek argues that, as human 
civilisation evolves, groups with poorly functioning rules fail and are absorbed 
into, or superseded by, other groups (Hayek 1960: 36). Groups with 
. 
successfully functioning rules will prevail over other groups (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 
99), not because the rules themselves have any intrinsic worth, but rather 
because they facilitate the maintenance of an extended order between the 
members of the group (Hayek 1967: 68). The extended order of particular 
groups, their shared practices and similar behaviour, exist because those 
practices have displaced practices which did not function to preserve the order: • 
and those groups have displaced groups with such unsuccessful, 
'malfunctioning' practices (Hayek 1967: 70).41 An example of this might be the 
success of European settlers in displacing the native inhabitants of Northern 
America. Group selection, as an element of cultural evolution, is the selection 
between groups in terms of the success or otherwise of their systems of rules 
(Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 22). Similarly the division of labour and the market, as 
cultural practices, have allowed the groups who developed them to succeed in 
material terms and to persist (Hayek 1978: 62). The most obvious factors in 
group selection are those practices which succeed in allowing reproduction 
because they guarantee the survival and extension of the group (Hayek 1988: 
16). 
If the market and the division of labour are viewed as giving groups a 
comparative advantage in terms of cultural evolution, then it is as a result of the 
fact that trade and related cultural phenomena encourage population growth 
(Hayek 1988: 39). As Smith noted the division oflabour is responsible for the 
growth of population and is necessary for population to be maintained at current 
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levels let alone in order for it to grow (Hayek 1991: 74).42 Economic progress, 
as a result of the division of labour, the market and trade, has increased the 
population of those nations that develop them to a level whereby without them 
their inhabitants would starve and die (Hayek 1978: 19). Also, following Smith, 
Hayek notes that our civilisation, dependent as it is on the division oflabour and 
specialisation, depends on the existence of cities (Hayek 1960: 340-41). The 
existence of cities, in Hayek's view, allows millions to survive who would 
otherwise perish (Hayek 1988: 129). The division of labour affected in urban 
areas is the key to economic growth and to the consequent growth in population 
(Hayek 1988: 126-28). Population density in cities allows the development of 
specialisation and draws people to the urban areas in the hope of securing 
employment in industry (Hayek 1988: 40; 1978: 61).43 As specialisation leads to 
a growth in specialist knowledge so the growth of population acts to prompt the 
process further by increasing the number of possible specialists (Hayek 1988: 
122). It is this growing diversity of specialist knowledge rather than the increase 
in individual intelligence which supports economic progress (Hayek 1988: 123). 
The co-ordination of specialist knowledge advances in cities (Hayek 1960: 342) 
and urban population increases with the growth of wealth and the advance of 
civilisation (Hayek 1960: 358). 
Group selection between cultural traditions is a result of the number kept 
alive, and socialised within, th~ tradition. As Hayek puts it: 'For the numbers 
kept alive by differing systems of rules decide which system will dominate. ' 
(Hayek 1988: 130). The only groups that survive are those which possess 
customs which function to provide for reproduction and the raising of children 
(Hayek 1988: 84).44 Civilisation, and the survival of the group, depends on the 
survival of children and upon the use of knowledge and cultural practices that 
allow this (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 93). Put another way: 'The size of the stock of 
41 This, as with all evolutionary processes, is no guarantee tbat they will continue to do so in 
the future (Hayek 1960: 67). 
42 Hayek suggests that Smith's comments on the significance of the size of the market for the 
scope of the division of labour are an implicit endorsement of a population linked theory of 
cultural evolution (Hayek 1984: 322~ 1988: 120, 155). 
43 Oakesbott also acknowledges the central role of urban areas in the advance of civilization 
(Oakeshott 1991: 366). 
251 
capital of a people, together with its accumulated traditions and practices for 
extracting and communicating information, determine whether that people can 
maintain large numbers.' (Hayek 1988: 124). This is, in Hayek's view, 
essentially the same argument as that advanced by Hume and Smith with regard 
to the development of property rules (Hayek 1984: 321_22).45 Moreover, as the 
Scots also note, successful cultural practices are often spread by immigration 
and colonisation. Hayek notes that population growth is often as much a 
product ofimmigration and the absorption ofless successful groups, as it is a 
result of the increasing size of families (Hayek 1993 vo1.3: 159). 
Population may however be the closest point of affinity between Hayek's 
cultural evolution and Darwin's biological evolution. Hayek argues that, in a 
very real sense, man's purpose is survival and reproduction (Hayek 1988: 133). 
This however is not a moralised argument. Population growth is not good in 
any moral or ethical sense, but rather is a descriptive measure of the successful 
functioning of practices that secure a human biogenic drive (Hayek 1988: 131). 
The selection of groups through a standard of success based on population is not 
a moral argument for the 'goodness' of the group's practices: it is a practical 
measure of their success that aims to explain the evolution of cultural traditions 
(Hayek 1984: 255). As Hayek notes we have become civilised in order to rear 
more children and not because of any intrinsic moral value in the individual or 
the practices which he makes use of (Hayek 1993 vo1.3: 167-68). Such a 
functional understanding of cultural evolution makes use of a sort of 'calculus of 
lives' (Hayek 1988: 132) where success is measured in terms of population 
growth. 
It should be noted however that the idea of group selection is not 
uncontroversial. Dawkins and others have attacked group selection in biology 
as flawed because it fails to provide an explanation of the link between the 
individual and the groUp.46 This view is taken up by Denis and Vanberg in 
4 .. Hodgson offers the example of the Shakers whose celibacy led to the constant need to 
recruit new members and, in the long run, to their extinction (Hodgson 1991). 
4~ He cites Smith approvingly on the assertion that: 'the most decisive mark of the prosperity 
of any country is the increase of the number of its inhabitants' (Hayek 1984: 322). 
46 Though Dawkins has in turn been attacked by others for an excessive focus on the 
individual gene (Hodgson 1991). 
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relation to Hayeldan group selection. They argue that 'free rider' problems 
prevent group selection theories from convincingly explaining how group level 
advantage can differ from an aggregation of individual level advantages (Denis 
1999: 3; Vanberg 1986: 83-86). Rules that encourage group survival are not 
necessarily the same as those which benefit individuals (Kley 1994: 162; 
Petsoulas 2001: 63; Shearmur 1996a: 84-85; Gray 1989: 247; Pau11988: 259).41 
Group selection theories have a problem explaining why individuals would 
submit to rules which are not to their immediate personal advantage. The 
obvious answer to this, as exemplified by Ferguson's argument over the 
willingness of individuals to die to protect the group, is that individuals are 
socialised within groupS.48 Sociability itself, as well as being the basis for the 
generation of cultural rules, is the glue that allows group advantages to exist. 
Explaining sociability in evolutionary terms will depend on both biology and 
cultural anthropology.49 
This leads to a second problem with Hayek's group selection. As we have 
seen Hayek uses population as an indication of group success, but it is not 
immediately clear why individuals should care about population growth (Gray 
1986: 141; Shearmur 1996a: 86). The answer to this is that they don't. As we 
have seen population is purely indicative of functionality and is in no way a 
conscious rationale for the selection of rules. To the extent that individuals are 
aware of the population as significant it is on the micro-level of wishing to keep 
those close to them alive. so A more significant criticism of group selection lies in 
the accusation that, as with all functionalist explanations, it is holistic in 
character and undercuts a commitment to methodological individualism in social 
science (Denis 1999: 15,32; Hodgson 1991: 79; Kley 1994: 23; Bimer 1994; 
Gray 1986: 52-54). If Hayek wishes to advance a group selection argument, 
47 Kley also notes that rules may not be the most significant factor in group survival which 
may also depend on access to resources. Though in Hayekian terms the group would require a 
framework of rules in order efficiently to exploit those resources. 
'IS See Above Part Two, Section Two, Chapter 1. 
49 In order for there to be free riders there must be something for them to 'ride' upon: a social 
group constituted by a set of commonly accepted conventional rules. This being the case if 
such groups are constituted by a rule that restricts free riding, then the critique fails. 
50 In this sense observations of population, though not tllemselves a value, may carry with 
them certain implications. For example we may not value population growth, but be 
indisposed to see rapid population decline which would involve the death of large numbers. 
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then he must be able to provide a link between group and individual levels of 
selection that keeps his methodological individualism intact. We have already 
considered the free rider problem by referring to sociablity and the fact that rules 
are not chosen on the basis of 'rational self-interest', what we now require is a 
conceptual link between individual level evolution and group level selection. 
This problem appears to be compounded when we consider that it is Hayek's 
view that it is systems of rules and not individual rules or individual applications 
of rules that are significant for group selection (Kley 1994: 170). As Vaughn 
has noted even if group selection is accurate it occurs on a systemic level. which 
is to say that 'bundles' of rules survive (Vaughn 1984: 124). Such customary 
'bundles' are indeed group level phenomena but, as we have argued above, they 
evolve through a medium ofindividual selection (Gray 1986: 13 5). As Hodgson 
notes: 'While group selection is occurring, individual selection is also going on 
simultaneously within the group.' (Hodgson 1991: 74. his italics). Individual 
experiments in living within the broader group tradition are the key to successful 
adaptation - with the link preserving the group being provided by socialisation 
and imitation.51 This argument provides a further instrumental justification of 
freedom whereby it is understood as freedom for adaptation in order to improve 
the efficiency of the tradition in a piecemeal manner (Macedo 1999: 297).52 
Individuals imitate those of their fellows whom they consider to be successful 
within the context of the group.53 Moreover groups import practices through 
the emulation of other groups .. This group selection can be understood not by 
. 
the 'death' of group members but by the disappearance of the practices which 
constituted the identity of the group. The notion of the total disappearance of a 
social group, whether by death or total absorption into a more efficient group, is 
a concept that refers to the earlier stages of cultural evolution (Vaughn 1984: 
51 As Steele notes group selection occurs on the level of groups within a system as well as on 
an individual level (Steele 1987: 181). Karlson makes this the focus of his approach to civil 
society. He views change in civil society as a process of group selection: individuals join and 
leave groups within the broader social group and this results in individual choice affecting the 
order of the society as a whole (Karlson 2002: 60). 
52 See the discussion of Christina Petsoulas' views on lhis, below Part Three, Section Three, 
Chapter 2. where there is a similar stress on the piecemeal nature of reform. 
S3 As Heath notes imitation of the successful depends on the context and the standard judged 
to represent success (Heath 1989: 110-11). Or, to be more accurate, the standard 'felt' to 
represent success as imitation is a non-deliberative act in most cases. 
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125). Communication between groups and emulation of technology and 
knowledge means that relatively unsuccessful groups are able to maintain group 
coherence as evolution progresses (Witt 1994: 184): they are able to imitate and 
to adapt the practices of more successful groups. It is for this reason that the 
population indicator becomes less significant in more economically developed 
cultures. The possession and accumulation of human capital, in the sense of 
knowledge, becomes a more significant indicator of group success than sheer 
population size (Radnitzky 1987: 24).54 Minogue, then, is correct to note the 
shift between the earlier and later stages of cultural evolution; group selection 
indicated by population levels typifies the earlier part of the process while 
imitative reform suggested by the success of other groups typifies the more 
advanced phase of cultural evolution (Minogue 1987). 
There does remain a problematic relationship between cultural evolution 
and the justification of a liberal market system. As we indicated in Part Three, 
Section One Hayek argues in favour of these from epistemological efficiency 
. 
[the invisible hand], but as we have also noted he is critical of the belief in 
accurate historical prediction. .As a result he appears to score an 'own goal' 
(Shearmur 1994: 196) by offering a consequentiatist justification of the market 
and then denying the possibility of foresight sufficient enough to hold that this 
will continue to be the case (Connin 1990: 312). This view however requires a 
little unpacking. If evolution depends on adaptation to circumstances and the 
efficient use of knowledge, then freedom is a key factor in the ability of 
individuals to adapt successfully. The argument in favour of freedom, and in 
particular market freedom, is precisely that it enhances the efficiency of 
adaptation and the utilisation of knowledge. 55 Thus Hayek describes how 
54 This speaks against Tomlinson's argument that population growth occurred on massive 
levels under the socialist regimes which Hayek attacked (fomlinson 1990: 49). A Hayekian 
response would be that this population growth depended on emulation and that where 
innovation occurred along command economic lines the measures generally led to a fall in 
Fspulation. An example might be the various attempts to collectivise farming. 
S Hayek's argument is an 'anthropology of morals' and not a 'moral philosophy' (Kukathas 
1989: 202-03), the support for freedom is an empirical observation. It has been suggested that 
Hayek's thought runs the risk of committing the 'so-called naturalistic fallacy' which attempts 
to 'deduce a genuine normative statement from a descriptive theory' (Radnitzky 1987: 30). 
This however is not Hayek's view precisely because he provides a solely instrumental 
argument for the efficiency of freedom as a means to ensure wealth accumulation and the 
survival of the population. As his critics rightly note he provides little in the way of a moral 
evolution occurs and then argues that given the reality of this model of social 
change it is preferable to encourage freedom to ensure efficient adaptation. 
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There remains a problem with the instrumental nature of the argument. As 
Johnston notes an assertion of the success of the market on instrumental grounds 
requires a justification of the end that the instrument reaches: in Hayek's case 
wealth and the survival of the existing population (Johnston 1997: 87). Johnston 
notes that ifpopulation ceases to act as an indicator of the success of the social 
system, then it is unclear why some ether value, his example is equality, ought 
not to be advanced as the goal of the social system. This view however neglects 
Hayek's other arguments in favour of markets, especially those on the 
incoherence of notions of social justice and the danger of totailtarianism. 
" Leading on from his focus on popUlation Hayek engages with a problem 
which, as we have seen, much exercised the Scots. He cites Carr-Saunders with 
approval: 
'Those groups practising the most advantageous customs will have an 
advantage in the constant struggle between adjacent groups over those that 
practice less advantageous customs. Few customs can be more 
advantageous than those which limit the numbers of a group to the desirable 
number, and there is no difficulty in understanding how - once any of these 
customs [abortion, infanticide, abstention from intercourse] had originated 
it would, by a process of natural selection, come to be so practised that it 
would produce an approximation to the desirable number.' (Hayek 1993 
voLl: 148-49). 
There is a sense in which our moral rules are selected in relation to their 
conduciveness to survival and to the sustainable growth of population (Hayek 
1993 vol.3: 160-61). As the economy grows and increasing numbers are 
supported, mankind will develop or adapt those practices aimed at population 
limitation. A change in circumstances, in this case economic growth, will render 
practices such as child exposure obsolete by reducing their economic 'logic' ,56 
This, however, is not a deliberative process and it rests on two principles: First, 
argument for the desirability of these values, but this in turn is not a eri tique of the details of 
the argument merely an assertion as to what more is required. 
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a practice such as child exposure may pass out of use because it no longer fulfils 
its social function [for example economic growth renders it unnecessary]; and 
second, the growth of knowledge [of contraceptive practices] results in the 
function of child exposure being more efficiently fulfilled by other practices 
developed from experience. 
To say all this however is not to argue that practices such as child exposure 
are placed beyond critique. Rules are indeed selected on the basis of the survival 
of the population, but to understand the function of a practice in relation to this 
need not imply approval (Hayek 1988: 20). Like the Scots' writings on the 
ancient Greeks, we might understand the function yet disapprove of the practice 
adopted and criticise its continuance after the conditions that entailed it had 
passed. Our moral practices are adaptations to our circumstances, and changes 
in circumstances may render them obsolete and make them abhorrent in the eyes 
offuture generations (Hayek 1988: 72).57 However, as Hayek notes, practices 
such as the Eskimo exposure of the elderly (Hayek 1988: 152) were developed 
to ensure group survival, and unless the group survived by their successful 
functioning, there would be no succeeding generations to disapprove of the 
practice. 58 Hayek also notes the significance of emotion in this process. He 
argues: 'If in the distant past perhaps altogether inhuman demands were 
sometimes made in the name of formal justice, as when in ancient Rome the 
father was praised who as a magistrate unflinchingly condemned his son to 
death, we have learned to avoid the gravest of such conflicts, and in general to 
reduce the requirements of formal justice to what is compatible with our 
emotions.' (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 148).59 Should circumstances dictate a practice 
which runs against the grain of the human emotional attachment to offspring, 
56 Radnitzky offers a similar understanding of the decline of child labour in which the rise in 
F,pulation reduced the economic 'logic' of employing children (Radnitzky 1987: 30). 
7 The underlying universalities which are a feature of human beings allows us, in Berlin's 
view, the ability to comprehend historical practices as 'human' through sympathetic 
imagination. He adds however that 'to understand is not to accept' (Berlin 1990: 86). Or as 
Hayek puts it: 'the near-universal acceptance of a belief docs not prove that it is valid or even 
meaningful any more than the general belief in witches or ghosts proved the validity of these 
concepts.' (Hayek 1993 vol.2: 66). Compare with the Scots' views on the same issue and 
superstition in general (Berry 1997: 77). 
58 Hayek also notes that it is possible to criticise a traditional practice if it is in contradiction 
to the other key principles upon which the order of rules rests (Hayek 1993 vol. 3 : 172). 
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then such practices will tend to be replaced by more emotionally acceptable 
approaches as circumstances permit and as knowledge grows.60 We adapt to 
circumstances and change our moral practices in line with changes in those 
circumstances: though, as we noted, the habitual and customary nature of moral 
practices means that this change is subject to 'evolutionary lag' (Gray 1986: SO) 
and is gradual and piecemeal.61 Custom is only an obstacle when it is no longer 
the only, or the most efficient, way of doing something, or fulfilling some 
function (Hayek 1960: lSI-52). It is for this reason that Hayek attacks 
conservatism as a failure to recognise change as a positive force that increases 
the successful functioning of the group in reaction to changes in circumstances 
(Hayek 1960: 400). As we noted before, habit and custom are flexible and allow 
gradual changes in line with changes in circumstance: 
'Though present morals evolved by selection, this evolution was not made 
possible by a licence to experiment but on the contrary by strict restraints 
which made changes of the whole system impossible and granted tolerance 
to the breaker of accepted rules, who may have turned out a pioneer, only 
when he did so at his own risk and had earned such licence by his strict 
observation of most rules which alone could gain him the esteem which 
. 
legitimized experimentation in a particular direction.' (Hayek 1993 vol. 3 : 
204}.62 
Our habits are ingrained but they admit of change and they must adapt to 
changes in circumstances in order to facilitate the survival of children (Hayek 
1978: 59). To this end Hayek adopts an argument similar to that of Min's 
'experiments in living' (Hayek 1960: 127). Experiments in living and the 
59 Compare this with the Scots' views on social change as regards child exposure. See above 
Part Two, Section Two, Chapter 2. . 
60 Wilson offers empirical support for this by noting that all known examples of infanticide as 
a cultural practice occur soon after birth. While the economic logic of the practice would 
suggest that it should occur when the child begins to make more significant demands for 
resources (Wilson 1997: 20-23). 
61 As Oakeshott points out, the gradual change in morals docs not lead to a collapse of the 
whole system of moral rules because it occurs in a piecemeal manner. The criticism and 
rejection of child exposure does not necessarily affect other moral rules. As he puts it: 'Parts 
of a moral life in this form may collapse, but since the habits of conduct which compose it are 
never recognized as a system, the collapse does not readily spread to the wholc.' (Oakeshott 
1991: 470). 
62 Compare this with Polanyi's views on scientific orthodoxy above Part Threc, Section One, 
Chapter 2. 
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success or failure of such provide the examples that guide the changes in human 
habits and cultural practices (Hayek 1984: 263; 1960: 36). This places our 
cultural tradition in a peculiar situation: 'Man did not adopt new rules of 
conduct because he was intelligent. He became intelligent by submitting to new 
rules of conduct.' (Hayek 1993 vo1.3: 163). Reform of our moral traditions 
must proceed by a process of immanent criticism (Hayek 1988: 69). We draw 
on our reason to examine the cultural practices of our group and assess their 
functionality. One criterion for selection is the compatibility of a rule of 
behaviour with the other principles of the cultural tradition; we seek to weed out 
contradictory practices in order to stabilise expectations and reduce confusion 
(Hayek 1993 vol.3: 167). Child exposure is contrary to the principles respecting 
individuality, the desire for procreation and so on, therefore it can be criticised 
and, as circumstances allow, adapted or discarded. Such a process demands 
gradual, incremental and careful reform, and criticism of both the articulated and 
non-articulated practices which function to preserve the extended order of 
civilisation (Hayek 1960: 410). Those rules survive the non-deliberative process 
of cultural evolution that function to preserve the order, those which do not fall 
into disuse (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 105). Our reform and criticism of our moral 
tradition must be based on an awareness of this constantly changing and 
adapting process. 
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Chapter 4: Knowledge and Morality 
As we have noted previously, the modems' methodological individualist 
approach does not presuppose an assertion that individuals are by nature selfish 
(Hayek 1991: 44). Hayek rejects the notion of economic man as a universal 
model on the same grounds as he rejects models of perfect competition: it simply 
does not reflect reality (Hayek 1991: 67).63 Homo oeconomicus is a rationalist 
abstraction which, Hayek argues, is not a product of the epistemological 
evolutionary tradition with which he identifies himself (Hayek 1960: 61). In 
support of this view Hayek points out that Smith does not operate with such a 
model of selfish egotism - for though he argues that we seek to act in our 
interest, he does not assert that those interests are necessarily selfish (Hayek 
1978: 268). The source of the error that attributes homo oeconomicus to the 
Scots is, in Hayek's view, the unfortunate stress laid in the writings on the 
division of labour on selfishness (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 110). Hayek argues that 
this use of the term selfishness by the Scots is misleading: what they actually 
argue for is not selfishness so much as the pursuit of our own purposes, and 
these purposes may be either selfish or altruistic (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 145). 
Hayek argues that this represents a confusion of self-interest with selfishness. 
He writes: 'There is much confusion of the ideal that a person ought to be 
allowed to pursue his own aims with the belief that, if left free, he will or ought 
to pursue solely his selfish aims. The freedom to pursue one's own aims is, 
however, as important for the most altruistic person, in whose scale of values the 
needs of other people occupy a very high place, as for any egotist.' (Hayek 
1960: 78). 
Hayek recasts the problem in epistemological terms: In order to achieve our 
altruistic goals ought we to consider the effects of our actions on all 
individuals?64 This, he believes - owing to our limited knowledge and the 
unintended nature of the consequences of much of our action - is impossible 
63 Economic man is similarly rejected by Oakeshott (Oakeshott 1990: 53) and Popper (popper 
1966 yoU: 91, 100-101). 
64 As Gissurarson puts it Hayek is 'showing the empirical rather than the rnorallimits of 
benevolence' (Gissurarson 1987: 93). The point also distances Hayek from the Kantian 
tradition ofuniversalisation as a moral criterion. 
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(Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 121). In response he advances the view that the focusing of 
individual attention on that individual's own interests [whether selfish or 
altruistic] produces the most efficient use of resources: and the most efficient use 
of resources to achieve human ends is in the interests of all (Hayek 1978: 65). 
He notes: 'To enable the individual to use his knowledge and abilities in the 
pursuit of his self-chosen aims was regarded both as the greatest benefit 
government could secure to all, as well as the best way of inducing these 
individuals to make the greatest contribution to the welfare of others.' (Hayek 
1978: 133). 
Self-interest becomes a part of the discovery procedure of the market. By 
pursuing our own purposes in the most efficient manner we make the most 
efficient use of our own localised knowledge and contribute to the efficient use 
of the cumulative sum of human knowledge (Hayek 1993 vol.3: 70). Through a 
series of conventionally developed institutions men have produced the means of 
mutual adjustment that allows the materially efficient use of local knowledge.6' 
Market individuals are concerned with profit and not the position of others, but 
the effect their actions produce on price signals allows the others to adapt to 
their actions and encourages a mutual adaptation which makes for the most 
efficient use of knowledge (Hayek 1988: 104). Self-interest works for the 
general interest through institutions of mutual adjustment, what Smith called the 
invisible hand, but, owing to epistemological constraints, attempts to act in the 
general interest rarely work to secure the general interest. 66 For Hayek the 
interest that each individual has in common in a 'great society' is the pursuit 
their own purposes: their collective interest is in the creation of conditions that 
allow them to pursue their own concerns (llayek 1993 vol. 1 : 121).61 
6S The invisible hand that produces benign spontaneous orders. 
66 Indeed Hayek offers the suggestion that it is not individual selfislmess which is a danger to 
society but rather group selfishness in the fonn of pressure groups which threaten the system 
as a whole (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 90; 1993 vol.3: 89). Compare this with Smith's views on 
merchants and see also Popper (popper 1966 vol. 1 : 108) on totalitarianism as collective 
selfishness. The argument can also be related to the anthropological assertion that groups of 
humans are more likely to engage in conflict than individual humans (Wilson 1997: 227). 
67 Again Hayek disagrees with utilitarianism in its classical fonn, stating that humans do not 
have as their chief end happiness, but rather survival and the scope to pursue their own 
conceptions of happiness (Hayek 1988: 69). 
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Hayek argues, persuasively if we refer back to the sections on the Scots, 
that the Eighteenth Century conception of self-love or self-interest referred not 
just to individual selfishness, but rather to a concern for the self and those 
intimately related to one.68 Such self-love included love of family and friends 
(Hayek 1984: 139). True individualism of this sort includes the circles of 
intimates around each individual (Hayek 1984: 146). We are socialised within 
such circles of intimates (Hayek 1984: 324), into families and communities, and 
to abstract human motivations from them necessarily renders the motivational 
model unrealistic. Hayek develops this view in anthropological terms to show 
that it served an instrumental function in the small group societies in which men 
existed for millennia (Hayek 1988: 11). In such face-to-face societies the care 
for intimates, because of the small size of the groups, meant that the 
identification and pursuit of common ends was eminently possible (Hayek 1993 
vol.3: 164). However Hayek argue~ that we cannot transfer such models of 
small group emotional collaboration to the wider extended order that we have 
developed. It is simply not possible to extend the same emotional concern to a 
body of people outwith our ken (Hayek 1988: 18). Small group solidarity is an 
insufficient organisational principle for an extended order (Hayek 1993 vol.3: 
162), but this is not to say that such groups cannot operate within that order. As 
Hayek argues: 'Such an order which relies on people working with the effect of 
satisfying the wants of people of whom they do not know presupposes and 
requires somewhat different moral views, from one in which people serve visible 
needs.' (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 144). 
For Hayek the emotional ties [love] that bind us to those close to us are 
concrete; they apply to particular individuals and cannot be extended to the 
whole of a great society (Hayek 1993 vol.2: 1 SO). A view echoed in Popper and 
Polanyi's assertions that love is grounded on intimacy or familiarity, on 
knowledge of the other, in a sense which always renders it concrete and resistant 
to abstraction (popper 1966 vol.2: 235; Polanyi 1951: 21). Oakeshott writes 
similarly on friendship and intimacy where: 'attachment springs from an 
intimation offamiliarity' (Oakeshott 1991: 416). We may very well love 
68 What Kukathas refers to as 'molecular' rather than 'atomistic' individualism' (Kukathas 
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mankind, but such a love is far weaker than our care for those concrete 
individuals to whom we are close. Adapting Smith's view on the matter, Hayek 
argues that it is a feature of human psychology that, while we may find it 
difficult to take the life of a concrete individual, we have less problem with the 
notion of sacrificing individuals distant or unknown to us (Hayek 1984: 117). 
Such a feature of human psychology is akin to the limitations on human 
knowledge that we have already seen. We feel concern for those close to us and 
can act efficiently to assist them through our local knowledge of their particular 
circumstances.69 However epistemological and emotional restrictions prevent us 
from doing so for the care of the millions of others to whom we are related in 
the extended order (Hayek 1960: 84).70 And the consequence of this for Hayek 
is that each individual should be 'free to make full use of his knowledge and 
skill, that he must be allowed to be guided by his concern for the particular 
things of which he knows and for which he cares, ifhe is to make as great a 
contribution to the common purposes of society as he is capable of making. t 
(Hayek 1984: 140).71 Small group associations for common purposes exist 
within the extended order but do not characterise the order as a whole. 
Proximity and common concerns can be pursued through them in an efficient 
manner so long as the model is not extended to the whole of society (Hayek 
1993 voU: 47). The great society, then, includes networks of non-economic 
associations (Hayek 1993 voL2: 112). 
Hayek's arguments on the epistemological and emotional constraints placed 
on individuals by their nature lead him to assert that in an extended order 
individuals should focus their attention on what they know and on that sphere 
which they can effectively control or influence. He argues that this is the 
1989: 125). 
69 Hayek makes use of this in his ideal constitutional model where he argues that voting in the 
upper house should be a ballot of contemporaries in succeeding years (Hayek 1978: 117). 
70 <morality governs our actions towards otbers in much the same way that gravity governs the 
motions of the planets; its strength is in inverse proportion to the square of tbe distance 
between them' (Wilson 1997: 191). 
71 As with planning for whole societies more generally, diversity and limited knowledge will 
mean that individual visions of the nature of the plan will differ and conflict (Hayek 1993 
vol.3: 17). 
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function of the notion ofresponsibility.72 To hold that an individual is 
responsible for a certain sphere of action is to direct his attention towards its 
efficient use (Hayek 1960: 71). Prudence becomes admired as a virtue precisely 
because it has allowed survival and the efficient exploitation oflocal knowledge 
of circumstances (Hayek 1993 vol.3: 165). In terms of market relations in an 
extended order this means that we depend not on distant individuals' opinions or 
feelings for us, but rather on our ability to provide them with services which 
result from our exploitation of our own situation (Hayek 1960: 98). This 
argument is related to the earlier arguments we noted in Hayek's theory of the 
mind and perception. He argues that we understand the actions of others by 
analogy from our understanding of our own actions (Hayek 1980: 63). When 
we seek to understand the motivation behind the actions of others (Hayek 1967: 
59) we rely upon our knowledge of our own motivations (Hayek 1976: 133). 
We imagine what we would do, how we would react, in similar circumstances. 
In this sense we attribute purpose to the action of others with reference to our 
own understanding of how we would act, and upon what knowledge, 
classification and rules we would regard as relevant in like circumstances (Hayek 
1967: 55). Our understanding of others is a product of a sympathetic [in the 
Scots' sense] process (Hayek 1967: 58). This is a non-deliberative process on 
most occasions. We often cannot explain the rationale of the moral judgements 
that are produced by it (Hayek 1991: 151). Such moral judgements are not 
necessarily rationally or consciously calculated, but rather are based on a 
'feeling' of what ought to be done in given circumstances (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 
79). For this reason our moral code has developed in such a way that it is 
compatible with human feeling~ witll emotion (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 148). 
Morality is not designed or chosen, but is based on emotional approbation. 
Hayek writes: 'Ethics is not a matter of choice. We have not designed it and 
cannot design it. And perhaps all that is innate is the fear of the frown and other 
signs of disapproval of our fellows.' (Hayek 1993 vol. 3 : 167). Such a moral 
code, resting on approval and disapproval and the attribution of similar thought 
72 Wilson offers the suggestion that rules of etiquette and polite behaviour ease social 
interaction by indicating self-control on the part of those coming together. They are a short 
hand signal that an individual may be trustworthy (Wilson 1997: 83). 
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processes, leads us to assume that agents possess responsibility for their actions 
(Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 99). As a consequence our assessment of the merit of an 
action is subjective, it is based on our own understanding of how we would have 
acted: upon our judgement of 'situational propriety' (Butler 1983: 21). Hayek 
again: 'The merit of an action is in its nature something subjective and rests in a 
large measure on circumstances which only the acting person can know and the 
importance of which different people will assess very differently.' (Hayek 1967: 
258). Moral approbation and disapprobation are the product of the fact that we 
cannot step into the minds of others. We assess their actions and motivations in 
terms of our own understanding. Thus by holding an individual responsible for 
his actions and judging them in terms of approval or disapproval we seek to 
influence their behaviour. As Hayek notes: 'We assign responsibility to a man, 
not in order to say that as he was he might have acted differently, but in order to 
make him different' (Hayek 1960: 75). Individuals exist in a social environment 
and they react to the reactions of others to their actions. It is because of this 
that we adjust our actions to that which we believe will secure the approval of 
others (Hayek 1978: 19). Such a desire for approval is linked to the process of 
socialisation and imitation, we seek approval by acting in the expected manner in 
given situations and, as a result, a convention is developed which represents the 
'done thing' in that given situation (Hayek 1967: 48).73 In Oakeshott's terms we 
acquire 'the knowledge of how to behave well which belongs to our way of 
living' (Oakeshott 1991: 130), or a 'habit of ordinary decent behaviour' 
(Oakeshott 1991: 482), through a process of socialisation through which: 'Our 
conduct consists of activity assimilated to that of others in small, and for the 
most part unconsidered and unobtrusive, adjustments.' (Oakeshott 1991: 425).74 
This inter-subjectively generated standard of behaviour represents the 
conventional means by which we assess the morality of behaviour. Building on 
the arguments of Szasz, Hayek argues that a successful free society depends 
upon praise and blame in order to educate its members in the moral rules under 
13 Learning the 'done thing' in this sense depends on an awareness of context, on 'situational 
propriety', as di Zerega notes the notion of suitable behaviour is not the same for a workplace 
and a date (di Zerega 1997: 126). 
14 Note also that Oakeshott explicitly compares this process to the formation of price in a 
market (Oakeshott 1991: 471). 
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which it operates: socialisation requires both imitation and praiselblame to 
encourage such imitation (Hayek 1967: 233). Moral rules do not have their 
origin in a rational calculation that is subsequently consciously imposed upon a 
society (Hayek 1993 vol.2: 148)." It is the esteem of others that acts as the 
inducement to follow moral rules (Hayek 1993 vol. 3 : 170): especially the esteem 
of those close to us, whom we seek to imitate and for whom we care. These 
conventionally developed standards of behaviour are, for Hayek, the same as the 
notion of propriety to be found in the work of the Scots (Hayek 1993 vo!.3: 
203).76 Such unarticulated habitual conventions are often highly difficult to 
express in a precise form (Hayek 1993 vol.3: 19). They are more often than not 
'felt' rather than consciously deduced: like Smith's sympathy we know how we 
ought to behave and how we expect others to behave, but we undertake this 
process on a non-deliberative level. We 'feel' the right thing to do more often 
than we know why it is the right thing to do." 
Those who deviate from the standard are disapproved of or excluded from 
the group (Hayek 1993 vol.3: 171) and the standards become what Hayek calls, 
following Campbell, 'social-evolutionary inhibitory systems' (Hayek 1993 vol.3: 
175).78 The function of the human propensity to praise and blame, to pass moral 
judgement, is often to affect a change in the behaviour of the subject judged and 
to preserve the conventional mode of behaviour that is part of the order inducing 
practices of the society (Hayek 1960: 74).79 Hayek believes that these inhibitory 
systems have existed as long as human society and that in many cases conscience 
75 Oakeshott compares morality to language in the sense that 'it is not the creation of 
grammarians, it is made by speakers' (Oakeshott 1990: 78). He also notes that morality is not 
instrumental, but rather is procedural (Oakcshott 1990: 60-61). It is not concerned with end 
states but with the manner of actions. As he puts it: it 'intimatcs considerations to be 
subseribed to in making choices' (Oakeshott 1990: 79). 
76 See Oakeshott: 'And a moral language is a language of propricty, not of prudence.' 
(Oakeshott 1990: 80). 
77 This interpretation goes against that advanced by Petsoulas who views the impartial 
spectator as a fully conseious thought experiment rather than a metaphor for the innate 
emotional response of individuals to their fellows. 
78 Again Hayek makes use of this in his ideal constitutional model where he uses concepts of 
propriety and conscience as inhibitory devices applied to the members of the legislature (Hayek 
1993 vol.3: 32). 
79 Brennan and Pettit refer to such approbation as an 'intangible hand' because of its 
fundamentally unintentional nature. We do not intend to affect a change in another's 
behaviour by expressing our disapproval: we merely seck to express our disapproval (Brennan 
and Pettit 1993). 
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has become ingrained in human nature. Thus the 'bad conscience' that Hayek 
discerns in the atavism of socialism is the hangover of long-held, innate even, 
emotional responses from man's mill~nnia of life in small groups: they represent 
an example of 'evolutionary lag' (Hayek 1988: 64). Unfortunately such innate 
emotional responses are no longer appropriate in the extended order of a market 
society. We may sympathise with the misfortunes of individuals in a 
marketplace, but it would represent a naive anthropomorphism if we were to 
attribute blame for this misfortune to the market (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 79). Moral 
rules which have developed through this inter-subjective sympathetic process do 
not serve individual desires, but rather contribute to the functioning of the 
overall order by easing interaction and reducing uncertainty (Hayek 1978: 17). 
Ulrich Witt has described Hayek's theory of cultural evolution as 'sketchy 
and unfinished' (Witt 1994: 187tO and, as we noted in the Introduction. one of 
the most common criticisms levelled at Hayek's social theory is that he refers to 
the twin ideas of spontaneous order and evolution 'without indicating that there 
might be an important difference between the two' (Barry 1982: 35). Barry 
distinguishes between two 'interrelated' meanings of spontaneous order: 'a 
complex aggregate structure which is formed out of the uncoerced actions of 
individuals' as opposed to 'the evolutionary growth of laws and institutions 
through a kind of Darwinian "survival of the fittest" process' (Barry 1982: II, 
his italics).81 The key differen~e noted here is that between explanations of 
emergence and explanations of endurance (Ullman-Margalit 1978: 275-278; 
Petsoulas2001; 174; Nozick 1994: 314; Heath 1989: 108). Thisraisesthree 
issues. First a chicken and egg issue: which came first, spontaneous mutual 
adjustment by rule following or the evolution of rules which allowed such an 
80 Gamble refers to Hayek's evolutionism as 'ambiguous' (Gamble 1996: 187). . 
81 Similar arguments are advanced by Gissurarson who distinguishes between the 'co-
ordinating consequences of certain traditi.ons' and 'an evolutionary selection of traditions' 
(Gissurarson 1987: 61); by Kley who notes that 'he fails to distinguish two fundamentally 
different types of spontaneous order, orderly patterns of co-opcration forming within a given 
system of rules on the one side, and systems of rules developing in a process of cultural 
evolution by natural selection on the other' (Kley 1994: 21, 38-39) and by Petsoulas who 
observes that 'he seems to combine two types of evolutionary explanation. His description of 
the spontaneous formation of social order relies on what I shall call an "invisible hand" 
explanation. His account of the emergence and maintenance of rules of conduct employs a 
"functionalist evolutionary" explanation.' (Petsoulas 2001: 17). Related points can also be 
found in Brennan and Pettit (1993); Shearmur (1996a: lIS) and Gray (1986: 33-34). 
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order to form? The obvious response to this from what we have seen of the 
application of spontaneous order approach to the evolution of morals is that the 
rules are the result of evolution from an original conventional adjustment. As a 
result, though the mechanism of adjustment may differ from that of the 
endurance of patterns of adjustment, they are nonetheless intimately related. 
Thus in response to those who would separate the 'twin' ideas Hayek need only 
respond that he is aware that they are not identical twins and that, as with all 
twins, one is born first. 
The second substantive problem for Hayek is that, as noted before, there is 
nothing in the evolutionary approach that ensures liberal outcomes (Kley 1994: 
191; Paul 1988: 260, 272; Gray 1986: 142; Barry 1982: 16,30; La11998: 113). 
Evolution here is a descriptive process which in no way guarantees a liberal 
order. Ifliberal conclusions are to be drawn, then a further argument is 
required: as we put it in the introduction, a spontaneous order approach must be 
accompanied by an invisible hand argument which demonstrates the propensity 
of liberal orders to produce benign orders. By this reading the superiority of 
liberalism is purely instrumental. Freedom is justified from the epistemological 
efficiency that allows the development of benign orders and as such stands or 
falls on the examination of the evidence of social science. This leads Barry to 
note that Hayek faces a third problem: it may very well be the case that 'made' 
law would be more efficient in term~ of forming spontaneous orders than a legal 
system which has 'evolved' within a society (Barry 1982: 42; Buchanan 1977: 
33,37; Rothschild 2001: 145). In other words a set of liberal rules that was 
rationally constructed with the specific aim of inducing spontaneous orders may 
prove better suited to the job than gradually evolved rules. However, as we 
have seen, the epistemological argument that accompanies the spontaneous 
order approach explicitly denies this in the sense that immanent criticism of a 
tradition of knowledge is the most efficient reaction to circumstances. Thus any 
'made' legal order would have to draw on the traditional tacit knowledge of the 
members of the group in order to stand any chance of facilitating order. A 
similar line of argument might be used to excuse the critiques of functionalism 
that are applied to Hayek's work (Gray 1986: 138-41). Functionalist arguments 
in evolutionary thought are often accused of making an erroneous supposition of 
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functionality drawn from survival. Which is to say that what exists is assumed to 
be efficient or functional. For Hayek this is only the case to a limited degree. 
Hayek deals with systems of rules and as a result he is able to assert that a group 
has survived because its rules are comparatively more efficient. No claim is 
made about the optimality ofa set of rules. To attribute such a claim to Hayek 
is to ignore the arguments on the growth of knowledge and the possibility of 
immanent criticism. Moreover the arguments regarding the efficiency of a liberal 
order are drawn from the [empirical] epistemological arguments about the 
superiority of mutual adjustment mechanisms of an invisible hand type.82 
Hayek has provided us with a conjectural history of the origins of morality 
that approaches the generation of norms of behaviour in functional terms. Man 
is a sociable and habitual creature in·possession of limited knowledge and in 
search of stability of expectations. He forms conventions with others which, 
through imitation and socialisation, become a tradition of moral behaviour. This 
tradition adapts to changes in circumstances and evolves by trial and error on 
both deliberative and non-deliberative levels: which is to say that both group 
selection and individual experimentation playa role. Moral rules provide a 
species of stability of expectations by expressing the 'done thing' that is 
expected of group members. Moreover these rules embody knowledge in an 
unarticulated form such that they direct individuals away from socially disruptive 
or individually harmful behaviour. Moral practice has no other function than the 
facilitation of mutual adjustment within the group: it is part of the invisible hand 
that facilitates socially benign spontaneous orders. 
82 This is why we have consistently sought to distinguish between evolutionary and 
spontaneous order explanations on the one hand, and invisible hand arguments on the other. 
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Section Three: Law and Government 
Chapter 1: Law 
The modem Liberals follow Hume in arguing that language, like law, 
money and morality, was never invented but rather represents a grown 
'formation' (Hayek 1967: 113). This is to say that language shows a definite 
order which is not the result of deliberate design (Hayek 1979: 69; Popper 1972: 
117, 159-60). Language is a key feature of the classification process of the 
human mind (Hayek 1988: 106), but more importantly it is part of the shared 
classification process that develops amongst groups of sociable men (Hayek 
1976: 141-42; Oakeshott 1991: 40, 62). Language is a social phenomenon: it 
can only meaningfully be understood to have developed through an inter-
individual process of classification (Hayek 1984: 319). In this sense language is 
a spontaneous order which develops over a period of time, it is an adapted 
practice whose function is to facilitate communication (Hayek 1979: 71).1 As a 
result the spontaneous order approach is the correct approach to the analysis of 
language; and a conjectural history of language reveals the spontaneous nature 
of the order of language. Individuals are socialised within existing language 
traditions that allow them to make use of the experience-based classifications of 
their predecessors (Hayek 1976: 135). In brief, language represents a 
classificatory framework which embodies the knowledge of past generations 
(Hayek 1967: 86)? It is acquired and developed gradually by peoples (Hayek 
1979: 34-35) in such a manner that children acquire it through a process of 
imitative socialisation which grants them access to a conceptual and 
classificatory framework which is imbued with vast quantities of knowledge 
(Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 19).3 Hayek argues that the non-deliberative nature of 
1 Hayek stresses the evolving nature of our language. He notes that words can change 
meaning, and indeed attacks the perversion of language for political ends (Hayek 1988: 110; 
1991: 118). He also argues that languages are subject to the process or cultural evolution 
through group selection. Which is to say that the languages of less successful groups will pass 
out of use. In response to this he cautions against deliberate attempts to preserve such 
rractices for posterity by encouraging people to continue in them (Hayek 1960: 364). 
In Polanyi's view language is a skill displaying tacit knowledge which is acquired in a 
subsidiary, not a focal, manner (polanyi 1969: 145,204), for example we attend to the 
meaning of a letter and are only subsidiarily aware of the words and grammar used to express 
it. 
l Polanyi refers to the process as 'groping' for meaning (Polanyi 1958: 112). 
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language acquisition, through imitation, proceeds in a manner akin to habituation 
within a tradition.4 And as we noted with his treatment of reason as a cultural 
product, he is clear that language and reason develop together and can in no 
meaningful sense be considered as having been invented (Hayek 1978: 4). 
Moreover, as with other spontaneous formations, its role has to do with the 
reaction to our ignorance through the communication of knowledge. He argues: 
'The best illustration, perhaps, of how we constantly make use of the 
experience or knowledge acquired by others is the way in which, by 
learning to speak, we learn to classify things in a certain manner without 
acquiring the actual experiences which have led successive generations to 
evolve this system of classification. There is a great deal of knowledge 
which we never consciously know implicit in the knowledge of which we 
are aware, knowledge which yet constantly serves us in our actions, though 
we can hardly be said to "possess" it.' (Hayek 1979: 150 n. 9). 
Along with language there develop other practices and general rules that 
function to sustain human society. One of the most significant of these is the 
concept of private or, Hayek's preferred term, 'several' property (Hayek 1960: 
450). Several property has the effect of preventing coercion and disagreement 
within groups (Hayek 1960: 140). By creating an individual protected sphere 
(Hayek 1984: 264), defined by general rules of possession, groups prevent 
conflict between members over resources. Moreover, lIayek argues, such 
several property allows a decentralisation of effort which encourages the 
development and utilisation oflocal knowledge (Hayek 1988: 86). Several 
property provides individuals with i delineated area upon which to exercise their 
own knowledge for their own purposes (Hayek 1993 vo1.3: 152). Lest we 
consider this the result of a process of absolutely selfish acquisition, as the 
development of private property is often described, Hayek stresses that though 
this may in part be an accurate description of the motivations of the actors, the 
function fulfilled is quite different. The function of several property is to secure 
.. He cites Ferguson approvingly: 'The peasant, or tile child, can reason and judge, and speak 
his language, with a discernment, aconsisteney, and a regard to analogy, which perplex the 
logician, the moralist, and the grammarian, when they would find the principles upon which 
the proceeding is grounded, or when they would bring to general rule, what is so familiar. and 
so well sustained in particular cases.' (Hayek 1978: 39; 1993 vol. 1: 150 n. 17-19). 
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peace within groups and to encourage the exploitation of dispersed knowledge 
(Hayek 1988: 77). Abstract laws such as those governing property provide 
peace and a degree of stability of expectations (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 109). 
Expectations are stabilised if people are provided with a clearly delineated 
'known' sphere of action (Hayek 1960: 142), thus reducing conflict and 
allowing peaceful exploitation of resources. 5 General rules or conventions 
regarding property and contract are adopted because they fulfil these functions 
(Hayek 1978: 62). Even though the persistence of such conventions does not 
require the conscious realisation of this by those who submit to them. Several 
property is a product, in Hayek's view, of the process of cultural selection that 
we examined in the previous section (Hayek 1984: 321). Its peace maintaining 
and economic efficiency promoting functions mean that groups which adopt it 
survive and flourish more efficiently than those which do not. 
Thus far we have dealt with conventions that arise without the need for an 
institutional framework to ensure their effective operation, but as disputes 
inevitably arise over property claims social groups develop mechanisms to deal 
with them and maintain peace in the·group. Following the Scots, Hayek rejects 
great legislator and social contract approaches to the analysis of the origins of 
government on the grounds that they are historically inaccurate constructivist 
rationalist errors (Hayek 1993 voU: 10-11; 1960: 14; 1984: 183). Like Millar, 
Hayek believes that the project of instituting a system of government was 
beyond the scope of primitive human groups (Hayek 1993 vo1.1: 97)~ instead he 
argues that social institutions such as government are not designed to serve a 
specific purpose, but rather evolve as spontaneous orders to fulfil a function 
(Hayek 1993 voU: 38-39). The institution of government is a spontaneous 
formation that gradually evolves from practice (Hayek 1960: 57). Such 
institutions are adaptations to the circumstances and limited knowledge of 
primitive groups (Hayek 1993 vo1.I: 13) that seek to provide conflict resolution. 
Law for Hayek predates the conscious act oflawmaking (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 
134) and government is an institution which is developed to enhance and to 
enforce law that already exists in a customary sense (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 34). In 
5 As Barty puts it. Hayek argues for a causal not a logical connection between laws and 
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an approach which closely mirrors that ofHume, Hayek argues that once people 
come to settle in one place (Hayek 1988: 41) and have selected a chief on 
criteria of ability (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 41), such a chief becomes the first 
lawmaker (Hayek 1960: 151).6 He develops the role of 'judge-king' (Hayek 
1984: 358), whose role it is to interpret existing practice to resolve problem 
situations. His authority to fulfil this task is based solely on the 'opinion' (Hayek 
1993 vol.1: 12) of those who are subject to his authority that he is entitled to 
wield it.' The role of the chiefis to rule on disputes, to plug gaps or to clarify 
customary practice in order to resol~e intra-group conflicts (Hayek 1993 vol.l: 
100).8 The chief has two primary roles which are at the heart of all governments 
and which have subsequently developed. The first role is to maintain order 
(Hayek 1993 vol.1: 76) by enforcing the traditional or customary rules of the 
group, and the second is to issue commands to secure specific goals [such as the 
command oran army in war] designed to achieve communal purposes (llayek 
1993 vol. 1 : 77). These two functions of the chief are fundamentally the same as 
the functions of modem governments. However the first function, of enforcing 
and clarifying rules to maintain order, is clearly the more important in Hayek's 
view, for it is this function which makes an extended society possible by 
resolving intra-group disputes (liayek 1993 vol.3: 33-34). 
The articulation of conventional practice that occurs when a chief arbitrates 
in a dispute is, for Hayek. the origin oflaw in the modern sense.9 He defines the 
nature of law in the following terms: 'The law will consist of purpose-
independent rules which govern the conduct of individuals towards each other, 
freedom (Barry 1979: 101). 
6 For this reason Oakeshott noles that the office and occupant are coeval, that the opinion that 
a certain person should decide a case is coeval with the recognition of chiefs (Oakesholt 1990: 
IS4). He also expresses the view that all states originate as monarchies as the most 'natural' 
form of conflict resolution is the appeal to a great man (Oakesholt 1990: 189). 
1 Hayek, Popper and Oakeshott all accept Hume's view that government is based on opinion 
(Hayek 1979: SI~ 1980: 60~ 1993 voU: SS~ 1993 vol.2: 13~ 1993 vol.3: 33~ 1978: 82, 8S~ 
1960: 103) (popper 1966 voU: 122) (Oakeshott 1990: IS6). The only dissenting voice is 
Polanyi who doubts the universality of understanding authority as based on opinion, arguing 
that fear can in some cases, his example is Stalin, hold a whole people in sway (polanyi 1958: 
224). 
8 Jacobs notes in this regard that the difference between a judge and a scientist or businessman 
lies in the fact that the judge does not choose his problem situation but rather is provided with 
it by those who bring cases (Jacobs 1998: 17). 
9 Menger follows a similar line of argument (Menger 1996: 216). 
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are intended to apply to an unknown number of future instances, and by defining 
. 
a protected domain of each, enable an order of actions to form itself wherein the 
individuals can make feasible plans.' (Hayek 1993 vo1.1: 85-86; see also 1993 
vo1.1: 122). Thus when he writes of a society that functions under the rule of 
law he is referring to a 'meta-legal doctrine' (liayek 1960: 206) which prescribes 
that legislation should be conducted in line with the above definition of what 
makes a law. Hayek seeks to underline this point because there has been a 
historic confusion about the nature of law. This confusion arises from the two 
distinct roles that formed around the position of early chiefs. There are two 
'types' oflaw which Hayek describes as: 'The use of enforceable generic rules in 
order to induce the formation of a self-maintaining order and the direction of an 
organization by command towards particular purposes' (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 55; 
see also 1993 vo1.3: 120). The two senses oflaw represent two different 
functions of government: the formation and articulation of general rules is law 
properly understood, while the issuing of administrative commands is a species 
oflegislation (Hayek 1978: 112; 1993 vol.3: 100). 
Law and legislation represent two different functions of the institution of 
government (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 126-28). Legislation develops from the 
execution of the commands of the legislator in the pursuit of the service 
functions of government (Hayek 1993 vol.3: 42).10 Law on the other hand is 
generalised rules of just conduct which apply to the whole of society and whose 
aim is to stabilise expectations rather than to secure a specific outcome (Hayek 
1993 vo1.2: 34). Hayek is quite clear that law is necessary for the formation of 
other spontaneous orders (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 112) in that it provides a stability 
of expectation and a regularity of behaviour which allows mutual adaptation. ll 
Laws, as Hume argued, must be general in form, known and certain, so that they 
. 
can facilitate the formation of a spontaneous order by enhancing the stability of 
expectations (Hayek 1960: 208). By this understanding laws are instrumental. 
He notes: 'When we call them "instrumental", we mean that in obeying them the 
10 Hayek is keen to stress that the definition of what makes a law is not that it is the will of a 
legislator, but rather that it rests on a notion of gradually developed general rules (Hayek 1993 
yoU: 73). The failure oflegal positivism to grasp the significance of the general formal 
requirements of what makes a law is, for Hayek, its greatest failing (Hayek 1993 vo1.3: 129). 
II See also Oakeshott (1990: 141) and Popper (1966 vo1.2: 132-33). 
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individual still pursues his own and not the lawgiver's ends. Indeed, specific 
ends of action, being always particulars, should not enter into general rules. The 
law will prohibit killing another person or killing except under conditions so 
defined that they may occur at any time or place, but not the killing of particular 
individuals.' (Hayek 1960: 152). Such generalised conditions applied to all 
provide a solid order within which individuals are able to plan their actions 
(Hayek 1993 vo1.1: 121). Moreover such generalised rules in the form oflaw 
serve an epistemological function. They add to our knowledge not only by 
stabilising our expectations but also because they embody the experience of past 
generations' attempts to facilitate suchan order (Hayek 1960: 157). 
Hayek views law as an institution that is discovered from prior practice 
rather than consciously created (Hayek 1993 vo1.1: 78). In the development of 
the institution of government we saw how chiefs appealed to commonly held 
ideas about just behaviour in order to settle disputes and it is in this sense that 
law pre-exists its enforcement or its conscious articulation (Hayek 1993 vo1.I: 
96). In a similar vein Oakeshott draws a distinction between morality not being 
the product of reason, and laws, as articulations ofmoratity, being attempts at 
the rational expression of moral practice (Oakcshott 1991: 479). This is also 
what lies behind Popper's assertion that the moral framework differs from the 
legal framework and encompasses it (popper 1989: 351). One implication of 
law pre-existing its enforcement is that chiefs [and governments more generally] 
will only enforce, or be able to enforce, laws that are widely accepted as 
conforming to the extant practices of the society (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 51). Such 
a limitation on lawmakers implies that those laws which are articulated will exist 
as customarily accepted practices which have grown up out of the experience of 
circumstances of past generations (Hayek 1993 voU: 170~ 1960: 157~ Polanyi 
1958: 223). Chief among the experiences that will have emerged will be those 
which facilitate order among the social group (Hayek 1993 vo1.l: 123): for 
example property conventions which prevent disputes over ownership. Law is 
'grown' from experience and articulated from a pre-existing convention rather 
than consciously created (Hayek 1993 vo1.1: 95). 
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The articulation or discovery oflaw was initially undertaken by chiefs who 
assumed the role of judge (Hayek 1984: 369).12 Codification by these figures, 
judge-made law, does not represent the creation oflaw, but rather the 
articulation of customary conventions (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 116-17; 1960: 148) 
and the role of the judge is to provide a generalised articulation of current 
practice. These generalised articulations clarify conventional practice and 
further stabilise expectations by setting precedents. In this sense it is regularities 
of behaviour that are necessary to facilitate the formation of spontaneous order: 
the more stable the regularities, the more extensive the order that may form. 
The first law-making was not a conscious attempt to secure a particular set of 
material results, but rather was an unintended consequence of the attempt to 
enhance the ordering devices of the society in reaction to a particular case 
(Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 115).13 As Hayek puts it: 
'The efforts of the judge are thus part of that process of adaptation of 
society to circumstances by which the spontaneous order grows. He assists 
in the process of selection by upholding those rules which, like those which 
have worked well in the past, make it more likely that expectations will 
match and not conflict. He thus becomes an organ of that order. But even 
when in the performance of this function he creates new rules, he is not a 
creator of a new order but a servant endeavouring to maintain and improve 
the functioning of an existing order. And the outcome of his efforts will be 
a characteristic instance of those "products of human action but not of 
human design" in which the experience gained by the experimentation of 
generations embodies more knowledge than was possessed by anyone.' 
(Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 119). 
The interpretation of conventional behaviour applied to specific situations 
that is undertaken by judges (Hayek 1993 vo!.l: 123) represents the evolution of 
the law. Law is not designed, but rather 'It is the outcome of a process of 
12 And later by lawyers in the sense that a lawyer making a case appeals to pre-cxisting 
standards and seeks to shape the judgement in favour of his client (Hayek 1993 vol. I : 69). 
13 Oakeshott describes the process as one of 'ruling' in the sense of the articulation of rules 
rather than the issuing of commands to secure a particular purpose (Oakeshott 1991: 380, 
427). The articulation of law ['lex' for Oakeshott] is 'adverbial'. it refers to conditions to be 
followed in self-chosen actions (Oakeshott 1990: 263; 1983: 130): thus civil association is a ' 
rule-articulated association' (Oakeshott 1990: 124). 
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evolution in the course of which spontaneous growth of customs and deliberate 
improvements of the particulars of an existing system have constantly 
interacted.' (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 100).14 
Further if law in the form of general rules is an adaptation to the limited 
nature of individual knowledge then this implies that lawmakers are similarly 
constrained by their limited knowledge (Hayek 1960: 158). Government 
properly understood, in Hayek's view, always proceeds in a general manner 
(Hayek 1960: 226), which is to say that its enactments are always in the form of 
general rules (Hayek 1993 vol.3: 37). Lawmaking, it follows, is the process of 
making or articulating general rules which will apply to the whole of society 
(Hayek 1978: 100). And while these general rules have to be enforced in order 
for society to operate (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 97), the government should act to 
enforce them only in line with other generalised rules. That is to say, the 
legislative and service functions (command functions) of government ought to be 
circumscribed by generic rules. For Hayek the legitimacy of a government rests 
not only on its following its own general rules, in the form of a constitution, but 
in its issuing enactments which take the form of general rules (I Jayek 1993 vol. 1 : 
92-93). 
Hayek gives the name Rules of Just Conduct to his conception of the 
procedural general rules that make social interaction possible. He defines these 
as: 'those end-independent rules which serve the formation of a spontaneous 
order, in contrast to the end-dependent rules of organization.' (Hayek 1993 
vol.2: 31). We should pause to note here that such a definition does not limit 
the rules of just conduct to law but instead encompasses the whole range of 
conventions regarding proper conduct.l~ It is in this sense that the rules of just 
conduct are 'constitutive' of a social group, they characterise the association and 
are the common bond which holds it together (Kley 1994: 182). The rules of 
just conduct apply to the lawmaking function of government rather than to the 
service function. They have no particular end in view and act as procedural 
guidelines for behaviour (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 133). Rules of just conduct are, in 
14 Hayek is therefore attracted to the common law tradition with its stress on precedent and 
gradual change. For an examination of the evolution of the common law and the Law 
Merchant see Benson (1990) and Trakman (1983). 
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form, abstract, general and universal. They conform to Hume's conception of 
general rules in that they refer to 'types' of behaviour in given circumstances 
rather than to the specific actions of identifiable actors (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 88). 
They do not command us how to act by laying down goals, and in this sense are 
they negative and end-independent: they are aimed at limiting the range of 
possible actions rather than guaranteeing a particular action (Hayek 1993 vol.2: 
82). Rules of just conduct are limitations of uncertainty rather than guarantors 
of certainty (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 124): they stabilise expectations by reducing the 
field of possibilities. 16 
Hayek believes that, like other social institutions, the rules of just conduct 
have been evolved in a gradual manner to help us deal with our ignorance of the 
complexity of our society (Hayek 1960: 66). And while such rules provide a 
better chance of successful action without guaranteeing results, they have 
nonetheless contributed to the growing complexity of society (Hayek 1993 
voI.2: 126). For example, Hayek notes how rules of just conduct support trade 
and the price system, but leave them free mutually to adjust rather than prescribe 
a notion of value. He writes: 
'the rules serve to provide information for the decision of individuals, and 
thus help to reduce uncertainty, but they cannot determine what use the 
individual can make of this information and therefore also not eliminate all 
uncertainty. They tell each individual only what are the particular things he 
can count on being able to use, but not what the results of his use will be so 
. far as these depend on the exchhnge of the product of their efforts with 
others.' (Hayek 1993 vol.2: 123). 
Rules of just conduct improve the chances of all by providing a guide to be 
considered in the formation of individual plans of action (Hayek 1993 voI.2: 
130). As they do not guarantee particular results they cannot be rules of 
distribution or organisation. They refer to commutative rather than distributive 
justice (Hayek 1978: 139) in that they refer to procedural regularities and not 
absolute certainties. As Hayek notes: 'Since only situations which have been 
created by human will can be called just or unjust, the particulars of a 
15 As noted by Jacobs (1998: 22; 2000: 52). 
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spontaneous order cannot be just or unjust: if it is not the intended or foreseen 
result of somebody' s action that A should have much and B little, this cannot be 
called just or unjust.' (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 33). In this sense the concept of social 
justice cannot be justice in the same sense as understood by following rules of 
just conduct. The pursuit of particular, certain, distributive results cannot 
depend on general rules which apply to all actors because it implies treating 
actors in a different manner depending on a criterion of desert (Hayek 1993 
vo1.2: 82-83, 135). This, of course, also means, significantly, that by treating 
individuals in different manners in the pursuit of distributive justice we lose the 
expectation stabilisation achieved by following generalised rules. 
Hayek believes that the institution of justice evolves and is gradually 
discovered from the conventions of human behaviour, and that this is what is at 
the heart of the much-abused term 'natural law' (Hayek 1967: 101).17 Justice, 
he argues, is possible in an extended society precisely because it relies on 
agreement only over general rules of behaviour and not over the pursuit of 
. 
specific individual purposes (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 15). We agree over rules of 
behaviour and need not come to an agreement over the ends of our actions 
within the framework these rules create (Hayek 1978: 61). These general rules 
proscribe types of action but make no reference to the ends at which legitimate 
actions aim. Hayek terms the order that spontaneously arises from such a 
process as a 'cosmos' or 'nomocracy': an order which results from the 
adherence to abstract general rules with no agreement as to ends (Hayek 1978: 
76). Justice in this sense of generalised rules, or rules of just conduct, is an 
adaptation to the imperfections of individual human knowledge (Hayek 1993 
vol. 2: 127). Thus the interplay of general rules with circumstances produces an 
abstract or extended order (Hayek 1967: 92), which is just in that it was 
procedurally legitimate, but which has no conception of justice in the sense of 
desert or desired end-state. 18 
16 See above Part Three, Section Two, Chapter 2. 
17 It is apparent that Hayek's theory of the origins oflaw and justice, with its stress on tile role 
of non-deliberative phenomena such as opinion and convention, is significantly different from 
iliat of Kant (Gissurarson 1987: 148). 
\8 Hayek compares such a notion of justice to Popper's evolutionary falsificatory model of 
science (Hayek 1993 vol.2: 42-43), arguing iliat it eliminates ilie illegitimate without 
identifying or asserting a certain end-state. 
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Moreover, because justice refers to ways of acting, it deals with choices 
about how to act, and such choices posit a notion of a responsible agent. In this 
way Hayek rejects end-state approaches to distributive justice because they 
approach the results of human interaction as though they were the results of 
intended action (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 38). This anthropomorphic misapprehension 
neglects the decisive fact that where there is no responsible agent acting with 
intent there can be no meaningful discussion of justice (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 70).19 
It is not the end-state that is properly understood as just, but rather the 
procedure of getting to the end-state (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 32). As Hayek puts it: 
'justice is not concerned with the results of the various transactions but only 
with whether the transactions themselves are fair.' (Hayek 1993 vo1.1: 141). If 
we adopt the end-state view it would be possible, in Hayek's opinion, to regard 
the results of the market as unjust: but in order to speak of them as just we 
would have to attribute agency and responsibility, to view them as having been 
deliberately intended (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 64). The market order [on a systemic 
level] cannot be viewed like this, as it is precisely Hayek's point that it operates 
inter-individually and produces unintended consequences. It is nonsense to talk 
about the unintended consequences of human interaction in terms of justice?O 
The spontaneous social order is the framework for the attainment of 
individual goals (Hayek 1979: 145). It allows the efficient use and co-ordination 
of dispersed knowledge to the benefit of the whole of society (Hayek 1960: 
223). For example the rules of property, as part of the framework, delineate 
secure individual spheres of influence that allow the efficient use of individual 
knowledge of particular local circumstances (Hayek 1960: 350)?1 The 
framework has no active purpose of its own but rather serves the purposes of 
individuals. As we have seen the framework of general rules [both non-
deliberative custom and conventions and deliberatively articulated laws] 
facilitates the formation of order by stabilising expectations. This process is 
19 A view shared by Oakeshott in his discussion of civil association (Oakeshott 1990: 148, IS3 
n.l). 
20 Or as Oakeshott puts it, Law is not impartial between wants but 'indifferent' to them 
(Oakeshott 1990: 243). 
21 Thus the rules of property form part of the invisible hand argument drawing on the idea of 
epistemological efficiency. 
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perverted by attempts to secure particular results for particular individuals 
. 
through notions such as social justice. Hayek asserts that: 'as they operate 
through the expectations that they create, it is essential that they be always 
applied, irrespective of whether or not the consequences in a particular instance 
seem desirable.' (Hayek 1960: 158). It is not the effect in particular cases, 
which gives the framework of general rules its legitimacy, but the improved 
chances of all as a result of the universal application of the rules (Hayek 1993 
vo1.2: 127).22 Such general rules are not aimed at the securing of particular 
human needs, but rather at the preservation of the overall order which allows 
individuals to pursue their needs (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 2).23 Justice is concerned 
with results only so far as they pertain to the legitimacy of the process or means 
of attaining them (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 39). Ajudge must confine his attention to 
the assessment of actions in terms of conformity with established rules rather 
than with any concern for the particular results which individuals produce under 
those rules (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 87). In this sense results which appear unjust 
might actually have arisen by a just process and so must be considered just if the 
general rules are to fulfil their function (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 42). The desire to 
correct the material situation of individuals whose lot is the result of a process 
that is just destroys the fabric of the system and harms all individuals by 
introducing a species of arbitrary action which destabilises expectations (Hayek 
1988: 19). 
Justice is not, strictly speaking, concerned with specific results of human 
interaction; rather it is a process that is typified by the following of general rules 
(Hayek 1993 vol.2: 70). In this way the rule of law, as the conditions of justice, 
operates in the same manner as the rules ofa game (Hayek 1991: 62).24 The 
rules of justice specify generic conditions whose effects upon particular 
. 
individuals are unknown (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 11). If general rules are to succeed 
22 Hence the references to Hayek as a 'system utilitarian'. 
23 This links into an argument, also drawn from Hume, about the desirability of encouraging 
individuals to view the operation of the law in terms of long-tenn advantages. The 
preservation of the overall order is in the long-term advantage of all individuals and the law 
has evolved to support this notion. See Hayek (1988: 58; 1984: 140, 144; 1993 vo1.2: 29,114, 
122*; 1993 vo1.3: 29). The argument is essentially system-utilitarian in character. 
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in stabilising expectations they must operate in unforeseen, and unforeseeable, 
future instances (Hayek 1991: 57). They become a part of the circumstances to 
which individuals adapt themselves, but in such a way that they are 'blind' 
(Hayek 1991: 76) to the particular effects of each individual's attempts at 
adaptation. General rules cannot determine specific outcomes of the adaptive 
process (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 126), they do not determine human action but rather 
limit the field of choice of actions in order to stabilise expectations and promote 
the formation of order (Hayek"1993 vol.l: 127)?~ They are instrumental and 
like the rules of a game they introduce a degree of stability into the conduct of 
the players (Hayek 1991: 56). Moreover the rules themselves constitute the 
game~ chess, for example, is constituted by its rules.26 
Similarly, as part of this overall framework which forms the rule ofIaw, 
there exists a conception of a 'constitution' (Hayek 1960: 219): a conception of 
a law limiting the activities of government in terms of rules in order to stabilise 
expectations by limiting changes to those rules. This 'framework of universal 
rules' (Hayek 1993 vo1.3: 131) lays down conditions and forms of behaviour 
within which the actions of government must remain. Judges are able to decide 
in line with the general rules of such a framework on the permissibility of the 
actions ofagovernment (Hayek 19~3 vol.3: 122). By limiting the scope for 
action held by a government in this manner (Hayek 1960: 222) the expectations 
of individuals are further stabilised by the prevention of arbitrary changes to the 
legal framework. There is however no need for this framework to represent a 
monolithic and eternal form. Though the imperfect nature of our knowledge 
prevents us from understanding the totality of the order which the constitutional 
framework supports, we are nonetheless able to reform the general character of 
the constitution so long as we do not seek to make it serve the purposes of 
24 A point which he credits Smith with reaJising (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 71). See also above on 
the constitutive nature of the rules ofa game ['not cricket' example]. Part Three, Section Two, 
Chapter 2. 
2S We should note here that several critics of Hayek have raised the point that nothing in this 
analysis of general rules guarantees a respect for individual freedom (Jacobs 1999: 7). Brittan 
highlights this point by the example of the Scottish Sabbath laws under which a general rule is 
restrictive of freedom of action (Brittan 1987: 62). 
26 Kley however rejects the game metaphor, arguing that, as the 'cards' arc not reshuffied at 
the end of each round, the process lacks the common start point associated with game playing 
(Kley 1994: 99). 
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particular individuals (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 41). Though many of the general rules 
that serve to aid the function of society may be considered to have developed as 
a spontaneous order from a process of unintended consequences, it is possible to 
attempt the gradual reformation of these rules in line with experience (Oakeshott 
1991: 422). This is permissible, in Hayek's view, so long as these reforms stick 
to the generalisation criteria and continue the function of the law in providing 
the general conditions for the formation of spontaneous orders within society 
(Hayek 1993 vo1.1: 45). For Hayek progress in relation to law and government 
is the gradual refinement of the framework of institutions that enhances the 
spontaneous order of society ~ayek 1993 vo1.3: 169~ 1991: 14). It is possible 
to design conscious additions to the framework based upon experience, and it is 
planning in this sense, the planning of the framework, which Hayek believes is 
. 
not only possible but desirable (Hayek 1980: 135). The framework of general 
rules that typifies the rule of law should be continuaJly adjusted to new 
circumstances as they emerge and are experienced (Hayek 1991: 29). The 
adjustment will not reduce stability of expectations so long as the resulting 
reformed rules are not retroactive and are laid down in a generalised form. All 
the same such reforms must bear in mind that they are reforms to the framework, 
they ought to be consistent with the rest of the framework in order to facilitate 
the stability of expectations necessary for mutual adjustment and the utilisation 
of dispersed knowledge. This is especially clear in economic matters where the 
co-ordinative efficiency of competition means that reform of the framework, 
from considerations of epistemological efficiency, ought to encourage those 
mechanisms which, from experience, are the most efficient (Hayek 1991: 27; 
1967: 263). 
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Chapter 2: The Role of Government 
Having passed through a conjectural history of the evolution of social 
institutions we may now move on to some of the practical conclusions that the 
modem liberals draw from their application of the spontaneous order approach . 
. 
Hayek, in particular, is clear that there are definite lessons to be learned from the 
conjectural analysis of cultural evolution?7 The most significant lesson for the 
modems is that freedom is justified as an instrument to secure certain other 
values that are taken for granted as being desirable?8 The role of government in 
this process is viewed from this perspective through the medium of the 
spontaneous order approach. As we noted above, Hayek argues that there are 
two distinct functions that are performed by all governments. We identified the 
enactments which express these functions separately as law and legislation29: 
where law is the articulation of generalised rules of just conduct and legislation 
is an administrative command to procure a service function (Hayek 1993 vol.2: 
6~ 1993 vol.3: 14,23). While these functions are both performed by the same 
institution, government, he cautions against conflating them?O The two 
functions are separate (Hayek 1993 vo1.1: 48), they aim at different ends and 
they are enacted in different mimners. This difference in function leads Hayek to 
27 Wilhelm notes that Hayek uses the conclusions of his social scientific approach to 
'preclude' certain possible courses of institutional change (Wilhelm 1972: 170)~ and Heath is 
clear that the conjectural nature of the explanation leaves room for reform of the actual 
institutions guided by the principles of evolution and spontancous order (Heath 1989: 109-10). 
As de Vlieghere puts it: 'The idea that the conjectural explanation of the origin and the 
success of certain institutions is useful in assessing their value in a changed society, 
presupposes on the one hand a functionalist confidence in spontaneous selection of the more 
functional institutions, and on the other hand a possibility of rational reform based on 
historical research and "immanent criticism"'. (De Vlieghere 1994: 294). 
28 As De Crespigny notes, in order truly to undermine Hayek's instrumental approach one 
must either disagree with the values which he believes freedom serves (rising living 
standards), or argue that the market does not do what he claims that it does. In this sense a 
cogent criticism of Hayek's work. is bound to take place on his own ground (De Crespigny 
1976: 56). 
29 Though Hayek himself does not make the distinction in quite these terms, continuing to 
refer to legislation in both senses but distinguishing between the nature of the 'law' produced 
(Hayek 1993 vol.3: 47-48). KJey breaks our two functions of government into six tasks which 
fit broadly into the criteria used above to distinguish law from legislation (Kley 1994: 84-87). 
30 Smith suggests a similar distinction: 'To judge whether such retaliations are likely to 
produce such an effect, does not, perhaps, belong so much to the science of a legislator, whose 
deliberations ought to be governed by general principles which are always the same, as to the 
skill of that insidious and crafty animal, vulgarly called a statesman or politician.' (Slnith 
1981: 468). 
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suggest a constitutional model that assigns the two functions to different houses 
ofa bi-cameral assembly (Hayek 1993 vol.3: 8; 1960: 207). His reasoning in 
support of this is that the aims and enactments required to pursue each function 
differ, and that there is a real danger should we confuse the articulation of 
general rules of just conduct with the issuing of administrative commands 
(Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 138). Hayek explains this difference in the following terms: 
'The rules required [to facilitate the provision of public services] will clearly be 
in the nature of rules of organization aiming at particular results, rather than 
rules of just conduct delimiting private spheres; and their content will be 
determined chiefly by considerations of efficiency or expediency rather than of 
justice.' (Hayek 1993 vol. 3 : 48; see also 1993 vol.3: 120). By allocating 
different functions to different houses of Parliament Hayek hopes to prevent a 
confusion of the methods required to pursue the different functions of 
government, to prevent the confusion of law properly understood with 
government edicts designed to secure a particular material result (Hayek 1984: 
354). 
The more important of the two functions of government is the enhancement 
of the framework of general rules which facilitates the spontaneous order of 
society (Hayek 1967: 102).31 Hayek believes that the service functions of 
government are subsidiary to the task of articulating the general rules of 
behaviour that allow society to exist.32 As we have noted in some detail the 
formation of spontaneous orders within society requires stable general rules that 
allow the degree of stability of expe~tation required to facilitate mutual 
adjustment. It falls to government to articulate those regularities which facilitate 
social order (Hayek 1993 vol.1: 133; 1993 vo1.2: 11). This being the case, the 
lawmaker must be aware that his task is not the implementation of a particular 
pre-designated pattern of order, or the organisation of individuals into a desired 
order, but rather it is his role to provide the conditions of relative epistemic 
certainty - stability of expectations - which allow individuals mutually to adjust 
and to create an order between them which will be spontaneous in form (Hayek 
31 Oakeshott expresses a similar view on the importance of the legal framework for market 
relations, with the role of government being 'the provision and custody of general rules of 
conduct.' (Oakeshott 1991: 403, 424). 
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1960: 159). Thus the lawmaker intends that there be order, but his actions do 
not determine the precise nature of the order which results. As Hayek puts it: 
'we can produce the conditions for the formation of an order in society, but 
we cannot arrange the manner in which its elements will order themselves 
under appropriate conditions. In this sense the task of the lawgiver is not to 
set up a particular order but merely to create conditions in which an orderly 
arrangement can establish and ever renew itself.' (Hayek 1960: 161). 
We should note at this point that Hayek relates this argument to his belief in 
the existence of concrete epistemic limitations on the ability of government to 
act efficiently. As we will see below, he believes that it is impossible for a 
government to centralise the knowledge necessary to plan a social order in 
detail. This leads to the superior efficiency of self-adjustment and spontaneous 
order formation. The task of government is restricted by the 'knowledge 
problem' (Hayek 1979: 178; 1967: 264), and its lawmaking function is shaped 
by a desire to make use of the spont~neous ordering devices that arise when 
individuals can rely on generalised rules of behaviour which provide stability of 
expectations. As we noted in the section on the origin of government the 
generalised rules are not rationally constructed by a government, but rather 
represent articulations of established opinion. Such is the importance of public 
opinion to the continued existence of any government that its actions will always 
be to a certain extent guided or circumscribed by it (Hayek 1993 vo1.1: 55). If 
the law is to be effective in stabilising expectations and inducing order, then it 
must be acceptable to the majority of the population. As Hayek notes: 'To 
become legitimized, the new rules have to obtain the approval of society at large 
- not by a formal vote, but by gradually spreading acceptance.' (Hayek 1993 
vol. 3 : 167). Government is limited as to the form that these generalised rules of 
conduct can take by the opinion of the people among whom they seek to induce 
order.33 One consequence of this is that the enactments of government ought to 
be restricted to areas where it is possible to secure an agreement of the majority 
(Hayek 1991: 45). This agreement need not be formally achieved, but ifit were 
32 It is for this reason that the general rule-fonning chamber is the upper house in his model. 
33 It is this view which lies behind Hayek's comment that: 'a spontaneous order may rest in 
part on regularities which are not spontaneous but imposed.' (Hayek 1978: 74). 
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not at least possible then the enforcement of the general rule would require a 
degree of arbitrary coercive effort by the government which would destabilise 
expectations and prompt disorder.34 
While we have noted that Hayek's intention is for government to provide a 
stable framework of general rules guided by the opinion of the people to be 
governed, we should also be aware that this is not by any means an inertial 
model. For Hayek the minimal state does not mean a state that does not act. He 
argues that when Smith spoke out against intervention by government he was 
referring only to actions by government which impinged on the protected 
spheres of individuals (Hayek 1960: 220). The enforcement of general rules 
does not represent interference by the government within the spontaneous order 
of society, but rather enhances the regularities necessary for the formation 
spontaneous order (Hayek 1960: 221). The reform of those general rules, so 
long as it is carried out in the specified manner of couching the rules in general 
terms guided by opinion, does not represent interference in the order. Rather it 
should be considered as a process of refinement (Hayek 1993 vol.2: 128). Such 
reform of the framework, properly undertaken, is a necessary part of the 
functional efficiency of the society as a whole (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 68). Hayek's 
metaphor for this is of a gardener: 'The attitude of the liberal towards society is 
like that of the gardener who tends a plant and in order to create the conditions 
most favourable to its growth must know as much as possible about its structure 
and the way it functions.' (Hayek 1991: 14). 
Our analysis thus far has stressed the non-deliberative and unintended 
nature of the development of social institutions and so the question remains as to 
where human agency and purposive rationality fit into the spontaneous order 
approach. As De Vlieghere notes: 'Societies are built on the undesigned 
accumulation of inventions, each of which, taken separately, could be the result 
of design.' (De Vlieghere 1994: 299). It stands to reason that, though the rules 
which facilitate the formation of spontaneous orders are often the product of a 
34 This is partly why Hayek is so distrustful of pressure groups whom he believes endanger 
this process by demanding minority opinions be foisted on the whole population (Hayek 1980: 
116; 1993 vol. 3 : 11). Polanyi expresses a similar view on the role of opinion in political 
change: 'Public opinion is constantly making adjustments in these matters by custom and 
legislation' (polanyi 1946: 56). 
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process of evolution, there is no reason why this is necessarily always the case 
(Gissurarson 1987: 64; Jacobs 1998: 22). Consciously 'made' rules in the 
correct generalised form might equally allow for spontaneous mutual 
adjustments (Heath 1989: 108). Moreover, spontaneously evolved rules are 
themselves subject to intentional reform (Jacobs 2000: 53). Part of Hayek's 
critique of constructivist rationalism was that this sort of intentional reform was 
being undertaken in a manner which risked destroying the benefits gained from 
evolved rules by ignoring the knowledge which is inherent in them. This 
however is not the same as saying that reform is impossible, or that reason is 
powerless to improve the efficiency of the framework of general rules. 
This is precisely the line of argument advanced by Christina Petsoulas in her 
critique of Hayek's 'appropriation' of Mandeville, Hume and Smith. Petsoulas' 
argument depends, as do many critiques of Hayek, on an attempt to separate the 
'twin' ideas of spontaneous order and evolution coupled with a critique of the 
latter. She does not take serious issue with mutual adjustment under general 
rules, but she does reject the notion of the non-deliberative evolution of the rules 
necessary for spontaneous order formation. She writes: 'Surely, rules which are 
deliberately altered, and which are maintained by intentional enforcement, cannot 
be the product of unconscious adaptation.' (Petsoulas 2001: 5): and she notes 
that 'if evolved rules of just conduct have to be enforced by an external agent, 
such as the state, it cannot be claimed that the spontaneous order is self-
maintaining' (petsoulas 2001: 68). All of which leads her to conclude that: 'the 
end result is unforseen, but incremental intentional improvements on inherited 
traditions and innovations (designed or accidental) are consciously selected to 
survive because they are found to s~rve particular human goals.' (Petsoulas 
2001: 92).3S From our present analysis there is nothing in this last statement 
with which Hayek would disagree so long as it does not claim universality. As 
we have already noted, Hayek's idea of group selection in no way conflicts with 
35 Petsoulas applies tins argument to Mandeville, skilful politicians intentionally create social 
order, Hume, institutions are selected by a rational process of trial and error, and Smith, the 
sympathetic process is the conscious application of conscience, in an attempt to discredit 
Hayek's association of these thinkers with evolutionism and spontaneous order. See the 
sections on the Scots for a rejection of this reading and the introduction for a comment on 
Mandeville. 
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his advocacy of immanent criticism as the preferred method of reform of social 
institutions.36 Moreover, as has been argued through our conjectural history of 
morals and institutions, the rules which facilitate the spontaneous social order 
are not simply 'laws' in the obvious sense. Law is an articulation of opinion and 
opinion itself is a product of socialisation into a particular moral tradition whose 
origins lie in mutual adaptation and conventional agreement. Law as an 
articulation of this is obviously on some level intentional. What Hayek tries to 
show is that the intent behind the articulation refers to some specific problem . 
situation and not to the holistic aim of securing a particular social order: indeed 
such articulated laws as are enforced, are enforced by evolved institutions. For 
Petsoulas' argument to convince decisively against non-deliberative evolution 
she would have to show that government was intentional in its origins or that its 
reforms have always consciously been aimed at securing a particular systemic 
order rather than the resolution of particular disputes. In other words she would 
have to fall back on an approach which the Scots would criticise as a simple 
model or fail to offer an objection to Hayek's notion of immanent criticism. 
Government is an evolved institution grounded on opinion, that it acts 
puposively to secure stability of exp~ctations is not the point of Hayek's 
argument. Rather it is that it did not arise purposively and is not capable of 
recreating the conditions, within which it did arise, in order consciously to 
reform itself in a holistic manner. The deliberate imposition and reform of rules 
of just conduct is not aimed at ,creating a new order, but at refining the existing 
order. Governments react to changes in opinion, and opinion represents the 
adjustment of individuals to their circumstances. 
The paradigmatic example ofthis is not the market but the development of 
science that we discussed earlier. Science, for spontaneous order theorists, is a 
conscious attempt to mirror the process that constitutes the human mind. It is 
thus based on the higher order non-conscious 'rules' of the mind but is itself 
undertaken in a deliberate manner in an attempt to advance knowledge. Seen in 
this light the rules laid down by government as laws are attempts to improve the 
36 Indeed his rejection of conselVatism might lead us to believe that successful reform by 
immanent criticism becomes a decisive factor in group selection as societies advance. Hayek 
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efficiency of the social order which are necessarily based on higher order non-
deliberative rules such as morality, habit and tradition. Cultural evolution has 
advanced human understanding to a point where immanent criticism of 
traditional behaviour is eminently possible.31 What Hayek and the modern 
liberals rail against is not reason but a conception of reason that sees it as 
existing outside the cultural tradition within which it has evolved. Gray is 
correct to understand this as: 'Hayek's attempt to combine respect for 
spontaneous traditional growths in law with the possibility of their rational 
assessment and critical selection. ' (Gray 1986: 71). Human social practices are 
the result of a process of cultural evolution but, like the state of debate in 
science, they are open to criticism fr9m within the broad cultural tradition in 
which they exist (Gray 1986: 115). Politics ought to be undertaken in a manner 
akin to that advocated for science by Popper and Polanyi (Magee 1973: 74-75): 
open and free critical debate within a broadly accepted tradition leading to 
reforms aimed at improving the efficiency of the system drawn from evidence, 
supported by experience, in the form of social science (Shearmur 1996b: 58-59) . 
. We see that - while the original institutional framework of society, the rules 
which facilitate spontaneous orders, arise from a process of unintended 
consequences - it is possible for government to act to refine the rules which 
induce order (Hayek 1993 vo1.l: 105). For Hayek it is the role of government 
to modifY the rules which it inherits in reaction to changes in circumstances 
(Hayek 1978: 11). Such refonn may be aimed at refining the stability of 
expectations in response to changed circumstances (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 119), or 
respects traditions of behaviour but rejects the view that they are immutable (Walker 1986: 
24). . 
37 Gray and Kukathas raise the point that Hayek's immanent criticism of traditions of 
behaviour faces a significant problem in that he argues that traditions hold tacit knowledge of 
which we are unaware. The danger is that a reform will do away with some aspect of 
traditional behaviour which carries vital tacit knowledge (Gray 1986: 16, Kukathas 1989: 103-
4). It is precisely the danger of such an ill-conceived reform that leads Hayek to advocate 
gradualist piecemeal reform~ but it remains nonetheless a problem from which his theory 
cannot escape. The flip side of this view has also been noted in that all plans for refonn are 
inevitably grounded on established knowledge. De Vlieghere notes that all constructions are 
based on more knowledge than the designer possesses, for example the blast furnace had to 
exist before the car, but the designer of a modem automobile need have no knowledge of the 
development of the technology necessary to create internal combustion in order to design a car 
(de Vlieghere 1994: 290). It is in this sense that Hayek believes that all progress must be 
based on tradition. 
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it may be to facilitate further the formation of order by better articulating 
conventional practice in order to eliminate potential sources of conflict (Hayek 
1993 vo1.2: 55). At this point we see the relevance of Hayek's pseudo-Kantian 
universatisation test as a criterion for assessment of the rule. Universatisation 
acts as a test of the compatibility ofa proposed rule with the existing framework 
of rules. As a result it ensures the coherence of the framework, which in turn 
ensures the all-important stability of expectations (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 28). 
Reform of the framework has the long-term goal of improving the likelihood of 
satisfactory mutual adjustment (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 29). 
If the role of government is to facilitate spontaneous order by stabilising 
expectations through the articulation of general rules drawn from the experience 
and opinion of the people, then any reforms which are carried out must be in line 
with established practice. A government ought to 'tinker' with the existing 
system of general rules and not seek utterly to redesign it (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 25; 
1960: 63). Reform, to borrow Popper's phrase, must be piecemeal (Hayek 1993 
vol. 1 : 56; 1960: 70) and be the refmement of established practice (Hayek 1988: 
8).38 Government initiated reform of the framework is building on established 
rules and practices (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 109) with the aim of removing gaps or 
incoherences (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 40) that restrict the functioning of the system. 
Thus understood the government is engaged in the task of reform as it 
consciously evolves the rule of law (Hayek 1991: 61). Reform is conducted 
within the context of an extant system or tradition of general rules and is 
pursued as the result of the experience of circumstances which reveal gaps in 
system (Hayek 1978: 20)?9 Such reform is based on an internal evaluative 
judgement (Hayek 1984: 116), the result of a process of immanent criticism, 
which operates within the system of rules. Hayek notes that: 'we shall call 
"immanent criticism" this sort of criticism that moves within a given system of 
rules and judges particular rules in terms of their consistency or compatibility 
• 
38 Though Hayek dislikes Popper's use of the tenn engineering (Hayek 1993 vol.3: 193, 204n. 
SO) the fundamental aspects of Popper's notion of reform appear to complement Hayek's view. 
For example Popper writes of change occurring 'little by little' (popper 1961: 7S), and of 
'traditions, changing and developing under the influence of critical discussion and in response 
to the challenge of new problems' (popper 1989: 352). 
39 Compare this with Smith's notion of the evolution of science through 'gap-plugging' in 
Part Two, Section One, Chapter 1. 
with all other recognized rules in inducing the formation of a certain kind of 
order of actions.' (Hayek 1993 vol.2: 24). 
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Immanent criticism and reform based upon it are refinements of particular 
sections of the existing system rather than rejections of the system as a whole.40 
This clearly links into Hayek's support for common law and judge made law. 
Judges undertake the reform of the system of general rules by a process of 
immanent criticism designed to refine the stability of expectations by setting 
precedent (Hayek 1993 voU: 118). Such adjustment [or 'experimentation' 
(Hayek 1960: 231)] enhances the functioning of the system so long as it is 
carried out in the proper generalised form. The lawmaking function of 
government accordingly is the provision of a framework within which mutual 
adjustment can take place in an efficient manner. It is, to repeat in conclusion, 
the inducement of spontaneous order by the provision of regularities, drawn 
from conventional opinion and practice, which encourages the efficient 
interaction of individuals. 
The second core function of government is the provision of certain services 
which are deemed to be in the communal interest but which would not otherwise 
be provided if the community did not act collectively. Hayek follows Burne and 
Smith in accepting the existence of public goods (Hayek 1991: 29; 1967: 121) 
that ought to be provided by government. There are cases where the market 
does not provide a good in an efficient manner - usually, as Smith noted, because 
. 
of a difficulty in controlling property rights and developing price mechanisms 
(Hayek 1991: 28) - and other means have to be found to secure its provision 
(Hayek 1991: 27). The existence of such public goods is, for Hayek, 
'unquestionable' (Hayek 1980: 111; 1993 vo!.3: 41; 1960: 141-42), and their 
provision by government acts to supplement the market provision of other goods 
(Hayek 1980: 110). It is the service function of government to provide such 
public goods from revenue raised by taxation (Hayek 1978: 144-45; 1993 vol. 1 : 
48, 1993 vol.2: 7). Hayek defines the first type of service function of 
government as: 'the direction of particular resources towards the rendering of 
certain services to determinable groups of people.' (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 140). He 
40 Again the parallel may be drawn with Popper's evolutionary theory of science. 
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lists a number of the services which fit into his conception of the proper scope of 
government action, and lays particular stress on those services which cannot by 
their nature be restricted to specific individuals: for example local roads, land 
registers and maps (Hayek 1993 vol.3: 44).41 
Before discussing in more detail the nature of a government's role as a 
service provider we ought to note again that the service function is subsidiary to 
the lawmaking function. In the ideal constitutional model the lower house which 
administers service provision is subject to the generalised rules of conduct laid 
down by the upper house. The service functions of government must be carried 
out in accordance with the general rules laid down as a part of the legal 
framework (Hayek 1984: 379). Which is to say that wherever possible these 
service functions are to be supplied generally to all citizens, and the coercive 
powers utilised in their implementation similarly restricted by generalised rules 
(Hayek 1993 vol.3: 110). 
The notion of government service functions as supplementing the market 
leads Hayek to argue that there is no necessary reason why extensive welfare or 
social services should be incompatible with the operation of a market economy 
(Hayek 1991: 28).42 Indeed Hayek appears to take it for granted that some sort 
of welfare system is a feature of all governments. His support for this view 
appears to be based on some notion of moral humanitarianism, though he also 
notes that it could at a base level be justified by a fear of revolution and a desire 
to appease the poor (Hayek 1960: 285). In any case it is taken as given that 
there will be some form of welfare provision as part of the service functions of 
government (Hayek 1960: 300-1). Such welfare, as a uniform minimum 
standard of living, exists 'outside' the market (Hayek 1980: 112; 1991: 99~ 1993 
vol.2: 87; 1993 vol.3: 142-43). What he means by this is that the aim of welfare 
41 Notice with the case of land registers and maps that the government has a service function 
that is related to the collection and dissemination of knowledge. This is also to be seen in his 
support for government standards in measurements (Hayek 1993 vol.3: 62). 
42 A point which Petsoulas believes undercuts his argument in favour of the efficiency of the 
market in providing increased living standards for the whole population (petsoulas 2001: S8). 
However this criticism misses the point that Hayek does not argue that the market is perfect in 
delivering rising living standards: his point is that it is the only system so far discovered which 
does. Moreover he also argues that it is only because of the wealth created by a market 
economy that there are people alive to benefit from welfare and resources sufficient to provide 
it. 
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legislation is to secure a minimum humanitarian standard of living available to all 
if required: a service which does not interfere with the operation of the market 
process. Such a welfare programme does not seek actively to redress any 
material inequality perceived to be the result of market interaction (Hayek 1967: 
175). It is not the result of a desire to create a state of social or distributive 
justice (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 142-43; 1960: 289; 1984: 379). Hayek's conception 
of welfare 'outside the market' is a notion of welfare as a safety-net, a 
guaranteed minimum level below which no one is allowed to fall. Such welfare 
is concerned primarily with the relief of poverty and not with the redistribution 
of income (Hayek 1960: 87,302). Which is to say that the service provision has 
no aim in view - such as a desire for greater equality - other than the relief of the 
difficulties of those whose incomes fall below a certain leve1.43 Such a model of 
welfare operates in accordance with generalised rules or principles, it treats all 
who have need of it in the same way (Hayek 1991: 59), as opposed to a 
redistributive model that necessarily treats individuals in an arbitrary manner in 
order to equalise inequalities. There is a uniform minimum, but neither 
privileges nor inequality of treatment (Hayek 1991: 156). Set incomes are not 
guaranteed to groups within the market, but only to anyone who should fall 
'below' or 'out of the market (Hayek 1993 vol.3: 150; 1960: 259).44 
He believes that a government guided by general rules ought to treat its 
citizens equally and that, as a result of this, it cannot secure equality of outcome 
(Hayek 1960: 99-100). He also argues that attempts to ensure an absolute 
equality of opportunity demand unfeasible degrees of arbitrary intervention 
(Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 85). Indeed no matter how far government seeks to 
intervene to facilitate equality of opportunity, the differences of human aptitudes 
and capacities prevent any meaningful sense of equality of opportunity (Hayek 
1960: 388). As he puts it: 'It was understood that the duty of government was 
not to ensure that everybody had the same prospect of reaching a given position 
43 As we noted above, Hayek regards such redistribution as incompatible with freedom. He 
believes that the safety-net model is compatible with freedom because it is governed by general 
rules and does not require that individuals be treated in an unequal manner (Hayek 1960: 303). 
44 His specific policy statements include: 8 support for social insurance (Hayek 1991: 90~ 
1960: 286, 292), support for some form of 'workfare' scheme (Hayek 1991: 95) and an 
opposition to a minimum wage (Hayek 1991: 92). 
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but merely to make available to all on equal terms those facilities which in their 
nature depended on government action.' (Hayek 1960: 92). As Rawls also 
notes, chief among the institutions which preclude equality of opportunity is the 
family.4s The family fulfils a necessary social role in the socialisation and 
education of children, but this function, and the differences between individual 
families, introduces a degree of inequality between children (Hayek 1993 vol.2: 
87). The chief illustration of this for Hayek is that the love of knowledge and 
the desire for education is, in his view, the result of a family atmosphere that is 
conducive to learning (Hayek 1960: 386). Consequently education is often seen 
as one of the barriers to equality of opportunity that arises from the material and 
emotional differences between families (Hayek 1960: 384). Hayek supports the 
notion of universal education arguing that it provides a degree of equality of 
opportunity to all children in the sense that it provides the chance to acquire 
knowledge (Hayek 1978: 142). He notes that this is a legitimate and desirable 
service function of government as it encourages the dissemination of knowledge 
in society (Hayek 1960: 376; 1991: 71). Education is, as we noted before, part 
of the process of 'cultural transmission' (Hayek 1984: 187) which is vital to the 
successful exploitation of knowledge in society. Hayek wholeheartedly supports 
the provision of universal education to a set level, but he questions whether it is 
wise to place so important a tool of cultural transmission in the hands of 
government (Hayek 1960: 379). Ifa government comes to control the provision 
of education, then it assumes a degree of power over the socialisation of the 
young which may prove too tempting to would be despots (Hayek 1960: 305). 
Education for Hayek represents socialisation and learning, it must never be 
allowed to become indoctrination. Learning does not mean learning to think the 
same as others, but learning to think for oneself (Hayek 1991: 84-85). So 
education, properly understood, is not indoctrination to guarantee that one view 
is held by all, but rather is the encouragement of critical thought among 
individuals within a common cultural tradition (Hayek 1991: 102). In order to 
ensure that this is the case Hayek agrees with Smith's educational views (Hayek 
45 Rawls (1973: 74). Hayek's objection to policies that seek to enforce absolute equality of 
opportunity at the expense of the family is that they destroy the socialisation function of the 
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1993 vo1.3: 61). Government funding of universal education as a public good 
does not necessarily mean that the education should be provided in schools 
controlled by the government (Hayek 1960: 378). He supports Milton 
Friedman's system of educational vouchers (Hayek 1993 vol.3: 46; 1960: 381-
82) whereby government pays for education from taxation, but the actual 
purchase of educational services occurs in the form of tax. backed vouchers 
given to parents. Thus education is publicly funded but privately provided, 
removing part of the influence which a government may be able to wield on the 
content of education.46 
In the case of higher education Hayek is similarly keen to see a role for 
government funding of education and research while still ensuring that such 
funding is never allowed to become a controlling influence. He views 
universities as a public good (Hayek 1960: 383) and supports the notion that 
researchers working at the boundaries of knowledge should be subsidised in the 
acquisition of the skills and knowledge necessary to operate effectively (Hayek 
1960: 388).47 Part of his scheme for this is the established system of tenure for 
professors where, like judges, impar:iality is secured by the provision of a 
definite income (Hayek 1960: 391). In the case of undergraduates Hayek argues 
that the dissemination of knowledge should be encouraged by the provision of 
student loans at special rates that would be paid back once the student had 
entered productive employment (Hayek 1960: 382-83). Such loans should, in 
his view, be supplemented by private scholarships to ensure that higher 
education is an opportunity open to all (Hayek 1960: 387). This last view 
reveals another aspect of Hayek's approach to welfare: his belief that wealth is a 
prerequisite of welfare. His essential argument is that welfare provision is a 
feature of all developed societies, but that the development is necessary for it to 
arise. He argues: 
family. Moreover, and related to the Scots' ideas on moral change, they go against the 
emotional grain of human nature. 
~6 Hayek notes that, in general, the provision of welfare is most efficiently undertaken by a 
mixture of government and private provision (Hayek 1960: 299). He also notes that voucher 
schemes allow the efficient utilisation of dispersed and localised knowledge by parents (Hayek 
1960: 294). 
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'All modem governments have made provision for the indigent, 
unfortunate, and disabled and have concerned themselves with questions of 
health and the dissemination of knowledge. There is no reason why the 
volume of these pure service activities should not increase with the general 
growth of wealth. There are common needs that can be satisfied only by 
collective action and which can be thus provided for without restricting 
individual liberty. It can hardly be denied that, as we grow richer, that 
minimum of sustenance which the community has always provided for those 
not able to look after themselves, and which can be provided outside the 
market, will gradually rise, or that government may, usefully and without 
doing any harm, assist or even lead in such endeavours.' (Hayek 1960: 257-
58). 
Ifwelfare is to be viewed as a public good to be funded by taxation (Hayek 
1960: 144) then it stands to reason that the wealthier the community, the higher 
the tax yield and the greater the provision of welfare. Under this view the 
market creates wealth and that wealth, through taxation, pays for a welfare 
system which exists 'outside' the market (Hayek 1984: 378). We need wealth, 
and consequently the market order which creates it, if we are to provide 
improved welfare services (Hayek 1988: 153; 1993 vol.3: 55; 1960: 101). The 
improvement of welfare provision is an unintended by-product of the success of 
the market in generating wealth (Hayek 1988: 81). 
The service and welfare functions of government are carried out within a 
framework of general rules which exists 'outside' the market. Hayek notes the 
following limitations which this places on the service functions of government: 
, 1) government does not claim a monopoly and new methods of rendering 
services through the market (for example, in some now covered by social 
insurance) are not prevented; 2) the means are raised by taxation on 
unifonn principles and taXation is not used as an instrument for the 
redistribution of income; and, 3) the wants satisfied are collective wants of 
47 Polanyi advances a similar view (polanyi 1951: 41-43), but Popper cautions against an 
excessive role for the state in education lest it lead to indoctrination (popper 1966 vo1.l: 111), 
a view developed by Mises who rejects any role for the state in education (Mises 1978: lIS). 
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the community as a whole not merely collective wants of particular groups. ' 
(Hayek 1978: 111). 
Two aspects of this are of interest. First, and linked to our earlier 
discussion of the importance ofthe utilisation oflocal knowledge, is the focus on 
devolved or localised administration of public services (Hayek 1978: 144-45; 
1993 vol.1: 139; 1993 vo1.3: ~5; 1960: 259). The use oflocal knowledge to 
apply resources is essential in Hayek's view because of the epistemic constraints 
placed on government by the dispersed nature of knowledge (Hayek 1960: 371). 
There is no reason for, say public parks, to be administered by central 
government (Hayek 1960: 375). The efficient use oflocal knowledge is more 
likely to be obtained if decisions are taken as close as possible to the objects 
concerned. Second, the decision to keep control on a local level allows not just 
more efficient adjustment to circumstances, but also innovation, evolution and 
diversity among the means chosen to administer local government services 
(Hayek 1960: 261-63, 286). Competition between devolved authorities, 
emulation and experimentation, create an atmosphere of innovation which 
encourages the more efficient provision of service functions (Hayek 1978: 112). 
Once again we see the key features of the spontaneous order approach 
applied through a conjectural history of human institutions from language and 
property to law and government. The desire for order and stability of 
expectations that arises from man's nature as a classificatory being leads to the 
development of interpersonal conventions which ease social interaction. The 
desire to resolve disputes over conventions of property leads to the emergence 
of judge/chiefs whose articulations of customary practice in reaction to given 
problem situations is the origin of law and who themselves represent the 
emergence of government. This process evolves and adapts in reaction to 
circumstances leading to the development of the hi-functionary modern 
conception of government. Behind all this, as always, is an invisible hand 
argument about the epistemological efficiency of a framework of general rules 
that allows mutual adjustment. 
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Section Four: The, Market 
Chapter 1: The Division of Knowledge 
As we have noted Hayek is clearly pre-occupied with the significance of the 
role of knowledge in the economy! Drawing on the arguments of the socialist 
calculation debates of the inter-war years, Hayek notes that the successful 
functioning of a large society depends on the successful co-ordination of the 
knowledge held by millions of individual minds (Hayek 1978: 236). The sheer' 
volume and complexity of this knowledge is such that no one mind has the 
power to absorb it in its totality (Hayek 1993 vol.2: 84). No one human mind 
can possibly grasp all of the relevant data necessary to plan a whole economic 
system. Indeed it is an error to proceed as if such a thing were possible (Hayek 
1984: 55). And this is Hayek's chief complaint against his opponents in the 
socialist calculation debate: their assumption that a rational plan for the whole of 
the economy is a matter of rational study of the relevant data (Hayek 1979: 
173). The central point about economics is that the information necessary is not 
centralisable~ indeed, the study of economics is the study of how individuals 
without such perfect knowledge interact. Hayek and his fellow Austrians stress 
the key role of the information-carrying function of prices and the discovery or 
information finding function of entrepreneurs. They argue that these roles are 
missing from a system of socialist or command economics, leading socialist 
economists to the logically impossible assertion that one mind or group of minds 
is capable of controlling and acting on all the information previously held by 
millions of individuals (Hayek 1984: 56-60). The argument is essentially that the 
complexity of social phenomena prevents efficient economic planning (Hayek 
1978: 237~ 1993 voU: 51) and it runs, in an abbreviated form, like this. 
All human minds are finite, and all economies are vastly complex: no one 
mind is capable of absorbing al~ ofthe information necessary to direct it 
successfully. Even if a super-mind were to exist the rapidly changing nature of 
1 We must note that in terms of economics there were significant differences between Hayek 
on the one hand, and Popper and Polanyi on the other, with the two laller being significantly 
less averse to government intervention and Keynesianism than Hayek (Magee 1973: 80-83~ 
Prosch 1986: 186; Shearmur 1996b: 32-36). As a result our composite model of the 
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circumstances and tastes would render any plan formed by such a mind obsolete 
almost as soon as it was made and therefore a less efficient ordering principle 
than market adaptation. Even should such a mind find a way to centralise and 
adapt, through some super-computer [though the number of equations requiring 
to be solved simultaneously suggest that this too is impossible (Hayek 1984: 58-
59)] it is then faced by the problem that some of the knowledge used by 
individuals to guide their economic decisions is of a tacit, inexplicable, habitual 
nature that cannot be rendered in a form which reconciles it with the terms of the 
plan. 
Human society is highly complex (Hayek 1967: 71) and, as we noted 
before, the chief subject matter of social science for Hayek is the study of the 
unintended consequences of human action: so the study of society is an 
examination of the 'phenomena of un organised complexity' (Hayek 1984: 269), 
. 
of the spontaneous order of society. Now it is already evident that it is 
constitutionally difficult to explain any very complex phenomena (Hayek 1967: 
259). The scope of the human mind is limited and it is an empirical truth that 
such minds are incapable of absorbing all of the relevant features of a complex 
situation (Hayek 1991: 44; 1960: 4). As Hayek notes from the calculation 
debate: 'the crucial phenomena determining the formation of many highly 
complex structures of human interaction, i.e., economic values or prices, cannot 
be interpreted by simple causal. or 'nomothetic' theories, but require explanation 
in terms of the joint effects ofa larger number of distinct elements than we can 
ever hope individually to observe or manipulate.' (Hayek 1988: 148). The mind 
cannot ascertain all of the data involved in the vast web of social interaction that 
forms the complex phenomena which make up society (Hayek 1967: 27).2 And, 
as we noted before, such complexity prevents the detailed prediction of future 
events in specific detail [a key feature of historicism] (Hayek 1967: 34, 37). The 
reduction of social phenomena to simple propositions, or historical laws, which 
would allow such prediction is impossible. There are no 'scientific' or eternal 
laws of society that can be ascertained by men and used to assist in the future 
spontaneous order approach here draws solely on the more extensive economic writings of 
Hayek. 
2 This is one of Hayek's arguments against classical utilitarianism (Hayck 1993 vo1.2: 19). 
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planning of society (Hayek 1976: 193). Science can assist us better to 
understand the general nature of social inter-relationships, but it cannot ever 
hope to provide formulae that ~low the accurate prediction of all future human 
circumstances (Hayek 1978: 12). For this reason those who seek to plan an 
economy tend to pursue one of two courses. They either stick with what they 
'know', that is to say they act in such a limited manner that their predictions 
have a reasonable chance of success (Hayek 1967: 80); in which case they plan 
very little or in such broad terms as to be highly inefficient. Or they seek to 
restrict the complexity of the circumstances in order to better understand and 
control them.3 As Hayek notes 'made' or deliberately designed orders of this 
type are necessarily simple because our minds are capable of only simple 
ordering processes on a conscious level (Hayek 1993 vo1.1: 38). Thus by 
limiting the knowledge necessary to understand an order we simplify the order 
and restrict its efficiency.4 
The complexity of social phenomena means that the analysis of them is very 
difficult; but it also means that ·the rational control and organisation of them is a 
near impossibility (Hayek 1960: 352). That it is not a strict impossibility is 
because it is possible to organise simple social interactions, but such organisation 
would entail an abandonment of complexity and its attendant benefits. As the 
complexity of human knowledge and interaction grows we see an increasing 
process of specialisation, a process that both compounds social complexity and 
is an expression of it (Hayek 1960: 80). Hayek's essential point is that the 
complexity of interaction and the multitude of circumstances which are features 
of human society necessarily lead to a situation where they are more efficiently 
governed by individual adjustment rather than by planning or central control 
(Hayek 1991: 151). Mutual adjustment, and the mechanisms which it produces, 
allow individuals to benefit from the knowledge of others by following certain 
3 This is consistent with Hayek's argument in the Road to Serfilom that links economic 
planning with totalitarianism. A malign ~ntended consequence of economic plalming is the 
erosion of economic and political freedom. 
" Oakeshott however attacks Hayek's alternative suggestions from the Road to Serfdom 
declaring them still prone to rationalist error in that it is a 'plan to resist all planning' 
(Oakeshott 1991: 26). 
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signals which communicate more knowledge than could possibly be assimilated 
and analysed by anyone mind (Hayek 1960: 32). 
Hayek follows the Austrian practice of rejecting classical equilibrium 
analysis in economics (Hayek 1980: 35).' He believes that such an approach is 
unrealistic on account of its assumption of perfect competition arising from 
perfect knowledge (Hayek 1980: 46). For Hayek, the argument in favour of 
market competition does not arise from any concern about the efficiency of 
perfect competition (Hayek 1980: 104). This is because basing an argument in 
favour of the efficiency of market competition on a model of perfect competition 
entails a conceptual model that posits perfect knowledge on the part of the 
participants (Hayek 1993 vol. 3 : 65). Hayek argues that such perfect knowledge 
is impossible and, that even if a supposition of it is to guide a conceptual model, 
it could not be conceived in a manner that would make the model applicable to 
any real1ife situation (Hayek 1993 vol.3: 69-70). To believe in models of 
perfect knowledge is, for Hayek, to misunderstand the nature of the economic 
problem which is fundamentally one of the imperfect nature of human 
knowledge (Hayek 1984: 223). The value of competition for Hayek, and the 
Austrians, is precisely that it is conducted in a situation of imperfect knowledge, 
and that it acts as a discovery procedure which co-ordinates various imperfect 
collections of knowledge (Hayek 1980: 96). 
As we noted above, Hayek argues that it is because all of the relevant 
information is not available to one mind that planning fails and competition is a 
more efficient economic model (Hayek 1979: 91). Hayek argues that the human 
mind is imperfect and, as a result, all individually held human knowledge is 
imperfect (Hayek 1979: 73; 1993 vol.3: 36). As we saw in the section on 
science, all human knowledge is essentially a system of categorisation that 
proceeds in a negative manner. Which is to say that it functions by excluding 
possibilities rather than by making definite eternal assertions (Hayek 1979: 74). 
To repeat the earlier point, the growth of knowledge is not the growth of 
certainty but the reduction of uncertainty (Hayek 1984: 158). We also noted, in 
5 See Barry (1988: 20) and Fleetwood (1996: 738-39). Caldwell suggests that Hayek turned 
away from technical economic theory because he saw the difficulty of applying equilibrium 
theory to questions of the co-ordination of knowledge (Caldwell 1988: 515). 
302 
Popper's critique of holism in particular, that the limited nature of the human 
intellect means that we cannot ever hope to conceive or grasp the 'whole' 
situation in all its aspects: which means that we cannot, by the nature of our 
minds, know everything about everything (Hayek 1979: 122). Our minds are 
restricted and act efficiently only when focused on a particular problem, which 
we, to a degree, isolate from its surrounding phenomena (Hayek 1960: 179). As 
a result of the limited nature of our minds, these focused studies are necessarily 
partial studies of elements of the 'whole' of social phenomena (Hayek 1967: 
124). This leads Hayek to the assertion that men are simply not clever enough 
to have designed an economic or social system (Hayek 1984: 322; 1993 vo1.3: 
164). No one mind can grasp all of the facts necessary to create such a design 
and no tool of human understanding could ever make such a design possible 
(Hayek 1993 vo1.3: 17). 
For Hayek this marks the vital 'importance of our ignorance' (Hayek 1967: 
39).6 Humans are necessarily ignorant of most of the facts of social interaction 
(Hayek 1993 vo1.1: 12). This 'unalterable ignorance' (Hayek 1993 vol. 3 : 130) 
leads him to assert that the most important task of reason is to realise its own 
limitations (Hayek 1979: 162; 1984: 326). To realise the limits of our rational 
abilities and those of our knowledge (Hayek 1967: 40), is to follow the Socratic 
approach to philosophy (Hayek 1960: 22). It is to develop a 'humble' view of 
human reason and knowledge that recognises the limited nature of our capacity 
to understand (Hayek 1960: 8).7 Ifwe recognise the limits of our individual and 
cumulative knowledge (Hayek 1988: 125) we are, Hayek argues, in a better 
position to make effective use of that limited stock which we do possess (Hayek 
1993 vol. 1 : 8). As he argues: ' .. .1 confess that I prefer true but imperfect 
knowledge, even if it leaves much indetermined and unpredictable, to a pretence 
of exact knowledge that is likely to be false.' (Hayek 1984: 272). 8 
6 Barry argues from this that the invisible band is a reaction to our ignorance (Barry 1982: 
26). 
7 Hayek deploys tenns like 'ignorance', 'imperfect knowledge' and 'uncertainty' to highlight 
this feature of bum an life (Hayek 1960: 427). 
8 Hayek complements this argument on the limitations of reason with the assertion that there 
is a species of human knowledge which is constitutionally resistant to articulation and 
generalisation. This phenomenon, which Hayek refers to as 'unorganised knowledge' (Hayek 
1984: 214), is knowledge that does not exist in a conscious form. In a sense it may be called 
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Hayek's argument is that our knowledge is always imperfect and dispersed 
among many individuals (Hayek 1979: 49-50). As individuals we cannot know 
all of the consequences of an action nor can we know all of the circumstances 
under which it is carried out (Hayek 1967: 90). We must necessarily act on 
what knowledge we have but also, and this is crucial, we are enabled to act on 
information held by others without explicitly knowing it through the 
development of certain social institutions which facilitate the transmission of 
knowledge in an abbreviated form (Hayek 1979: 161). Such a process does not 
depend on any centralisation of all knowledge, rather it functions by allowing 
individual adjustment to the behaviour of others who are similarly adjusting to 
their circumstances. We have developed these social practices and institutions 
without any real idea of their overall nature or operations (Hayek 1978: 71). 
That is to sayan institution such as the market allows us to act as if we have that 
knowledge held by others even though we do not (Hayek 1988: 47). Moreover, 
we are not even aware of the totality of the system that allows us to act in such a 
manner. Such institutions [price, propriety, law] are adaptations to our 
ignorance developed to reduce the necessary uncertainty which arises from our 
ignorance of the knowledge held by others (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 8). 
Whilst human knowledge does indeed exist, and may even be considered to 
form a cumulative whole, this whole does not exist in a unitary form nor is it 
within the grasp of any individual.9 Human knowledge is dispersed among 
'countless' people (Hayek 1984: 270), it is held by individuals and is not capable 
of unification in any complete sense. lO Individuals are the media of knowledge in 
this sense: they are the one's that 'know' (Hayek 1993 vol. 3 : 190). They cannot 
have knowledge of the whole but they may have knowledge of many discrete 
individual facts. It is in this sense that our knowledge of the knowledge of 
others is similarly limited. For example, under the division oflabour, workers in 
distinct specialities may have no idea of the knowledge upon which they depend: 
the man who puts the heads on pins need have no knowledge of the production 
of the steel upon which he depends for his materials. Ignorance is mitigated by 
'skill' rather than objective knowledge (Hayek 1980: 51). See above Part Three; Section Two 
on habit and custom. 
9 Leading the spontaneous order theorists to adopt a methodological individualist approach. 
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interdependence, we need not know the knowledge of others in order to benefit 
from it (Hayek 1960: 24). As we shall see below, Hayek follows the Scots in 
regarding this as one of the chief benefits of a system of trade and market 
exchange. We are able to specialise and to exchange, to profit and to survive, 
without the need for extensive knowledge outside our chosen speciality. The 
market does indeed co-ordinate the knowledge of many millions of individuals, 
but it does so without collecting that knowledge in one place at one time (Hayek 
1988: 7). The interaction ofindividuals, as the media of trade, is the media for 
the exchange and interaction of information (Hayek 1988: 43). It allows 
dispersed knowledge, the knowledge of different circumstances held by different 
individuals, to be of use to all people. In a complex society this means that such 
dispersed knowledge is knowledge of particular circumstances held by 
individuals that is communicated in a manner that allows its efficient utilisation 
by other individuals (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 9). 
Hayek follows the Scots in noting the spontaneous, undirected nature of the 
division oflabour (Hayek 1993 vo1.1: 11 0, 140; 1984: 319), and in finding it to 
be constitutive of a complex society (Hayek 1984: 184).11 We saw in Part Two 
how specialisation and the utilisation of dispersed knowledge are vital to the 
Scots' understanding of the benefits of the division oflabour [Part Two, Section 
Four, Chapter 1]: but Hayek does more to stress the role of knowledge in this 
process than the Scots. He states that the benefit of the division of labour is that 
it is based on a complementary division of knowledge. Not only does the 
division of knowledge, produced by the division of labour, lead to material gains, 
but it also [as a 'fact' of economic 'reality'] places constraints on what men can 
hope to do consciously to develop the economy as a whole. The increasing 
importance of specialist knowledge as the cumulative sum of human knowledge 
advances, the increasing likelihood that a specialist will know more about an 
aspect of human knowledge yet less about many others, lies at the heart of 
10 Hayek notes that Smith was well aware of this (Hayek 1988: 14). 
11 Mises argues that the division oflabour is the source of individuality, citing the example of 
the similarity of two South Sea islanders in contrast to the diversity of two random Europeans 
(Mises 1951: 293,305). He also notes that modem urban civilisation is only possible because 
of an extensive division of labour and a developed system of market exchange (Mises 1951: 
49). 
305 
economic development (Hayek 1967: 125,388). For example, as the cumulative 
sum of academic knowledge advances, so Hayek believes, specialisations will 
become increasingly focused (fIayek 1967: 123-25). The sum grows not 
because individuals know more in the sense of encompassing wider fields, but 
rather because the depth of their knowledge of a narrower field adds to the 
whole. 
The different experiences of diverse individuals broaden human knowledge. 
For example, the development ofa profession proceeds by the development of 
those who profess it (Hayek 1984: 56~ 1960: 38). This is, as Hume noted, not 
to say that men are becoming in some sense more intelligent in the individual 
sense of mental capacity. Rather it is to say that the focusing of attention 
necessarily increases the scope for useful observation by men of necessarily 
limited mental faculties. Hayek parallels Smith's argument on the small 
difference between the philosopher and the porter arguing: 'Knowledge and 
ignorance are very relative concepts, and there is little evidence that the 
difference in knowledge which at one time exists between the more and the less 
educated ofa society can have such a decisive influence on its character.' 
(Hayek 1960: 378). The division of knowledge is both a reaction to the 
complexity of the world and a process which compounds that complexity by 
diversifYing the experience and knowledge of individual specialists (Hayek 1991: 
36). The growth of cumulative social knowledge is a product of the division of 
knowledge achieved through specialisation (Hayek 1960: 26). While at the very 
same time this growth of cumulative knowledge encourages and requires further 
divisions of knowledge in order to deal with the increasing scope of human 
inquiry and behaviour (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 4). 
As we have seen a complex, modem, open society depends on a division of 
knowledge that precludes larg~-scale social planning. The atavism that Hayek 
associates with constructivist rationalism, the desire to return to some version of 
a tribal society, links into this argument. It would be possible, in Hayek's view, 
to plan or organise a small-scale tribal society with a tolerable degree of success. 
But this is simply because the amount of information required, like the number 
of individuals involved, would be strictly limited (Hayek 1993 vol.2: 88-89). 
Once population grows and societies reach even moderate degrees of size and 
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complexity, the task of efficiently planning economic activity exceeds the 
capabilities of any one mind. Moreover, as we shall see, it is only because of the 
division of labour and the division of . knowledge that population growth of this 
sort is possible at all. 
Localised, individually held knowledge cannot accurately be centralised 
(Hayek 1979: 92). Such local knowledge is knowledge of particular times and 
circumstances held by those who experience them (Hayek 1979: 174-75). It is 
acquired from the specific position of the individual concerned who shapes his 
individual plans as an adaptati~n to those circumstances (Hayek 1980: 53). 
Individuals within a particular set of circumstances will use their knowledge of 
those circumstances to select the aims of their actions (Hayek 1993 vol.2: 9). 
F or Hayek this is simply an extension of the division of labour argument about 
specialisation: knowledge of the circumstances of one's profession places one in 
a position to make the most effective decision regarding the objects concerned 
(Hayek 1984: 56). If such knowledge of circumstances is individually held 
(Hayek 1978: 136), then the most efficient overall use of knowledge will be 
produced by the cumulative sum of the successful exploitation of local 
circumstances by individuals (Hayek 1978: 133).12 This efficiency is further 
underlined if the case ofa change in local circumstances is considered. The 
efficient utilisation of human knowledge requires the successful adaptation to 
changes in local circumstances, and successful adaptation is once again most 
likely to be produced by those with the relevant first hand knowledge (Hayek 
1960: 23, 33-34; 1993 vol.2: 121). Individuals form plans in reaction to the 
circumstances in which they find themselves, and these plans are adapted to 
changes within those circumstances as they occur (Hayek 1980: 93). Individual 
exploitation oflocal circumstances and adjustment to change depends upon the 
successful exploitation of such localised knowledge (Hayek 1993 vo1.I: 103). If, 
as Hayek argues, such knowledge is held individually and cannot successfully be 
centralised, then it follows that a decentralised system, one which depends on the 
adjustment to circumstances by individuals in those circumstances, is the most 
12 Hayek follows the Scots' practice of noting the 'accidental' nature of this process (Hayek 
1960: 29), in that the most efficient use oflocal knowledge of circumstances results from the 
right person being in the right place at the right time. 
efficient system for the adaptation to change (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 103; 1993 
vol.3: 68).13 
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It might be countered that some form of decentralised planning might be 
utilised to get around this aspect of the knowledge problem but this, as Hayek 
notes, neglects the fact that it is not merely the possession oflocalised 
knowledge which is significant but also its use - use in the sense of its integration 
with other localised knowledge (Hayek 1960: 82). It is only one part of the 
argument to say that the 'man on the spot' (Hayek 1984: 217) is in the best 
position to make effective decisions about the particular circumstances in which 
he finds himself. The effective management of resources by placing decision 
making in the hands of those on the ground (Hayek 1960: 88, 294) is an 
important part of Hayek's argument about the efficient use of knowledge. 14 
However the question remains as to how best to encourage the co-ordination of 
such knowledge while preserving a degree of flexibility and autonomy which 
would allow the benefits of de-centralisation to be enjoyed. What Hayek seeks 
to understand is how efficient use can be made of localised knowledge (Hayek 
1960: 150; 1978: 77) in such a way that its benefits are transmitted throughout 
society in an effective manner. He wishes to understand how individuals 
adjusting to changes in local circumstances are able to communicate this 
knowledge in such a way that other individuals in other circumstances are able to 
adjust to their adjustments (Hayek 1.993 vol. 1 : 1 q6). 
Taking this view of human knowledge as the imperfect, diverse and 
dispersed reactions of individuals to the circumstances in which they find 
themselves, the question becomes one of how men successfully reconcile these 
adaptations and sums ofloca1 knowledge: it becomes the problem of the co-
ordination of knowledge. Here Hayek draws on his previous thoughts on human 
psychology: chiefly the desire for order and the dislike of disorder. Hayek 
\3 One of the chief such questions is how men communicate tIle 'value' of knowledge. Which 
is to say how they come to know which knowledge of circumstances is important (Hayek 1984: 
257). There must exist, for the efficient exploitation of localised knowledge to come about, 
some incentive to acquire useful knowledge (Hayek 1988: 89) such that those in particular 
circumstances will exploit the relevant aspects of the circumstances in which they find 
themselves. In brief: How do we come to know what to look for in a given situation? (Hayek 
1988: 77). This becomes one of the key issues in the efficient co-ordinatioll oCknowledge. 
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argues that the human propensity to generalise from experience leads men to 
form 'rules' of adaptation to particular kinds of recurrent circumstance (Hayek 
1993 vo1.2: 23). Through a process of socialisation these rules of reaction are 
spread through society. As a result men need not share local knowledge of all 
relevant circumstances so long as they proceed by such general rules of adaptive 
behaviour (Hayek 1993 vol.2: 11). If such interaction does not depend on an 
explicit situational analysis, but rather on the following of rules which stabilise 
expectations, then there is no reason why such successfully socialised 
conventions of behaviour need be consciously understood and undertaken in 
order to fulfil their function. They may instead exist as customs, habits or 
traditions of behaviour whose successful functioning is not dependent on 
deliberative understanding (Hayek 1988: 23, 75; 1984: 214). Hayek proceeds to 
examine the human institutions that have arisen to facilitate the successful 
adaptation of individuals to circumstances of which they are unaware (Hayek 
1984: 327). General rules of behaviour provide a degree of stability of 
expectation, but what must also be taken into account is how men have 
developed co-ordination devices which allow successful adjustment. 
14 Which Hayek, following the Scots, viewed as one of the strongest arguments in support of a 
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Chapter 2: The Co-ordination of Knowledge 
As we have seen Hayek considers human knowledge to exist in the 
dispersed, imperfect holdings of individuals. Following on from his analysis of 
the division of knowledge he asserts that civilisation rests on the effective use of 
this dispersed knowledge (Hayek 1993 vo1.1: 15). Put another way, civilisation 
rests on the co-ordination of dispersed knowledge efficiently used: upon the 
invisible hand (Hayek 1979: 149). As Hayek notes, this approach suggests that 
civilisation does not so much depend on a growth of knowledge as on the 
efficient use of knowledge already held (Hayek 1993 vol. 1: 14). Ifwe are to ask 
ourselves how Hayek defines such efficiency we have two factors that must be 
taken into account. The first is that as much dispersed knowledge as possible 
ought to be utilised (Hayek 1984: 212-13) and the second is that decentralised 
decision-making allows a more accurate exploitation of local circumstances. 
The question is how, or more precisely by way of what institutions, do we 
integrate this dispersed knowledge given that it is impossible to centralise in one 
mind (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 41-42). This question, the co-ordination of dispersed 
knowledge, is the central economic problem (Hayek 1980: 50-51,54). As 
Hayek puts it: 
'If each man is to use his peculiar knowledge and skill with the aim of 
furthering the aims for which he cares, and if, in so doing, he is to make as 
large a contribution as possible to needs which are beyond his ken, it is 
clearly necessary, first, that he should have a clearly delimited area of 
responsibility and, second, that the relative importance to him of the 
different results he can achieve must correspond to the relative importance 
to others of the more remote and to him unknown effects of his actions.' 
(Hayek 1984: 142). In this case efficiency may be considered as a situation 
where 'no need is served at the cost of withdrawing a greater amount of 
means from the use for other needs than is necessary to satisfy it' (Hayek 
1993 vo1.2: 113). 
system of private or 'several' property (Hayek 1988: 86-88). 
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As we noted when we discussed central planning there are epistemic 
limitations placed upon the scope of a central authority's ability to act in an 
efficient manner in this regard (Hayek 1979: 178). Mankind, however, in 
Hayek's view, have developed a series of institutions and practices [the invisible 
hand], which he terms the 'extended order', which assist us in dealing with our 
ignorance (Hayek 1988: 81). The efficient co-ordination of dispersed 
knowledge is necessarily an 'inter-individual process' (Hayek 1979: 152). There 
are two issues at stake: how to make use of the individual sums of knowledge, 
and how to co-ordinate the use of unique local knowledge of circumstances 
(Hayek 1993 vo1.l: 13). In terms of economics the development of a system of 
price signals operating within an extended market order [or Catallaxy (Hayek 
1984: 258)] is the key human practice developed to deal with our ignorance and 
co-ordinate dispersed knowledge (Hayek 1980: 17; 1993 vol.2: 108-09).1' As 
Hayek puts it: 'Information-gathering institutions such as the market enable us 
to use such dispersed and unsurveyable knowledge to form super-individual 
patterns.' (Hayek 1988: 15). The market produces a co-ordination of 
knowledge by facilitating mutual adjustment in reaction to the information held 
by prices: 'It is through the mutually adjusted efforts of many people that more 
knowledge is utilized than anyone individual possesses or than it is possible to 
synthesize intellectually; and it is through such utilization of dispersed 
knowledge that achievements are made possible greater than any single mind can 
foresee.' (Hayek 1960: 30-31). The price mechanism is essential for the efficient 
utilisation of knowledge in an extended order of civilisation (Hayek 1960: 350). 
A market system with prices and their incentive qualities direct attention, 
facilitate mutual adaptation and function to encourage the efficient utilisation of 
dispersed knowledge (Hayek 1984: 326).16 The efficient use of individual 
knowledge by mutual adjustment is the true nature of what Smith metaphorically 
termed the invisible hand (Hayek 1978: 268). The invisible hand produces 
benign results precisely because it ensures the efficient utilisation of knowledge 
15 Prices are of course based on money values and Hayek draws on Menger's conjectural 
history of the evolution of money from convention to explain the basis on which the price 
system rests (Menger 1996: 131-35; O'Driscolll994: 127). 
16 Hayek also notes the key role played in this system by the broader general rules which 
stabilise expectations and allow the price system to operate (Hayek 1991: 56). 
to produce the best possible results given the limited and dispersed nature of 
individual sums of knowledge .. 
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In an attempt to make use of dispersed knowledge in a complex extended 
society the dictates of efficiency lead us to favour decentralisation. Such 
decentralisation requires some institution which co-ordinates the decentralised 
decisions, some process of mutual adjustment that ensures that decentralised 
decisions might accommodate themselves to each other (Hayek 1991: 36). As 
we have seen, to trust this role to a central planning authority, or to one mind, 
limits the adaptability of the decentralised decision makers and is inefficient as a 
result of the epistemic limitations of the human mind (Hayek 1980: 24). 
Competition for Hayek is the practice that men have developed in an economic 
context to deal with this problem. However as we noted above Hayek is not 
concerned with static, unrealistic models of perfect competition (Hayek 1993 
vol.3: 65~ 1980: 94, 100, 104). What he seeks to understand is actual 
competition, viewing the market as justified precisely because competition, 
however imperfect, is preferable in terms of efficiency to any other mode of co-
ordination. 
Hayek argues that competition fosters a spirit of experimentation (Hayek 
1960: 261, 263) which encourages us to seek after new ways of doing things. It 
is only, he argues, through a competitive process that we discover facts and 
exploit new, more efficient, modes of behaviour (Hayek 1980: 96). He writes of 
the relationship between competition and knowledge that: 
'Competition is essentially a process of the formation of opinion: by 
spreading information, it creates that unity and coherence of the economic 
system which we presuppose when we think of it as one market. It creates 
the views people have about what is best and cheapest, and it is because of 
it that people know at least as much about possibilities and opportunities as 
they in fact do.' (Hayek 1980: 106). 
Competition is a 'discovery procedure' (Hayek 1988: 19), an adaptation to 
circumstances (Hayek 1980: 102) that promotes the efficient utilisation and 
discovery of knowledge (Hayek 1984: 255). The competitive process of a 
market economy is the medium for the acquisition and communication of 
knowledge (Hayek 1993 vol. 3 : 68). Competition, the desire to succeed in such, 
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is the incentive that moves us to seek out new ways of doing things; and our 
observation of the success of others in this process is the transfer device for 
efficient utilisation of knowledge (Hayek 1993 voI.3: 75).17 The market is 
primarily to be understood as a communication system with competition as the 
device that keeps the messages carried as accurate as possible (Hayek 1984: 
276). 
Before passing on we ought to note that Hayek refutes the accusation that 
such competition is of the 'dog eat dog' variety. He argues that the competitive 
process of the market is not a winner. takes all process. Which is to say that 
competition does not provide one winner for all time (Hayek 1993 vol.2: 127); 
losers live to fight another day. He also argues, as we shall see, that the 
competition of a market is not a zero-sum game. Another brief aside: if the 
market and prices are the media for the communication of economic knowledge 
between contemporaries, then they are complemented by practices whose 
function it is to transmit knowledge between generations through time and to 
transfer knowledge between cultures (Hayek 1960: 27). Transmission of 
knowledge between generations occurs, as we noted, through a process of 
socialisation within a tradition. This process of imitation and learning occurs on 
both a deliberative level, of education, and a non-deliberative level of habituation 
or accustomisation (Hayek 1960: 59) [for example through the institution of the 
family (Hayek 1960: 90)]. We acquire a great deal of our knowledge from 
socialisation within a tradition (Hayek 1988: 75,151; 1993 voU: 74), and 
traditions are not static: they adapt, evolve, grow and change in reaction to the 
experiences of each generation. They come to embody more knowledge through 
this experience than can ever be communicated in a deliberate or conscious 
manner (Hayek 1978: 9). Furthermore there also exists a transfer of knowledge 
between cultures with different traditions and practices. This process, as the 
Scots noted, primarily facilitated through such contacts as trade (Hayek 1988: 8, 
51), promotes the exchange o~ successful practices through imitation. 
Hayek's most significant discussion of the co-ordination of knowledge is to 
be found in his analysis of the functioning ofa market economy. We should note 
17 The desire to succeed is a product of the biogenic drives that underlie human behaviour for 
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from the start that he does not consider the 'market' to be a single edifice or 
institution that may be analysed as a \Vhole (Hayek 1984: 219). The term market 
now no longer applies to buying and selling, to trade, in a specific location which 
may be termed a marketplace (Hayek 1979: 99). Rather it may be understood as 
a form of order,· as a mode of human interaction which is most closely akin to 
what is commonly understood by the term economy. However Hayek dislikes 
this term, believing that the spontaneous market order, or catallaxy, is formed 
from the interaction of a broad· range of economies [in the Aristotelian sense of 
household management] (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 108-9). The basic human desire to 
provide for subsistence, arising from the 'natural' biogenic drives of the body, is 
the force which has driven the creation and development of the market order 
(Hayek 19932: 112). A series of institutions, practices and interrelations has 
developed which allow the efficient exploitation of dispersed knowledge for 
mutual advantage. By way of the institutions of the catallaxy the total product 
of human labour is maximised because of the maximisation of the product of 
individual human labour (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 118). The market increases man's 
ability successfully to adapt to his circumstances (Hayek 1993 vol.2: 107), while 
simultaneously promoting the more efficient use of resources. In addition to the 
efficiency and adaptive characteristics of the market order which promote the 
maximisation of production (Hayek 1993 vo!.3: 94), the market also acts in a 
social or cultural manner such that it diffuses power through society (Hayek 
1993 vo1.2: 99), as the Scots noted in their analysis of the fall of feudalism, and 
also such that it promotes the peaceful interaction of peoples (Hayek 1993 vol.2: 
113). 
At the heart of Hayek's analysis of the catallaxy is his understanding of its 
role in terms of information and knowledge. He views the market as an 
impersonal device which directs indtviduals toward profitable behaviour (Hayek 
1993 vo1.2: 87).18 The system of market prices acts as an 'impersonal 
mechanism' for information transmission (Hayek 1991: 37); as a 'mechanism for 
communicating information' (Hayek 1984: 219); a 'steering mechanism' (Hayek 
Hayek, see above Part Three, Section One. 
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1960: 282) and moreover as a communication 'system' (Hayek 1984: 276). 
Drawing on the analysis of the Austrian tradition of economics Hayek 
understands prices as signals that 'abridge' information (Hayek 1979: 173, 177), 
which render it into a comprehensible form which may be used by men with a 
limited capacity to absorb information. The trial and error process of bargaining 
through which prices are established filters information about human desires and 
resources and creates a monetary 'value' that guides the action of individuals in 
relation to productive activity (Hayek 1980: 100). As a result a market, through 
the price mechanism, spreads information in a comprehensible form which may 
be used by individuals in the formation of those plans which guide their action 
(Hayek 1980: 96). 
Prices are signals (Hayek 1993 vol.2: 125): they direct the attention of 
individuals towards significant areas of concern without requiring those 
individuals to comprehend all of the information which they embody (Hayek 
1984: 257; 1993 vol.2: 115).19 Such signals allow individuals to adjust their 
behaviour in order to pursue the most profitable course of action for themselves 
(Hayek 1988: 59): they embody information about profitable behaviour (Hayek 
1991: 93), about the demand for and scarcity of goods, which allows individuals 
to adapt to circumstances beyond their individual experience. For example, 
prices, in the form of wages, indicate the demand for certain professions (Hayek 
1988: 46). They direct the form of specialisation or the division oflabour 
(Hayek 1988: 99) and in a sen~e are necessary for such specialisation to occur in 
an efficient manner (Hayek 1993 vol.3: 162). However, as Hayek notes, this 
directive function of prices in relation to specialisation has little to do with 
notions of reward or desert. The function of prices is not to reward people for 
work in the past, but rather it is to indicate profitable occupations or specialities 
to others. Prices do not reward people in this functional sense; they direct them 
toward profitable modes of behaviour by indicating demand (Hayek 1993 voL2: 
72). Prices act as incentives not only to those already within the speciality, but 
18 Hayek credits Smith with at least a partial realisation of this in his focus on the negative 
feedback functions of prices. For Hayek Smith's invisible hand is a negative feedback 
knowledge communication device (Hayek 1993 volJ: 158; 1984: 259; 1978: 63). 
19 They thus parallel the state of the debate in science in Polanyi and Popper's analysis. 
Polanyi even refers to prices as a 'consensus' (polanyi 1958: 208). 
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also to those outside it (Hayek 1993 vol.3: 142). Price signals flag up incentives 
(Hayek 1960: 316), they indicate areas of profitable specialisation. This is what 
is meant by the phrase 'to spot a gap in the market'. An entrepreneur will 
exploit a 'gap' in provision indicated by price signals and his success, or profit, 
will act as an incentive to others to join him in his profitable specialisation 
(Hayek 1984: 219, 262). 
Moreover because price is a subjective value, in the sense that it is 
interpersonally generated through the interaction of many buyers and sellers in a 
diversity of circumstances, it is open to frequent fluctuation and adaptation to 
changes in those circumstances which generate it (Hayek 1993 vol. 3 : 170).20 A 
change in price is an adaptation to a change in circumstance (Hayek 1990: 228) 
that 'abridges' the knowledge of that change and renders it understandable to 
. 
individuals without explicit knowledge of those circumstances. The inter-
subjective nature of prices is what allows their quick and accurate alteration to 
reflect the knowledge of changed circumstances held by individuals (Hayek 
1984: 126). Up to date prices reflect up to date information in a form which 
cannot efficiently be procured by a central planning authority (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 
116). Which is to say not only can the authority not absorb that information, but 
also it cannot adapt quickly enough to gather new information on changes in 
circumstances. Prices are an evolved institution that has developed as a 
response to our individual ignorance or limited information processing abilities 
(Hayek 1984: 261). They allow individuals, through the 'reading' of them, to 
adapt to changes in circumstances beyond their experience and to alter their 
plans accordingly (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 9). 
The market order works through a system of incentives which embody 
information and direct human activity (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 125). For these prices 
to carry accurate information about profitable activity there must be room for 
the disincentive offailure (Hayek 1991: 92). Signals about unprofitable 
behaviour are equally as important, in a directive function, as signals about gaps 
in the market and opportunities for profit. A competitive process underlines this 
function of prices with competition between actors securing the efficient 
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allocation of resources (Hayek 1967: 304). Inefficient producers will fail and the 
failure will serVe as a signal of unprofitability (Hayek 1980: 176).21 Hayek 
regards this function of the market order, and its expression in the form of 
prices, as a form of negative feedback. Information about unproductive 
behaviour is relayed to other individuals by the failure of those who attempt it. 
. 
Such negative feedback requires that frustration and failure should be allowed to 
occur in order for the information to pass on to others (Hayek 1993 vol.2: 2).22 
Hayek argues that this negative feedback approach is clearly to be found in 
Smith's work arguing: 'that we can make effective use of that dispersed 
knowledge only if (as Adam Smith was also one of the first to see clearly) we 
allow the principle of negative feedback to operate, which means that some must 
suffer unmerited disappointment.' (Hayek 1993 vol. 2: 71, 178). It is here that 
we see the beginnings of Hayek's epistemological argument for freedom in the 
market order. The freedom to fail must exist just as the freedom to exploit local 
circumstances must: in order for the information processing of the price system 
to operate efficiently (Hayek 1984: 220). 
By this understanding freedom is justified as a means to progress. As de 
Crespigny puts it 'liberty as an instrument of social progress' (de Crespigny 
1976: 58); or as Brittan would have it 'liberty is an instrumental value in the 
service not of happiness or welfare (as in utilitarianism), but of progress material 
and intellectual seen as an end in itself.' (Brittan 1987: 51).23 The problem 
remains that Hayek provides no argument in support of freedom as a value in 
itself, nor indeed does he provide a consistent definition of the concept, a point 
which rankles some of his critics (Kukathas 1989: 129; Shearmur 1996a: 8). 
Though, as we have noted throughout this study, this criticism does not refer to 
the internal consistency of Hayek's application of the spontaneous order 
20 More accurately an inter-subjectively generated objectification of value. A point raised by 
Hayek's pupil Shackle (Shackle 1972: 220-28). 
21 This argument leads Hayek to oppose Rawls' views about undeserved or unfair failure or 
disappointment of expectations (Hayek 1988: 74). For Hayek the directive role of such failures 
in securing future efficient adjustments outweighs any consideration of fairness in this sense. 
22 In this sense the market does not aggregate knowledge but rather selects it (Shearmur 
1996a: 49). 
23 This view also explains why Popper speaks not of the maximisation of happiness but of the 
minimization ofsufIering (popper 1994: 124~ Quinton 1976: ISO). 
approach, but rather to what would be required to supplement it should it be 
analysed in moral terms. 
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As we noted above Hayek believed that epistemological constraints render 
calls for central planning of economic activity unrealistic. In a command 
economy there can be no accurate transferral of information through freely 
adjusting prices. The question that is central to all attempts to control an 
economy is how do we arrive at a measure of value which accurately reflects the 
circumstances in the absence of a price system? (Hayek 1980: 139). With Mises 
Hayek argues that this problem is insoluble: the role of prices as information 
signals and subjective standards of value cannot be replicated by any deliberately 
. designed system (Hayek 1980:.143). The failure of planned economies is caused 
by their inability to utilise the knowledge held in prices (Hayek 1991: 55). 
Indeed efficient economic co-ordination in a market order is only possible 
because of prices, and their absence in any economic system would make 
effective co-ordination impossible (Hayek 1980: 122). Moreover Hayek also 
attacks the more interventionist demand management techniques of those 
western governments influenced by the economic thought of Keynes. He argues 
that any attempt to control prices or wages acts as a perversion of information 
transmission. The infonnation carried no longer reflects in an accurate manner 
the circumstances of production, but becomes infected with the policy desires of 
governments (Hayek 1993 vot2: 76). Price controls fail in Hayek's view 
because they misdirect economic actors, they lose the efficient co-ordination of 
inter-subjective market prices (Hayek 1993 vol.3: 95). Moreover such controls 
require a degree of arbitrary interference by government, and this has a 
disruptive effect on the whole of the catallaxy reducing its successful operation 
by hindering the accuracy of adaptation (Hayek 1960: 227-28). Hayek argues: 
'Any attempt to control prices or quantities of particular commodities 
deprives competition of its power of bringing about an effective co-
ordination of individual efforts, because price changes then cease to register 
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all the relevant changes in circumstances and no longer provide a reliable 
guide to the individual's actions.' (Hayek 1991: 27)?4 
The desire to ensure 'just' remuneration which lies behind price and wage 
controls is a mistaken approach. Hayek believes that any attempt to enforce 
some notion of desert, however formulated, by the control of prices perverts the 
information carrying role which is their chief function and prevents the efficient 
operation of the market order (Hayek 1984: 262). Following Menger he 
stresses the view that prices embody a subjective valuation: they do not, and 
cannot meaningfully be understood as, expressing an objective value such as 
desert (Hayek 1984: 199).25 Drawing on the Austrian theory of value (Hayek 
1988: 97-98) Hayek argues that prices are generated interpersonally and as a 
result are subjective. They do not embody any objective or universal value such 
as desert (Hayek 1960: 283; 1993 vo1.2: 72; Popper 1966 vo1.2: 177).26 Money, 
for Hayek, is an institution that men have developed to ease the process of 
market interaction and to provide abridgements of information. 27 It is a means 
and not an end (Hayek 1991: 67). Moreover because the market deals with 
interpersonal, subjective valuations in monetary terms it makes no sense to talk 
of value as inhering in concepts such as labour (Hayek 1984: 145). The market 
is concerned with·what Hayek terms commutative justice and not with 
distributive justice (Hayek 1984: 145). The spontaneous adjustments of the 
market order are efficient, but.they are not moral (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 63), they 
do not deal with concepts such as desert. As we have seen Hayek believes that 
attempts to 'pattern' or plan society in line with distributive criteria such as 
desert are both inefficient and impossible in practice (Hayek 1960: 87). 
The catallaxy succeeds by being a game played under general rules. Which 
is to say that fairness in this se~se applies to the way the game is played and not 
to its results (Hayek 1978: 63). For Hayek it makes no sense to view the results 
24 There are other features that can act to pervert the information carried by prices. Among 
these Hayek notes: the size of the public sector (Hayek 1993 vol. 1 : 140); inflation (Hayek 
1960: 330) and the government monopoly of the supply ofmoncy (Hayek 1978: 224; 1988: 
103). 
25 They are objective only in the sense that they are inter-subjectively generated and accepted. 
26 Here Hayek admits a difference between his own analysis of value and that of Smith (Hayek 
1984: 26). 
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of market interaction in terms of mora! evaluations because the market is both 
non-moral and non-purposive (Hayek 1993 vol.2: 62). Since the results of 
market interaction do not represent the product of anyone actor, or actors, 
action and intentions; then it is.impossible to judge its results with reference to 
moral assertions concerning desert (Hayek 1993 vo1.2: 64, 73). The outcomes 
of market transactions do not, and constitutionally cannot, express value 
judgements as to the desert or merit of individuals (Hayek 1993 vol.2: 94). No 
one is strictly speaking responsible for the results and judgement can only be 
. 
undertaken according to the criteria of the rules of the game (Hayek 1984: 126). 
For Hayek the market is both neutral and 'blind', it does not seek to 
maximise results for all but merely provides the best chance for those results to 
occur by allowing the accurate transmission of information (Hayek 1984: 258). 
It is a game of both chance and skill (Hayek 1984: 375). Moreover, and 
significantly, the market is not a zero sum game. There is no cake that is divided 
as a prize in the sense that the very playing of the game in an efficient manner 
increases the size of the potential prize (Hayek 1984: 260; 1993 vo1.2: 115). 
In conclusion, the application of the spontaneous order approach shows 
that the market represents a system of mutual adjustment providing for the 
efficient use of knowledge within an evolved set of social institutions and 
practices. The limited nature of human knowledge leads to the development of 
adjustment mechanisms that allow the efficient use of dispersed and imperfect 
knowledge within a framework of general rules which provide a degree of 
stability of expectations. Once again freedom, bounded by general rules, is held 
to be instrumentally justified to encourage the accurate operation of mutual 
adjustment. In this study of the role of prices we find the nature of the invisible 
hand. It is the evolved institutions and practices that allow the efficient 
discovery, communication and 'utilisation of knowledge. 
27 He follows Hume (Hayek 1967: 113) in asserting the gradual and unintended nature of the 




Chapter 1: Conclusion 
We have now reached a point where we can draw together the 
various elements that typify the spontaneous order approach to 
political theory. Throughout our examination of the Scots and the 
Modems' discussions of the nature and origins of the core social 
institutions we have seen how they deploy a series of concepts that 
constitute a particular explanatory approach to the study of social 
theory. Spontaneous order theorists believe that they are engaged in 
a descriptive, scientific project that aims at an accurate 
understanding of the social world. The spontaneous order liberals 
set out to explain the nature of the social world, and from that 
explanation they seek to draw conclusions about the most effective 
means of securing what they believe to be a group of universal 
human goals. These goals are not laid down in the language of 
moral values, but rather are drawn from an examination of the 
factors that universally motivate human action. Thus, the 
spontaneous order theori"sts argue, all humans seek to secure 
subsistence and material comfort. As a result social systems that 
secure these goals can be regarded as successful. 
. Spontaneous order thus represents a distinctive approach to 
social and political theory within the liberal tradition. As we noted 
in the introduction it exists within a strain of Anglo-American 
empiricist thought that we termed British Whig Evolutionary 
Liberalism. We have seen how this evolutionary approach, in 
particular its stress on habit an~ non-deliberative behaviour, 
distinguishes the spontaneous order liberals from the more 
constructivist approach of Kant and the Benthamite utilitarians. It 
can also be contrasted with both the justificatory contract approach 
of liberal theorists such as John Rawls, and the rights based 
approach of libertarians such as Robert Nozick. Moreover, the heart 
of the difference lies not in the principles defended or the 
conclusions drawn, but in the method of argument. Spontaneous 
321 
order theorists rest their !lrgument on a descriptive social theory 
rather than a normative moral argument in favour of liberal 
principles. It is therefore important to bear this distinction in mind 
when examining the work of the Scots and the Modems. This is 
because their mode of argumentation differs from that of the other 
liberals: their approach and the evidence that they cite in support of 
their position is far more rooted in a descriptive social theory rather 
than a prescriptive moral argument. Liberalism, for both the Scots 
and the Modems, is instrumentally justified as a result of the 
scientific observation of social phenomena: it is concrete rather than 
abstract, its conclusions rest on a series of falsifiable assertions 
about the efficiency of liberal institutions rather than an abstract 
vision of the Good. Through our focus we have been able to 
demonstrate this aspect of the Scots and the Modem's argument. 
Moreover, by examining their writings on the same linked topics we 
have seen how the approach consistently deploys the same core 
concepts as it seeks explanation in each field. 
Spontaneous order theorists of both periods operate with a 
particular conception of humal} nature or the underl ying 
universalities of human behaviour. They argue that human beings 
are sociable creatures who can only be understood within the 
context ofa social setting. A psychology of human behaviour is 
developed that views the human mind as an ordering device that 
'sorts' our experience in order to calm our minds and to stabilise our 
expectations. Man is by nature an order-seeking being who learns 
from his experience of the world around him, and who adjusts his 
behaviour, and his mental order, in reaction to his circumstances. 
The chief underlying characteristic of human behaviour is the desire 
to provide for subsistence. This is a universal human aim drawn 
from the biogenic drives that constitute our animal nature, and can 
be used as an underlying universal principle through which to 
analyse the development of social institutions. 
The spontaneous order theorists believe that they are engaged 
in a 'scientific' project. They regard science as the search for order, 
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and the classification of experience, to 'explain' that which appears 
wondrous to us. Science represents a formalised, deliberative 
version of the operation of the human mind undertaken to stabilise 
our expectations. Social science is the explanation of order in the 
social world: it is conducted by the examination of historical 
evidence and the formation of composite models, or conjectural 
histories, of the institutions and practices that constitute the social 
order. Both the Scots and the Moderns regard the origin of the core 
social institutions -language, science, morality, law, government 
and the market - as traceable to the interaction of order-seeking 
individuals with the circumstances in which they find themselves. 
However, these institutions are "not originally the deliberate result of 
the purposive actions of individuals. Men did not set out rationally 
to construct these institutions. They sought to stabilise their 
expectations and produced, as a result of their interaction, a series of 
unintended consequences that led to the formation of social order. 
Such a spontaneous order approach remains, at base, a 
methodological individualist one: the explanation still invokes the 
behaviour of individuals as the primary unit of understanding, but 
insists that the order which they form was not part of the intentions 
behind their original action. Social order is spontaneous, the result 
of the mutual adjustment of individuals to their circumstances and to 
each other. The origin of social institutions and practices does not 
lie in deliberate design and both groups of thinkers reject simple 
models or constructivist rationalist approaches to social theory. 
Indeed this approach regards reason itself as a product of the 
spontaneous process of the development of order: social institutions 
could not be the product of deliberative rationality because 
deliberative rationality could only have been developed in a social 
context characterised by the order and stability produced by those 
institutions. 
Social institutions originate as conventions, at the level of 
group rather than individual, habit formation. These conventions 
represent an inter-subjective equilibrium reached by the actors 
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which, from experience, they have found effective in stabilising 
their interactions. This stabilisation allows individuals to pursue 
their own purposes more effectually by reducing uncertainty as 
regards the actions of others. The social order evolves and adjusts 
to changes in circumstance as they occur so as to preserve stability. 
This evolution is often, but not necessarily, non-deliberative: though 
the end of our adjustments is not a specific pattern of order it is 
possible for us to apply our knowledge and experience to enhance 
the order-inducing characteristics of our institutions. Indeed social 
science that proceeds by the spontaneous order approach provides us 
with a degree of understanding that might form the basis for a 
process of immanent criticism and reform of existing institutions. 
At this point the spontaneous order theorists develop a second 
line of argument that we have termed an invisible hand argument. 
Given that society is properly understood as an evolving 
spontaneous order, that is the product of the unintended 
consequences of the actions of subsistence and order-seeking 
individuals, then an explanation is required to account for the 
benign, or successfully functioning, nature of particular spontaneous 
institutional orders. Drawing on the underlying universal human 
goals of order and material comfort, they regard it as clear that some 
institutional adaptations have met with more success than others. 
What the spontaneous order theorists set out to examine is what 
features of these orders produce this success, and how they might be 
extended to provide the best chance for the greatest number of 
securing the universal human goals. The Scots and the Moderns 
both provide analyses of successful spontaneous orders that rely on 
a principle of epistemological efficiency. Stability of expectations 
and spontaneous order are intimately linked to questions of 
knowledge: they add to our knowledge of the world by reducing 
uncertainty. At the same time the order provided by the core social 
spontaneous orders -law, science, morality, and the market - has 
allowed the spontaneous development of a series of institutions -
the division oflabour and knowledge - that allow a growth in the 
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cumulative sum of human knowledge through specialisation. The 
growth of experience operates chiefly through the efficient 
adjustment of individual specialists to their particular circumstances 
and to each other. This efficient adjustment aIIows a benign 
equilibrium td form that meets the universal desire for secure 
subsistence. It is dependent on each individual being able to assess 
their position and to act accordingly to further their interests. This 
line of thought, so the spontaneous order theorists believe, provides 
an 'obvious' or instrumental justification for a liberal market 
economy. If the greatest number possible are to enjoy the 
satisfaction of universal human goals, then the market is the most 
efficient means that we have yet discovered to secure this. The 
critique of socialist planning and government intervention in the 
economy that the spontaneous order theorists provide is not 
grounded in the idea that they ought to pursue fundamentally 
different values. Rather, drawing on their spontaneous order 
analysis of social order, they assert that intervention and planning 
can never act as efficiently as freedom to secure goals that are 
universally held. If efficient adjustment and order are universally 
desirable, then freedom within a liberal institutional and legal 
framework represents the most epistemologically efficient means of 
attaining the key human 'goal of subsistence and material comfort. 
The point is not that other political approaches are 'immoral' or 
mistaken in their values, but that they fail to understand the nature 
of the social world and the implications of this for man's ability to 
shape his environment. 
The spontaneous order theorists believe that success in securing 
the universal human goals can be indicated by increased levels of 
population and by rising living standards. This growth is dependent 
on the efficient use of resources and the co-ordination of the use of 
human knowledge in an efficient manner. Efficient mutual 
adjustment in the stable context of a system of general rules allows 
this specialisation: freedom under the law and market exchange 
being the most efficient means yet discovered to secure social 
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progress. Moreover, because individuals are capable of learning 
through a trial and error process, and of imitating the behaviour of 
those whom they perceive to be successful - and because they seek 
the same universal goals - then there will be a tendency, given the 
choice, for individuals t~ adopt those cultural practices which best 
secure their aims. While Hayek's theory of group selection appears 
crude and unfinished it represents an attempt to account for the 
process of cultural evolution in terms of spontaneous order and the 
growth of human knowledge. It might even be that the next 
generation of spontaneous order theorists will extend the model of 
cultural imitation and order seeking to provide a conjectural history 
or composite model that accounts for the process of globalisation. 
Indeed Virginia Postrel, in her The Future and Its Enemies 
(postreI1998), has begun to do just that. By examining 
globalisation through the spont.aneous order approach Postrel argues 
that the key divide in modern political thinking is not between 'left' 
and 'right', but between those who accept a 'dynamist', spontaneous 
order vision of globalisation and those who hold a 'stasist' view that 
opposes the instrumental justification of liberalism and the market. 
This analysis views 'stasists' - whether Conservative, Green, 
Socialist or Nationalist - as engaged in a campaign to prevent the 
global spread of the institutions and practices that we have referred 
to as representing the invisible hand. 
This thesis has attempted to identify the constituent elements of 
the spontaneous order approach to social theory and to examine how 
the application of the approach can be coupled with an invisible 
hand argument to produce an instrumental justification of liberal 
values grounded in an assertion of their efficiency in securing a 
series of key, universal human goals. Its novelty has been in 
analysing spontaneous order as a distinct approach to the social 
theory of science, language, morality, law and government, rather 
than as the offshoot of a particular economic theory. Indeed the 
conclusion drawn is that the invisible hand argument that provides 
an instrumental justification of freedom depends on all of these 
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institutions. That the invisible hand is a series of evolved social 
. institutions that allow the efficient discovery and co-ordination of 
knowledge in the pursuit of the human desire for material comfort. 
Evolved institutions, such as morality, property and law, form the 
framework that allows the generation of benign spontaneous orders. 
And the mechanism of the invisible hand is that which creates 
benign spontaneous orders as the result of the co-ordination of 
human activity and the harmonisation of the unintended 
consequences of human action. The generation of conventional 
general rules of morality and law~ the common valuation of money 
and its use to provide price signals to co-ordinate economic effort; 
the pursuit and method of science; and indeed the human mind itself 
are all spontaneous orders that form a part of the invisible hand 
argument in favour of liberal principles. The spontaneous order 
approach, and the invisible hand arguments that draw upon it, 
constitute a definite approach to social theory that typifies a 
particular branch of classical liberalism. 
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